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SUMMARY 
The system of Alternative Dispute Resolution, commonly kno'Ml as ADR, comprises 
multiple informal processes. Traditional processes of negotiation, mediation and 
arbitration are primary processes within the system of ADR. The elements of the primary 
processes have been combined with one another or with those of public process to form 
hybrid ADR processes original only to the system of ADR. These hybrid processes are: 
rent-a-judge, the mini-trial, the summary jury trial, neutral evaluation and 
mediation/arbitration. Under the auspices of ADR, derivative processes have also been 
developed, such as expedited arbitration, documents-only arbitration, final-offer 
arbitration and quality arbitration. 
Each process is distinct and separate, having its O'Ml unique form, function and method 
of transforming a dispute. Outwardly, this represents a diverse collection of disjunctive 
processes. Yet an introspective analysis shows that there is an innate centrality that 
originates in core principles that bind individual processes to each other and to a unified 
body of theory. These foundational principles of ADR are replicated in each of its 
processes. In these terms, ADR is therefore conceptualised as a pluralistic system of 
dispute resolution that consists of autonomous and individual systems of process that 
conform to a central body of general theory and consensual principles. 
As a method of extracting the fundamental principles of ADR, the discontinuities and 
continuities between the theory and principles of civil procedure, as a unitary system .of 
procedure, and ADR processes are explored. However, in its conclusions, the thesis 
rejects the premises of a unitary system of procedure as forming the basis for the theory 
and principles of ADR. Instead, the contrary notion is advanced that ADR is an 
independent system of dispute resolution which is based on a theory of processual 
pluralism and supported by cogent processual principles. 
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MODE OF CITATION 
In the footnotes, abbreviated references are made to every work that is cited. This style 
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authority and to simplify the citation of multiple works written by the same author. 
All abbreviated references have been consolidated and coupled to full bibliographical 
references under the heading: BIBLIOGRAPHY AND MODE OF CITATION contained 
on page 279 below. 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
SUMMARY 
······················································································································· 
Page 
iii 
KEY TERMS ....................................................................................................................... iv 
PREFACE v 
MODE OF CITATION............................................................................................................. vi" 
1.0 EXPLORING THE THESIS....................................................................................... 1 
1.1 A pathology of civil procedure ... ... ........ ... .... ..... .............. .. ... . .. . .. . .. ... . . . ... . . .... ... . . .. .. . 1 
1.2 The search for system ............................................................................................ 5 
1.3 Methodology ... ....... .. . . .. ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . ......... ........ .. .. .. . ...... .. . . .. . ... ... .... ......... .. ......... .. .. .. . . . 6 
1.4 Preview: the anatomy of Alternative Dispute Resolution ...... .............. ........ .. . . .. . 8 
1.5 Conclusion: processual pluralism . . ... . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . ..... .. . . ..... ... . .. . ... . . .. ... . . .. . .... ... 13 
2.0 INTERPRETATION .................................................................................................. 15 
2.1 The alternatives vvithin the alternative ........ ......... ........ ....... .. ... .. ... ...... ... ... ... ..... .. . . 15 
2.1.1 The quest for perspective .. ..... .. ........... ... .. ... . . . . . ........... ............... .. ....... .. ....... 15 
2.1.2 The alternative to litigation............................................................................. 18 
2.1.3 The alternatives within the alternative .......................................................... 22 
2.1.4 The appropriate alternative . . . ... . . . ............ ... . . ......... ....... ... . . ....... .. .. . .... ........... 25 
2.1.5 Conclusion: CO-Ordinate systems . .. . . . .. . .. . . .. . . ... . . .. . .. .. . ............. .... .......... ........ 27 
2.2 The meaning of dispute .......................................................................................... 28 
2.2.1 Explaining the setting ......... ...... ..... .... ... . . .... ........ .. . ....... ... . ........ ... . .......... .. . . . . 28 
2.2.2 Contextualising the concept "dispute" . . . . .. . .. . . ... . . . ........ ..... ......... ......... .......... 29 
2.2.3 The legal dispute ............................................................. ............................. 38 
2.2.4 Towards a definition of "dispute" .................................................................. 43 
2.3 Resolution in context .............................................................................................. 45 
2.3.1 The meaning of "resolution" ......................................................................... 45 
2.3.2 Consensual resolution................................................................................... 45 
2.3.3 Resolution by coercion ................................................. ................................ 47 
vii 
3.0 THE PRIMARY PROCESSES: DEFINITIONS, CONCEPTS 
3.1 
3.2 
3.3 
4.0 
4.1 
4.2 
4.3 
4.4 
5.0 
5.1 
5.2 
5.3 
AND TERMINOLOGY ............................................................................................. . 
The primary processes ......................................................................................... . 
Exploratory analysis ............................................................................................. .. 
3.2.1 Negotiation ................................................................................................... . 
3.2.2 Mediation ...................................................................................................... . 
3.2.3 Arbitration ..................................................................................................... . 
The primary processes as formative principles ................................................. . 
ADR PROCESSES: CLASSIFICATION ................................................................. . 
Principles underlying the classification .............................................................. . 
Methodology ........................................................................................................... . 
Explanation of the gradients ................................................................................ . 
4.3.1 The horizontal gradient ................................................................................ . 
4.3.2 The vertical gradient .................................................................................... . 
Final remarks ......................................................................................................... . 
NEGOTIATION, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND ADR .............................................. . 
The concept of legal negotiation in the context of ADR .................................. .. 
Processual characteristics .................................................................................. .. 
Negotiation strategy .............................................................................................. . 
49 
49 
53 
53 ' 
/58 )'· 
"'-----·--· 
78 
86 
89 
89 
92 
98 
98 
100 
104 
109 
109 
113 
125 
5.3.1 Tenns and concepts ..................................................................................... 125 
5.3.2 Descriptive analysis . ..... . .. . ............. ..... . .. . . ............ ..... . ...... .. ......... .......... ..... .. 127 
5.3.3 Critical evaluation ......................................................................................... 134 
5.4 Contextualising legal negotiation ............ .... .. .. ......... ..... .. .. .. . . .............. ............ .... . 136 
5.5 The structure of legal negotiation .... . .......... ... ..... ........ ....... ......... .... ..... ......... ...... . . 142 
5.6 Strategy selection . .. ... .... . . ... .. ..... ........... ........ ............ ................. ...... ... ................. ... 146 
5. 7 Negotiation and legal negotiation ... ........ ..... . . . .. . ... ....... .... . . ................. ....... ........... 154 
THE FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF MEDIATION........................................... 157 
Mediatory intervention ... . .... . ... . . ................ ...... .......... ............ ...... ... .... . ....... ............. 157 
\ 6.1.1 The nature of third-party intervention ............. ....... ................................. ..... . 157 · 
6. 1.2 Mediatory intervention as structured negotiation .. . . ... . . ... ............................. 161 
6.1.3 The scope and limits of mediatory intervention ........................................... · 164 
viii 
6.2 The nature of the mediation process . . .. . . . . . . .. . ...... ......... .. . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . .. . . .. . . .. ... . . . .. ... 168 
6.2.1 Mediation: process without an external structure ........................................ 168 
6.2.2 Consensual nature of mediation .................................................................. 170 
6.2.3 Mediation and the nature of a dispute ......................................................... 173 
6.3 Basic principles .... ... . . .. ..... .... .......... ..... ... .............. ..... .. .. . .. . . . . ...... ...... ... . .. . . . .. ...... ...... 177 
6.3.1 Neutrality ...................................................................... ................................. 177 
6.3.2 Confidentiality ............................................................................................... 183 
6.3.3 Processual equality .................................................................................. :.... 189 
6.4 Evaluation of the process of mediation ............................................................... ~ 
7.0 THE PROCESSUAL NORMS AND VALUES OF ARBITRATION ......................... 205 
7 .1 Arbitration in the context of ADR . . .. ................... .. .. .... ...... ... . . .. .. . . . . . ... ... . . .. ... .. . ....... 205 
7 .2 Arbitration and third-party intervention ................................................................ 211 
7 .2.1 Introduction .. .. . .. ...... . . ... . .. . .. . .... .. . . . . . . . . ... .. . . . . . .. . . .. .. . . ... ..... . . .. . . ...... . ........... ... .... . 211 
7.2.2 Structure of power ........................................................................................ 211 
7.2.3 Decisional methodology ............................................................................... 214 · 
7.2.4 Role and function of the third-party neutral.................................................. 216 
7 .3 Contextualised applications ... . . . . . . .. . . . .......... .......... .. ... ... . .. . . . . . ... . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . .. . . 220 
7 .4 Derivative extensions .. . ........ .... ... . . . . . ...... ... ...... .. . ...... . .. .. . .. . . . . ... . ... . . . . .. ... . . . . . . . .. .... ... .. 223 
7 .5 Arbitral norms and values . . . ..... ..... ... ....... ........ .. . . .. . .. ... . . .. .. . .... .. . . .. . ...... ... ........ .. . .. . .. 228 
8.0 THE HYBRID PROCESSES.................................................................................... 231 
8.1 Hybridisation of the primary processes . . .. . ................ ........... .. . ... . . . . . . .. ... . . . .. . .. . . .. .. 231 
8.2 Classification of the hybrid processes . .. ............. .. .. .. . ....... .. ... . ... .. . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . ... .. . . 236 
8.3 Descriptive analysis .............. ........ ... ....... .......... ................ ... . ........... .. . .. . . .. . . . ... . .. . . . . . 239 
8.3.1 The litigation/arbitration combination ............................................................ 239 
8.3.2 The litigation/negotiation combination.......................................................... 248 
8.3.3 The mediation/arbitration combination ......................................................... 260 
8.4 The processual quality of the hybrid processes . ... . . ...... .. . . ... ............. .. . . . .. . ....... .. 264 
9.0 PROCESSUAL PLURALISM ................................................................................... 269 
9.1 The quest for processual humanism .... .. .. .. .... . ............. ........ .... .. . .. ........ ... ... .. .. ..... 269 
9.2 Propositions and principles . . ...... .. . .. ............ ... ... .... .. ... . . . ........ ............... ........... ...... 272 
9.3 ADR theory: prognosis ........ ........... ... . . . . .. ... ..... ... .. . . . . .. . ......... .... ......................... .... . 276 
ix 
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND MODE OF CITATION ...................................................................... 279 
TABLE OF STATUTES ........................................................................................................ 303 
INDEX.................................................................................................................................... 307 
x 
CHAPTER 1 
EXPLORING THE THESIS 
1.1 A pathology of civil procedure 
1.2 The search for system 
1.3 Methodology 
1.4 Preview: the anatomy of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
1.5 Conclusion: processual pluralism 
1.1 A pathology of civil procedure 
This thesis responds to the contemporary debate both in South Africa and other Anglo-
American jurisdictions regarding the modification of existing litigious practices and the 
revision of the values underlying the public adjudicative process. Abundant reasons for 
dissatisfaction with the judicial process could be put, 1 but only the most salient will be 
advanced. 
An initial reaction might be that a brief diagnosis of the ailments of civil procedure is an 
incongruous starting point for a work that deals with an analysis of the theory and 
principles of Alternative Dispute Resolution.2 Yet, this is essentially a matter of 
2 
For further details, see Erasmus "Reform of our law of civil procedure" 1 et seq, 
"Regspleging in die gedrang" 1 et seq; Kahn "Cause for discontent with the 
administration of justice" 602 et seq. 
For the sake of convenience and in keeping with normal usage, the term 
"alternative dispute resolution" will throughout this work be referred to by its 
accepted acronym of "ADR". 
2 
perspective. A narrow approach to civil procedure that regards it merely as a body of 
pragmatic procedural rules that regulate the conduct of an institutionalised form of 
dispute resolution, pre-empts any critical evaluation of the authenticity of alternative 
methods of dispute resolution. 
The broader view is that, beyond the mechanistic application of procedural rules, civil 
procedure also has a social purpose. As a State-sponsored method of dispute 
resolution, it adjusts personal antipathies between litigants, apportions finite economic 
resources that are in contention, compensates for unlawful injury, regulates social 
behaviour on the grounds of public policy and, in general, obviates the need for self-help 
as a method of redress. To individual litigants the implications are personal, but in the 
aggregate, these implications have a broader societal significance. 3 
The consequences of functional and qualitative defects of the formal system of 
procedure are not necessarily restricted to the legal system. Procedural maladies afflict 
the whole body of society. A legal practitioner might shrug off a discontented litigant as 
an instance of an unfortunate miscarriage of process and procedure, forgetting that the 
cumulative effect of similar events erodes public confidence in the system of civil 
procedure as well as the credibility of the courts. Unfortunately, public disillusionment is 
becoming endemic. 
The popular perception is that the legalese, adversarial posturing and technical 
subterfuges of lawyers, with the acquiescence of judges, form a barrier that isolates the 
average citizen from the public norms and institutions which have been designed to 
succour him. The ideals of justice, truth and the public good have become weak 
whimpering in a seemingly dysfunctionate system in which its beneficiaries perceive 
themselves to be its victims. The sophistication of litigious procedures and the 
complexity of legal adjudication often operate to defeat the very gravamen underlying 
their existence - the public redress of private grievances through the enforcement of 
substantive rights. 4 
3 See, further, James and Hazard Civil Procedure 279-280. 
4 See, further, Carbonneau Alternative Dispute Resolution 1-5. 
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Many factors have compounded to justify this view. The alarmingly high transactional 
costs of legal services outstrips the financial resources of the average citizen, not to 
speak of indigent persons. The result is that in many instances the substantive rights of 
the individual remain alienated or infringed due to the exorbitant cost of public redress. 
The formality of proceedings and the technicality of procedures evident in strategic 
manoeuvres and tactical objections, cause undue delay that in turn exacerbates the 
problem of legal costs. These factors also impede the humanistic transformation of a 
legal dispute. In order to satisfy the stringent requirements of the system of procedure, 
the interests of litigants are translated by lawyers into highly technical procedural 
formulas that are most often beyond the comprehension of their clients and in conflict 
with their personal needs. The upshot is that generally the layperson conceives 
adversarial litigation and public adjudication as being essentially anti-social.5 
In South Africa, the problem is aggravated by political and cultural factors. The legacy of 
apartheid ravaged the noblest principles of our common law that derived from the liberal 
legal systems of England and Holland, as the latter had received the Roman law of the 
Justinianean period. Rightly or wrongly, the majority of the population who until recently 
suffered under the yoke of apartheid, attribute part of the blame to the judiciary for 
having compromised the rule of law, thereby questioning the legitimacy of the courts as 
well as their ability to provide popular justice.6 But, apart from political considerations, 
the problem also has cultural dimensions. 
The individualistic norms that underlie the adversarial system of litigation are alien to 
many members of our African population, especially those in the rural areas, who 
partake in a communal life-style and hence adhere to a more humanistic ethos. 
Adversarial values and public adjudication are basically foreign to a ''folk" culture that 
has traditionally relied on informal indigenous processes as a means of lending 
credence to community norms and values. The mindset of the majority of the population 
is that informal indigenous processes are not on the periphery but at the core of dispute 
5 
6 
See Editorial "Reforming the legal system" 1-3. 
See, for instance, Glaeser "People's courts: popular participation and new legal 
forms" 86-88. 
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resolution and ironically, judicial dispute resolution is regarded by many as being the 
alternative. 7 
The conflict between the social purpose of civil procedure and the inability of its system 
of procedure to fulfil these purposes, is a perennial problem. As a social phenomenon, 
civil procedure is constantly in need of reform. As the renowned Anglo-American 
proceduralist, Professor Millar, aptly stated: "The history of civil procedure in any country 
is in essence a history of procedural reform".8 The policy of reform is to realign 
procedural functions with their underlying social purpose. However, in our time, civil 
procedural reform is complicated by the ADR movement. ADR also has a social purpose 
and retains a variety of processes that are posed as alternatives to court proceedings. 
As such, ADR challenges litigious practices and is sceptical of public adjudication. ADR 
privatises a dispute on the basis of the ethics of self-reliance and self-responsibility 
thereby promoting informal extra-curial processes that are private and confidential and 
which can be cost-effectively tailored to meet the personal needs of the disputants. The 
general assumption is that the mutual agreement of the disputants assures the durability 
of the outcome. 
The crux of the matter is that ADR is unofficially effecting procedural reform by making it 
possible to exclude certain disputes from the public system of dispute resolution and to 
deal with these disputes privately. Irrespective of whether a narrow or a broad approach 
is taken of civil procedure, it is vital to come to terms with ADR because of the manner in 
which it intrudes upon the public system of dispute resolution. One of the most important 
aspects of this investigation is to determine whether ADR is merely a social movement 
·that in time will lose its impetus and fade or whether it is an authentic and independent 
system of dispute resolution, based on a theory of process that is supported by cogent 
principles. 
7 See, generally, Bennett African Customary Law 51-55 70-77. 
8 
"Editorial preface" xxxvii. 
5 
1.2 The search for system 
This thesis commenced as a search for system in a field of study that as yet has no 
general systematic frame of reference. In the piles of journal articles and heap of 
textbooks devoted to the subject of ADR, a central theme had to be found. As a primitive 
science, ADR as yet has no coherent system of thought but is rather a seemingly 
unrelated mass of information contained in anecdotal accounts, empirical studies, books, 
in-depth research articles, commentaries, reports on ADR programmes and institutional 
newsletters. Many of these sources made great sense in their own contexts but were 
unconnected to any central theme, somewhat like dissonant notes, each on their own 
melodious, but without a melody that recurs and moulds the music into symphonic 
harmony. If there was a central theme it was hidden. Initially, there was no option but to 
start the thesis on the supposition that there is system: that ADR is in the first place an 
independent system of dispute resolution, that its processes are based on principles and 
that these principles are interconnected within a general theoretical framework. This then 
is the hypothesis of the work. The thesis turns on the supposition that ADR is an 
independent system of dispute resolution that is based on a theoretical structure of 
cogent processual principles. 
The research and writing commenced with trepidation, for to predict in advance that the 
hypothesis will be proved, is daunting. The added risk was that any preconceived 
conclusions could taint the honesty of the work. Research should speak for itself. 
However, as the writing took shape, the need to cast the sources into some sort of 
system artificially, disappeared because the centrality of the subject seemed to become 
alive, giving the work its own meaning, illuminating its own intrinsic truths and 
establishing its own inner cohesiveness. Suppositions became propositions and a 
hypothesis turned into a thesis. 
In retrospect, though, it is not quite true that the sources shaped themselves, for having 
content without form can sully any work, be it art, music, literature or even a thesis. A 
methodology was applied - there was a purposeful organisation of the sources and an 
ordered method for their interpretation. 
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1.3 Methodology 
A very definite method of interpretation is applied. The method of interpretation responds 
directly to a particular characteristic of ADR. 
ADR consists of a number of context-based applications. What this means is that ADR 
comprises of a portfolio of processes that may be applied in different contexts, 
depending on the needs of the disputants. Unlike court proceedings, ADR processes are 
not regulated by a uniform code of procedural rules that adapt the content of any cause 
to conform with the formal requirements of court procedure. The contrary is true in the 
case of ADR processes. An ADR process absorbs the culture of a dispute9 and adapts 
itself to meet the requirements of that dispute. ADR processes are therefore applied in a 
variety of different contexts. For instance, in regard to the process of mediation, it is 
possible to refer to divorce mediation, child custody mediation, family mediation, 
community mediation, environmental mediation, commercial mediation, school 
mediation. So the litany of applications may continue, both in regard to the process of 
mediation as well as in respect of the processes of negotiation and arbitration. 
The difficulty is that most sources deal with a particular context-based application of 
ADR. Very few concentrate on the general principles of ADR. Consequently, in this 
thesis, context-based descriptions of ADR processes are interpreted by means of the 
excluding the context of a process, extracting the generic principles and integrating 
these principles into a general framework of processual theory. This explains the 
absence of detailed descriptions of any context-based applications of ADR, as for 
instance, divorce mediation or labour arbitration. In brief, every source dealing with a 
context-based application was considered and used if it illustrated the text by means of 
an example or contributed to the general body of theory and principles of ADR. 
The use of dialectic was another distinctive method employed. In a field of study that 
has no developed system of theory and principle, use of the dialectic is one method of 
discovering these principles or establishing criteria for evaluating its theory. ·For 
9 See, further, 1.4 below for a discussion of the phrase "culture of the dispute". 
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instance, an ADR/litigation dichotomy10 functioned as a model for determining the 
attributes of ADR processes by comparison to judicial proceedings. Likewise, a model of 
the various forms of third-party intervention indicated the unique forms and structures of 
different processes.11 However, an approach based on the use of the dichotomy can 
lead to an overemphasis of discontinuities and in so doing, obscure the continuities 
between various forms of process. With this problem in mind, every effort has been 
made to maintain a balance between continuities and discontinuities in particular 
contexts. 
Another problem stems from the basic fact that ADR in South Africa is still very much in 
an embryonic stage. Accordingly, ADR practice is still experimental and there is a dearth 
of academic literature. For this reason it was necessary to rely mainly on the ADR 
sources of other Anglo-American jurisdictions, notably those of the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Australia. Yet, this thesis is a South African work. Preference was 
therefore given to any South African source if it constituted primary authority and, if not, 
wherever possible, a South African source was cited in conjunction with other 
comparative sources. 
The term "comparative sources" is a little ambiguous. Non-South African sources could 
be regarded as being comparative within a South African context. Certainly these 
sources have a functional value and introduce a body of knowledge that has the 
potential of developing and extending the system of ADR in South Africa. But there is an 
irony in this. The very lack of local sources forced a reliance on ADR literature 
extraneous to South Africa so that, in many ways, the thesis has become a consolidation 
of ADR sources from various jurisdictions. In this respect, the thesis is comparative in a 
wider sense. 
A last point needs to be clarified. There is always tension between art and science -
between the musician and composer, dancer and choreographer, practitioner and 
proceduralist and so forth. This thesis approaches ADR in its science-form. It is therefore 
10 See 2.1.2 below. 
11 See, for instance, 7.2 below. 
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neither descriptive nor prescriptive in respect of ADR skills and techniques. Instead, the 
approach is analytical with the sole purpose of extracting, identifying, developing and 
synthesising the theory and principles of ADR. For this same reason, the thesis does not 
suggest any reform of the system of civil procedure nor make any proposals regarding 
the application of ADR processes. In brief, the thesis confines itself to ADR as a science-
form. 
1.4 Preview: the anatomy of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Acronyms are convenient expressions but at times can be extremely misleading. 
Frequently, because an acronym conveys only the ideological content of the words it 
represents, there is a failure to grasp the intrinsic meaning and truth that lies behind the 
initials of the relevant words. 
What is hidden by the acronym "ADR"? The word "alternative" can be extremely 
deceptive. An alternative to what? To court proceedings or to other dispute resolution 
processes or merely, a choice of optional processes? So too, the intricate meaning of 
the word "dispute" could be glossed over. What type of dispute? A legal dispute or a 
dispute that is as yet in need of transformation or in stages of transformation? 
"Resolution" has a number of technical meanings relating to the quality of an outcome. 
As an acronym, "ADR" could be used .glibly, encouraging rhetoric if the deeper meaning 
of the represented words is not analysed and critically evaluated. Although the acronym 
"ADR" is used throughout this thesis, this should not be misconstrued as a cosmetic 
treatment of the subject.12 Indeed, the themes of this thesis can be reduced to an 
analysis of the words "alternative dispute resolution", used both separately and in 
combination. 
The word "alternative" is rich in meaning, going to the core of the system of ADR, 
drawing out its principles and forming its theoretical grounds. A starting point is to be 
found in the dialectic. ADR processes are placed in a dichotomous relationship with 
12 For a detailed interpretation of the term "Alternative Dispute Resolution", see 
chapter 2 below. 
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court proceedings. The theory rests on an oversimplified logic: all ADR processes are 
alternatives to the process of litigation, therefore all ADR processes are by definition 
non-litigious.13 The result is extremely restrictive for no valid system of theory can be 
constructed on a negative theorem. The flaw lies in the use of the dichotomy as a model 
for reasoning. Once the exaggerated absolutes inherent in the dichotomy are detected, 
its importance deminishes. Yet, the dichotomy does serve a useful purpose, at least 
initially, since the counterbalancing of various processes establishes the basis for 
developing a classification of these processes. 
In contradistinction to the process of litigation, ADR is founded on three primary 
processes: negotiation, mediation and arbitration. 14 Prior to the development of ADR, 
there was no special connection between these processes nor are they original. to ADR. 
Each existed separately and independently until appropriated by ADR when they 
became functionally associated with each other under its auspices. An unlikely coalition 
in a practical setting, yet co-ordinated within the system of ADR, the first tentative steps 
at coalescing these processes into some sort of coherent processual system were taken. 
An initial approach classifies the primary processes on the basis of their functional 
characteristics in respect of each other and in regard to the process of litigation.15 
Evaluation based on the characteristics of the primary processes is useful yet limited in 
its potential to develop theory because only instrumentalist criteria are applied, which 
can progress no further than mere comparisons of the advantages or disadvantages of 
using a particular process. This 'NOrk introduces the form of process as an additional 
dimension and combines form with the function of process.16 
The form of process is the essence of processual theory. Analysis of the form of process 
delves into the primary elements of a process, extracts its foundational principles and 
formulates the theory that explains both its function and application. More specifically: 
13 
14 
15 
16 
See, further, 2.1.2 below. 
For the definitions of these processes and a discussion of their underlying 
concepts, see chapter 3 below. 
See chapter 4 below and especially annexure A. 
See 4.2 below as well as table 1. 
10 
according to its form, a process is in its nature either litigious or non-litigious and in 
respect of its method of application, a process is either adjudicative or non-
adjudicative.17 This seemingly elementary classification affects every functional aspect of 
any form of process.18 A study of form in regard to function focuses attention on both the 
limitations as well as the positive attributes of the various forms of process. This in itself 
launches a further inquiry into the principles that determine the form, limits and functions 
of various processes that give each unique qualities. 
Fundamental to the primary ADR processes of negotiation, 19 mediation20 and 
arbitration21 is that they are consensual. In the most basic terms, this means that the 
primary processes do not function on the basis of coercion - that they are governed by 
non-authoritarian principles. This is fundamental to any understanding of the theory and 
principles of ADR. 
A core principle is that of disputant consensus. The mutual consent of the disputants is 
foundational. In the case of all three primary processes, the disputants by agreement 
select the process, devise or agree to the rules of conduct and accept the outcome. No 
external sanctions are applied as in the case of court proceedings. It is therefore 
possible for a party unilaterally to terminate the process. 
In the case of the processes of negotiation, mediation and arbitration, the principle of 
disputant consensus is generative. From this cardinal principle, other subsidiary 
principles have evolved: disputant autonomy, self-reliance through problem solving, 
disputant participation, processual flexibility and fairness based on processual equality. 
To a greater or lesser extent, these consensual principles are infused into the primary 
processes. The generative quality of these principles not only inures in the primary 
17 See, further, 4.3.1 below. 
18 See, further, 4.3.2 below. 
19 For a detailed discussion of the process of negotiation, see chapter 5 below. 
20 For a detailed discussion of the process of mediation, see chapter 6 below. 
21 For a detailed discussion of the process of arbitration, see chapter 7 below. 
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processes but is also projected in their progeny, the hybrid ADR processes identified as 
rent-a-:iudge, the mini-trial and mediation/arbitration.22 
The discussion of the word "alternative" comes full circle. Commencing with 
contradictions expressed in an ADR/litigation dichotomy, it ends in harmonisation - a 
move from discontinuities to continuities. The progression explains the system inherent 
in ADR. Use of the dichotomy is necessary to discover the consensual principles of ADR 
but, having achieved this, these principles exert their own independence. By tracing the 
continuity of the consensual principles of ADR, it is evident that they create an affinity 
between the various context-based applications of ADR and form the foundations of a 
systematic and unitary structure of theory. Tested within a theoretical model, it will 
become evident that the consensual principles of ADR are authentic and independent, 
therefore being capable not of competing with, but rather complementing the 
institutionalised system of court proceedings. 
The meaning of the word "dispute" also has intriguing dimensions.23 From a legal 
perspective, the word "dispute" is problematic. The legal view of a dispute is extremely 
limited mainly because substantive and procedural requirements transform a dispute to 
meet the demands of the legal system. As a result, there is little understanding of the 
dispute in its non-legal context - as an event that expresses personal, community or 
social antipathies that originate in a grievance base that is transformed by a process of 
"naming, blaming and claiming". By means of this process of transformation, a rejected 
claim becomes a dispute that once again is transformed by non-legal processes, which if 
unsuccessful, recourse is then had to the legal system. The theory of the dispute and 
disputing contains some salient lessons. V\/hat it teaches is that, just as a dispute is 
transformed procedurally within the legal system, so too non-legal disputes are 
transformed by informal processes. The principles of dispute transformation are 
therefore also extremely important to the theory of ADR. 
For a detailed discussion of the hybrid processes, see chapter 8 below. 
23 See, further, 2.2 below. 
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As mentioned above,24 in practice ADR consists of a number of context-based 
applications that absorb the culture of the dispute - the process itself as well as the 
setting and context of a dispute are integrated. This speaks not only about the concept 
of a dispute but more importantly, about the manner in which ADR processes transform 
a dispute. Unlike the authoritarian and sanctioned rules of civil procedure that divorce 
the dispute from its culture to bring it into conformity with the formal procedural 
requirements of the system of court proceedings, the consensual underpinnings of ADR 
processes spurn any externally imposed institutional rules. This is true of all three 
primary processes. In negotiation, through their bilateral interaction, the disputants 
devise their own processual standards; in mediation, processual control vests in and is 
derived from the mediator while control of the content and outcome of the dispute rests 
with the disputants and lastly, in the case of arbitration, the arbitrator is bound by the 
contractually predetermined arbitration agreement. In no instances are externally 
imposed processual rules applied. The transformation of the dispute is internal to the 
process itself and the degree of intervention is commensurate to the competence vested 
in the neutral third party to transform the dispute. Once more the consensual principles 
of ADR emerge, as they are in this instance fused with the theory of dispute 
transformation. 
The word "resolution" is difficult to interpret because its meaning is seemingly so plain 
and uncomplicated. However, in the vocabulary of ADR, "resolution" has technical 
nuances. ADR theory has it that every process produces an outcome and each outcome 
is in turn qualitatively distinct: binding or non-binding, coercive or consensual.25 Once 
more a dichotomous classification is apparent. These emergent contradictions are 
resolved by reliance on a theory of decision making. The decisional methodologies of 
the processes of negotiation and mediation are purely consensual and therefore based 
on joint decision making. Even the intervention of the mediator does not alter the 
consensual decisional method of the process of mediation for the intervention remains 
unobtrusive, being confined to processual control. Consequently, in both instances the 
outcome is always consensual, non-binding and directed at the adjustment of 
24 See 1.3 above. 
25 See, further, 2.1.4 below. 
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relationships. The position is a little different in regard to arbitration: its decisional 
methodology is adjudicative and its outcome binding. However, the outcome remains 
consensual because the disputants agree to be bound by adjudicative decision making, 
choosing the certainty of a binding award rather than a consensual realignment of their 
relationship. In keeping with its theory and principles, ADR outcomes are consensual. 
1.5 Conclusion: processual pluralism 
ADR consists of systems within a system. The average lawyer would find this a difficult 
conundrum to solve because the legal notion of process is founded on the paradigmatic 
principles of the process of litigation. The legal conception of process is that it functions 
within a unitary system of consistent and uniformly applied rules that are directed at the 
resolution of single issues. Processual pluralism is therefore alien to conventional legal 
thought. The vital clue that solves the conundrum lies in the notion of processual 
pluralism. 
In the text that follows, it will become evident that AOR is basically a system of 
procedural pluralism. ADR consists of multiple systems of process that share a single 
theoretical system of processual principles. Each process is within itself independent but 
not autonomous because ultimately each is dependant on a unifying body of theory and 
principle. Processually, ADR combines several processes within its system: negotiation, 
mediation, arbitration as well as the rent-a-judge, mini-trial and mediation/aFbitration 
processes. Each process is distinct in its form and specialised in its function but all share 
common consensual principles in a central structure of processual theory. These 
principles have already been identified, the most salient being: disputant consensus, 
disputant autonomy and participation, processual flexibility and decision making through 
problem solving. The theory of ADR is thus based on the concept of processual 
pluralism. 
Essentially, this thesis explores the theory and principles of ADR as a pluralistic system 
of dispute resolution. Because the concept of a unitary procedural system is so ancient 
and that of processual pluralism so new, this thesis is admittedly tentative and possibly 
even incomplete. Yet, this reflects not so much on the thesis but on the fact that the 
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theory and principles of processual pluralism are as yet under-developed in Western 
legal science. There will undoubtedly be others who will supplement the various themes 
of this thesis and even reject some of its premises. This would be a wholesome 
development because it would indicate that the system of ADR is maturing into a 
systematic field of science. 
The thesis is therefore only a preliminary contribution to the development of the theory 
and principles of ADR. Hopefully, in time to come, ADR will be recognised as a science 
on its own and this will eventuate in the adjustment of the rigours of litigious practices as 
well as in the revision of public adjudicative norms. 
CHAPTER 2 
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2.1. 1 The quest for perspective 
The word "alternative" is very much in vogue these days. The terms "alternative 
housing", "alternative cnedicine", "alternative music", "alternative life-style" and the like, 
have become colloquial. "Alternative dispute resolution", commonly known by the 
acronym "ADR" is yet another phrase that can be added to the list. 
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A comprehensive description of ADR is difficult to formulate. ADR is an umbrella term 
that applies to numerous situations and means different things to different people. To the 
businessperson, ADR is a confidential and expedient method of resolving a commercial 
dispute without recourse to the unwanted publicity of a court hearing not to speak of the 
tardiness of its procedure. The same would apply to the corporate sector, the added 
advantages being that ADR offers an efficient means of settling disputes between 
parties who are involved in continuous relationships as in the case of inter-corporate 
disputes, differences between subsidiaries of the same holding company or even major 
disagreements between directors of the same company. Environmentalists regard ADR 
as a method of upholding the public interest in areas or situations where the 
environment is endangered. In the field of labour relations, ADR has become an 
established means of resolving disputes between management and labour. For those 
involved in community projects, ADR provides useful mechanisms for resolving 
neighbourhood disputes according to community values. Personal relationships are also 
affected: psychologists and social workers have discovered that ADR can be used to 
settle satisfactorily family and marital disputes. But what does ADR mean to the lawyer? 
This is not an easy question. One of the purposes of the legal system is to resolve 
human controversy according to public norms and standards. The legal system not only 
defines and determines the nature and scope of these norms but also maintains them by 
means of their enforcement through the judicial system. Dispute processing is intrinsic to 
the judiciary. In functional terms, the method of judicial dispute resolution is conducted 
by means of the process of litigation.1 Essentially, litigation is the institutionalised 
process adopted by the court system as the method of resolving public disputes. In this 
context, the word "alternative", as it is used in the rubric "alternative dispute resolution" 
could be contentious if its meaning is misunderstood. Does the use of the word 
"alternative" indicate an intrusion into the legal domain of dispute processing and dispute 
resolution? Does "alternative" signify that ADR is a system of dispute resolution directly 
In this work the term "litigation" is used in its widest sense to denote any form of 
contradictory proceedings heard in a court of law and commenced either by 
action on summons or application on notice of motion. The term is used in the 
knowledge that the process of litigation includes a number of stages that rarely 
lead to full adjudication at a trial. 
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in opposition to the system of judicial dispute resolution? Questions of this nature can 
only be clarified by a critical interpretation of the word "alternative". 
The word "alternative" has a number of connotations: unorthodox, unconventional, 
different, informal, non-conformist. Although these words express some of the likely 
meanings of "alternative", they fail precisely to explain the relationship between ADR 
and litigation. A more technical meaning for the word "alternative" is needed. Reference 
to a dictionary definition seems to be a suitable starting point. 
The Oxford Concise Dictionary2 describes "alternative" as "(of two things) mutually 
exclusive; . . . one of more than two possibilities". The word "alternative" is therefore 
capable of two meanings: either the choice between two possibilities, the one being 
exclusive of the other, or, the election of one possibility out of many. The word 
"alternative" can thus be given a restrictive or an extensive interpretation. 
In the context of ADR, a restrictive interpretation of "alternative" assumes the existence 
of two systems of dispute resolution that are mutually exclusive to each other. Litigation 
is obviously the other mainstream system of dispute resolution to which ADR processes 
are offered as an alternative.3 Given a restrictive interpretation, the presumption is that 
the process of litigation and ADR processes are antithetical to one another. This 
interpretation assumes and intensifies an ADR/litigation dichotomy.4 
Moreover, a restrictive interpretation of "alternative" also permits the isolation and 
comparison of one or more ADR processes as being mutually exclusive in regard to 
other ADR processes. The focus is transferred to whether or not certain processes 
should be recognised within the system of ADR. However, this approach maintains the 
ADR/litigation dichotomy because the process of litigation is still excluded as one of the 
2 7 ed (1982). 
3 Faris "Reconciling ADR and judicial dispute resolution" 7. 
4 See, further, 2. 1.2 below. 
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options for dispute resolution - the choice of alternative processes remains limited within 
the system of ADR.5 
An extensive interpretation of "alternative" permits the selection of one dispute resolution 
process out of a choice of many others, including litigation. ADR processes are not 
regarded as substitutes for litigation but instead, litigation is treated as one of the 
available options that might be suitable for the resolution of a dispute in specific 
circumstances. This interpretation attenuates the ADR/litigation dichotomy.6 
Each interpretation of "alternative" will be examined critically not only in theoretical terms 
to establish the scope of this work but also to determine the functional potential of the 
system of ADR in relation to the legal system. 
2. 1.2 The alternative to litigation 
A restrictive interpretation of "alternative" emphasises the ADR/litigation dichotomy in its 
fullest sense. ADR processes and litigation are counter-positioned. This leads to the 
inevitable assumption that they are mutually exclusive. The result is an oversimplified 
equation: all non-litigious processes are ADR processes. 7 Reasoning of this nature 
5 
6 
7 
See, further, 2.1.3 below. 
See, further, 2.1.4 below. 
The proposition that all non-litigious processes are ADR processes is not a 
precisely defined concept but is formulated by implication from the works of 
various commentators. Trollip ADR 7 defines ADR in the following terms: 
"Alternative or appropriate dispute resolution generally refers to the processes 
involving the use of a neutral third party ADR facilitator to ease the settlement of 
disputes outside court procedures." (Own italics) The Bureau of National Affairs, 
in its authoritative report of 1985, expressly promotes the ADR/litigation 
dichotomy in the title of the report that reads: "Resolving disputes without 
litigation." This view is also promoted on 1 of the report: "ADR systems are 
essentially substitutes for the courts and federal agencies in resolving conflicts 
between the two or more parties." Pears Beyond Dispute 1 defines ADR as" ... 
the generic term that has been widely adopted in the English-speaking world to 
describe organised dispute resolution outside the courts." (Own italics) Reikert 
"ADR: quo vadis?" 32 concedes that: "ADR means different things to different 
people" and then proceeds to note three different perspectives relating to ADR, 
namely," ... all forms of dispute resolution other than litigation ... those processes 
which leave the form and content of the final settlement (if any) to the disputing 
parties themselves ... "and lastly_" ... those non-litigious processes which involve 
19 
leads to an adulteration of terminology and also dilutes the scope and function of AOR 
processes. Riskin and Westbrook8 aptly summarise the situation 
Most people, lavvyers included, are simply not familiar with the different processes 
and therefore tend to lump nearly all non-litigious methods into one large ADR 
blob. 
In the context of the ADR/litigation dichotomy, ADR offers a portfolio of processes that 
may be applied as alternatives to litigation. The assumption is that all non-litigious 
processes are mutually excf usive of litigation. As a result ADR processes are posed as a 
viable alternative to the process of litigation. This reasoning is subject to stringent 
criticism. 
There is no doubt that ADR processes are different to the process of litigation. If the 
word "alternative" is used to indicate these differences, then the ADR/litigation 
dichotomy is functional in that it accentuates instrumentalist considerations regarding the 
advantages and disadvantages of both systems of dispute resolution. However, if the 
word "alternative" is used in the context of the AOR/litigation dichotomy to indicate two 
parallel systems of dispute resolution in competition with one another, this interpretation 
simply does not reflect reality. The mere fact that the two systems are different from each 
6 
the intervention of an outside third party". After posing these three consideration, 
he opts for "all non-litigious forms of third party intervention". Similarly, Pengilly 
"ADR: the philosophy and the need" 81 comments: 'There has to be a better way 
of doing it than resorting to litigation as the only way of solving problems." Further 
in the same work at 83 he pertinently contrasts ADR and litigation in the following 
terms: "ADR is not a 'soft' option to litigation. Rather ADR is a rapidly developing 
science in its own right. Despite its complexities, it is proving to be an effective 
alternative method to litigation ... ". In this context, he remarks at 87: " ... ADR is a 
process of solving problems without the assistance of the courts". The 
ADR/litigation dichotomy is based upon the distinction between non-litigious and 
litigious processes hence dividing the field of application into court-based 
processes and ADR processes. 
Dispute Resolution and Lawyers 7. A similar view is held by Bush "Defining 
quality in dispute resolution" 343: " ... the litigation/ADR dichotomy obscures the 
many important distinctions between different ADR processes, lumping them 
together as if ADR was one homogeneous institution set apart from the courts". 
See also Menkel-Meadow "For and against settlement" 485; Scott-Macnab 
"Terminology and ADR" 20-21. 
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other does not justify the assumption that they are in competition with one another or that 
the one is a substitute for the other. 
ADR cannot replace or compete with the process of litigation. Litigation is an institutional 
method of dispute resolution; it is the conventional method of dispute resolution that 
serves the court system. The deliberative and adjudicative function of the judiciary is 
exercised through the medium of the courts. In constitutional terms, the judiciary, as one 
of the three components of government, is responsible for the interpretation, application 
and enforcement of the social values embodied in substantive legal principles contained 
in legislation and common law. Accordingly, the judiciary fulfils the dictates of its 
governmental function that are directed at the public ordering of society. In more specific 
terms, the judiciary is responsible for the maintenance of public norms and standards for 
the good of society as a whole. Even if ADR was construed as being in a position 
independent of the mainstream system, the authoritative standing of legal norms as well 
as their enforcement under the sanction of the State, establish the courts as the final 
arbiters of all disputes. Litigation is therefore the process that gives practical expression 
to public norms and values. No private system of dispute resolution can compete with or 
replace the process of litigation or exclude its public function. 9 Hence to juxtapose ADR 
and the process of litigation and then to assume that the former is a suitable substitute 
for the latter, is to defy reality. This view by no means negates the distinction between 
non-litigious and litigious processes. Rather, it points to the futility of artificially 
maintaining the ADR/litigation dichotomy in its plenary form. 
9 This view is primarily based on the comments of Sir Laurence Street ''The court 
system and ADR" 5. His standpoint is succinctly encapsulated on 6 as follows: 
"The indispensable starting point of co-relating the court system and ADR 
procedures is that proposition that the judicial institution with its inherent 
sovereign quality, cannot be confronted by any alternative mechanism. We 
cannot, for example, countenance any alternative parliament or legislature ... 
Again, we cannot countenance any alternative to the executive authority of the 
sovereign such as, for example, a military executive power structure; ... And so it 
is with the judicial branch of government, the court system; we recognise the 
need for, and we provide, additional mechanisms to assist the court system in 
the fulfilment of its sovereign dispute-resolving function. But these mechanisms 
are not, and cannot be recognised as alternative, in the true sense of the word, 
to the court system." See also Street "Language of ADR" 194. 
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There is yet another criticism which arises from a restrictive interpretation of the word 
"alternative". Any absolutisation of the ADR/litigation dichotomy is based on the 
supposition that litigation is the norm. This is not necessarily true. Although litigation 
might be the paradigm for dispute resolution, litigation is not the norm. This rather 
enigmatic statement is explained by the fact that courts are the final but not the only 
arbiters of a dispute. In fact most disputes are not resolved by the courts precisely 
because the majority of disputes are non-legal. Even legal disputes are rarely resolved 
by the courts. Reality is that most disputes are resolved within a non-legal context by 
means of informal dispute resolution processes such as negotiation and mediation. This 
applies even in the case of legal disputes. Consequently, very few disputes are filed as 
court proceedings and if so, approximately 95% are settled before trial by informal 
methods of dispute resolution. Those disputes that eventually do go to trial represent a 
minute fraction of the total number of disputes if measured on a dispute gradient.10 Seen 
from this perspective, litigation is not the norm for dispute resolution. The situation is 
inverted: informal methods encompassed within the system of ADR are actually the 
norm. Given this perspective, the ADR/litigation dichotomy based upon a restrictive 
interpretation of "alternative", is contrived because its premises are fallacious. 
10 The view that litigation is not the norm is widely held by commentators. See 
Sander "ADR: an overview" 1-2 who on the basis of this assertion concludes that 
ADR is therefore not founded upon the need to find a substitute for litigation. 
Astor and Chinkin Dispute Resolution 29 respond in a similar manner: ''[W]ithin 
Western society, where litigation is the dominant method of dispute resolution, 
lawyers and courts play only a marginal role in resolving disputes and only a 
small percentage of these disputes is ever brought into the courts". Goldberg, 
Green and Sander Dispute Resolution 5 argue that ADR should have very little 
effect on court congestion precisely because so many disputes are settled out of 
court by informal methods: "Only a small portion of [these] perceived injuries 
result in court filings and only a similarly small portion of the latter consume 
significant amounts of judicial resources. Some disputes that cannot readily be 
settled through negotiation are resolved by mediation or arbitration; of those that 
do lead to court filings, somewhere around 90 to 95 percent are settled without 
the need for a full trial." Numerous empirical studies support the statistic that 90 
to 95 percent of the proceedings commenced in court do not reach the trial 
stage: Galanter "Landscape of disputes" 28; Pickering "Settlement negotiations" 
31; FitzGerald "Grievances, disputes and outcomes" 29. See also Fulton 
Commercial ADR 13-15; Faris "Reconciling ADR and judicial dispute resolution" 
14. 
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Although a restrictive interpretation of "alternative" as it is placed in the context of the 
phrase "alternative dispute resolution" points to the differences between ADR processes 
and the process of litigation, the maintenance of this position is purely academic. The 
ADR/litigation dichotomy is only functional when it establishes a model for assessing the 
practical application and limitations of the processes of both systems of dispute 
resolution. 
2.1.3 The alternatives within the alternative 
A restrictive interpretation of "alternative" commits the word to the election of one of two 
mutually exclusive options. Applied to the internal dynamic of ADR, a restrictive 
interpretation of "alternative" forces a selection of options between various non-litigious 
processes on the basis of their distinguishing characteristics. The emphasis is shifted. 
The issue no longer concentrates on the ADR/litigation dichotomy but is occupied with 
the question of whether or not all non-litigious processes fall within the scope of ADR. 
This particular interpretation of "alternative" focuses on the intrinsic nature of various 
ADR processes. In many respects the discussion that follows partially pre-empts a later 
chapter dealing with the classification of ADR processes.11 Both portions of the work are 
integral to each other. Common to both is an investigation of the internal dimensions of 
ADR as a system of dispute resolution. 
ADR is founded upon three primary processes: negotiation, mediation and arbitration. 12 
Each primary process is unique in itself but common to all is that they are consensual in 
nature. The disputants voluntarily agree to use a particular process and the dispute is 
settled on the basis of their mutual consent. Notwithstanding this common characteristic, 
the differences between each primary process are distinct. These differences form a 
basis for comparison which in turn identifies alternatives within an alternative. 
11 
12 
See 4.2 below for a classification of ADR processes. 
See 3.1 below for an overview of the primary processes. 
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A fundamental distinction between the primary processes relates to the relationship 
between the various participants. Quite clearly the relationship is dyadic as far as 
negotiation is concerned. On the other hand, mediation and arbitration point to a triadic 
relationship. Put differently: the parties to negotiation are involved in a bilateral 
relationship whereas in the case of mediation and arbitration the relationship is trilateral 
on account of the role played by the neutral third party. 
The question arises as to whether or not negotiation is a substantive ADR process in the 
absence of a third-party neutral. This issue has some merit. Negotiation has established 
processual characteristics13 and is conducted according to specific strategies.14 
However, the balance of power is uncontrolled, often leaving the weaker party at the 
mercy of the stronger party. In this sense, the process is subjective. 
The same cannot be said of mediation and arbitration. The participation of a third party 
neutral is a determinant of the respective processes. The role of the third-party neutral is 
mainly to conduct and determine the process, move the process through its various 
stages and most importantly, balance the power positions between the disputants in 
order to ideally achieve a fair and lasting settlement. For these reasons, certain 
commentators regard mediation and arbitration as substantive ADR processes to the 
exclusion of negotiation.15 Although many non-arbitral ADR processes are regarded as 
13 
14 
15 
See, further, 5.2 below. 
See, further. 5.3.2 below. 
For an example of this type of reasoning, see Riekert "ADR: quo vadis?" 32. 
Riekert expressly excludes negotiation as a substantive ADR process, 
contending in the first place that negotiation may be conducted without the 
intervention of a third party neutral; secondly, when negotiation processes are 
used as a strategy by third party neutrals, the negotiation process is no longer 
discrete because of its assimilation within a process based on third party 
intervention. This line of reasoning enables Riekert to maintain that ADR consists 
of "all non-litigious forms of third party intervention". The BNA Report 11 
acknowledges that negotiation is often regarded as an ADR process but does 
not regard negotiation as an independent ADR process: "[N]egotiation is a term 
that is associated with ADRs' but is essentially a combination of med-arb and 
conciliation. Negotiation can, and is often, undertaken without the presence of a 
third-party neutral. Negotiation in the context of ADRs implies the presence of a 
neutral ... Therefore, negotiation may be closer in some disputes to med-arb, and 
in other disputes to conciliation". Similarly, Street "Language of ADR" 196 
distinguishes between the form of structured negotiation used when a third party 
neutral is involved and bilateral negotiation which he describes as " ... the long-
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being structured forms of negotiation, negotiation is not always recognised as a primary 
and independent ADR process. According to this view, the word "alternative", is 
restrictively interpreted to exclude negotiation as a legitimate ADR process.16 
A restrictive interpretation of "alternative" also addresses the option of choosing between 
adjudicative and non-adjudicative processes.17 The dividing line is quite clear: arbitration 
is adjudicative whereas negotiation and mediation are non-adjudicative processes. 
Because the process of arbitration is adjudicative, this process is immediately associated 
with the process of litigation.18 On account of its adjudicative dynamic, arbitration is 
16 
17 
18 
established and well understood inter1ocutory procedure of formal or informal 
settlement or pre-trial conference". If by this, negotiation is acknowledged as a 
primary process, then a very limited view of negotiation as a substantive process 
is expressed. Notwithstanding these opinions, they remain individual since no 
general trend excludes negotiation as a primary process. For instance, two 
seminal Australian works respectively include and exclude negotiation as a 
substantive ADR process. Astor and Chinkin Dispute Resolution deal 
extensively with the process of negotiation whereas Fulton Commercial ADR 
makes no mention of negotiation. Except for the BNA Report above, this 
controversy does not arise in the American literature where, instead, the process 
of negotiation is given extensive treatment and approached critically; for a review 
of the American views on negotiation, see chapter 5 below. Because the ADR 
movement is yet in its initial stage of development in South Africa there is a 
related lack of domestic sources. Thus no definitive statement can be made in 
regard to the South African situation. Although this does not necessarily indicate 
a trend, Trollip ADR, deals only with ADR processes that involve third-party 
neutrals and negotiation is ignored as a primary process. Van Vuuren 
"Altematiewe dispuutbeslegting", in his classification of ADR mechanisms, 
excludes the process of negotiation. 
See Calver "Commercial arbitration" 36; Astor and Chinkin Dispute Resolution 
59. 
Riskin and Westbrook Dispute Resolution 2-6 clearly distinguish between 
adjudicative and consensual processes and classify arbitration as an adjudicative 
processes. This view is subject to criticism in that arbitration is a consensual 
adjudicative process in so far as the parties agree to submit to arbitration. The 
correct distinction is between adjudicative and non-adjudicative processes. 
However, there is unanimity among commentators that arbitration is an 
adjudicative process. See, for instance, Astor and Chinkin Dispute Resolution 
115; Nolan-Haley ADR 119; Fulton Commercial ADR 21. 
Goldberg, Green and Sander Dispute Resolution 189 differentiate betWeen 
public and private adjudication and indicate that arbitration is the form of the 
privatised adjudication. Fulton Commercial ADR 67 comments that arbitration is 
an attempt to achieve a judicial outcome and that " ... parties (and the courts) 
expect the arbitrator to act 'judicially'. Little wonder that arbitration is sometimes 
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regarded as being a hybrid of the process of litigation. The effect of this reasoning is to 
extend the ADR/litigation dichotomy: genuine ADR processes are not only non-litigious 
but also non-adjudicative.19 
The maintenance of these distinctions leads to strained conclusions that tend to confuse 
theory and practice. Although a literal interpretation of "alternative" might contribute to a 
deeper understanding of the internal dynamic of ADR, reliance on these theoretical 
premises could severely restrict the scope and function of ADR. 
2.1.4 The appropriate alternative 
Committing the word "alternative" to a restrictive interpretation entrenches the 
ADR/litigation dichotomy. Very little can be achieved by positioning these two systems of 
dispute resolution in absolute terms. In practice, both systems are compatible. 
Disputants are not forced to choose unequivocally between either litigation or an ADR 
process. In the normal course of events, informal methods are usually applied and if they 
fail, recourse is had to litigation. However, in certain instances the dispute may be of 
such a nature that litigation is a first and only option for the resolution of a dispute.20 The 
19 
20 
referred to as 'litigation without wigs"'. Calver "Commercial arbitration" 38 
expresses the same opinion: "Governments have recognised that arbitration is 
the dispute resolution method closest to the judicial model and that they are able 
to save costs by legislating for the use of arbitration." 
This is not a general approach and the debate is isolated to Australia only. An 
extreme view is expressed by Angyal "Alternative dispute resolution" Legal 
Issues (Australian Legal Group no 3, December 1987) 11 as cited in Fulton 
Commercial ADR 15: "The key difference between ADR and those traditional 
techniques of litigation and arbitration is that ADR techniques are used to 
produce a resolution by agreement to the dispute, while litigation and arbitration 
are processes by which a result is imposed upon the parties." Fulton discounts 
this approach as being too narrow and acknowledges arbitration as a substantive 
ADR process. Pears Beyond Dispute 3 26 takes an ambivalent stance in that he 
describes arbitration as a "semi-alternative". Pengilley "ADR: the philosophy and 
the need" 83 makes the rather obscure statement that ADR " ... is proving to be 
an effective alternative method to litigation and arbitration ... " (own italics), 
thereby seemingly rejecting arbitration as a substantive ADR process. 
Astor and Chinkin Dispute Resolution 54-58 enlist some of the advantages of 
litigation: protection from power imbalance, the enunciation of public values and 
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nature of each type of dispute dictates the type of process that ought to be used for its 
resolution. 
This approach lends itself to an extensive interpretation of the word "alternative": the 
election of one of a number of available dispute resolution options. In the context of an 
extensive interpretation, ADR and judicial dispute resolution are placed in a co-ordinate 
relationship.21 Litigation is merely one of a number of options that may be selected to 
settle a dispute. 
By applying an extensive interpretation to the word "alternative" a functional element is 
introduced. Carping on issues regarding the ADR/litigation dichotomy becomes 
theoretical. The focus is on the functional assessment of a suitable process for the 
settlement of a particular type of dispute. The attributes of a particular process, including 
litigation, are carefully considered to determine what would best be suited to the 
resolution of the dispute in question. In this setting, the issue relates to the selection of 
an appropriate dispute resolution process. In no manner is litigation excluded as an 
option. Litigation is yet another dispute resolution process, albeit a conventional method 
of dispute resolution sanctioned by the State. The objective is to select an appropriate 
dispute resolution process, litigation being one of the considered alternatives. 
An extensive interpretation permits the word "alternative" to include ADR processes as 
being additional to the mainstream system of dispute resolution. ADR processes are true 
alternatives to litigation but without the polarity expressed in the ADR/litigation 
dichotomy. They are recognised as being supportive of the system of judicial dispute 
resolution which remains the basic point of reference. ADR provides additional dispute 
resolution processes. If they should fail or are not suited to the needs of the disputants, 
recourse may be had to the formal justice system. 22 
21 
22 
procedural safeguards. See also Pengilley "ADR: the philosophy and the need" 
89; Banks "ADR: a return to basics" 572. 
Faris "Reconciling ADR and judicial dispute resolution" 10. 
See Sander "ADR: an overview'' 2; Pengilley "ADR: the philosophy and the 
need" 93; Street 'The court system and ADR" 10; Street "Language of ADR" 194 
198. 
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This approach relates to the mainstreaming of ADR into the formal justice system. ADR 
is placed in a complementary relationship to the system of judicial dispute resolution. 
The result is to upgrade the function of ADR within the legal system and to give impetus 
to its development as a system of dispute resolution that has the potential for dealing 
with controversy even at the grievance level. Moreover, the integration of ADR within the 
formal justice system should, in economic terms, lead to a considerable saving of court 
time and court administration and reserve the valuable resource of judicial expertise for 
more serious cases. An extensive interpretation of "alternative" therefore renders the 
ADR/titigation dichotomy redundant. Consequently, both systems of dispute resolution 
become supportive of each other and could combine to create a functional dynamic for 
the resolution of disputes. 
In the context of an extensive interpretation, the use of the word "alternative" is 
misleading. The words "appropriate" or "additional" are better suited for the acronym 
ADR because they aptly describe the functional importance of ADR within the 
mainstream system of dispute resolution. However, at this stage it is too late to recommit 
the wording of the rubric "alternative dispute resolution".23 
2.1.5 Conclusion: co-ordinate systems 
A restrictive interpretation diverts ADR from the mainstream model, thereby promoting 
and maintaining an ADR/litigation dichotomy. The opposite applies in respect of an 
extensive interpretation of the word "alternative". 
According to an extensive interpretation, the word "alternative" is expressed as the true 
alternative - the possibility of selecting one out of many processes (including litigation) 
on the basis of its form and function, in order to appropriately resolve a particular 
dispute. Consequently, the continuities between the system of ADR and judicial dispute 
resolution, rather than the discontinuities, are accentuated. An extensive interpretation 
23 On account of the futility of the ADR/litigation dichotomy, many commentators 
have indicated a preference for the words "appropriate" or "additional" as a 
replacement for the word "alternative": Astor and Chinkin Dispute Resolution 
69-71; Street ''The language of ADR" 194; Pears Beyond Dispute 1; Trollip ADR 
7; Faris "Reconciling ADR and judicial dispute resolution" 11. 
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therefore regards both systems of dispute resolution as being co-ordinate rather than 
rival. As a result, the functional attributes of both informal and formal dispute resolution 
processes are emphasised, thereby confirming the continuity between informal 
processes and their institutionalised counterparts. 
2.2 THE MEANING OF DISPUTE 
2.2.1 Explaining the setting 
One of the essential functions of the legal system is to deal with controversy and dispute. 
Yet, legal literature contributes very little to the broader debate relating to the meaning, 
origin, nature, content and transformation of a dispute. This is also true of South African 
legal literature. Perhaps the reason is that lawyers tend to take a very narrow view of a 
dispute. Understandably, a dispute is mainly conceptualised as a legal dispute. The 
technical demands of the system of procedure as well as the requirements of 
substantive law restrict the legal concept of a dispute to the ambit of rights and 
remedies. A dispute is therefore formulated as a legal abstraction that in many respects 
is at odds with the reality of a dispute within a particular social or cultural context. 
Consequently, the legal notion of a dispute tends to be based on a dichotomy between a 
legal and a non-legal dispute. 
The tendency in the legal sphere is to regard a dispute as being unique to the legal 
system, thereby isolating the legal dispute from the universe of disputes and dispute 
processing. This mindset is extremely restrictive for essentially the continuities between 
the legal dispute and other types of non-legal disputes are disregarded. For present 
purposes, criticism lies not so much in the specific manner in which the legal system 
transforms a dispute but rather in its failure to regard the formulation of a legal dispute as 
a continuation of the transformation of a non-legal dispute. 
The formulation of the legal dispute and the related method of dispute processing does 
not function beyond the normal boundaries of the social process but is in fact an integral 
part of that process. Within the legal environment, a dispute might justifiably be regarded 
as an ultimate event in the sense that recourse is made to the system of legal process in 
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order to ensure its final and authoritative disposition. However, this should not obscure 
the fact that a dispute does not originate within the legal system. A dispute has a critical 
path. By means of a process of "naming, claiming and blaming"24 a grievance is 
transformed into a dispute; thereafter the dispute undergoes a number of 
transformations that are directed at its resolution, the final transformation occurring 
within the legal system if its resolution cannot be achieved by non-legal methods. 
A distinctive feature of the source material is that it has been written mainly by 
sociologists, social psychologists and social anthropologists, and not by lawyers. Their 
research has produced a body of literature that conceptualises a dispute and dispute 
transformation as integrated social phenomena. This has important implications for any 
system of dispute resolution, albeit legal or non-legal, because the word "dispute" is 
explained in independent social terms, devoid of the norms and values that influence the 
definition and transformation of a dispute within a particular system of dispute resolution. 
On the basis of the source material it is thus possible to establish objective criteria for 
the evaluation of the word "dispute". 
The source material also has important consequences for both ADR and the legal 
system. In relation to the legal system, the continuity between a legal dispute and the 
broader social process is emphasised. For ADR, the conceptualisation of a non-legal 
dispute justifies its social objectives and validates its methods of dispute processing. 
Most important of all, though, is that the word "dispute" can be interpreted not only within 
the framework of a legal/non-legal dispute dichotomy but also as a broader social 
concept. 
2.2.2 Contextualising the concept "dispute" 
Definitions are excellent starting points but otherwise inadequate, because they are 
usually phrased to suit the demands of a particular theory. This is certainly true in regard 
to definitions of the term "dispute". 
24 See, further, 2.2.2 below. 
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Mather and Yngvesson25 refer to a dispute in the following terms: "By a dispute we mean 
a particular stage of social relationship in which conflict between two parties (individuals 
or groups) is asserted publicly - that is, before a third party." The authors are describing 
a dispute from their particular vantage point, namely, at the stage when a dispute has 
been submitted to a third party.26 Miller and Sarat, on the basis of empirical studies done 
in respect of the grievances experienced by average households, explore the origin of 
disputes in grievances and claims. Against this background, "[a] dispute exists when a 
claim based on a grievance is rejected either in whole or in part".27 Dealing with the 
specific topic of grievance processing, Lempert is of the view that " ... disputes [are] 
controversies involving two (or more) parties, each making a special kind of claim: a 
normative claim of entitlement".28 In an extensive study on dispute institutions in society, 
Abel gives the widest possible definition of a dispute, stating that " ... a dispute is nothing 
more than a form of social relationship, a developmental stage through which any 
relationship may pass".29 The ethnographic attitudes towards disputing in three small 
American neighbourhoods were studied by Merry and Silby. In this context, disputes are 
defined as" ... cultural events, evolving within a framework of rules about what is worth 
fighting for, what is the normal or moral way to fight, what kinds of wrongs warrant action, 
and what kind of remedies are acceptable".30 Lastly, Felstiner, Abel and Sarat, in their 
seminal work on dispute transformation, comment: "[D]isputes are not things: they are 
social constructs; their shapes reflect whatever definition the observer gives to the 
concept".31 
A basic observation is that there is no correlation between any of these definitions. This 
is merely an observation and not a criticism, for each definition is valid in its own 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
'The transformation of disputes" 776. 
777. 
"Grievances, claims and disputes" 527. 
"Grievances and legitimacy" 708. 
"Dispute institutions in society" 226-227. 
"Reexamining the concept of dispute" 157. 
'The emergence and transformation of disputes" 631. 
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particular context. However, the definition given by Felstiner and his colleagues is 
preferred. This might seem surprising because it is the vaguest of all. That is precisely 
why it has merit - it recognises that a dispute is beyond objective definition because 
every dispute has experiential dimensions. 
Disputes and disputing are one of the many facets of interpersonal relationships and 
hence inextricably woven into the fabric of the larger social process. Every dispute is an 
event that is integrated in to the social dynamic. Any attempt at precise definition 
therefore of necessity becomes contrived. As in the case of loving, grieving, rejoicing 
and the like, a dispute forms an integral part of interpersonal and social relationships, 
based on feelings and emotions. A dispute is not a concrete event capable of statistical 
evaluation nor can it be measured like the molecules of an atom or the air pressure in a 
tyre. Ultimately, a dispute is beyond precise definition because in the final instance a 
dispute is composed of the differing perceptions and values of the disputants.32 
This leads to one other observation. A dispute is not an ultimate event. The dynamic 
underlying every dispute is that it is directed towards its own resolution. Being directed at 
its resolution, a dispute is necessarily in a state of flux. A dispute never remains static 
because the tendency towards its resolution moves the dispute through a process of 
transformation. The process of transformation alters the content of the dispute to such 
an extent that a disparity eventually exists between the original dispute and the dispute 
as it has been transformed to meet the demands for its resolution. 
These particular characteristics of a dispute bear important consequences for any 
system of dispute resolution. Because a dispute is an event that defies precise 
measurement, the norms and processes of the system of dispute resolution to which the 
dispute is addressed, have a vital impact on the manner in which substance is given to a 
dispute by means of its reformulation. The reformulation of a dispute entails its 
32 This concept is eloquently expressed by Galanter "Landscape of disputes" 12: 
'They (disputes) are not some elemental particles of social life that can be 
counted and measured. Disputes are not discrete events like births and deaths; 
they are more like such constructs as illness and friendships, composed in part of 
the perceptions and understanding of those who participate in and observe 
them." 
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transformation according to the norms and procedural standards of the system of dispute 
resolution concerned. 
A systematic analysis of dispute transformation has provided valuable information about 
the nature of a dispute. Mather and Yngvesson show that the definition of a dispute 
shifts and changes once it has been presented to a third party.33 A dispute is redefined 
as a result of its being rephrased by means of a process of narrowing or expansion. 
Narrowing signifies the process through which categories that classify events are 
imposed on a particular event or series of events thereby defining the subject of a 
dispute to accommodate conventional systems of dispute management. 34 Expansion 
does not necessarily mean that the dispute is escalated. Rather, it refers to the 
redefinition of a dispute in order to incorporate changing conditions not previously 
accepted by a third party operating within the conventional framework. 35 What is 
confirmed is that a dispute is not a static event but is in a state of constant transformation 
as the perspectives of the disputants and other participants redefine and rephrase it. 36 
Mather and Yngvesson focus specifically on dispute transformation after a dispute has 
been addressed to a third party.37 The dispute itself is the starting point. However, there 
is another dimension of a dispute: the emergence and transformation of a grievance into 
a dispute. 
Felstiner, Abel and Sarat responded to the need for a systematic examination of 
emergence and transformation of a grievance into a dispute. The sub-title of their article: 
"naming, blaming and claiming", clearly encapsulates the various stages of dispute 
transformation. Unique to their work is that the disputants are pivotal to their study of a 
33 
'The transformation of disputes" 776-777. 
34 778 783. 
35 779 797. 
36 776. 
37 777. 
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dispute, representing a shift of emphasis from dispute-processing institutions as the 
subject of research.38 
The essential question posed by the authors is: by what process does an injurious 
experience become a dispute? The enquiry is therefore focused on the antecedents to a 
dispute. The first transformation necessary for the emergence of a dispute is that an 
"unperceived injurious experience" must be perceived as being injurious. 39 
Once the experience has been perceived as being injurious, the transformation that 
occurs is labelled as naming. In this instance the transformation is founded upon the 
disputants' perceptions. This creates methodological problems because experiences are 
perceived differently. Similar events may be perceived differently and this in itself has an 
important impact on the creation of a grievance. 40 Merry and Sil by remark in this respect 
that, although perception has an important effect on the generation of a grievance, the 
perceptions of disputes and the manner in which they are dealt with are entrenched in 
the habits and customs of particular social groups and cultures; this influences 
behaviour in a manner that cannot be described as rational choice making. 41 Coates and 
Penrod, in response to the conceptual framework devised by Felstiner, Abel and Sarat, 
integrate social psychological theory and the dispute transformation model. 42 The 
differential rates of perception are interfaced by showing the effect of relative 
deprivation,43 equity,44 and perceived control45 on the manner in which individuals 
perceive injury and form a sense of "entitlement" to redress. Hence, naming - the 
38 
'The emergence and transformation of disputes" 633 640. 
39 632. 
40 633-634. 
41 
"Reexamining the concept of disputes" 157. 
42 
"Social psychology and disputes" 658. 
43 Ibid. 
44 659. 
45 Ibid. 
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identification of a perceived injurious experience - is influenced not only by sociological 
but also by social psychological and anthropological factors. 
The next step in the process of transformation occurs when fault is attributed to another 
person or social entity. The process of attribution is identified as blaming.46 Blaming 
distinguishes a grievance from a complaint. When a perceived injurious experience is 
attributed to a particular person or social entity, it is a grievance. There is no attribution 
involved as far as a complaint is concerned because it is not directed at a particular 
person or entity. 47 Coates and Penrod place the blaming transformation into a general 
theory of attribution. Once again the instability of the individual's perception is illustrated. 
Attributional bias is found in the tendency to blame personal causes rather than 
circumstances. There is also a tendency on the part of perpetrators to make biased 
attributions by distorting available information in order to convince themselves that their 
victims were in some manner to blame for the negative events.48 However, there would 
seem to be an even stronger tendency to accept self-blame for negative events thereby 
explaining the reason for so many potential disputes never progressing beyond the 
naming stage.49 The importance of the social psychological input is that it confirms that 
attribution is an important element of a grievance and that these attributions are 
unstable. 
The last transformation is known as claiming - the grievant states the grievance to the 
person or entity believed to be responsible for the injurious experience and 
simultaneously seeks a remedy for the alleged wrong.50 Important supplementary 
information has been contributed by Coates and Penrod. People who blame themselves 
for an injury are least likely to claim against the perpetrator.51 However, external and 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
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Felstiner ''The emergence and transformation of disputes" 635. 
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internal52 attributions play a significant role in the claiming transformation. Stable or 
unstable53 or intentional or unintentional54 causes of events also affect the claiming 
process. 55 The combination of these attributions interact to determine the incidence of 
claiming. 
At this stage of the process of transformation a clear description of a dispute becomes 
possible: "A claim is transformed into a dispute when it is rejected in whole or in part."56 
In these terms, a dispute is simply a claim that is rejected. However, its complexity lies in 
its antecedent emergence and transformation. 
The dispute and its antecedent transformation are treated holistically by Felstiner and 
his colleagues with the emphasis being on the individual, thereby permitting an enquiry 
into perceptions, grievances and conflicts that within an institutional structure of dispute 
resolution would never qualify as disputes.57 As a result it is possible to postulate that 
dispute processing by means of litigation or even in informal fora accounts only for a 
fraction of the antecedent events that might finally be transformed into disputes. 58 
Finally, what this study also teaches is that a dispute cannot be reduced to an analytical 
definition because in the final instance, each of its stages of transformation should be 
regarded as being "subjective, unstable, reactive, complicated, and incomplete".59 
52 
53 
54 
55 
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Miller and Sarat focus attention on grievances, claims and disputes with particular 
emphasis on the origins and contents of a dispute.60 Their starting point is that disputes 
begin as grievances: "[A] grievance is an individual's belief that he or she (or a group or 
organisation) is entitled to a resource which someone else may grant or deny".61 The 
description of a grievance offered by Miller and Sarat differs on fundamental grounds 
from that of Felstiner and his colleagues. Whereas the latter place emphasis on 
attribution, the former focuses on "entitlement". The element of "entitlement" explains the 
normative content of a grievance. This conceptualisation of a grievance is similar to that 
of Lempert's. In Lempert's view a grievance arises when "a person claims he is 
normatively entitled to something another person possesses or controls, and the other 
has neither denied the claim nor asserted a normatively superior one".62 The normative 
underpinning of a grievance is so important for Lempert that he asserts that "[without] a 
normative basis, a grievance collapses into a mere injury".63 Hence, for Lempert, the 
normative requirement emphasises the sense of entitlement inherent in the emergence 
of a grievance. 
Miller and Sarat list some of the different responses to a grievance. In some instances, 
"lumping it" is one manner in which potential conflict is avoided. Redefinition of the 
problem in order to redirect blame is another manner of dealing with a grievance. So too, 
the grievant might register a claim in order to indicate a sense of entitlement to the other 
party.s4 
The process of claiming is also analysed in some detail. A claim may be accepted in full 
thereby avoiding the dispute. A compromise amounts to a partial rejection of a claim and 
thus constitutes a dispute. Outright rejection of a claim establishes an unambiguous 
dispute because both parties are in conflict about the same resource. Delayed reaction 
60 
"Grievances, claims and disputes" 526. 
61 527 537. 
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"Grievances and legitimacy" 708. 
63 709 note 2. 
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or difficulty in obtaining satisfaction of an ostensibly recognised claim is tantamount to a 
rejection of a claim, thereby also creating a dispute.65 This reasoning supports the 
assumption that unless a claim is made, a dispute cannot come into existence.66 In these 
premises Miller and Sarat conclude: "A dispute exists when a claim based on a 
grievance is rejected in whole or in part" .67 Although the wording is different, the 
description of a dispute given by Miller and Sarat expresses the same meaning as that of 
Felstiner and his colleagues. Common to both is that the rejection of a claim transforms 
a grievance into a dispute.68 
A number of conclusions can be drawn. Sociological, social psychological and social 
anthropological research contextualises a dispute in terms that negate preconceived 
legal notions. A dispute cannot be analytically defined69 because to do so would 
artificially limit its dimensions as a social process. A dispute, by the very nature of its 
emergence and subsequent transformation, is a dynamic event incapable of being 
charted or transcribed in precise terms. To the lawyer this is a rather alien concept 
because legally every dispute must be capable of being defined and categorised in 
substantive and procedural terms. In the legal sphere, a dispute is expressed in rational 
and abstract terms, detached from the broader social process that accounts for the 
origins of the dispute. For this very reason, the contexualisation of a dispute as 
described above, indicates the need to understand a legal dispute in its broader social 
setting as well as the continuity between non-legal and legal disputes. However, in order 
to attain this perspective, the meaning, content and scope of a legal dispute needs to be 
explored. 
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and Sarat, contending that the maturation of a grievance into a dispute does not 
mean that the grievance will cease to exist because the dispute is settled 
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2.2.3 The legal dispute 
The language of rights and remedies is mainly that of lawyers and the courts. Every 
dispute that is directed to the legal system must be capable of being categorised in 
terms of its related rights and remedies. This is evident from the following passage taken 
from a standard textbook on Civil Procedure 
The law of procedure is adjective law, ie it is accessory to substantive law, 
which defines the legal rights, duties and remedies ... A knowledge of 
substantive law ... will not itsetf enable a practitioner to secure redress for 
his client. It does however assist him to answer three questions which are 
in their nature preliminary, though, naturally, no less fundamental on that 
account: (1) Has my client a right? If so, (2) has there been an 
infringement of that right? What is his remedy?70 
The passage indicates that a dispute in its non-legal context must be redefined before it 
will be capable of being recognised as a legal dispute. A dispute only becomes capable 
of being classified as a legal dispute if it is possible to pigeonhole it into a category of 
substantive rights and a related procedural remedy must exist. The legal system will 
therefore only process a dispute if its social dimensions are reformulated to meet the 
substantive and procedural requirements of the legal order. 
An essential characteristic of a legal dispute, then, is that it is tagged, labelled and 
classified according to the authoritative norms and procedures of the legal system. 
Hence, not every dispute in the broader social context qualifies as a legal dispute. A 
dispute only becomes justiciable if it is capable of being retranslated into the predictable 
and authoritative norms of the legal order. In many respects this can be attributed to the 
strict procedural demands of the system. The substantive rights pertaining to a dispute 
must be formulated as a cause of action in accordance with the dictates of the system of 
civil procedure. Should it not be possible to redefine a dispute as a cause of action, it 
cannot be assimilated into the system. The term "cause of action" exemplifies the 
institutionalised nature of a legal dispute. In technical terms, a "cause of action" 
70 Herbstein and Van Winsen Civil Practice 1. 
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describes a fact or group of facts that give rise to one or more rights to relief. 71 
Rephrased this means that the facts of a dispute are framed within a category of 
instances that the substantive law recognises as conferring grounds for relief in 
accordance with the prescribed procedural rules.72 In this particular context, the 
formulation of a legal dispute could be described as being anti-social. A dispute in its 
personal or social setting is redefined only on the basis of legal norms and values in 
order to guarantee its justiciability; the grievance and conflict underlying any personal, 
community or societal interests are irrelevant in legal terms unless it is possible to 
transpose them into a valid cause of action. 
A further characteristic of a legal dispute is that the redefinition of a dispute into legal 
terms simultaneously predicts the related remedy. For instance, if the dispute is 
categorised as being over breach of contract then, if the breach is proved according to 
the prescribed rules of evidence, the substantive remedy is either rescission of the 
contract plus damages or specific performance plus damages. 73 The legal interpretation 
of the dispute is predicative of its remedy, irrespective of the fact that the related remedy 
might not be what the disputants desire as a suitable resolution of the dispute. The legal 
transformation of a dispute entails a synthesis of right and remedy, hence 
depersonalising the dispute and its outcome. No provision is made to accommodate the 
interests of the disputants especially if they are bound to each other in an inter-
dependent or continuing relationship. Rights and not interests predominate and if the 
71 
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interests of the disputants are at all considered, they are interpreted on the grounds of 
public policy or in the public interest.74 
The case of Natal Fresh Produce Growers' Association v Agroserve (Pty) Ltd5 
illustrates these considerations. On the facts, the farmers of the Tala Valley in Natal, 
acting through the Natal Fresh Produce Growers' Association, brought an action for an 
order interdicting Agroserve from "'manufacturing and/or distributing within the Republic 
of South Africa products which are collectively referred to as 'hormonal herbicides"'. 76 
The plaintiff's particulars of claim stated, inter alia, that hormonal herbicides used within 
the Republic are spread by means of water and air and accordingly are deposited on the 
fresh produce growing in Natal and in particular, the Tata Valley.77 The deposit of the 
herbicides has damaged and will continue to damage the produce grown by the 
members of the Association and that the damage is a direct result of the distribution and 
use of the herbicides in the Republic. 78 The only manner in which this damage can be 
prevented is by eliminating the use of hormonal herbicides in the Republic. 79 
Consequently, the defendant had and continued to wrongfully cause damage to the 
fresh produce grown by the members of the Association. 80 
The defendant raised an exception to the particulars of claim "as lacking averments 
which are necessary to sustain an action".81 In the first instance, the defendant argued 
that the hormonal herbicide is manufactured and distributed in accordance with the 
provisions of the Fertilizers, Farm Feeds, Agricultural Remedies and Stock Remedies 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
See also Mulligan "Alternative dispute resolution" 99 for a succinct differentiation 
between rights and interests. 
1990 4 SA 749 (N). 
752E. 
7538-C. 
753C-D. 
753E-F. 
753G-H. 
7520. 
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Act of 1947 and therefore that prima facie its activities are lawful and the products so 
manufactured are capable of lawful use.82 However, for present purposes, the second 
issue raised on exception is the most salient. The defendant submitted that the lawful 
manufacture and distribution of the hormonal herbicides is not rendered unlawful 
because they are used to the detriment of third parties for whose conduct the defendant 
is not responsible. To argue otherwise 
would involve an extension of the concept of unlawfulness in Aquilian liability to a 
new situation, an extension which is not warranted by the general criteria of 
reasonableness, and which would be inimical to public policy as amounting to an 
unjustified interference with the defendants' freedom of trade and the right of 
legitimate users of the products to protect their crops.83 
The court per Howard JP upheld the defendanfs exception contending, inter alia, that 
the scope of the Aquilian action should not be extended to new situations unless there 
were positive considerations of policy that justified such an extension and that the 
plaintiff had not discharged the onus in this respect.84 
This decision expresses in a practical setting many of the theoretical considerations 
relating to the characteristics of a legal dispute. The defendant's exception was upheld 
precisely because the plaintiff could not rely on a recognised category of Aquilian liability 
and by the same token was unable to prove the need on the ground of public policy for 
creating a further category of rights. In other words, the plaintiff had formulated a cause 
of action which did not meet the substantive and procedural norms of the system. 
Irrespective of the fact that hormonal herbicides are ostensibly detrimental to the 
environment and that these products had probably caused damage and continued to 
cause damage to the fresh produce of the farmers of the Tala Valley, these 
considerations were not justiciable because they could not be established according to 
the substantive and procedural standards of the legal order. The legal logic is quite 
clear: Because the plaintiffs subjective interests could not be classified within a 
82 7540. 
83 754E-F. 
84 7531-754C; 7588-F. 
42 
recognisable category of substantive rights, the plaintiff's cause of action could not be 
sustained and hence no remedy could be granted. Clearly evident is the inextricable link 
between right and remedy as well as a clear distinction between personal and public 
interests. 
In a broader context, what comes to the fore is that for a dispute to qualify as a legal 
dispute, the dispute needs to pass through a process of transformation. This entails that 
the dispute must be redefined and translated according to the norms and values of the 
legal system. The effect of this reformulation creates disparity between the dispute as an 
existential reality and as an abstract formula that complies with imperative norms of the 
legal system. 85 
A necessary conclusion is that in the legal sphere a dispute is formulated in abstract and 
rational terms that are often divorced from social reality. The origin of a dispute as well 
as its personal, community or societal dimensions exercises little influence on the 
content of a legal dispute. If they do, these non-legal values are assessed in regard to 
objective standards of public morality or in relation to the public benefit. A legal dispute is 
therefore confined to specific legal and procedural categories that redetermine the 
content of the dispute in order to qualify it to be received into the court system for dispute 
processing. 
Given these attributes of a legal dispute, the impression is created that the legal dispute 
is isolated from the broader social process. This general impression changes if the legal 
dispute is contextualised within the universe of disputes and dispute transformation. 
What is evident is that the transformation of a non-legal dispute precedes the 
formulation of a legal dispute and that by a process of elimination, based on the stringent 
85 Fulton Commercial ADR 13 differentiates between the meaning of the word 
"dispute" in its legal context and in other fields of dispute resolution: "What can 
be termed as a dispute at law is determined by the normative orders in the form 
of formally administered legal rules. Such rules, which differ from rules of custom 
or ordinary morality, are not only authoritative in determining what the legally 
sanctioned outcome of a dispute will be but, more fundamentally, are _also 
authoritative in determining what disputes are justiciable. If no rule can be cited 
which addresses a person's perceived injury then, no matter how outraged or 
violated the person feels, the dispute will still not be justiciable. The dispute must 
frt into an acceptable legal category if the legal remedy is to be pursued." 
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application of legal norms and standards, only certain non-legal disputes will qualify for 
dispute processing within the legal system. If the process of dispute transformation is 
expressed diagrammatically as a pyramid, grievances occupy its base and the legal 
dispute, its apex. 86 The model places the legal dispute at the pinnacle of the disputing 
process precisely because the legal dispute represents the ultimate formulation and 
transformation of the original dispute. Because all other methods of dispute resolution 
have failed, final recourse is made to the legal system for the definitive settlement of the 
dispute. This gives some indication of the continuity between the legal dispute and the 
larger social process. Through the judicial component of government, legal norms and 
public standards are applied to definitively dispose of a dispute thereby ensuring the 
public ordering of society.87 
The continuity between a non-legal and legal dispute is apparent within the macrocosm 
of dispute transformation. The formulation of a legal dispute is merely a continuation of 
the process of the transformation of a non-legal dispute that cannot be resolved other 
than by legal means. In this context, the formulation and transformation of the legal 
dispute occupies an important position within the larger social context of disputes, 
disputing and dispute processing. 
2.2.4 Towards a definition of "dispute" 
Any attempt to define a dispute camouflages its situational context. Every dispute has 
experiential dimensions, whether personal or societal. This in itsetf complicates any 
definition of a dispute. But, paradoxically the lack of definition itsetf formulates, if not a 
definition, then at least a definitive concept of a dispute. 
86 
87 
Galanter "Landscape of disputes" 11-18. 
For the notion that the legal system is the mechanism employed for the public 
ordering of society, see Hahlo and Kahn The SA Legal System 26-29 at 26: 
'The first and foremost purpose of the law is to maintain peace and order in the 
community. Man needs to live in society if he is to achieve his full development. 
Society, however, cannot exist without law, for without rules of conduct there can 
be no order, and without order there cannot be peace and progress." For the 
concept of the legal system as a means of social control, see also 4-5. 
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As a starting point, it is possible to describe tentatively a dispute as an unstable social 
event that is in a state of continual transformation until it is resolved. Between the 
emergence of a dispute and its eventual resolution, a number of vital transformations 
occur. A dispute is essentially the product of grievance transformation, aptly described 
as a process of naming, blaming and claiming. A particular moment occurs when a claim 
is rejected; at this point a grievance is transformed into a dispute. 
However, once a dispute has been submitted to a third party, a reformulation of the 
dispute of necessity occurs according to the norms and procedural standards of the 
system of dispute resolution concerned. In other words, the system of dispute resolution 
is a determinant of the formal content of that dispute. Upon its reformulation, a dispute 
becomes the expression of the policy considerations, objectives and values maintained 
by the particular system of dispute resolution to which recourse is made. A notable 
transformation is evident. The dispute, originating as an emotional and situational 
experience, is organised and delineated according to the definitive and often rational 
terms of the system of dispute resolution by means of which it is processed. The content 
of the word "dispute" is therefore directly influenced by the substantive norms and 
processual form that transforms the dispute to meet the demands of a particular system 
of dispute resolution. 
In the final analysis, the word "dispute" has a technical meaning within the context of the 
rubric "alternative dispute resolution". For the purposes of ADR, a dispute is not a static 
and stable event but should rather be conceived as a dynamic process of transformation 
that is influenced by the form and function of the specific ADR process that is applied to 
resolve that dispute. This same notion applies to a dispute in a legal setting, with one 
notable exception. A legal dispute is expressed in rational and abstract terms that 
conform the dispute to the substantive and procedural standards of the legal system so 
that the legal formulation eventually has little bearing on the dispute as it is perceived in 
a purely social context. Because ADR is not constrained by the same considerations that 
transform a legal dispute, it is able to deal with a dispute at all levels of its 
transformation, even at the initial grievance base. 
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2.3 Resolution in context 
2.3.1 The meaning of "resolution' 
What does "resolution" mean in the context of "alternative dispute resolution"? An 
uncritical response would be that "resolution" refers to the settlement of a dispute. 88 This 
response fails to express the complexity of the word "resolution" in context. 
A critical area relates to the nature of the settlement. In this respect there are only two 
options: a dispute may be resolved either consensually or by coercion. The first option 
refers to the resolution of the dispute on the basis of agreement; the second, to the use 
of sanction as a means of enforcing the resolution of the dispute. Each must be treated 
critically to fully understand the meaning of the word "resolution". 
2.3.2 Consensual resolution 
When is a dispute resolved consensually? There are a variety of situations. The 
disputants may settle the dispute by compromise. The result of compromise is a 
lose/lose situation. A dispute may also be resolved on a win/lose basis due to the 
imbalance of power between the parties that results in the stronger party forcing his will 
on the weaker party. Another possible means of resolving a dispute is when the one 
disputant in frustration simply "lumps it". 89 A last variant is a win/win situation when a 
dispute is resolved by the mutual agreement between the disputants. 
In each instance the resolution of the dispute is directly related to the quality of the 
outome. When "lumping" occurs the dispute is resolved but unilaterally so, hence 
indicating the total absence of mutual agreement between the disputants. The aggrieved 
party acknowledges that he is in a "lose" situation and reluctantly decides to accept it. In 
such circumstances, the dispute is resolved but when the quality of the resolution of that 
88 
89 
Fulton Commercial ADR 16. 
For the incidence of "lumping", see Galanter "Landscape of disputes" 14-16; 
Miller and Sarat "Grievances, claims and disputes" 527. 
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dispute is assessed, the total lack of any mutual agreement between the disputants 
indicates that the dispute has been resolved inadequately. 
The position is slightly different in the case of a lose/lose situation based on 
compromise. The disputants accept a lose/lose situation - both lose and no one gains. 
On the face of it, the dispute has been resolved and in this instance mutual agreement is 
seemingly present. However, when the quality of the outcome is questioned, there is 
doubt as to whether the underlying issues between the parties have been explored and 
even accommodated to assure a fair and lasting settlement. Considerations relating to 
quality also arise in the instance where a dispute is resolved on a win/lose basis. Implicit 
in this instance is that one of the disputants is forced to accept a "lose" situation, with all 
the inherent unfairness involved. Ostensibly the resolution of the dispute is based upon 
mutual agreement but in reality the mutual agreement is defective because an imbalance 
of partypower has forced the weaker party to accept a "lose" situation. 
The win/win situation is setf-explanatory. There are no "losers" - each disputant obtains 
what she needs on the basis of mutual agreement. Because in theory there are no 
"losers", the win/win result is regarded as the ideal outcome for the consensual 
resolution of a dispute. Morally, the win/win result justifies the need for a lasting 
resolution of the dispute, based on the fairness of a mutually beneficial outcome. 
Unfortunately, the win/win outcome has been given ideological dimensions that are not 
always related to reality. In our competitive society a premium is placed upon "winning". 
Hence, in many instances the win/lose syndrome is inescapable either because 
resources cannot be divided or predetermined rules predict a win/lose result. This is 
known as a "zero-sum" condition. For instance, when a contract is put out to tender the 
inevitable result is that it will be awarded to only one contractor. Given the prevalence of 
the zero-sum condition, a win/win result is often neither a functional nor a realistic 
objective.90 Be that as it may, the very concept of a win/win situation acts as an incentive 
90 See Keltner Mediation 4-6. Keltner on 5 also deals with ''the semantic fallacy of 
win/win", contending that win/win is sometimes used as a manipulative ploy to 
induce a party to accept a settlement which he would not otherwise have done, 
when the win/win vocabulary is used in a win/lose situation. 
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for reassessing a value system that applauds "winning" at the expense of joint decision 
making. Instead, what are advanced are strategies that promote the sharing of resources 
and interaction based on mutual consent.91 
What is the significance of these variants? The first observation is that contrary to 
expectation, mutual agreement is not a prerequisite for the resolution of a dispute. In 
instances of "lumping", mutual agreement is totally absent although the dispute is 
resolved. However, apart from "lumping", the element of agreement is common to the 
other methods of dispute resolution. But only agreement is necessary - not mutual 
agreement. As has been shown there are degrees of mutual agreement which affect 
only the quality of the settlement. The other common element is that agreement for the 
resolution of a dispute is obtained through the interaction of the parties with the notable 
exception of "lumping". Thus, in its consensual context, "resolution" refers to the 
voluntary settlement of a dispute on the grounds of an agreement obtained through the 
interaction of the disputants. Ideally, the quality of the resolution of a dispute would be 
enhanced if the dispute were settled by means of mutual agreement in order to ensure 
that the resolution of the dispute is fair and that it will endure on account of the 
willingness of the parties to honour the agreement. 
2.3.3 Resolution by coercion 
A dispute may also be resolved by coercion either by self-help or through intervention of 
the State by means of the use of sanction. The word "resolution" therefore also has a 
specific meaning in this particular context. 
The relationship between the civil administration of justice and the social order is 
complex. In a society governed by the rule of law, the use of private violence as a means 
of enforcing a claim is prohibited. In every civilised system, the responsibility for 
maintaining public order is imposed upon the government. In the case of disputes 
relating to civil claims, the deliberative and adjudicative functions of government are 
exercised by the judiciary, acting through the court system. Hence every judgment or 
91 Ibid 6. 
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order of a court is enforced by the sanction of the State either by means of the execution 
of a judgment debtor's property or by contempt proceedings.92 In brief, the sanction of 
the State has replaced self-help as a means of resolving a dispute. The judgment or 
order of a court is therefore dispositive of a dispute and enforced by the use or threat of 
coercion exercised by the State.93 
In this setting, the resolution of a dispute is not achieved by a settlement between the 
parties. Instead, the judgment or order of a court disposes of the dispute and brings it to 
finality, irrespective of whether or not one or all the disputants agree. Moreover, the 
resolution of the dispute is founded upon a written and reasoned judgment that is 
binding not only on the disputants but through the precedent system, is applicable by 
analogy to all future disputes of the same nature. 
Within the framework of the legal system, the word "resolution" therefore has a technical 
meaning. Succinctly stated, the resolution of a dispute is imposed upon the parties and 
enforced by the power of State. 
92 
93 
Herbstein and Van Win sen Civil Procedure 597. 
See also Hazard Civil Procedure 281-285 for a discussion of litigation as a form 
of coercion and at 297-298 for a brief synopsis of the functions of civil justice. 
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3.1 The primary processes 
ADR is founded upon three primary processes: negotiation, mediation and arbitration. 
Although this statement is academically neat and does correctly express a basic 
premise, the sceptic might rightly retort that not one of these processes is original to 
ADR. There is a great deal of truth in this response. The primary processes are certainly 
not novel to ADR. For centuries, negotiation, mediation and arbitration have been 
recognised as non-judicial methods of dispute resolution. This raises a number of 
foundational questions in relation to the place of the primary processes within the system 
of ADR: Is ADR an authentic system of dispute resolution if it uses traditional methods of 
dispute resolution as its primary processes? Does ADR genuinely contribute to the 
resolution of disputes if it relies on dispute resolution processes that have been and will 
be utilised irrespective of its existence as a system of dispute resolution? These are 
challenging questions that force an answer. 
There is no quibble that the primary processes are orthodox methods of non-judicial 
dispute resolution. However, within the context of the ADR movement, these primary 
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processes have been thoroughly modernised. Each primary process has been re-
interpreted to apply in instances that fall beyond its traditional domain. For instance, 
arbitration was mainly used to resolve commercial disputes but is now also recognised 
as an effective dispute resolution process in the field of labour relations and, whereas 
mediation was traditionally applied as a means of resolving ecclesiastical and 
international disputes, presently its scope has been extended to facilitate, inter alia, 
divorce settlements as well as the resolution of family and community disputes. Although 
negotiation, mediation and arbitration will always be recognised as traditional methods of 
dispute resolution, their incorporation in the system of ADR has resulted in an extension 
of their conventional fields of application. In brief, the conventional form and functions of 
negotiation, mediation and arbitration have. been retained. However, as a result of their 
integration within the system of ADR, the scope of their application has been extended to 
areas of dispute that were never envisaged traditionally. 
The other important point is that all three traditional dispute resolution processes have 
now been incorporated into a single system of dispute resolution. Prior to the inception 
of the ADR movement, each primary process functioned independently of the other. As 
in the case of many traditional usages, very little systematic or analytical consideration 
had been given to the primary processes. ADR has changed this. The combination of 
the three primary processes within one system of dispute resolution has engendered 
research into the nature of these processes, their form, function, objectives and 
classification as well as the type of dispute to which each relates. ADR research is 
backed by the widespread application of these processes in a variety of fields that 
hitherto had not been considered. This by no means implies that ADR has become a 
field of science; it is still in its initial stages of development. However, acting as a 
catalyst, the combination of the primary processes in a single system of dispute 
resolution has encouraged a body of research, albeit not always systematic, that holds 
promise for a science in the making. 
However, research into and the popular practice of the primary processes in diverse 
fields of application does not of itself establish ADR as an independent system of dispute 
resolution. Such a development would have occurred irrespective of the existence of 
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ADR. Something more is needed to satisfy the sceptic. In this respect, two important 
factors need to be examined: the extension of a particular primary process into a variety 
of derivative processes as well as the mixing of certain elements of the primary 
processes to form hybrid processes. 
There can be no doubt that the merging of the primary processes into the ADR 
framework has led to a great deal of creative experimentation with dispute resolution 
processes. The purpose is to achieve the optimum resolution of a dispute in terms of 
cost effectiveness, economy of time and the quality of the settlement. With these 
objectives in mind, the conventional form and function of the primary processes have 
been retained but their method of application has been diversified. An example would 
best illustrate this. The term "arbitration" is associated with a voluntary and private 
process that is, like litigation, formal and adjudicative in form, being therefore time-
consuming and often expensive. Normally, arbitration in this form is referred to as 
"conventional" arbitration. But, with the emergence of ADR, the term "arbitration" is not 
any longer as clear. Under the direct influence of the ADR movement, a wide variety of 
arbitration techniques have been developed: expedited arbitration, final-offer arbitration, 
documents-only arbitration and quality arbitration.5 Similarly, negotiation is a general 
term that could refer to competitive, co-operative or integrative negotiation in a variety of 
social contexts.6 By the same token, structured mediation, conciliation and facilitation are 
derived from a generic concept of mediation.7 Although the primary processes are not 
original to ADR, their derivative processes are. The system of ADR has not simply 
borrowed processes - it has also generated derivative processes. 
Given all these considerations, there is one that is overriding and alone validates the 
authenticity of ADR as an independent system of dispute resolution, notwithstanding its 
reliance on the primary processes. The ingenuity of ADR lies in the manner in which 
elements of negotiation, mediation and arbitration have been combined to form hybrid or 
5 See, further, 3.2.3 and chapter 7 below. 
6 See, further, 3.2.1 and chapter 5 below. 
7 See, further, 3.3.2 and chapter 6 below. 
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mixed processes. 8 The merging of certain characteristics and functions of two or more of 
the primary processes has created a rich variety of highly effective and efficient dispute 
resolution processes that are original only to the system of ADR. For example: the mini-
trial9 is an off-shoot of the process of negotiation in combination with the process of 
litigation; the rent-a-judge process10 assimilates the principles of arbitration and litigation; 
mediation/arbitration 11 merges the primary processes of mediation and arbitration. The 
hybrid processes are distinct from the primary processes. As a direct result of the 
influence of ADR, they have acquired the stature of modern dispute resolution processes 
that cater for contemporary needs. Understandably, because they are modern, there is 
not much systematic research or even a comprehensive understanding of the hybrid 
dispute resolution processes. What is established though is that the hybrid processes 
are indisputably original to the system of ADR. 
Although ADR is founded upon the processes of negotiation, mediation and arbitration, it 
is not totally dependent upon these processes. The invention of non-conventional 
dispute resolution processes has produced a portfolio of dispute resolution processes 
unknown to any other generation except our own. This in itself lends authenticity to the 
system of ADR and establishes it as an independent system of dispute resolution. The 
system of ADR thus stands on the foundations of the primary processes upon which a 
variety of authentic dispute resolution processes have been constructed. 
8 See, further, 3.2.4 and chapter 8 below. 
9 See, further, 8.3.2 below. 
10 See, further, 8.3.1 below. 
11 See, further, 8.3.3 below. 
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3.2 Exploratory analysis 
3.2.1 Negotiation 
Compared to the other primary processes, negotiation is the dominant process. 
Negotiation is inherent in the nature of humankind. Since time immemorial, humans have 
negotiated about every conceivable aspect of life and still do so today. Viewed in this 
context, negotiation is as varied as the persons involved and as complex as the related · 
situations it serves. Accordingly, definitions abound. However, a random sample of some 
definitive descriptions do explain the basic elements of negotiation 
Negotiation is a basic means of getting what you want from others. It is a back-
and-forth communication designed to reach an agreement when you and the 
other side have some interests that are shared and others that are opposed.12 
Negotiation, that is where two or more people together attempt to reach 
agreement on some matter.13 
Negotiation may be generally defined as a consensual bargaining process in 
which parties attempt to reach agreement on a dispute or potentially disputed 
matter.14 
Negotiation is a process of interaction between parties directed at reaching some 
form of agreement that will hold and that is based upon common interests; with 
the purpose of resolving conflict, despite widely dividing differences.15 
[N]egotiation can be defined as the process in which two or more participants 
attempt to reach a joint decision on matters of common concern in situations 
where they are in actual or potential disagreement or conflict.16 
Negotiation is one kind of problem-solving process - one in which people attempt 
to reach a joint decision on matters of common concern in situations where they 
are in disagreement and conflict.17 
12 Fisher and Ury Getting to Yes xi. 
13 Astor and Chin kin Dispute Resolution 77. 
14 Nolan-Haley ADR 13. 
15 Pienaar and Spoelstra Negotiation 3. 
16 Gifford Legal Negotiation 3. 
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Negotiation may be tentatively described ... as a process of adjustment of existing 
differences, with a view to the establishment of a mutually more desirable legal 
relation by means of barter and compromise of legal rights and duties and of 
economic, psychological, social and other interests. It is accomplished 
consensually as contrasted with the force of law.18 
Diverse as this list of definitions may be, when read cumulatively a number of recurrent 
themes can be identified -
(a) negotiation is a process 
(b) the process is consensual and hence voluntary 
( c) as a process, negotiation based is on the bilateral interaction of the 
disputants 
( d) the purpose of negotiation is to attempt to resolve a dispute relating to 
interests or rights 
(e) this objective is achieved on the basis of an agreement obtained by joint 
decision making. 
A vital element of negotiation is that it is a process.19 In this respect emphasis is placed 
on the continuity of negotiation. Negotiation is not some ad hoc event - negotiation has a 
starting point and it reaches a point of termination signified by either agreement or the 
failure to settle. Whether this is attained within a few hours or over a period of months or 
even years is irrelevant. What is important is the element of continuity which is common 
to all forms of process. Moreover, within this time frame, negotiation passes through a 
number of distinct and recognised phases.20 Admittedly, the phases of negotiation are 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Gulliver Disputes and Negotiations xiii. 
Mathews "Negotiation" 94. 
See Pienaar and Spoelstra Negotiation 3 18-19; Mathews "Negotiation" 94; 
Gulliver Disputes and Negotiations 180-186. 
Although it is impossible to determine a definitive structural model for the different 
stages of negotiation, the literature indicates clearly that as a process negotiation 
must pass through various developmental stages. See Anstey Negotiating 
Conflict 127-157; Gifford Legal Negotiation 32-36; Leeson and Johnston 
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not comparable to those for legal process but this does not diminish the fact that the 
various phases of negotiation do constitute a form of process. These considerations 
underlie the use of the term "the process of negotiation".21 
The process of negotiation is consensual. The disputants mutually agree to settle their 
dispute by means of the process of negotiation, thereby excluding any possibility of 
external coercion to force a settlement of the dispute. Although the process is 
consensual, this does not mean that it is always voluntary. The process of negotiation is 
sometimes, though not often, imposed upon the disputants. The best example would be 
the pre-trial conference that is mandatory under our rules of court.22 Then there is the 
case where the decision to enter into the process of negotiation is ostensibly voluntary. 
This occurs in instances where pressure is brought to bear upon the one disputant to 
enter into negotiations. In the legal sphere, litigation is sometimes commenced as a 
tactic to induce an opposing party to enter into negotiation and also to settle, given the 
expense and inconvenience of full-scale litigation.23 Although the process of negotiation 
is not always voluntary, it is always consensual since one of the disputants may always 
terminate the process. 
One of the distinguishing features of the process of negotiation is that it is based solely 
upon the bilateral interaction of the disputants. The term "bilateral" indicates that the 
process is dyadic in the sense that a neutral third party is not involved. The disputants 
themselves fill the role of advocate and decision maker: the disputants determine the 
rules that will govern the form of the proceedings, identify and argue the facts in issue, 
control the process and determine its outcome.24 
21 
23 
24 
Dispute Resolution in America 105-106; Menkel-Meadow "Legal negotiation" 
777; Pienaar and Spoelstra Negotiation 48-49. 
See, further, 5.2 below. 
See Uniform Rules of Court rule 37. 
Galanter "Negotiation and legal process" 268-269. See also Leeson and 
Johnston Dispute Resolution in America 104. See, further, 5.3.2 below. 
Astor and Chinkin Dispute Resolution 80; Leeson and Johnston Dispute 
Resolution America 103 107; 
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However, the bilateral nature of the process does not mean that only two disputants are 
involved. Multi-party negotiations may be conducted. In the case of multi-party 
negotiations, the dyadic character of the process is retained but opposing coalitions are 
formed between two or more of the disputants.25 Accordingly, in the context of the 
process of negotiation, the word "bilateral" is a technical term which means that a third-
party neutral is not involved in the resolution of the dispute between the disputants. 
Interests and rights form the subject of the process of negotiation. At first, this distinction 
could be rather confusing. For instance, the title of a popular book Everything is 
Negotiable26 by Gavin Kennedy, gives the impression that all disputes can be thrown 
into the same negotiation melting pot. Generally, this is what the average person would 
presume. And, up to a point the title of Kennedy's book is correct subject to an important 
qualification: technically, either interests or rights are negotiated. To the layperson this 
distinction might seem artificial but in a legal context the differentiation is material. 
Eisenberg distinguishes between rule-making negotiation and negotiation for the 
purposes of dispute resolution.27 In the case of the former interests are necessarily the 
subject of negotiation. Put differently, negotiation is transactional. The very purpose of 
negotiation in this instance is to create future rights or interests. Innumerable 
transactions can be mentioned but to mention only a few: deciding at which restaurant to 
dine, having a dress made by a dressmaker, forming a lift club, buying a motor vehicle or 
25 
26 
27 
For the nature and functioning of coalitions, see Gifford Legal Negotiation 175-
179; Raiffa Science of Negotiation 11-12 252-253. 
Arrow Books 1989 reprint. 
"Private ordering through negotiation" 637-638. Kanowitz ADR 39-41, by analogy 
to arbitration terminology, distinguishes between "interests" and "rights" 
negotiation. "Interests" negotiation refers to the situation where the parties " ... 
enter into negotiations with one and another although there has been no prior 
legal relationship between them"; the purpose of the negotiations is purely 
transactional and therefore if the parties cannot or do not want to reach 
agreement, they can discontinue negotiations. On the other hand, in the case of 
rights negotiation there is no attempt to establish any legal relationships but 
rather the parties are in effect " ... asserting pre-existing rights ... that normally 
may be vindicated in a lawsuit". 
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fixed property, leasing property, buying insurance or making an investment. The list is 
unending because in the majority of cases negotiation is transactional. Essentially, this 
means that future rights or interests form the subject of negotiation; that negotiation is 
directed at future events or performances; and lastly, that no dispute relating to the 
actual or alleged infringement of legal rights is involved. This is identified as rule-making 
negotiation. 28 
On the other hand, negotiation is rights related when it deals with the occurrence of past 
events that have led to the actual or alleged infringement of legal rights. The disputants 
enter into negotiation in full knowledge of the fact that their discussions are being 
conducted against the background of legal rights and duties and should the negotiations 
fail, either of the disputants may resort to litigation to dispose of the dispute. In this 
sense, it is possible to speak of dispute negotiation.29 Hence, to contend that "everything 
is negotiable" is too broad. 
The basic purpose of negotiation is to reconcile interests or to settle a dispute by joint 
decision making. The notion of joint decision making is generally alien to common 
notions about negotiation. This attitude, which is often shared by lawyers, may be 
attributed to the adversarial culture instilled by the process of litigation. The general 
approach to negotiation is distributive, based on a competitive style. Yet, there is another 
approach which promotes co-operative or integrative negotiation which in turn is 
matched by a collaborative style. In this respect, it is possible to achieve the ideal 
objective of joint decision making founded on the understanding that negotiation is 
essentially a problem-solving process.30 
28 
29 
30 
See Eisenberg "Private ordering through negotiation" 665-680. See also Astor 
and Chinkin Dispute Resolution 77-79; Nolan-Haley ADR 13-14; Gifford Legal 
Negotiation 39-40 190-191. 
See Eisenberg "Private ordering through negotiation" 639-665; Nolan-Haley ADR 
14; Gifford Legal Negotiation 39-40 190-191. 
For the influence of the adversarial mode of litigation on the negotiation process, 
see Hartje "lawyer skills in negotiation" 138-139; Menkel-Meadow "Legal 
negotiation" 755-757. See 5.3.2 for a detailed discussion of competitive, co-
operative and integrative strategies of negotiation. 
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Negotiation therefore has many facets: it is a bilateral and consensual process directed 
at rule making or dispute resolution which is ideally achieved through problem solving by 
means of joint decision making. 
~ 
\ 3.2.2 Mediation 
When dealing with mediation, the divergence between practice, concept and 
terminology complicates a clear definition of the process. The terms "mediation", 
"conciliation", "passive and active mediation", and "facilitation" are used without much 
discretion to describe a particular type of mediation practice. Yet, reduced to basics, all 
these terms refer to a single generic concept. This generic concept of mediation entails a 
consensual process involving the intervention of a neutral third party who in a non-
adjudicative capacity and without the authority to make a binding decision, assists the 
disputants to settle their dispute. What is disconcerting is that conceptually the 
differences between these terms are indistinct yet in practice each of these terms is 
seemingly related to separate processes that in their form relate generically to 
mediation. 
Where the problem begins and ends is difficult to tell. Perhaps, the attempt to devise 
different terms for the various forms of mediation that are used in practice is at the root of 
the problem. Alternatively, the lack of concept might be the cause of the many variants 
being practised. The end result is muddled terminology. 
The want of clear and unambiguous terminology is in itself problematic. Settled 
terminology is an essential prerequisite for the theoretical developi:nent of any field of 
study. The danger is that imprecise terminology could stunt conceptual development. 
Practice that is context based with scant regard for concept and the related 
determination of terminology, could seriously affect the credibility of the various forms of 
the process of mediation. Concept and practice are inseparably enmeshed. An 
imbalance between the two can cause untold problems. These issues are not purely 
academic. For instance, naming a process in itself designates a particular function to the 
third-party neutral. The lack of uniformly accepted terminology could lead to a serious 
59 
misunderstanding about the process named and that intended by the disputants. 
Moreover, the general public is the user of these mediation processes. If proponents and 
practitioners are unsure about terminology and confused about related concepts, it is 
doubtful that the public will be able to appreciate fully or be confident to use the related 
processes. 
In particular there is widespread uncertainty about the use of the terms "mediation" and 
"conciliation". The issue is further complicated if the process of facilitation31 is dra\Nl1 into 
the debate, especially because of the tenuous dividing line between this process and 
conciliation. The essence of the controversy is \IVhether the terms "mediation" and 
"conciliation" are synonymous or \IVhether each describes a distinct process. Although 
verging on the periphery of the debate, the same questions may be asked in relation to 
the use of the terms "conciliation" and 'facilitation". 
Confusion about terminology is particularly prevalent in the United Kingdom. Although 
the term "conciliation" is used to describe the consensual settlement of disputes through 
the intermediary intervention of a neutral third party, it is recognised as being a 
"some\IVhat confusing and unfortunate term".32 Part of the confusion stems from the 
completely reversed meaning given to the terms "mediation" and "conciliation" in other 
Anglo-American jurisdictions. As a result, both "conciliation" and "mediation" are 
frequently used interchangeably in the United Kingdom. 33 It is, however, recognised by 
some commentators that each term refers to processes that differ widely from each 
31 
32 
33 
"Facilitation" is a term used to describe the process whereby a person, known as 
the facilitator, assists two or more parties to communicate with each other with 
the object of enabling the parties to agree on a common course of conduct which 
might involve the a joint meeting to resolve the dispute or an undertaking to 
submit to an informal dispute resolution process. See further Astor and Chinkin 
Dispute Resolution 64; Newton "ADR and the lawyer" 562; Pretorius "Overview" 
4. 
Bevan ADR 15; Walker "Divorce mediation in Great Britain" 34. 
For instance, Littman ''The resolution of serious disputes" 51-60 who consistently 
uses the term "conciliation" which in context could be replaced by the term 
"mediation", as it is understood in certain dispute sectors within the United 
Kingdom or in other Anglo-American jurisdictions. 
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other.34 As far back as 1983, Lisa Parkinson, one of the most prominent practitioners in 
the field of divorce mediation/conciliation succinctly summarised the problem 
There is a good deal of confusion in the use of terminology and the expectations 
achieved through conciliation. The vvord is being used as a kind of vvoolly blanket 
which covers, and partially conceals, a variety of procedures and methods.35 
In that same year, Simon Roberts took a definite stance in favour of the use of the term 
"mediation".36 However, as yet, the term "mediation" has not replaced "conciliation" 
although there is a tendency in favour of using of the term "mediation". This approach is 
expressed by Karl Mackie 
There is sometimes an overlap or confusion with the term "conciliation" - usually 
defined as a less proactive form of intervention where the third party aids the 
disputants to reach their own agreement rather than seeking, as in mediation, to 
suggest actively the terms of a possible agreement ... For the purposes of this 
chapter, the subtlety of this distinction need not be explored other than as a way 
of illustrating that the process of mediation may take a number of forms. 37 
But the use of imprecise terminology has seemingly become entrenched. In a genuine 
attempt to rectify the situation rather contorted explanations are offered. One suggestion 
is that a distinction should be drawn between 11facilitative" and "evaluative" mediation. 
Facilitative mediation occurs when the mediator does not express an opinion but merely 
enables the parties to communicate with each other by introducing an element of 
objectivity to their dispute; evaluative mediation refers to the instance where the third-
party neutral persuades the parties to settle by giving an opinion on law, facts and 
evidence.38 This tends to confuse rather than clarify terms. Essentially, all forms of 
mediation are facilitative. Furthermore, the meaning of evaluative mediation is 
34 Walker "Divorce mediation in Great Britain" 34; Mackie "ADR in the UK" 9. 
35 
"Conciliation: Pros and cons part II'' 185. 
36 
"Mediation in family disputes" 537. 
37 
"Negotiation and mediation" 88. 
38 Bevan ADR 15-16. 
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misleading since in the United States it would be interpreted as a form of rights-based 
mediation which is basically an evaluative process as distinct from interest-based 
mediation that explores the underlying personal dimensions of a dispute.39 In what may 
be regarded as a pragmatic move, the Centre for Dispute Resolution has adopted the 
policy that "mediation" will be used as a generic term to cover both types of process.40 
The problem of terminology is not restricted to the United Kingdom. A diversity of opinion 
also exists in other Anglo-American countries. 
In the United States, the term "mediation" is used more consistently than "conciliation". A 
primary reason is that in the United States ADR focuses on the processual aspects of 
ADR processes, whereas in other countries, especially the United Kingdom, the 
emphasis is on context-based applications in divergent areas of dispute. 41 Be that as it 
may, there is still a tendency to use the terms "mediation" and "conciliation" 
interchangeably.42 However, this is mainly limited to the use of these terms in 
legislation.43 There are historical reasons that explain this. Originally, as ·far back as 
1939, "conciliation" was used as a synonym for "mediation". But with the advent of court-
sponsored programmes aimed at reconciling separating spouses, the parties disliked the 
idea of "reconciliation" conveyed by the word "conciliation"; it evoked the assumption 
that the process was aimed at minimising conflict and reconciling the parties, as 
opposed to resolving the issues underlying it. 44 The use of the term "mediation" also 
became preferable because of the shift of emphasis from reconciliation to divorce 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
For rights-based and interests-based mediation, see Goldberg, Sander and 
Rogers Dispute Resolution 243-244 251. 
Mackie "ADR in the UK" 10. 
Mackie "Dispute Resolution: the new wave" 6. 
Rogers and McEwen Mediation 2; Rogers and Salem Guide to Mediation 4. 
Rogers and McEwen Mediation 2 note 4 read with appendix C at 293. 
Rogers and McEwen Mediation 32-33; Singer Settling Disputes 25. See also 
Singer Divorce Mediation - A Comparative Perspective 11; Scott-Macnab 
"Terminology and ADR" 23. 
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counselling and custody mediation.45 Even though use of the term "mediation" is 
prevalent, the imprecise description of terms has the effect of confusing issues. For 
instance, Levin and Golash define mediation as "the conciliation of a dispute through the 
non-coercive intervention of a third party".46 The use of the word "conciliation" is 
definitely misleading. By the same token the rare attempt to describe "conciliation" is 
clumsy to say the least 
Unlike mediation, conciliation usually connotes only preliminary involvement by a 
third party. The outsider (sometimes called a ''facilitator'') may bring the parties 
together or carry a few messages back and forth. Facilitators also may act as 
moderators in large meetings, making sure that everyone is able to speak and be 
heard. Facilitators are not expected to volunteer their own ideas or participate in 
moving the parties to an agreement. In effect, conciliation and facilitation are less 
active forms of mediation. 47 
The problem with this description of "conciliation" is that the conciliator is described as 
being a facilitator - the functions of the processes of conciliation and facilitation clearly 
overlap. Although one might agree with the comment that conciliation is a less active 
form of mediation, it remains vague because the boundaries between the two processes 
as they occur in practice are not clearly delineated. 
In Australia there is no accepted understanding of what constitutes conciliation and how 
it differs from mediation. In fact there are a range of opinions. On the one hand there are 
very definite views about the differences between the two processes while on the other 
hand, these processes, as well as facilitation, are lumped together as being different 
forms of mediation in its generic sense. Reikert makes a clear distinction between the 
two processes by placing emphasis on the roles of the third-party neutrals. For the 
purposes of mediation, "[t]he mediator is a process facilitator and does not express 
45 Scott-Macnab "Tenninology and ADR" 23. 
46 
"ADR in the Federal Courts" 40. 
47 Singer Settling Dispums 24. 
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opinions or offer advise to the disputants, although he/she will usually probe their 
positions ... ".48 In regard to conciliation, he asserts 
The conciliator is expected to contribute his/her own views and opinions during 
the process. The advisory role may range from the counsel of a respected 
eminence grise of a particular profession to the mandated, normative role of a 
conciliator under some statutes ... 49 
However, Sir Laurence Street rejects outright that there are any substantial differences 
between the terms "mediation" and "conciliation",50 asserting that if there are any 
distinctions between the two processes they are "extremely fine". Because these 
distinctions are not "relevant, practicable or useful", he concludes that the terms 
"mediation" and "conciliation" are synonymous. This view is based on the identification 
of "an identical genetic structure" for both processes 
[B]oth have three fundamental characteristics. In the first place, both originate in 
an agreement between the disputants to call in the aid of a facilitator to assist in 
the structuring and conduct of settlement negotiations which will include, as part 
of their very essence, private consultations with each disputant. In the second 
place, the facilitator has no authority to impose a solution on the disputants as 
does a judge, arbitrator or expert appraiser. And in the third place, the whole 
process remains at all times entirely flexible and dependent upon the continuing 
willingness of the disputants to continue with it until such time as either they 
themselves agree upon terms of settlement or one or other of them terminates the 
negotiations; it is, in short, consensus-orientated. 51 
The views of Reikert and Street are balanced by Astor and Chinkin.52 In a descriptive 
analysis of various conciliation models prevalent in Australia, they indicate the diversity 
of concept ranging from services offered by private organisations to statutory schemes, 
48 Reikert "ADR: quo vadis?" 33. 
49 Ibid 33. 
50 
"Language of ADR" 196. 
51 Idem. 
52 Dispute Resolution 61-64. 
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mainly under the Family Law Act of 1975 (Cth),53 the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975 
and the Sex Discrimination Act of 1984.54 55 What Astor and Chinkin show is that 
contradictions abound and that the views exemplified by both Reikert and Street, 
although instructive, do not fully encompass the diversity of the mediation process in its 
generic sense. In full awareness of these contradictions, Fulton grapples with the 
problem of the various forms of mediation and conciliation. He suggests that the solution 
lies in distinguishing between "passive" and "active" mediation instead of "conciliation" 
and "mediation". He justifies this distinction on the basis of the lack of any general 
agreement as to whether conciliation is "an active or passive pursuit". 56 
Variance between terminology, concept and practice is also a feature of the fledgling 
ADR movement in South Africa. This is especially evident in respect of the various forms 
of mediation that have been devised. A major problem is that there is no historical 
analogue for mediation in the country. The upshot is the indiscriminate use of the term 
"mediation" resulting in disparity between what is practised and the conceptual 
understanding of this term. In fact, there is a distinct preference for the use of the term 
"mediation" as it is applied in private practice or for official use in the title of statutes. 
What is actually meant by the use of the term "mediation" is another matter. 
The legislative use of the word "mediation" is a major area of controversy. So far, two 
statutes contain this term in their official titles: the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters 
Act57 and the Short Process Courts and Mediation in Certain Civil Cases Act. 58 Neither of 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
For a detailed description of conciliation in terms of this Act, see Astor and 
Chinkin Dispuie Resolution 245-246. 
For a detailed description of conciliation in terms of this Act, see Astor and 
Chinkin Dispuie Resolution 245-246. 
For a comprehensive suNey of conciliation legislation in Australia, see Evatt 
"Conciliation in Australian Law" 1-4. 
Commercial ADR 74-75. 
24of 1987. 
103of1991. 
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the two statutes furnishes a definition of the term "mediation" but they rather describe a 
procedure which is indistinctly named as "mediation". 
In terms of the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act of 1987, the Minister of Justice 
may appoint one or more family advocates at each division of the Supreme Court of 
South Africa.59 Family counsellors may also be appointed to assist the family advocate.60 
The family advocate, assisted by family counsellors, acts under a statutory duty to 
protect the best interests of a minor or dependent child.61 Once a divorce action has 
been instituted or application made for the variation, rescission or suspension of a 
custody order or arrangements regarding access to a child, 62 either party to the action on 
application or the court, can request the family advocate to institute an inquiry that will 
result in a report and recommendation concerning the welfare of a minor or dependant 
child that is affected by the proceedings.63 The family advocate may also apply to court 
for the authority to conduct an inquiry rr in her opinion the inquiry would be in the best 
interests of a minor or dependant child.64 Moreover, rr the family advocate considers it to 
be in the best interests of a minor or dependant child she may, or rr so ordered by the 
court, must appear at the trial or hearing in order to give any evidence that has a bearing 
on the proceedings and cross-examine any witness.65 
This prescribed process is certainly not mediation in any of its recognisable forms. By no 
stretch of the imagination can the investigative and representative functions of the family 
advocate be classified as being akin to a~y form of the mediation process. Yet, the 
legislature has labelled these proceedings as "mediation". The term simply does not fit 
59 s 2(1). 
60 
s 3(1). 
61 
s 4(1)(b). 
62 s 4(1)(a). 
63 
s 4(2)(a)-(b). 
64 
s 4(3). 
65 Ibid 
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the process of mediation in any of its recognised concepts or its accepted methods of 
practice. The prescribed process is not consensual, its scope is restricted to pursuing 
the best interests of minor or dependant children, intervention by the family advocate is 
only for the purposes of investigation or representation and not primarily to facilitate a 
negotiated settlement between the parties and the process itself is conducted in the 
public and adversarial setting of the courts. Although the legislative intention to protect 
the minor or dependant child involved in divorce proceedings is commendable, the 
appointment of an advocate for a child is not and never will be mediation in any of its 
forms. To argue otherwise would be to confuse representation with the mediatory 
function of non-adjudicative and non-binding intermediary intervention to facilitate the 
settlement of a dispute. This is precisely what the Act has done: it has mismatched 
terminology and the related process which it prescribes.66 
The Short Process Courts and Mediation in Certain Civil Cases Act of 1991 provides for 
the appointment of mediators and "mediation proceedings" that are to be conducted 
within the structure of the magistrates1 courts. Only a person who is legally qualified may 
be appointed as mediator.67 The mediator so appointed is obliged to take an oath or 
make an affirmation of office in terms of which the mediator undertakes, inter alia, to 
"administer justice to all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice and . . . in 
accordance with the law and custom of the Republic ... ".68 Mediation proceedings may 
be instituted at any time prior to or after the issuing of a summons, but before judgment, 
by the mutual consent of the parties. 69 The clerk of the court must give notice to the 
66 
67 
68 
For a critical appraisal of this Act, see Coertze "Huwelike, kinder, egskeiding, 
huwelike" "525; Mowatt "News but nothing new" 611. See also the critical 
comment by Cohen "Divorce mediation" 73 note 3. Bosman 'The family 
advocate and mediation" 56 58 asserts that mediation is implied under the 
provisions of the Act but concedes that the form of mediation so applied differs 
from the process as it is commonly understood; mediation is not voluntary; the 
family advocate participates in decision-making process; facts are established 
with which the parties might disagree; the process includes an evaluation of the 
parenting abilities of the parties and lastly, children may be involved directly in the 
process. 
Sees 2(1)-(2) read withs 7. 
Sees 3(1)(a). 
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parties or their representatives of the time, date and place for the conduct of the 
proceedings which are to be held in chambers before the mediator.70 The mediator must 
then investigate and enquire into the matter. 71 After the completion of the interview and 
the investigation, the mediator must make an order in respect of the settlement reached 
between the parties as well as in respect of other related matters. 72 The order is of 
record73 and will be binding in any subsequent proceedings.74 If any party fails to attend 
at the interview before the mediator, the mediator may issue an appropriate order which 
might include judgment for the plaintiff. 75 An order for costs may also be given by the 
mediator.76 Any order so issued will be final and no appeal will lie from it.77 An order, 
however, is subject to review.78 
The form of the process invented by the legislature contradicts many of the conceptual 
notions of mediation. Conceptually, a mediator must act in a non-adjudicative capacity 
without authority to make a binding decision on behalf of the parties. Yet, the mediation 
model prescribed under the Act endows the mediator with the power to make orders and 
give judgments. The necessary conclusion is that the relevant official, though named as 
a mediator, is in fact a quasi-adjudicator. This is confirmed by the wording of the 
affirmation or oath of office which obliges the official to " ... administer justice to all 
persons ... in accordance with the law and customs of the Republic ... ". 
69 Ibid. 
70 Sees 3(1)(b). 
71 Sees 3(1)(d). 
72 See s 3(2)(a). 
73 See s 3(2)(b ). 
74 Sees 3(3). 
75 Sees 3(5). 
76 Sees 3(6). 
77 Sees 3(7). 
78 See ss 11-12. 
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The contradiction is especially evident on the conceptual level. Mediation is essentially 
anti-legal for its main thrust is interest based and its objective is to achieve a settl~ment 
of a dispute by probing the underlying issues between the parties. 79 Adjudication relates 
to law and mediation to interests; it is doubtful whether this dichotomy can ever be 
satisfactorily bridged without altering the essential nature of each. By tampering with the 
recognised role and function of the mediator, the Act has created a new process which, 
although a contradiction in terms, may for the sake of convenience be called adjudicative 
mediation. This is borne out by the process named in the Act as "mediation proceedings" 
that have all the trappings of mediation but which are totally alien to this process. True 
enough the proceedings are consensual because they may only be commenced by the 
mutual consent of the parties. But that is as far as it goes. After the proceedings have 
been commenced, the element of coercion typical of all legal proceedings, is introduced: 
the proceedings are commenced by summons that must be served in the manner as 
prescribed;80 the parties become subject to the authority of the "mediator" who may 
make orders that are binding on both of them, even to the extent that a judgment may 
even be granted against a defendant who fails to attend any of the proceedings81 and, 
any such order is enforceable by execution.82 
Further, contradictions abound: the proceedings are not private but are held in court 
chambers and any settlement or offer is of record; the parties need not negotiate their 
own settlement through the intervention of a mediator since they are entitled to appoint 
legal representatives; normally the disputants through the mediator agree to the costs of 
the mediation whereas under the act the "mediator'' may make an order as to costs; the 
order or judgment of a "mediator'' is subject to review thereby bringing the "mediation 
79 
80 
81 
82 
Mowatt "High price of cheap adjudication" 84. 
Rules of Courts for Short Process and Mediation Proceedings rules 11-12 in 
regard to the commencement of proceedings and rules 14-15 in relation to the 
service of process. 
See s 3(2)(a) (5)-(6). 
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proceedings" within the structure of the legal process as well as the norms and 
standards of the legal system itself. 
The disparity between the concept of mediation and the proceedings devised by the Act 
are obvious: the official called a "mediator" is for the purposes of the Act a quasi-
adjudicator and the purported "mediation proceedings" in fact amount to quasi-legal 
proceedings. There is no basis of comparison at all. The memorandum to the bill states 
its purpose as being "the establishment of an alternative dispute adjudication 
procedure".83 However, the use of the term "mediation" raises undue ADR expectations. 
This is in fact at the root of the problem. The legislative use of the term "mediation" is a 
misnomer. In reality what has been established is a sophisticated form of the settlement 
conference that is conducted by an judicial official and this reality ought to have been 
reflected in the title of the Act. 
Reviewed cumulatively, both Acts do more harm than good for the development of the 
ADR movement in South Africa, and especially for the practice of any form of mediation. 
The processes invented by these Acts imitate the process of mediation only in so far as 
they provide for the intervention of a third party to settle a dispute. The use of the term 
"mediation" in the title of these Acts is therefore deceptive and could easily create the 
mistaken impression in the mind of the public and uninformed practitioners that the 
processes offered are in fact mediation processes in the context of ADR. Especially if 
negative experiences are encountered, this could have a damaging effect on the 
practice of the process of mediation in the future. 
There is one other misapplication of the term "mediation" that must be noted. However, 
in this instance, it relates to the private sector and more specifically, the construction 
industry. The dispute resolution clauses of two standard contracts need to be examined: 
83 See par 1 of the Memorandum on the Objects of the Short Process Courts 
and Mediation in Certain Civil Cases Bill, 1991; see also Mowatt "High price of 
cheap adjudication" 77 note 4. In general, see also the critical comments of 
Cohen ''Mediation terminology is important" 221. 
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the contract of the Joint Building Contract Committee of 199184 and the General 
Conditions of Contractfor Works of Civil Engineering Construction of 1990.85 
Both contracts establish a three-tier structure for dispute resolution. In the event of a 
disagreement arising between the client and contractor, the first step is for the 
architect/engineer to consider the disagreement and give a written decision; rr the 
architect/engineer fails to give his decision or either of the parties rejects the decision, 
then a dispute is declared.86 The parties may then submit the dispute to mediation87 and 
rr either of the parties rejects the mediator's opinion, the dispute must, in the case of the 
JBCC 1991, be referred to arbitration88 or in respect of the GCC 1990 to either 
arbitration or to the division of the court having jurisdiction.89 
In terms of the JBCC 1991, the parties must submit written representations to a mediator 
who has been appointed jointly; thereafter, the mediator must give his opinion but not 
before he has attempted to reconcile the opposing views.90 The mediator's opinion is 
binding on both parties, unless either one of the parties disputes the opinion by giving 
notice thereof in writing within the prescribed period.91 The process is subject to two 
important quatrrications: the parties are not entitled to be represented by legal 
practitioners92 and most importantly, the mediator in giving his opinion will be deemed to 
be acting as an expert and not as an arbitrator.93 
84 Hereinafter referred to as the JBCC 1991. 
85 Hereinafter referred to as the GCC 1990. 
86 See JBCC 1991cl37.1; GCC 1990 cl 61(1). 
87 See JBCC 1991cl37.2; GCC 1990 cl 61(2). 
88 See JBCC 1991 cl 37.3. 
89 See GCC 1990 cl 61(3)-(4). 
90 See JBCC 1991cl37.2.3. 
91 See JBCC 1991 cl 37 .3. 
92 See JBCC 1991cl37.2.2. 
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Although the GCC 1990 contains similar provisions, they differ slightly in detail from 
those of the contract of the JBCC. The mediator may in his discretion follow either a 
formal or informal procedure and receive submissions either orally or in writing, sworn or 
unsworn, at a joint meeting or separately from, any person whom he believes can assist 
him in the formulation of his opinion. 94 However, each party to the dispute must be given 
an opportunity to present evidence or submissions and also be given full details of the 
evidence and submissions produced by an opposing party.95 Legal representation is not 
allowed.96 The mediator is entitled to propose compromise settlements in order to 
dispose of the whole or part of the dispute. 97 As soon as is practically possible, the 
mediator must give his written opinion to both parties.98 The mediator's opinion will be 
binding on both parties only to the extent that it is agreed as being binding.99 100 
The essential question is whether the processes determined by these contracts is 
mediation as it is known under its generic model described above, or whether the term 
"mediation" is used to describe a totally different concept and process. Some of the 
deviations from the conceptual model for mediation proposed in this work are obvious: 
the proceedings are commenced by the presentation of written or oral submissions or 
evidence; the mediator must first attempt to reconcile the parties; the mediator may act in 
an investigative capacity; the mediator is bound to furnish the parties with a written 
opinion. However, these matters are of secondary importance compared to the 
93 
94 
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96 
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98 
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100 
See JBCC 1991 cl 37 .2.4. 
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See GCC 1990 cl 61(2)(b). 
See GCC 1990 cl 61(2)(d). 
See GCC 1990 cl 61(2)(e). 
See GCC 1990 cl 61(2)(f). 
For a general commentary on the provisions for mediation contained in both 
contracts, see Finsen New Building Contract 126-127; Hyman Engineering 
Contracts 166-167; Finsen "Arbitration and mediation in the construction 
industry" 184-186. 
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extremely active interventionist role accorded to the mediator. The mediator is entitled to 
conduct independent investigations. Moreover, he is master of the proceedings to such 
an extent that the concept of the disputants negotiating their own settlement through the 
mediator seems to be of minimal importance. The purpose of the process is that the 
mediator should ultimately prepare and furnish the parties with a written opinion. In both 
instances, the mediator's opinion is binding in so far as the parties agree to be bound.101 
The question that must be raised is whether the process named as "mediation" is in fact 
mediation or either independent expert appraisal or non-binding arbitration. 
Theoretically, at least, the process identified under the JBCC 1991 ought to be classified 
as independent expert appraisal especially in view of the fact that it is specifically stated 
that the mediator will "be deemed to be acting as an expert and not as an arbitrator''. 
This reservation is not contained in the GCC 1990. Instead the GCC 1990 provides that 
the mediator's opinion is not binding on the parties except in so far as they agree to be 
bound. The most likely assumption that can be drawn from this provision is that the 
process so described is that of non-binding expedited arbitration. However, the 
processes set out in both contracts are described by the term "mediation". Once more 
the imprecise use of terminology plays havoc with the concept of mediation and raises 
serious doubts about the actual role of the third-party neutral. Had careful attention been 
given to the use of correct terminology in the first place, the need for conjecture would 
have been obviated. The actual identification of the process of independent expert 
appraisal and non-binding expedited arbitration, respectively, if these processes were 
intended, would have simplified matters considerably and delineated with clarity the 
actual role of the third-party neutral in each instance. 
The term "conciliation" is not commonly used in South Africa, and if so, it is referred to in 
either a highly specialised context or in an exploratory manner. The former relates to the 
statutory practice of conciliation in terms of the Labour Relations Act of 1956; 102 the latter 
alludes to the Hoexter Commission Report dealing with the structure and functioning of 
101 
102 
Finsen New Building Coniract 127; Finsen "Arbitration and mediation in the 
construction industry" 185; Hyman Engineering Coniracts 167; 
28 of 1956 s 35 provides for the ad hoc appointment of a conciliation board on 
which the disputants to a labour dispute are equally represented. 
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the courts, 103 which under its chapter dealing with proposals for a family court, 104 
proposed the use of conciliation as a means of resolving family and divorce disputes.105 
For the rest, the preferred term is "mediation" and particularly so in private practice. The 
official handbook of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Association of South Africa 106 in 
its definition and description of ADR processes makes no mention of the process of 
"conciliation".107 Likewise, in the field of private family and divorce mediation, only the 
term "mediation" is used. In fact, the term "mediation" is contained in the official title of 
South Africa's most highly recognised association in this particular field, the South 
African Association of Mediators in Family Matters.108 The conciliation/mediation debate 
that plagues so many other Anglo-American countries is therefore not at all contentious 
103 
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Fifth and Final Report Part A of the Commission of Enquiry into the 
Structure and Functioning of the Courts RP 78183, commonly referred to as 
the Hoexter Commission Report. 
The Desirability or Otherwise of the Establishment of a Family Court, RP 78/83 
part VII. 
The report at 522-523 describes conciliation in the following terms: rnhe 
conciliation process, which, in cases of irreparable rift in the marriage , is aimed 
at helping estranged spouses to communicate directly and to good purpose with 
each other to make their parting less traumatic for them as well as their children; 
and to resolve by agreement disputed points (such as custody of and access to 
minor children and the division of matrimonial assets." Scott-Macnab Mediation 
Arbitration 223-236 identifies in this description of conciliation two distinctive 
forms of process: the first urges a conciliatory and supportive approach while the 
second relates to the resolution of specific disputed points eg the custody and 
control of minor children. Conciliation is not described as a unitary but rather as a 
binary process of which mediation is the more specialised form and therefore at 
the very least the two forms of process should "be kept conceptually, if not 
actually apart". In regard to the correct use of terminology, it is preferable to use 
the term "mediation" generally while at the same time "recognising conciliation as 
that part of the process which deals with its supportive and therapeutic aspects". 
See also Scott-Macnab and Mowatt "Family mediation" 49-51. 
Commonly known by the acronym of ADRASA and is a lawyer organisation that 
has been founded to promote the concept and practice of efficiently resolving 
disputes other than by litigation. For further details, see Steadman "Directory of 
organisations" 208. 
The ADRASA Handbook was published by ADRASA in 1993. 
Commonly known by the acronym of SAAM and is a multi-disciplinary 
professional body that specialises in the field of family and divorce dispute 
resolution. For further details, see Steadman "Directory of organisations" 5. 
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in South Africa and is mainly raised in academic works dealing with family and divorce 
disputes.109 
Although the terms "mediation" and "conciliation" are sometimes used loosely,110 there is 
a genuine attempt in the local legal literature to distinguish between these two terms. 
Van Vuuren defines "mediation" and "conciliation" vaguely but does acknowledge that 
the differences between these terms are not always clear. His distinction is based on the 
function of the neutral third party and the level of participation of the disputants. In regard 
to mediation, he contends that the mediator may objectively advise the parties and make 
proposals for settlement but essentially the disputants must resolve their own dispute; 
conciliation entails mediation but differs in that the conciliator facilitates communication 
between the disputants, assists them to agree on a possible method for resolving the 
dispute and if so requested, may give a non-binding opinion.111 According to Pretorius, 
mediation is a continuation of the structured negotiation process involving the services of 
a neutral third party who assists the disputants in reaching an agreement based on their 
own decision-making powers; conciliation is distinguished on the grounds that "the 
conciliator will, in addition to playing the rote of mediator, make a formal 
recommendation to the parties for settlement of the dispute" .112 Mowatt, in describing 
these terms in relation to family matters, refers to conciliation as "an informal process 
whereby parties meet with a neutral third party to explore amicably the possibilities of a 
reasonable settlement".113 But his most telling remark is that, in legal terms, there is such 
vagueness in respect of the meaning of conciliation that it prevents the formalising of 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
See Scott-Macnab Mediation Arbitration 223-236; Scott-Macnab and Mowatt 
"Family mediation" 49-51; Mowatt "Family court and mediation" 290-294; Scott-
Macnab Mediation in the Family Context 5-10; Scott-Macnab ''Terminology and 
ADR"21-25. 
For instance, Burman and Rudolph "Repression by mediation" 252 note 3 
expressly state that for the purposes of their work the terms "mediation" and 
"conciliation" are used interchangeably. See also Schafer "Alternative divorce 
procedures" 308 note 72. 
"Altematiewe Dispuutbeslegting" 276. 
"Oveiview" 4. 
"Family court and mediation" 290. 
75 
terminology as well as the structuring of content.114 Against this background, his remarks 
about divorce mediation should be considered 
[M]ediation in divorce ... can be regarded as a process whereby the parties are 
encouraged, with the assistance of a neutral third party, to reach decisions on 
disputed issues .. . It is a process of legal decision making and should be 
distinguished from counselling . . . It is of the essence of mediation, as understood 
in this sense, that the validity of the process stems solely from the agreement 
between the parties; it is not derived from the authority of the mediator. This does 
not mean that the mediator may not add his o\J\111 proposals to those which have 
been volunteered by the parties. But it is important that the decision should not be 
imposed upon the parties.115 
The ADR movement in South Africa is still in its experimental stage of development and 
therefore the attempt to distinguish between mediation and conciliation is in itself 
encouraging. Irrespective of the shortcomings of these descriptions, they form the basis 
for further research and discourage the facile assumption that the terms "mediation" and 
"conciliation" are synonymous. 
This comparative survey illustrates the confusion that results from the absence of 
precise terminology. The variety of views and explanations that attempt to differentiate 
between the terms "mediation" and "conciliation" tend more to obscure the issues than to 
resolve them. At either end of the spectrum the debate ranges from whether these two 
terms are synonymous and are therefore interchangeable, to the view that these terms 
represent distinct and separate processes. There is also the problem of the reversed use 
of these terms which is quite different from using the terms interchangeably. The 
reversed use of terms in no manner negates the individuality of each process but rather 
points to the confusion that ensues in different dispute sectors when a particular process 
as it is commonly understood and practised, is called by another name. Another anomaly 
is the disparity between the use of a particular term and the process that is practised. 
This observation relates in particular to legislation that uses the term "mediation" but in 
fact the process that is prescribed is different to the generally accepted generic concept 
114 Idem. 
115 
"Family court and mediation" 293. 
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of mediation.116 Similarly, certain contractual provisions for dispute resolution provide for 
a method of non-binding third-party intervention that is called "mediation" and has its 
attributes but in reality deviates substantially from the conceptual model.117 
There is also the use of descriptive labels - terms that are devised to explain the 
differences between "mediation" and "conciliation". The best examples would be the 
distinctions made between "active and passive mediation" as well as between 
"evaluative and facilitative mediation". Although these descriptions might add to the 
existing confusion, they should not be rejected outright because they do attempt to 
distinguish between the terms "mediation" and conciliation". What is clearly 
acknowledged is that mediation and conciliation are separate and different processes 
and that each of these processes are derived from the same generic concept of 
mediation. Moreover, the words "active" and "passive" indicate that in practice there are 
differing degrees of mediatory intervention and the words "evaluative" and ''facilitative" 
explain the differing functions of the third-party neutral. The significance of these labels 
is that they focus on the divergence between theory and practice; they indicate that 
concept has not kept pace with developments that arise out of context-based 
applications of the general mediation model. 
The controversy may be reduced to two basic questions: firstly, are different terms used 
to describe the same concept or secondly, do the different terms actually describe 
different concepts? The first question goes to the root of the problem. The generic 
concept is so wide that it accommodates all the variants that occur in practice. For the 
sake of convenience, the generic concept will be restated: mediation entails a 
consensual process that involves the intervention of a neutral third-party who in a non-
adjudicative capacity and without the authority to make binding decisions, assists the 
disputants to settle their dispute. 
116 
117 
As for instance in the case of the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act of 
1987 and the Short Process and Mediation in Certain Civil Matters Act of 1991. 
As for instance in the case of the dispute resolution clauses contained in the 
JBCC and GCC contracts. 
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Quite clearly the processes of mediation and conciliation both fall within the ambit of this 
generic description. However, this does not validate the view that both these terms are 
synonymous and are therefore interchangeable. There is one critical factor that has 
been overlooked. The generic concept fails to distinguish between the differing functions 
and degrees of intervention of the third-party neutral as is reflected in the practice of 
these processes. The answer lies in recognising that, apart from the generic concept of 
mediation, further conceptualisation is necessary to encompass the differing activities of 
the third-party neutral that occur in a practical setting. The findings of this brief 
comparative survey support this view. 
The weight of opinion is that the process of conciliation, especially when applied in the 
context of a legislative support programme, imposes an evaluative and often a 
therapeutic function on the conciliator and, depending on the degree of third-party 
intervention, permits the conciliator to give advice to the disputants in order to bring them 
to a point where they are able to determine the main issues in dispute and to decide on 
a method for resolving these issues. On the other hand, in the case of the process of 
mediation, the mediator facilitates the negotiations between the disputants on the 
substantive issues in dispute that are capable of being integrated into a system of legal 
decision making and the mediator's intervention is confined to controlling and giving 
momentum to the process so that the disputants may settle the dispute on their own 
terms. 
This work adopts the approach that the words "conciliation" and "mediation" are distinct 
terms that describe separate and individual processes. This view fully recognises the 
generic concept of mediation but relegates its function to that of a theoretical model of 
first reference only. Moreover, in keeping with the legal and procedural emphasis of this 
\NOrk, a specific meaning is attributed to the term "mediation" that generally reflects the 
//-~-~- \ standards of practice in Anglo-American countries, notwithstanding the reversed use of 
\ 1./ ~\VL. ·. ',terminology. ®e process of mediation is therefore defined as a consensual and private k V' I <·::~::._ __ ,/process that involves the intermediary intervention of a neutral third party, known as a 
mediator, who, in a non-adjudicative and non-advisory capacity and without the authority 
to make binding decisions, controls and structures the process of negotiation that occurs 
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between the disputants so as to assist the parties to reach mutual agreement on 
substantive points of dispute that are capable of being integrated into a system of legal 
decision making.118 
3.2.3 Arbitration 
There is no confusion about the term "arbitration". Through the centuries, arbitration has 
been a term familiar in ancient systems of law as a legal proceeding. Other than in the 
case of the primary processes of negotiation and mediation, the very definition and 
concept of arbitration is ensconced in the legal system. As a primary process, arbitration 
has a long history in which its concept and definition were continually adapted to meet 
the changing demands of the legal system which it served. The history of arbitration 
therefore explains its modern concept and definition. 
Because of its colonial past, the analogue for arbitration in South Africa is traced to the 
law of England and that of Holland, as it had received Roman law of the Justinianian 
period into its domestic system of Germanic law. The concept of arbitration in South 
Africa is therefore based on the dual heritage of English law and Roman-Dutch law but 
in a very specific sense: the legislative tradition of arbitration is derived from English law 
and the related common-law principles are inherited from the Roman-Dutch law. 
A remarkable phenomenon is that the basic concept of arbitration as it is currently 
understood remains the same as in previous centuries. Johannes Voet in his 
Commentaries 4.8 interprets the Digest of Justinian's Corpus luris Civilis in relation to 
the practice of arbitration recognised by the courts of Holland. The substantive and 
procedural details differ from modern practice yet Voet clearly describes arbitration as a 
legal proceeding that had been devised to obviate the cumbersome procedures, 
frustrating delays and exorbitant expense of court proceedings 
The reason being, so it has been said, that some persons are frightened of the 
too heavy expense of law suits, the din of legal proceedings, their harassing 
118 See, further, chapter 6 that deals in detail with the process of mediation. 
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labours and pernicious delays, and finally the burdensome and weary waiting on 
the uncertainty of law.119 
Although occurring in a different setting, similar circumstances led to the evolution of 
arbitration in English law. 
Initially the royal courts were primarily concerned with disputes about land, or conduct 
that disturbed the king's peace and were therefore not adapted to meet the needs of 
commerce. Debts or commercial credits owed to or by foreigners were wholly 
unenforceable, the procedure of the royal courts was tardy and technical and therefore 
inadequate for settling disputes between traders who were continuously travelling from 
one fair to the next, and so too, for this reason jurisdiction was normally ousted because 
of the need to prove venue so as to accommodate the sitting of a jury.120 The result was 
that merchants and traders began to rely on their own special tribunals to settle 
commercial disputes outside the normal jurisdiction of the courts.121 The best known 
commercial tribunals were the pie-powder courts and the courts of staple.122 These 
developments occurred in England during the Middle Ages. Although Voet is describing 
the practice of the courts of Holland, his commentary is based on what had already 
occurred in Roman law. The English experience was not particularly novel - Roman law 
pre-dated these developments. 
Arbitration has a history and that shows that it is an ancient procedure. Obviously, the 
ancient forms of arbitration must have differed in their detail from the modern concept of 
arbitration, but essentially the concept remains the same. Arbitration was developed as a 
flexible procedure to obviate the cumbersome and time-consuming processes of the 
ordinary courts. This in itself points to a fundamental principle: arbitration was devised as 
119 Commentaries 4.8.1; Gane 1 Selective Voet 736. 
120 Parker "History of Commercial Arbitration" 6. 
121 Parker "History of Commercial Arbitration" 6; Jones "History of arbitration" 130. 
122 Parker "History of Commercial Arbitration" 6-7. 
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an alternative to the procedure of the courts. Voet is astute to differentiate between 
arbitration and litigation 
Yet it should not be passed over that in many things arbitration proceedings differ 
from judicial. I say so because a state of /is pendens is not brought about by the 
former; nor is reconvention allowed, since a submission has its own limits, 
beyond which an arbitrator settles nothing .... since it was never embraced in the 
submission. This applies to appeal .. . Nor are arbitrators furnished with public 
authority, so that they can neither compel litigants nor force witnesses to give 
evidence. Furthermore when arbitrators have been corrupted by one or other of 
the parties to the submission, the action on fraud asserts in its place, and is 
granted to the person damaged against the person corrupting; whereas when 
judges are corrupted, the decision is ipso jure null and void and there is no need 
of an action on fraud against the corrupting opponent. 123 
In a contemporary context, these distinctions are not particularly relevant. Over the 
centuries the form and content of both arbitration and litigation have changed and, so 
too, the relative advantages and disadvantages of each process. However, the value of 
the distinctions drawn by Voet illustrates that historically arbitration and litigation were 
recognised as separate and independent procedures. 
Voet's Commentaries were published at the turn of the 17th century.124 At 
approximately the same time in England, the Arbitration Act of 169?125 was passed. This 
Act introduced an important principle; it provided that an arbitral award could be 
enforced by the courts if this was agreed upon by the parties in their submission to 
arbitration.126 Voet shows that a similar principle applied in the Roman-Dutch law. The 
parties in their submission to arbitration could agree to have the award made an order of 
court.127 Arbitration was recognised (although not definitively expressed as such) as a 
123 
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125 
126 
127 
Commentaries 4.8.1; Gane 1 Selective Voet 737. 
Hahlo and Kahn The SA Legal System 556. 
9 & 10 Will 3 c 15. See also Gill Law of Arbitration 1-2 for a brief background to 
the Arbitration Act of 1697. 
Park.er "History of Commercial Arbitration" 14. 
Commentaries 4.8.31; Gane 1 Selective Voet 763. 
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consensual procedure in that it was based on a submission that set out the mutual 
agreement of the parties to arbitrate their dispute. Voet is careful to define vvhat is meant 
by a submission 
An arbitrator is appointed by submission of the parties, that is an agreement by 
vvhich the contestants promise that they will abide by an arbitrator's decision ... 128 
The submission is regarded by Voet as being extremely important for the conduct of 
arbitration proceedings: the submission may be expressed or tacit; 129 only certain 
persons were competent to enter into a submission;130 not every cause could be the 
subject of a submission; 131 the award had to be given in the time fixed in the 
submission;132 and the arbitrator had to dispose of every issue contained in the 
submission and could not exceed its limits.133 
One of the natural consequences of enforcing the decision of an extra-curial tribunal as 
an order of court would be that the parties request the court to revise that decision or the 
courts themselves assume that responsibility. The Arbitration Act of 1697 initiated the 
development of substantive principles in this regard. At the time of the Act, the grounds 
for refusing to enforce an arbitral award were limited to a review of vvhether the arbitrator 
had acted within the terms of the submission, thereby restricting the issues to the 
personal obligations between the parties.134 Only in the early 18th century did it become 
128 
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130 
131 
132 
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Commentaries 4.8.3; Gane 1 Selective Voet 738-739. Van der Linden in his 
commentary on the cited passage confirms that arbitration is a voluntary and 
consensual procedure but subject to the reservation that it can be compulsory as 
in the case of a will that stipulates that disputes between heirs must be resolved 
through arbitration. Van der Linden's comment confirms that voluntary and 
compulsory arbitration were recognised in his age. 
Commentaries 4.8.3; Gane 1 Selective Voet 739. 
Commentaries 4.8.4-4.8.5; Gane 1 Selective Voet 740-741. 
Commentaries 4.8.10; Gane 1 Selective Voet743-744. 
Commentaries 4.8.17; Gane 1 Selective Voet 7 49-750. 
Commentaries 4.8.18; Gane 1 Selective Voet 7 40. 
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settled practice that a court could intervene to set aside an arbitral award on the grounds 
of a mistake in law.135 Although occurring in a different setting, similar considerations 
applied in the Roman-Dutch law. 
Voet distinguishes between three distinct matters: revision, correction and appeal.136 If 
an aggrieved party was dissatisfied with the award, it was possible to deliver a protest 
within the prescribed period which had the effect of commencing judicial proceedings for 
the review of the award. Once the prescribed period had expired, only correction was 
possible. Voet is quite definite that an arbitral award can never be taken on appeal. In 
the case of appeal the issues are heard by a judge of a higher court whereas in the case 
of revision only an ordinary judge of the court that would have heard the matter had it not 
been submitted to arbitration, is competent to conduct the revision. 137 As in the case of 
appeal, execution of the arbitral award is stayed until the decision on revision has been 
given. However, the issue regarding an appeal in respect of an arbitral award does not 
seem to be totally settled in the Roman-Dutch law. The general principle was that no 
appeal lies against an arbitrator's decision.138 However, whenever an arbitral award had 
been confirmed or altered by a judge of revision, the aggrieved party was entitled to 
appeal to a judge of a superior court should that party contend that he had suffered 
damage.139 Furthermore, it seems that the issue of whether an appeal was permitted or 
not, was dependent on whether the parties agreed to have the award enforced by an 
inferior or superior court; appeal to a superior court was possible if the parties had 
agreed to the jurisdiction of a lower court.140 
134 Parker "History of Commercial Arbitration" 15. 
135 Park.er "History of Commercial Arbitration" 16-18. 
136 Commentaries 4.8.25; Gane 1 Selective Voet 259-260. 
137 Commentaries 4.8.25 read with 4.8.27; Gane 1 Selective Voet 759-761. 
138 Commentaries 4.8.1 read with 4.8.25; Gane 1 Selective Voet 737 759. 
139 Commentaries 4.8.28; Gane 1 Selective Voet 762. 
140 Commentaries 4.8.31; Gane 1 Selective Voet 763-764. 
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As far as legislation is concerned, the Arbitration Act of 1889141 is a major landmark. 
Firstly, it amended and consolidated all prior legislation, including the provisions of the 
Common Law Procedure Act of 1854142 which, in relation to arbitration, was a first 
attempt at recognising and integrating arbitration into the legal system. The Arbitration 
Act of 1889 finally achieved the objective of establishing arbitration as part of the law of 
England.143 Secondly, the Arbitration Act of 1889 is also focal to the history of arbitration 
in South Africa since it formed the model for the statutory development of arbitration in 
this country. 
In South Africa, the Arbitration Act of 1965144 regulates any written agreement to 
arbitration 145 excluding matrimonial causes or matters relating to the status of a 
person.146 The Act consolidated and repealed147 all prior legislation that applied in the 
Cape, Natal and the Transvaal.148 The Arbitration Act of 1889 effectively applied in 
South Africa until 1965 because, apart from minor variations, the provisions of the 
provincial legislation were based on those of the English statute of 1889.149 There was 
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146 
147 
148 
149 
52 & 53 Viet c 49. 
17 & 18Vietc125. 
Parker "History of Commercial Arbitration" 19. See also Jones "History of 
arbitration" 133. 
42 of 1965. The Arbitration Act of 1965 is modeled on its English counterpart, the 
Arbitration Act of 1950: Jacobs Arbitration in SA 1. 
s 1 (i) "arbitration agreement" means any written agreement providing for the 
reference to arbitration or any existing dispute or any future dispute relating to a 
matter specified in the agreement, whether an arbitrator is named or designated 
therein or not. 
Sees 2. 
Sees 42(1). 
Arbitration Act 29 of 1898 (Cape); Arbitration Act 24 of 1898 (Natal); Arbitration 
Ordinance 24of1904 (Transvaal}. 
Jacobs Arbiiration in SA 1. 
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one notable exception. Until 1965, arbitration in the Orange Free State was dealt with 
according to the principles of the Roman-Dutch law.150 
The statutory regulation of arbitration based on the model of English legislation 
effectively restricted the scope of application of Roman-Dutch law. But this in no manner 
detracts from the fact that Roman-Dutch law and not English law is the common law for 
arbitration. The Arbitration Act of 1965 does not expressly set aside the Roman-Dutch 
law.151 Although English case law was introduced as persuasive authority in respect of 
those South African provisions that contained terms similar to those of the English 
legislation, the general tendency of South African courts is to interpret the legislation 
concerned in accordance with the Roman-Dutch law.152 Moreover, in terms of its 
definition of an "arbitration agreement", the Arbitration Act of 1965 is restricted to the 
regulation of only written submissions to arbitration.153 The implication is therefore that 
all submissions that are not in writing are governed by the Roman-Dutch law.154 
The modern definition of arbitration is therefore rooted in its historical concepts. Every 
modern definition is based on concepts that can be traced to the historical foundations of 
arbitration. These concepts may be enumerated as follows -
150 
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1 LAWSA par 406. 
Davis Law and Practice of Arbitration 3; Jacobs Arbitration in SA 1-2 3; 1 
LAWSA407. 
Jacobs Arbitration in SA 1 3-4. For instance, Jacobs 3 notes that whereas in 
English law an award can be set aside if a mistake of law appears on its face 
even if that mistake does not amount to misconduct, in South African law a 
mistake in law not amounting to misconduct on the face of the award does not 
justify setting it aside. 
See note 145 above. 
Davis Law and Practice of Arbitration 3; Jacobs Arbitration in SA 6-7; 1 
LAWSA par 407. 
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(a) arbitration is an extra-curial procedure aimed at expediting the resolution 
of a dispute by avoiding the formality, technicality, delays and expense of 
litigation; 
(b) the related procedure is mainly regulated by legislation; 
(c) the arbitrator acts a neutral third party who in his private capacity 
exercises a judicial function; 
(d) the method of dispute resolution is adjudicative; 
( e) the process is based on the mutual consent of the parties as expressed 
by the terms of their agreement to arbitration; 
(f) the award is binding on the basis of the mutual agreement of the parties 
but it may be made an order of court and be enforced as such; 
(g) an award is not subject to appeal but may be reviewed on application to 
court. 
These basic concepts, ancient though they may be, are contained as the elements of 
every modern definition of arbitration.155 
Full arbitration, expedited arbitration, documents-only arbitration, final-offer arbitration: 
these are all modern terms that would have flummoxed our Roman, Dutch and English 
precursors. And yet, if the meaning of these terms was briefly explained, they would 
have understood the concept because the principle and practice of arbitration, no matter 
how rudimentary it might have been, was part of their system of legal dispute resolution. 
155 For instance, see Jacobs Arbitration in SA 1: "An arbitration is the reference of a 
dispute or difference between not less than two parties for determination, after 
heating both sides in a judicial manner, by a person or persons other than a court 
of competent jutisdiction." Astor and Chinkin Dispute Resolution 63 give the 
following definition: "Arbitration is an adversary process whereby an independent 
third party (or parties) chosen by the parties makes an award binding on the 
parties after having heard submissions from them." Kanowitz ADR 304 offers the 
following definition after having noted the distinction between non-binding and 
binding arbitration: "Binding arbitration ... is a system under which disputing 
parties choose a neutral third party to hear their dispute and to resolve it by 
rendeting a final and binding decision or award." All these definitions contain one 
or more of the elements contained in the conceptual model for arbitration stated 
in the text. 
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3.3 The primary processes as fonnative principles 
Existing in isolation from each other, the processes of negotiation, mediation and 
arbitration were limited to the scope of their conventional functions and traditional fields 
of application. However, combined as primary processes within a unified system of 
dispute resolution, these three processes have taken on new dimensions that give 
momentum to the formation of the system of ADR. As has been noted, within the system 
of ADR, the context and scope of the primary processes have been extended into 
derivative processes and hybrid processes have been devised. Within the ambit of the 
system of ADR, the primary processes have been reinterpreted thereby establishing the 
formative principles that generate its development and propagate its maturation. 
However, the formative function of the primary process has mainly occurred by means of 
experimentation at the context-based level of application. The experimental stage of 
development is characterised by the expansion of ADR techniques and processes in 
substantive areas of dispute to the neglect of theoretical underpinnings. A tension 
between theory and context-based applications is inevitable. However, serious problems 
arise if theory does not keep pace with practice and vice versa. The confusion regarding 
concept, definition and terminology is particularly obvious in those dispute sectors which 
rely on the process of mediation. A preoccupation with experimentation at the expense 
of theory runs the risk of dissipating the formative influence of the primary process. 
These formative principles ought to be projected into a developmental stage in which the 
process-related dimensions of the system of ADR are explored and extended within a 
general structure of theory. Emphasis on theory and process promotes a critical 
evaluation of the content, structure and the internal dynamics of ADR processes, raises 
issues of quality and formulates standards of practice and ethical norms for professional 
conduct. A stable theoretical framework consisting of cogent principles and well-defined 
concepts, forms a secure base from which the institutionalisation of ADR can proceed 
systematically. Institutionalisation entails the mainstreaming of ADR into the court 
system, the statutory regulation of ADR, the introduction of court-annexed processes, 
the funding of state-sponsored ADR programmes as well as the formal regulation and 
control of private dispute resolution organisations and their members. 
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In many respects this model for development indicates the route that the fledgling ADR 
movement should take in South Africa. If there is a general failure to create a 
developmental base of theory and principle and instead the emphasis falls on context-
based applications, it is likely that ADR will stultify and lose its impetus to change the 
dynamics of dispute resolution in this country. 
CHAPTER 4 
ADR PROCESSES: CLASSIFICATION 
4.1 Principles underlying the classification 
4.2 Methodology 
4.3 Explanation of the gradients 
4.3.1 The horizontal gradient 
4.3.2 The vertical gradient 
4.4 Final remarks 
4.1 Principles underlying the classification 
The content of the preceding chapters contains primary principles that, if extracted, 
establish a framework for the classification of primary dispute resolution processes. The 
themes developed in these chapters will therefore be briefly summarised in order to 
establish the primary principles which they contain. These principles will be used to 
construct the framework of the schematic classification that follows. 1 
The interpretation of each word of the rubric "alternative dispute resolution" brings a 
number of salient principles to the fore. A restrictive interpretation of the word 
"alternative" raises two important aspects. The first introduces the ADR/litigation 
dichotomy by posing that non-litigious and litigious processes are antithetical to each 
other.2 The result is to counterposition the systems of ADR and judicial dispute 
See 4.3 below. 
2 See 2.1.1 above. 
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resolution as being mutually exclusive. As has already been stated,3 this view is more a 
matter of fiction than of fact. However, the ADR/litigation dichotomy does create a useful 
theoretical model that distinguishes between non-litigious and litigious processes. 
The second restrictive interpretation that may be applied to the word "alternative" deals 
with the internal dynamic of the system of ADR In this respect, the issues relate to the 
distinction between substantive and non-substantive ADR processes, depending on 
whether or not the intervention of a third-party neutral is required, or whether the ADR 
process concerned is adjudicative or non-adjudicative. 4 Although these issues are highly 
theoretical, they do introduce principles relating to third-party intervention as well as the 
distinction between adjudicative and non-adjudicative processes. 
Finally, the word "alternative" is given an extensive interpretation. This interpretation 
introduces the concept of appropriate dispute resolution: one of a number of process-
related options, including litigation, may be selected to meet the requirements of the 
dispute concerned. In this setting, the form and function of a particular dispute resolution 
process is the determining factor. Consequently, all dispute resolution processes, 
including litigation, are integrated into a system of dispute resolution that promotes the 
functional selection of a particular process to suit the nature and content of the dispute 
concerned. On the grounds of this principle, litigation is acknowledged as a dispute 
resolution process and therefore justifies its inclusion in a classification of the primary 
dispute resolution processes of negotiation, mediation and arbitration. 5 
The interpretation of the word "dispute" forces an analysis of the origin, nature, meaning 
and transformation of a dispute. Principles for two major themes are developed. The one 
is the distinction between a non-legal and a legal dispute, 6 the other relates to dispute 
transformation.7 These principles are interrelated. A dispute is eventually transformed 
3 See 2.1.2 above. 
4 See 2.1.3 above. 
5 See 2.1.4 above. 
6 See 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 above. 
7 See 2.2.2 and 2.2.4 above. 
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according to the norms and values of the system of dispute resolution to which it is 
addressed. This is a continuous process that accounts for the transformation of a 
grievance into a dispute and the eventual transformation of a dispute in its social setting 
into a legal dispute, the latter being placed at the apex of the dispute resolution pyramid. 
This model explains the continuity between a grievance and a non-legal dispute and a 
non-legal dispute and a legal dispute. These principles indicate the manner in which the 
form and function of a particular process transforms the dispute and directly influences 
its outcome. 
The word "resolution" has a number of dimensions in regard to the outcome of dispute 
processing. The examination of the outcome of a dispute introduces diverse factors 
relating to its enforcement and its qualitative attributes. A guiding principle is to 
determine whether the outcome is binding or non-binding. A binding outcome entails 
enforcement through the coercive power of State. Moreover, qualitative evaluation may 
be applied to a non-binding outcome because the absence of coercion makes such an 
outcome reliant on the mutual agreement of the disputants. This evaluation determines 
whether the outcome results in a win/lose, lose/lose or win/win situation.8 
At this stage it is possible to identify a number of dichotomies: litigious/non-litigious 
processes, adjudicative/non-adjudicative processes, legal/non-legal disputes, binding 
and coercive/non-binding and non-coercive outcomes. The principles which these 
distinctions raise form the basis for analysis and classification. 
Litigation has already been identified as an important dispute resolution process. 9 
Further, within the ambit of the system of ADR there are three recognised primary 
processes: negotiation, mediation and arbitration.10 In an integrated system of dispute 
resolution, the primary ADR processes, along with litigation, form major categories for 
classification. Each individual process establishes the framework for classification in 
regard to the form of process. 
8 See 2.3 above. 
9 See 2.1.4 above. 
10 See 3.1 above. 
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There are some remaining points that need to be clarified. The first is that principles 
relating to procedure have not been dealt with yet. These principles permeate the work 
and will therefore be systematically evaluated in the chapters that follow. The 
classification contained in this chapter anticipates the content of subsequent chapters. 
In the light of the above, the following are extracted as the primary principles for 
classification -
(a) the form of process 
(b) procedure 
(c) the dispute 
(d) third-party intervention 
(e) disputant participation 
(f) outcome 
These primary principles form the basis for further classification. However, before any 
classification can be attempted it is necessary to determine issues relating to 
methodology. 
4.2 Methodology 
The classification of ADR process is based upon two interdependent factors. The first 
relates to the primary principles that are selected to form the framework of the 
classification. This matter has already been dealt with.11 The other factor concerns the 
method of reasoning that should be applied. Two options are available: either an 
inductive or a deductive method. Each method directly influences the compilation of the 
classification. 
There are a number of ways to approach ADR. One recognised approach is to 
concentrate on context-based applications of ADR processes in various dispute sectors. 
This means that ADR processes are classified according to substantive areas of 
11 See 4.1 above. 
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dispute.12 This has a restrictive effect. The related research is necessarily either 
anecdotal or empirical. Useful though this research might be, its method is inductive, 
demanding that general principles be abstracted from particular experiences or results. 
This particular approach is therefore not conducive to establishing universal criteria as 
the basis for classification because it is unable to place ADR processes within a general 
structure of theory. 
The other approach to ADR is process related. This approach is based on the premise 
that ADR establishes a system of process that is alternative to, but not exclusive of, the 
system of judicial dispute resolution. In this context, ADR processes are assessed in 
relation to legal process. The emphasis is on process which in turn forces an evaluation 
of ADR processes within the structure of the general principles of procedure. The 
adoption of this approach has a direct impact on the structure of any classification. The 
method of reasoning is deductive, commencing with the general principles of process 
and procedure and then working to the particular principles applicable to specific 
processes. 
Both approaches have their own merits, depending on the aim that each intends to 
achieve. However, for the purpose of this work, the process-related approach which is 
deductive, is adopted. This approach is in keeping with the purpose of proving that ADR 
is a system of process. 
12 See, for instance, Nagel "Multi-criteria dispute resolution" 6-29 in which a 
systematic analysis of dispute processes is applied in relation to particular 
substantive areas of dispute (eg family disputes, labour-management disputes, 
merchant-consumer disputes, neighbourhood disputes, disputes between a 
government agency and a private firm, disputes between business firms, 
disputes between governmental agencies, international disputes); dispute 
resolution processes are analysed according to the substantive nature of the 
dispute. An even better example is to be found in Mills Conflict Resolution and 
Public Policy which concentrates solely on public sector dispute resolution; the 
content consists of a mixture of anecdotal or empirical research as is evident 
from a random selection of some of the chapters of the work: "The hazardous 
waste dilemma and the hazards of institutionalising negotiation"; "Utility 
consumer dispute settlement: a regulatory model for mediation, arbitration and 
class advocacy"; "Competition, negotiation, or co-operation? Three alternative 
models for contracting services". 
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A process-related classification of ADR processes is not without its own problems. A 
critical factor relates to the method that will control and direct the classification of the 
subject matter. On the basis of existing research, two recognised methods of 
classification emerge. The one method classifies ADR processes according to individual 
characteristics; the other uses comparison as a method of classification. The merits of 
each method are assessed before an alternative method is proposed. 
Classification on the basis of the characteristics of the various ADR processes is useful 
and should not be summarily rejected. 13 In fact, every classification of ADR processes is 
dependent on an analysis of the characteristics of the processes concerned. However, a 
characteristic-based classification is normally incomplete because the various 
characteristics that form the framework for classification are isolated from the body of 
general theory. Put differently, the inadequacy relates to the failure to relate the various 
characteristics to the general principles from which they are derived. 
Comparison is yet another method for classifying the subject matter of ADR processes. 
In this instance, two methods of comparison are possible. The first relies on a 
comparison of similarities and dissimilarities of the elements of the various processes 
involved; 14 the second method is based on a qualitative comparison that grades the 
processes concerned in relation to their efficacy in terms of a given list of elements.15 
Comparison is an important component of any classification. An evaluation of the 
similarities and dissimilarities of the subject matter of various processes leads to a 
deeper insight into their different functions. So too, a qualitative comparison emphasises 
in functional terms the advantages and disadvantages of using a particular process. 
However, both methods have serious defects. Both restrict the content of the 
13 
14 
15 
See Goldberg, Sander and Rogers Dispute Resolution 4 for a characteristics-
based classification. This classification is appended at the end of this chapter 
and marked as annexure A for the purposes of identification. 
For a classification based on the same method of comparison, see Brand 
"Nature of arbitration process" 100-101. This classification is appended at the 
end of this chapter and marked annexure B for the purposes of identification. 
See Street "Comparison of dispute resolution processes" 117 for a classification 
based on a qualitative comparative method. This classification is appended at 
the end of this chapter and marked annexure C for the purposes of identification. 
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classification since the subject matter so classified is limited to the similarities and 
dissimilarities of individual elements of the processes concerned. But most importantly, 
the individual elements compared are not traced to their source of origin that is derived 
from the structure of the general principles of procedure. This has the effect of restricting 
the scope of the classification because only the elements of the various processes that 
are capable of comparison, are considered. 
An analytical method of classification is applied in this work.16 The subject matter relating 
to various ADR processes is integrated by interrelating the form of process to the 
general principles of procedure. The classification is therefore composed of a horizontal 
and a vertical gradient. The form of process is represented on the horizontal gradient 
and the general categories of procedure are contained on the vertical gradient. The 
subject matter is contained beneath the horizontal gradient and to the right of the vertical 
gradient and may be analysed by simultaneously cross-referencing both gradients. 
A notable feature of the classification is that both gradients contain an internal sub-
classification. This permits a more precise analysis of the subject matter. A concrete 
example taken from the schematic classification below17 would best illustrate this 
working method. If arbitration is the subject for analysis, then the following method 
should be applied. By reference to the horizontal gradient it may be established that 
arbitration is a FORM of process that is non-litigious and adjudicative. A further analysis 
of arbitration is possible by applying the vertical gradient. For instance, it is possible to 
determine that in respect of its OUTCOME, arbitration (as a non-litigious and 
adjudicative process) produces a win/lose result. Individual elements of the subject 
matter may therefore be analysed according to the particular classification and sub-
classification of the information contained in both gradients. This application 
simultaneously involves the reduction of any individual element back to its source of 
origin within the framework of the general principles of procedure. 
16 See also table 1 below. 
17 See table 1 below. 
TABLE 1 - CLASSIFICATION OF APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES 
technical, formal and 
adversarial 
public and legal 
rules of natural justice 
regulated by court 
rules of evidence 
predetermined and rigid 
public proceedings 
summons on action 
aoolication on motion 
rigidly applied 
supplied by State and 
formal, but not necessarily 
technical or adversarial 
private and legal 
rules of natural justice 
standards of proof agreed 
betvveen disputants and 
arbitrator 
informal and non-adversarial 
private and community standards 
no guarantees; mediator 
maintains povver balance 
no guarantees 
burden of persuasion only, resting on disputants 
rules of procedure and I mediator determines rules I disputants determine 
substantive criteria may be of conduct ~th disputants O'Ml rules 
determined bv disoutants 
private except Wien taken I private highly private 
on review 
by mutual agreement 
flexible 
determined by jurisdictional I private, as arranged by disputants 
factors 
appeal I no appeal, only review I no appeal or review 
non-legal or legal 
arbitration agreement 
mainly commercial, 
industrial and labour 
non-legal; rights-, interest- or grievance-based 
identified by disputants I agenda 
~commercial, labour, I all 
divorce and family, 
environmental 
~ 
public adjudicator 
coercive povver of court 
state imposed judicial 
official 
state 
party prosecution and 
presentation regulated by 
rules 
legal representation 
impersonal; adversarial 
presentation heightens 
conflict 
judgment I order 
binding 
private adjudicator 
disputants by agreement 
submit to procedural and 
substantive control. 
party selected, usually Vllith 
specialist knolMedge 
prosecution and 
presentation regulated by 
disoutants 
self-representation or legal 
representation 
permits on-going 
relationships 
award 
mainly binding but can be 
non-binding 
win /lose 
limited range of legal 
remedies determined by 
court 
execution under sanction of 
State 
possible remedies 
identified by disputants and 
determined bv arbitrator 
award on application 
enforced as order of court 
facilitator 
disputants subject to 
mediator control but 
determine their O'Ml I no third-party 
bargaining parameters involvement 
party selected, usually Vllith 
specialist knolMedge and 
mediator skills 
privately by disputants 
mediator controls process, 
disputants control content 
and outcome 
disputants have total 
control over process, 
content and outcome 
self-representation 
permits, maintains or 
enhances on-going 
relationshios 
permits on-going 
relationships, if style 
not comoetitive 
deed of settlement 
contractually binding 
mutually acceptable agreement sought 
actual remedies identified and determined by 
disputants 
enforcement only under law of contract 
~ 
98 
There is another important feature of this method of classification. The analytical method 
of classification also permits a subsidiary classification either of the characteristics of a 
particular process or on the basis of a comparison of the various processes involved. 
The characteristics of a particular form of process may be referenced by reading down 
the columns of the vertical gradient. So too, by reading across the columns of the 
horizontal gradient it is possil:)le to compare the various processes on the basis of their 
similarities and dissimilarities. 
Noticeable by its absence is the classification of the hybrid processes.18 Numerous 
problems complicate the inclusion of the hybrid processes into the classification of the 
primary ADR processes. The intrinsic nature of the hybrid processes prevents their 
inclusion into the main classification. The overriding reason is the manner in which the 
hybrid processes combine elements of the primary processes. This alters the method of 
classification. Each hybrid process must be classified according to the elements of the 
primary processes that have been combined to create the hybrid process itsetf. For 
these reasons, a separate classification of the hybrid processes will follow in a 
subsequent chapter.19 
4.3 Explanation of the gradients20 
4.3.1 The horizontal gradient 
The horizontal gradient relates to the classification of the FORM of process. Every 
aspect of the classification is influenced by it. There is one cardinal reason that 
accentuates the importance of the horizontal gradient: the transformation of a dispute is 
directly influence by the FORM of process. FORM is at the heart of process - its 
substance, nature and method of application. The FORM of process is therefore focal to 
any process-related classification. 
18 
19 
20 
See, further, 8.3 below. 
See further 8.2 below. 
In order to facilitate a clear description of both the horizontal and vertical 
gradients, key terms have either been capitalised, italisised or printed in bold. 
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The category process is sub-classified under the headings litigation, arbitration, 
mediation and negotiation. Ostensibly, this sub-classification may be regarded as merely 
naming the major dispute resolution processes. However, the naming of an individual 
process has more important implications. Each process predicts the nature and method 
of the transformation that will occur as well as the process-related implications. These 
implications are expressed in the vertical gradient. 
The nature and method of application constitute a further classification in regard to the 
FORM of process. The nature of the FORM of process is either litigious or non-litigious 
and the method of application in respect of a particular process is either adjudicative or 
non-adjudicative. 
The sub-classification of the nature of the FORM into categories of litigious and non-
litigious may be misleading if not qualified. The distinction between litigious and non-
litigious processes could be associated with the ADR/litigation dichotomy. As mentioned 
above,21 the ADR/litigation dichotomy is not at all relevant to this classification apart from 
introducing this distinction. For the purpose of this classification, litigious and non-litigious 
are not used as oppositional terms but instead have a technical meaning. In their 
technical sense these terms indicate whether or not a particular process is capable of 
sustaining a dispute on the basis of substantive legal principles and court-sanctioned 
rules of procedure. In terms of the classification, litigation is the only FORM of process 
that is litigious. Arbitration, mediation and negotiation are non-litigious. This conclusion is 
obvious in respect of mediation and negotiation but needs to be qualified in regard to 
arbitration. Although it is possible that an arbitral award may be based on principles of 
law, it is equally possible that the award could deal only with the merits of the facts in 
dispute. Moreover, sanctioned rules of court do not apply to arbitration proceedings 
unless the disputants mutually agree to adopt these rules. What is evident is that 
arbitration does have some of the attributes of a litigious process but not in plenary form. 
Arbitration is therefore classified as a non-litigious process.22 
21 
22 
See 4.1 above. 
For the distinction between litigation and arbitration as forms of adjudication, see 
Bayles "Principles of legal procedure" 38-39. 
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The terms adjudicative and non-adjudicative may also be misunderstood. A 
misconception is that the term adjudication indicates whether an outcome is binding or 
not. This is not a correct description of adjudication but rather expresses a consequence 
incidental to the selection of a process that is either adjudicative or non-adjudicative. 
Within the context of the classification, adjudicative and non-adjudicative refer to the 
method of decision making in regard to a particular form of process. The category 
adjudicative entails the method whereby the issues in dispute, as they have been 
formulated by the parties, are appraised by a neutral third party on the basis of the 
evidence presented and resolved in favour of one of the disputants, on the grounds of 
an objective and often reasoned decision. The meaning of non-adjudicative· is self-
explanatory. 
The function of the horizontal gradient may be illustrated by the following example: if 
mediation is selected as the FORM of process, then according to its nature it is non-
litigious and its method of decision making is non-adjudicative. The same type of 
analysis may be applied to the processes of litigation, arbitration and negotiation. 
4.3.2 The vertical gradient 
The vertical gradient is classified according to five categories relating to process: 
PROCEDURE, the DISPUTE, THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION, DISPUTANT 
PARTICIPATION and OUTCOME. Each category is subject to a further sub-
classification. Whereas the horizontal gradient deals with the method of dispute 
transformation, the vertical gradient relates to the content of that transformation. 
The vertical gradient commences with the category: PROCEDURE. The word 
"procedure" is used in its broadest sense to indicate the manner in which a process is 
conducted as well as the values that underlie that process. The stated sub-classification 
of PROCEDURE into standards of proof, rules, confidentiality, commencement, time 
limits, venue and redress, relates directly to the formal conduct of a specific process. 
These are self-evident and do not need any further comment. The philosophical 
underpinnings are expressed under the elements of nature, norms and procedural 
guarantees. 
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The nature of PROCEDURE is classified as being either technical, formal, informal or 
adversarial. The major determinant regarding the nature of PROCEDURE is whether a 
process is either adversarial or non-adversarial. The term "adversarial" refers to the 
presence of a third-party neutral who in an adjudicative capacity plays the role of an 
umpire within the Anglo-American setting of trial proceedings. Moreover, "adversarial" 
alludes to the principles of party prosecution and party presentation whereby each of the 
disputants is responsible for prosecuting the complaint or defending it, as the case may 
be, as well as investigating and presenting proofs or arguments. 23 In an adversarial 
setting, each disputant takes a partisan stance in regard to his own cause or defence, as 
the case may be, on the assumption that truth may be established by synthesising 
opposing views.24 
Although not always evident from the practical rules of procedure, all forms of procedure 
are based on normative precepts. The practical rules of procedure have a significance 
beyond their verbal meaning. These values are sometimes formulated as public and 
legal norms that have been devised to safeguard public morality or the public interest. 
Similarly, procedural norms are formulated to express private or community standards. 
The norms of PROCEDURE are therefore an important indication of the value system 
that supports the objectives of a particular process. 
The aspect of procedural guarantees deals with the issue of whether or not a particular 
process maintains and protects the rights or interests of disputants.25 Once the 
23 
24 
25 
For the principles of party prosecution and party presentation, see Hazard Civil 
Procedure 4-5; Millar "Formative principles" 19-21 9-11. 
See, further, Berman 'Western legal science" 909-911 921 930; Calamandrei 
Procedure and Democracy 72 75 79; Couture "Judicial process" 19-20. In 
regard to the dialectical nature of process, Couture writes: " ... that which 
constitutes the structure of process is the dialectical order. The judicial process 
and the dialectical process appear to us to be united by a firm bond. The truth is 
arrived at by oppositions and refutations: by thesis, antithesis and synthesis. 
Justice employs dialectic, because it is by the principles of contradiction that the 
truth can be reached, the confrontation of opposites." 
Although the principles relating to procedural guarantees have not been 
systematically developed in Anglo-American systems, the following works 
express certain aspects of these principles: Baxter Administrative Law 542-557; 
Bayles "Principles for legal procedure" 57-57; Delgado et al "Fairness and 
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disputants have committed themselves to the choice of a particular process, the 
procedure that determines the content of that particular _ process also controls the 
conduct of the disputants. The rights and interests of a disputant could be infringed or 
alienated if rules for the conduct of procedure were not applied to maintain the balance 
of power between the disputants. The term "procedural guarantees" might be a 
misnomer in regard to the process of negotiation since in this instance the disputants 
maintain the balance of power between themselves, the acknowledged risk being that 
the weaker party might well be in a less favourable bargaining position. However, in 
situations where a procedure is dependent upon third-party intervention, the disputants 
submit themselves to the control of the third party. The conduct of the third party is 
therefore crucial to the maintenance of the balance of power between the disputants who 
could have their rights or interests alienated if the third party did not manage power 
imbalances or enforce the rules of process that do so. The maintenance of the balance 
of power between the disputants ensures a fair hearing or an open and honest 
exploration of the issues in dispute, as the case may be. In adjudicative processes the 
rules of natural justice are applied to ensure that procedural guarantees are maintained. 
It is in this context that procedural guarantees are analysed as a category of 
PROCEDURE. 
The DISPUTE is divided into three categories: nature, formulation and sectors. The 
nature of a dispute is indicated as being either legal, non-legal or grievance-based. This 
amounts to a summary of the stages of dispute transformation. Each stage of the 
transformation is indicated on the horizontal gradient by reference to a particular type of 
process and this in turn is integrated with the differing methods relating to the formulation 
of the dispute for the purposes of dispute processing. The interrelationship illustrates the 
intimacy between the dispute as a social event and the manner in which it is transformed 
by the system of process to which it is addresses for its resolution. The category relating 
to DISPUTE sectors analyses the prevalence of certain types of disputes in relation to 
the processes contained in the horizontal gradient. 
fonnality" 1367-1375; Fisch "Constitutional issues in civil procedure" 219-228; 
Starke "Procedural fairness" 638-640. See also 6.3.3 below. 
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In terms of the classification, the following are represented as separate categories: third 
party intervention, disputant participation and outcome. For the purposes of analysis, the 
individual representation of each is justified provided that it is borne in mind that the 
separation of these elements is artificial. In a practical setting all three categories are 
integrated: as the degree of third-party intervention decreases, disputant autonomy 
increases. This formula also relates to the outcome. The greater the degree of 
intervention on the part of the third-party neutral, the less the disputants are able to 
control the outcome. The opposite is also true. These principles are illustrated by means 
of the following matrix. 26 
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Figure 1 
The matrix is governed by two gradients: the horizontal gradient that relates to control of 
the outcome and the vertical gradient that determines control of process. Both gradients 
are categorised in relation to disputants, third party and rules. Each segment of the 
matrix indicates the relationship between the principles expresses by both gradients. 
However, there is an aspect of the matrix that needs to be clarified. The diagonal 
26 Adapted from Bryson "Conflict, law and alternative" (1988) Community 
Quarterly 25 cited in Fulton Commercial ADR 21. 
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representation27 shows private negotiation as being the only form of process that permits 
full party autonomy as well as absolute control over the outcome of the process. The 
degree of disputant autonomy diminishes progressively (as well as control over 
outcome) by moving downwards to the segment that represents the process of litigation. 
The matrix indicates that when the process of litigation is used, party autonomy 
decreases to such an extent that the outcome of the process is regulated totally by rules 
and hence by the coercion that underlies their enforcement. 28 These principles underlie 
the analysis contained under the related categories of the vertical gradient. 
4.4 Final remarks 
Any classification of ADR processes is at the most tenuous because ADR, as a system 
of dispute resolution, is still a primitive science. Compared to a classification that might 
be compiled in the future, any current classification is necessarily preliminary. However, 
what the schematic classification does teach is that the primary ADR processes are 
capable of being integrated into the general theory of procedure and that its principles of 
process are of general application. 
For some ADR is a social movement, for others it is merely a method for managing 
disputes within a specific dispute sector. But, ultimately, if ADR is to be recognised as an 
independent system of dispute resolution, it should be possible to rely on principles of 
process that have been systematically developed and that may be uniformally applied in 
practice. If this goal cannot be attained, ADR will amount to no more than the 
unsystematic application of informal dispute resolution techniques that are only relevant 
in certain dispute sectors and dependant on the policy and values prevalent in a specific 
dispute sector. 
The schematic classification shows that the primary ADR processes can be analysed in 
the context of the general structure of procedure. Consequently, ADR is much more than 
27 
28 
ie reading the matrtx from the top left segment to the bottom right segment. 
See, further, Fulton Commercial ADR 21-22. 
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a broadly based social movement or a convenient portfolio of dispute resolution 
processes that can be applied at random in specific dispute sectors. A process~related 
classification points to ADR as having an internal dynamic that functions on the basis of 
independent principles of process. From a legal perspective, this ought to lend 
authenticity to ADR as a system of process that can meet and serve the demands of the 
legal system primarily because its various forms of process are capable of supporting 
legal decision making. 
Characteristics 
Voluntary/ 
Involuntary 
Binding/ 
Nonbinding 
Third party 
Degree of 
formalitv 
Nature of 
proceeding 
Outcome 
Private/ 
Public 
"Primary" Dispute Resolution Processes 
Adjudication 
Involuntary 
Binding; sul~ject to appeal 
Imposed, third-party neutral 
decisionmaker, generally 
with no specialized exper-
tise in dispute subject 
Formalized and highly struc-
tured by predetermined, 
rigid rules 
Opportunity for each party to 
present proofs and argu-
ments 
Principled decision, sup-
ported by reasoned opinion 
Public 
Arbitration* 
Volu11tarv 
Binding, sul~ect to review on 
limited grounds 
Party-selected third-party de-
cisionmaker. oflen with 
specialized subject expertise 
Procedurally less formal; pro-
cedural rules and substan-
tive law may be set by 
parties 
Opportunity for each party to 
present proofs an<l argu-
ments 
Sometimes principled deci-
sion supported by reasoned 
opinion; sometimes com-
promise without opinion 
Private, unless judicial review 
sought 
*Court-annexed arbitration is involuntary, nonbinding, and public. 
iHediation 
Voluntarv 
If agreement. en-
forceable as con-
tract 
Party-selected out-
side facilitator 
Usually informal, 
unstructured 
Unbounded pre-
sentation of evi-
clence, arguments 
and interests 
Mutually acceptable 
agreement sought 
Private 
N egotii1tio11 
Voluntary 
If agreement, en-
forceable as con-
tract 
No third-party fa-
cilitator 
Usually informal, 
unstructured 
Unbounded pre-
sentation of evi-
dence, arguments 
and interests 
Mutually acceptable 
agreement sought 
Private 
...... 
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107 ANNEXURE B. 
TABLE OF ARBITRATION, COURT ADJUDICATION 
AND MEDIATION CHARACfERISTIC.S 
Arbitration 
It is voluntary in its initiation 
and compulsory in its con-
tinuation 
The disputants choose the 
adjudicator 
TI1e adjudicator may be 
selected for his knowledge 
in the dispute subject 
There is no appeal to a 
higher court, only a revi~· 
The adjudicator determines 
the outcome in accordance 
with terms of reference 
TI1e disputants determine 
the issue prior to the arbi-
tration 
The arbitration procedure is 
determined by the disputants 
and may be relatively simple 
and infom1al 
Arbitrators do not necessarily 
apply public norms 
Court adjudication 
It is compulsory in its initia-
tion and in its continua-
tion 
The State chooses the ad-
judicator 
TI1e adjudicator may not be 
selected by the parties and is 
often not a specialist in the 
dispute subject 
TI1ere is an appeal or a 
review 
TI1e adjudicator determines 
the outcome in accordance 
with precedent 
The issue must correspond 
with a specific legal cause 
of action 
TI1ere is a formal. rigid and 
predetermined procedure 
prescribed by Jaw 
Court adjudicators apply 
public norms 
l'vlediation 
It is voluntary in initiation 
and continuation 
TI1e disputants choose the 
mediator 
111e mediator may be selec-
ted by his expertise and is 
often a specialist in the 
dispute subject 
TI1ere is no appeal or review 
The disputants determine 
the outcome 
The disputants can fashion 
the issue and vary it during 
the mediation process 
The procedure is informal 
and flexible 
Mediation does not neces-
sarily apply public norms 
Precedent does not apply Precedent is applied strictly Precedent is of little im-
strictly 
TI1e disputants determine 
possible remedies 
The outcome can be deter-
mined by Jaw, principle or 
equity 
Power can affect the out-
come 
TI1e outcome is enforceable 
There is a relatively high rate 
of compliance with the out-
come 
Arbitration is generally held 
in private 
TI1e dispuwnts must establish 
the forum 
Time and place is flexible 
The forum is privately 
funded 
Arbitration can be relatin:ly 
inexpensive 
Arbitration can be relatively 
time-efficient 
Arbitration is often less ad-
versarial 
Arbitration can allow on-
going relationships to ·be 
maintained 
Disputants often represent 
themselves 
TI1ere is a limited and inflex-
ible range of remedies pre-
scribed by law 
The outcome is usually gov-
erned by law and principle 
(sometimes equity) 
Power has little effect on the 
outcome 
TI1e outcome is enforceable 
TI1ere is a lower rate of 
compliance with the out-
come 
Court adjudication is held 
in public 
TI1e forum is established by 
the State 
Time and place is rigid 
TI1e forum is funded by the 
State 
Court adjudication is seldom 
inexpensive 
Court adjudication is usually 
very time-consuming 
Court adjudication is usually 
very adversarial 
Court adjudication often 
strains or destroys ongoing 
relationships 
111e disputants are almost 
always legally represented 
portance 
TI1e disputants determine 
the actual remedies 
The outcome can reflect the 
concerns and priorities of 
the disputants and m:xyignore 
law and be unprincipled 
Power has a major effect on 
the outcome 
An agreement arising out of 
mediation is enforceable 
TI1ere generally is a very 
high rate of compliance 
with the outcome 
Mediation is generally held 
in prirnte 
111e disputants must establish 
the forum 
Time and place is flexible 
The forum is privately 
funded 
Mediation is usually relatively 
inexpensive 
Mediation is usually relatively 
time-efficient 
Mediation can be relatively 
non-adversarial 
Mediation is olten positive 
for relationships 
Disputants are seldom repre-
sented by lawyers 
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DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN COMMERCIAL MATTERS 
Element Litigation Arbitration Expert Af ediation Appraisal 
1 Confidentiality No Yes Yes Yes 
2 Choice of adjudi- No Yes Yes Yes 
cator or 
appointee 
3 Range of issues As pleaded As As stated Open ended 
particularised 
4 Flexibility of pro- Moderate 
cedure 
High Very high Very high 
5 Delay potential Moderate Low None Very low 
6 Control by Low Moderate Very high Very high 
parties 
7 Susceptibility to J\foderate Low-Moderate None Very low 
tactics 
8 Control over High .Moderate None None 
parties 
9 Control over High Moderate None Not applicable 
witnesses 
10 Power to compel Yes No No No 
consolidation 
11 Width of rem- Wide Restricted Not applicable Not applicable 
edies 
12 Binding decision Yes Yes Yes No 
13 Enforceability of Direct Almost direct Indirect, Not applicable 
decision 
14 Susceptibility to Open Restricted None Not applicable 
appeal 
15 Liability for op- As ordered As awarded None None 
ponent's costs 
16 Cost of tribunal Free Parties as Parties as Parties as 
awarded agreed agreed 
17 Level of costli- Relative to Relative to Low Low 
ness length length 
18 Level of time Relative to Relative to Very low Low 
required of length length 
parties 
19 Preservation of Doubtful Doubtful High Very high 
business 
relationship 
CHAPTERS 
NEGOTIATION, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND ADR 
5.1 The concept of legal negotiation in the context of ADR 
5.2 Processual characteristics 
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5.3.2 Descriptive analysis 
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5.5 The structure of legal negotiation 
5.6 Strategy selection 
5. 7 Negotiation and legal negotiation 
5.1 The concept of legal negotiation in the context of ADR 
Negotiation is the predominant method of private ordering. As a result there are a 
multitude of negotiation techniques that cover a variety of social relationships. In its 
broader sense, negotiation is a process of communication that entails either bargaining 
to reach an agreement or interaction to resolve psychological confrontation. Negotiation 
applications relate to political deals, commercial transactions, bargaining for the release 
of hostages, framing governmental rules and regulations, resolving family and marital 
disputes, settling community and environmental problems, and so the list of applications 
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can continue. What is immediately evident is that negotiation is an extremely flexible and 
adaptable process that can be contextualised in a variety of social situations. 
Negotiation has always been associated with lawyers and the legal system. But, never 
before has negotiation as it is applied in a legal setting been specifically identified as 
legal negotiation - a method of negotiation that functions within a legal environment 
according its own unique standards, values and structure. If reasons are to be sought, 
then there is one that is outstanding: the dimension that has been given to legal 
negotiation has occurred contemporaneously with the emergence and- development of 
the system of ADR.1 
ADR has provided the framework within which different values and points of reference 
could converge and cross-fertilise each other with regard to the theory and practice of 
negotiation. LegaJ negotiation is a product of this process. Through the influence of 
ADR, negotiation as it occurred in a legal setting was reassessed not only from a legal 
perspective, but also on the basis of inter-disciplinary studies. Legal negotiation theorists 
turned to social anthropological, psychological and sociological sources to make sense 
of the process of negotiation as practised in its legal environment. 
As a social anthropologist, Gulliver2 established the notion that negotiation, in all its 
forms and in all cultures, is not an indefinite, formless and random event that is used on 
an ad hoc basis but instead has distinct processual characteristics. Negotiation is 
therefore a structured process that is capable of being utilised and managed rationally 
as it progresses through a number of predefined stages, though not according to a rigid 
model. Because of the emphasis on the processual nature of negotiation, it is possible to 
analyse both the process of negotiation and legal process as decision-making models. 
Eisenberg3 explored the normative issues that arise from an analysis of the continuities 
and discontinuities between legislation and adjudication, on the one hand, and 
2 
3 
See Gifford "Strategy selection in legal negotiation" 42 note 11. 
See Disputes and Negotiation. 
See generally "Private ordering through negotiation". 
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negotiation as an informal decision-making process, on the other hand. On this basis it is 
possible to differentiate between rule-making or transactional negotiation as an 
extension of the legislative function and dispute negotiation as an informal analogy of 
formal decision making. The distinction is fundamental because it contextualises legal 
negotiation as relating to either the creation of legal rights or the resolution of disputes 
concerning legal rights. Rule-making negotiation relates to future conduct while the 
dispute negotiation deals with disputes arising from past events. 
Eisenberg's work also raises an important question about the nature of negotiation in the 
context of the system of ADR. The distinction between rule-making negotiation and 
dispute negotiation establishes a normative basis for contextualising the t.vvo forms of 
negotiation. Negotiation as a primary ADR process relates to dispute negotiation. As its 
name indicates, ADR is focused on the resolution of disputes. In no manner is the 
significance of rule-making negotiation denigrated. Both forms of negotiations are 
equally important. However, as a primary alternative dispute resolution process, 
negotiation should be interpreted as dealing with the resolution of disputes, irrespective 
of whether their content is legal or non-legal. A specific meaning is therefore attached to 
negotiation as a primary ADR process. 
The emergence of the system of ADR has also led to a critical evaluation of the 
traditional structure of and strategy for legal negotiation. The conventional competitive 
approach to legal negotiation is typified by the standard work of Bellow and Moulton.4 In 
direct contrast, Ury and Fisher5 devised the method of principled negotiation and Raiffa6 
developed the notion of integrative bargaining. These innovative approaches to 
negotiation represent a trend that moves away from the linear structure of distributive 
bargaining that is characteristic of legal negotiation coupled to a competitive strategy. 
The response is evident in the legal literature that followed. The co-operative strategy 
was given prominence by Williams,7 affirming that a strategy other than a competitive 
4 See generally The Lawyering Process: Negotiation. 
5 See generally Getting to Yes. 
6 See generally Science of Negotiation. 
7 See generally Legal Negotiation and Settlement 
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strategy could be applied within the adversarial structure of legal negotiation. Similarly, 
the application of an integrative strategy on the basis of a problem-solving model was 
developed and promoted by Menkel-Meadow.8 From different perspectives, Lowenthal9 
and Gifford10 provide rational grounds for strategy selection in relation to legal 
negotiation. 
There is a dry irony in the work of Mnookin and Kornhauser.11 The content of their work 
has little to do with negotiation theory but one single idea that they expressed made their 
work famous. Negotiation that relates to a legal dispute occurs "in the shadow of the 
law", thereby creating a bargaining endowment for the disputants. The "shadow of the 
law'' concept once more narrows the meaning of negotiation as a primary ADR process 
whenever it is applied in a legal environment. Apart from being understood as a form of 
dispute negotiation, a distinctive type of negotiation that may be described as "legal 
negotiation" is the product of the "shadow of the law'' concept. This succinct phrase 
encapsulates the very essence of the negotiations that occur against the background of 
legal process. Legal negotiation anticipates the outcome of an adjudicative decision 
thereby introducing precedent, substantive law, evidence as well as the delays inherent 
in litigation, its uncertain outcome and its exorbitant transactional costs, as factors that 
directly influence the substance of the negotiations. 
The concept of legal negotiation is given an interesting twist by both Kritzer 12 and 
Galanter.13 Working on the assumption that the majority of legal disputes are settled by 
negotiation, these commentators observe that the compelling presence of the courts 
presents an adjudicative alternative should the negotiations fail. This idea provokes 
thought about the purpose and function of negotiation as a primary dispute resolution 
a 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
See generally "Legal negotiation". 
See generally "General theory of negotiation". 
See generally "Strategy selection in legal negotiation". 
See generally "Bargaining in the shadow of the law". 
The Negotiation Process in Ordinary Litigation 136-137. 
"Negotiation and legal process" 268-269. 
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process within the system of ADR and points the way for further research regarding the 
relationship between legal negotiation and adjudication. 
What each of these commentators teach is that negotiation is not a haphazard social 
event or an indistinct method of communication. Negotiation has an art-form and a 
science-form. In its science-form it is possible to identify definite processual stages, 
differentiate between certain forms of negotiation, recognise its potential as a problem-
solving method and analyse the course of its conduct by means of the selection of 
different strategies. Because of its prominence as a method of dispute resolution, 
increased attention has been focused on the role and function of the process of 
negotiation as it is applied in a legal context. In fact, labour relations negotiations or any 
other context-based application of negotiation could have been chosen other than legal 
negotiation as the subject of this text. In each instance the specialised context of that 
particular form of negotiation would have been related to the theoretical model of 
negotiation. However, because of the predominant processual theme of this work, 
negotiation in its legal setting has been selected. This offers an opportunity to explore 
the continuities between negotiation as an informal process with legal process as a 
formal counterpart. 
5.2 Processual characteristics 14 
A common perception among lawyers is that any valid form of process ought to be 
formal, technical, adversarial, rule bound, uniformly applied and subject to the external 
, 
control of a neutral third party. Any other form of process is suspect if it does not meet 
the standards of legal process. The effect is to isolate legal process from informal 
processes. Consequently, the continuities and discontinuities between legal process and 
informal processes are disregarded. 
14 This portion of the chapter is no doubt tedious to read. However, it is necessary 
to minutely analyse the processual nature of negotiation because of its 
fundamental importance within the system of ADR as a primary process, along 
with mediation and arbitration. Mediation and arbitration are regarded as 
substantive ADR processes (see, further, 2.1.3 above) and hence their 
processual integrity is not in doubt. It is therefore important to prove that 
negotiation also has a definitive processual structure. 
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This holds true for negotiation as a process. Merely because the process of negotiation 
does not conform to the stringent requirements of legal process, does not alter the fact 
that it does have processual characteristics. A comparison of the characteristics of 
negotiation and legal process clearly shows that these forms of process differ 
fundamentally from each other. Negotiation is informal, bound only to the rules and 
standards agreed upon by the parties themselves, need not be adversarial and is 
conducted by the parties themselves without the intervention of a neutral third party. 
However, these differences do not negate the inherent processual characteristics of 
negotiation. An analysis of the internal dynamic of negotiation indicates that it is a form 
of process. The internal dimensions of the negotiation process therefore need to be 
explored before it may be summarily assumed that it does not have processual 
characteristics. 
An analysis of the internal dynamic of the process of negotiation shows that it functions 
by means of the uniform application of stylised procedures. By this is meant that 
negotiation moves through a number of recognised developmental stages. The weight of 
authority of both legal and non-legal scholars confirms the consistency of identifiable 
developmental stages in their descriptions of negotiation. The detail might differ but if 
examined as whole, the recognition of distinct stages for negotiation is common to all the 
texts that have been reviewed. 
Mankel-Meadow abstracts the following stages of negotiation from her survey of 
"adversarial" writings 15 -
(a) pre-negotiation strategising or planning to determine target and resistance 
points, location and timing of negotiation; 
(b) 
(c) 
15 
offers and responses (expressions of differences and issue definitions); 
information exchange (positions, arguments and objectives); 
The "adversarial writings" referred to by the author indude Williams Legal 
Negotiation and Settlement (see text to note 17 below); Raiffa Science of 
Negotiation (see text to notes 24-28 below); Gulliver Disputes and 
Negotiations (see text to notes 29-34 below). Gifford Legal Negotiation (see 
text to notes 18-21 below) was not considered because his work was published 
later, in 1989. 
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( d) bargaining where concessions are made and analysed; 
( e) closure or agreement, where agreements are made and parties allocate 
final responsibilities for negotiated relations.16 
Responding to the findings of extensive empirical studies conducted among lawyers, 
Williams identifies four distinct negotiation stages -
(a) orientation and positioning; 
(b) argumentation; 
(c) emergence and crisis; 
(d) agreement or final breakdown.17 
According to Gifford, the process of negotiation also consists of four distinct stages -
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
orientation and positioning; 18 
exploration of issues; 19 
bargaining or "convergence";20 and 
final or concluding stage.21 
"Legal negotiation" m. 
Legal Negotiation and Settlement 70-85. 
This stage is the same as that stated by Williams (see text to note 17 above). 
However, in interpreting this stage, Gifford describes it as the phase when the 
''tone" of the negotiations is set by the parties; initial encounters indicate the 
styles and tactics that will follow. 
Compared to Williams, Gifford at 34 expands the scope of this stage by 
describing it as that of the exploration of issues, which includes argumentation as 
well as information exchange on the basis of selectively disclosed information. 
For the meaning of the term "convergence", see note 32 below. 
Legal Negotiation 32-36. 
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Non-legal scholars consistently agree that negotiation is a process that progresses 
through identifiable stages of development. In this respect, the most prominent writers 
are Raiffa22 and Gulliver.23 Raiffa also allocates four developmental stages to the 
negotiation process24 when it occurs in a competitive setting in which two parties are 
negotiating over a single issue in dispute. These four stages are -
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
22 
23 
24 
25 
27 
preparation for negotiation;25 
opening gambits;26 
the negotiation dance;27 and 
Raiffa, is a mathematician, who has developed a game theoretical model for 
negotiation that to date remains influential. 
Gulliver is an anthropologist who has approached the subject of negotiation from 
a cross-cultural perspective. His work presents perhaps the most objective 
assessment of the negotiation process primarily because of its multi-cultural 
scope. 
Raiffa describes the four stages of negotiation in a particular context that should 
be clarified. He has adopted an asymmetrically prescriptive/descriptive approach. 
A symmetrically descriptive approach examines the behaviour of all the 
negotiators on both sides without prescribing how they should behave; the 
symmetrically prescriptive approach examines how rational negotiators should 
behave in competitive, interactive situations in terms of game theoretical models. 
The asymmetrically prescriptive/descriptive approach focuses on advice to only 
one party to the negotiation about how to behave in order to achieve a specified 
outcome. It is asymmetrical in that attention is paid to one party alone; 
prescriptive for the party receiving the advice and descriptive of the probable 
behaviour of the opposing party. See Raiffa Science of Negotiation 20-22 359. 
Because of the asymmetrically prescriptive/ descriptive approach adopted by 
Raiffa, his description of the first stage of negotiation and indeed, also of the 
other stages that follow, deviates considerably from that of the other writers. In 
respect of the first stage, described as "preparing for negotiation, the individual 
negotiator is advised to consider the following: know yourself; know your 
adversary; think about negotiating conventions relating to the behaviour of the 
opponent, location, language and the negotiation team; consider the logistics of 
the situation; realise the value of simulated role playing as a method of 
preparation and lastly, set personal aspiration levels". See Science of 
Negotiation 126-127. 
Once again, this next stage is described in highly prescriptive terms: determine 
who should make the first offer, control your reaction to an extreme first offer and 
protect your integrity by avoiding the disclosure of information as an alternative 
to giving false information. Science of Negotiation 127-128. 
''The negotiation dance" is a rather obscure term for describing a stage of the 
negotiation process and needs to be explained. In essence, this stage is akin to 
the bargaining stage identified by. the other writers, which is interpreted by Raiffa 
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(d) end play (closure).28 
Gulliver's stages of negotiation are more detailed by comparison to those of other 
writers. Eight stages are identified -
(a) the search for arena;29 
(b) composition of agenda and definition of issues;30 
(c) establishing maximal limits to the issues in dispute;31 
( d) narrowing the differences; 
(e) preliminaries to final bargaining; 
(f) final bargaining;32 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
as encompassing an awareness of the pattern of concessions as well as the 
continuous reassessment of perceptions. Science of Negotiation 128-129. 
"End play" is a term that signifies the closure of the negotiation process or the 
final stage. Once again Raiffa's prescriptive approach prevails and his advice to 
the negotiator during this stage is to make commitments or gracefully break a 
commitment; help an opponent to break a commitment; introduce an 
intermediary if a deadlock is suspected and finally, to broaden the domain of 
negotiation in instances where there may be no way of achieving a solution 
because of stated commitments. Science of Negotiation 129-130. 
''The search for arena" is defined by Gulliver as the first stage of negotiation in 
which the parties agree on the location where the negotiation will take place as 
well as the social, legal and cultural rules that will regulate the process. Disputes 
and Negotiation 122-126. 
The negotiation cannot commence until the agenda has been formulated, even 
provisionally, on the understanding that it may be reviewed at a later stage by the 
introduction of other issues. Agenda formulation can obviously not occur until the 
parties have defined the exact nature of the issues in dispute. Disputes and 
Negotiations 126-135. 
The tone of the negotiations having been set in the first two stages, the third 
stage signifies more than a mere exploration of the issues but rather attempts to 
establish maximal limits and demands - "demands or claims that a party has 
some calculated expectation of obtaining in the eventual outcome" as well as 
"demands or claims by the opponent that a party accepts as representing the 
opponent's calculated expectations". Disputes and Negotiation 135-141. 
The three stages (d)-(f) named by Gulliver Disputes and Negotiation 141-168, 
cumulatively represent what the other writers express as a single stage. Gifford 
Legal Negotiation 34 describes the third of the four stages that he identifies, as 
"bargaining or convergence". He expressly uses the term "convergence" to 
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(g) ritual affirmation;33 and 
(h) execution of outcome.34 
In the South African context, the major work on negotiation by Anstey Negotiating 
Conflict similarly recognises four developmental stages35 -
(a) preparation;36 
(b) opening the negotiation;37 
(c) bargaining; and 
( d) closure and agreement 38 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
describe in a single stage what Gulliver defines in three separate stages. The 
same applies to the third stage described by the other writers. 
This stage represents the outcome produced by the negotiations. The outcome 
may be either a total breakdown of the negotiations or an affirmative agreement 
between the parties. If the negotiations culminate in the settlement of the dispute, 
some form of formal affirmation is effected through the memorialisation of the 
agreement. Disputes and Negotiation 168-170. 
The final stage of Gulliver's developmental model has been overlooked by the 
other writers. Quite correctly, Gulliver identifies a post-negotiation stage that 
relates to the execution of the settlement. 
See 130-157. See also Anstey ''The negotiation process" 17-29. 
The "preparation stage" as defined by Anstey is in its emphasis somewhat 
different to what is described by Williams (see text to note 17 above) and Gifford 
(see text to note 18 above) as "orientation and positioning". Anstey regards the 
preparation for negotiation as being of major importance for the success of the 
negotiations. In this respect, he enumerates the following as basic steps for the 
conduct of this stage: the identification, analysis and partialisation of issues; the 
establishment of bargaining ranges and strategic planning in regard to power 
relativities, concessions, opening moves, setting the climate for negotiation. 
Negotiating Conflict 130-139. 
This stage is expressed quite differently by Anstey in comparison to the other 
writers. Williams (see text to note 17 above) identifies the second stage as the 
argumentation stage and Gifford (see text to note 19 above) as the stage when 
the exploration of issues occurs. However, stage 3: establishing maximal limits to 
the issues in dispute, as identified by Gulliver (see note 31 above), expresses 
some of the elements of stage two described by Anstey. For Anstey stage two 
entails the following: the establishment of bargaining boundaries; setting the 
bargaining climate; arguing, defending, clarifying positions and manipulating 
expectations of the process. Negotiating Conflict 139-145. 
Anstey's identification of the third stage as "bargaining" and the fourth stage as 
"closure and agreement" is in line with the descriptions of the other writers, 
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However, it should be noted that Anstey's stages of development are explicitly placed in 
the context of distributive bargaining from the perspective of labour and industrial 
relations. 
Another important South African work dealing with negotiation is that written by Pienaar 
and Spoelstra Negotiation: Theories, Strategies and Skills. The sub-title gives a clue 
to the major thrust of the work. It has been written as a practical guide for negotiation-
skills workshops. The content is dominated by a psychological and clinical perspective 
as is evident from the description of the stages of negotiation enumerated by the 
authors -
(a) the emotional phase;39 
(b) the political phase;40 
(c) the problem definition phase;41 
(d) the constructive phase;42 and 
(e) the final socio-emotional phase.43 
Although these various descriptions of the stages of negotiation might seem repetitive, 
they do have a functional value. Writers from different disciplines consistently affirm that 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
except for Gulliver who in any event differs from the others. See Negotiating 
Conflict 145-157. 
The emotional stage signifies the first encounter between the parties; the initial 
relationships that are established determine the climate for the negotiations that 
follow. The leader of the negotiations team plays a dominant emotional role 
during this particular stage. Negotiation 48. 
During this stage common ground is established: the roles of individuals are 
defined; the rules and agenda are agreed upon and, depending on the expertise 
required, a task leader emerges. Negotiation 48-49 . 
• 
This stage is identified with group cohesiveness: the group defines the problem 
and trade-offs are offered. Negotiation 49. 
The problem is dealt with constructively during this stage and the task leader 
plays an active role while that of the team leader diminishes. Negotiation 49. 
That is, closure occurs during this final stage; the team leader dominates and the 
climate for re-entry or implementation is established. Negotiation 49. 
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negotiation is a process which progresses through distinctive stages of development. 
Every stage has a specific content and an identifiable purpose as well as processual 
significance for the conduct of the negotiations. However, these descriptions give a 
fragmented view of the stages of development of the negotiation process. In order to 
attain a more comprehensive perspective, the various stages of negotiation as 
expressed by individual writers, are consolidated below. 
The first stage is aptly characterised in psychological terms by Pienaar and Spoelstra as 
being the emotional phase when interpersonal contacts establish the future negotiation 
relationships.44 On the substantive level, this is identified by Menkel-Meadow as the pre-
strategising stage used to determine "target and resistance points, location and timing of 
negotiation".45 Menkel-Meadow fairly reflects Gulliver's first two stages, respectively 
dealing with the search for arena46 as well as the composition of the agenda and the 
definition of issues.47 The political phase identified by Pienaar and Spoelstra also fits 
these descriptions.48 Williams describes the activity during this stage as relating to the 
establishment of a working relationship between the disputants and the adoption of initial 
positions. 49 According to Gifford, during this stage initial proposals are made by the 
parties and preliminary encounters indicate the style and tactics that wilt follow. 50 Both 
Anstey and Raiffa emphasise the importance of preparation during stage one. Anstey is 
meticulous in his description of the detail required for thorough preparation;51 Raiffa 
offers prescriptive advice to the individual negotiator about how to adjust to the 
negotiations that will follow. 52 
44 See note 39 above. 
45 
"Legal negotiation" 77. 
46 See note 29 above. 
47 See note 30 above. 
48 See note 40 above. 
49 Legal Negotiation and Settlement 72-77. 
50 Legal Negotiation 34. 
51 See note 36 above. 
52 See note 25 above. 
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The second stage is marked by a shift of emphasis from procedural to substantive 
issues. During this stage Gifford identifies the exploration of issues which includes the 
presentation of arguments, the gathering of information as well as the narrowing of 
issues.53 Williams similarly associates stage two with arguments and persuasion, the 
making of the first concession and the search for alternative solutions.54 Raiffa's labelling 
of stage two as the "opening gambit" is expressive of the approach that an individual 
negotiator might adopt during the second stage: deciding which party should make the 
first offer, the manner of dealing with an exorbitant demand made by an opponent and 
controlling the disclosure of information.55 Both Anstey and Gulliver concentrate on the 
establishment of maximal limits during this stage.56 Pienaar and Spoelstra's description 
of the problem definition phase57 generally describes the trade-offs and process of 
problem definition that occurs during the second stage. 
The term "bargaining" sums up the interactions during the third stage. Both Gifford58 and 
Menkel-Meadow59 relate stage three to a period of serious bargaining between the 
parties. The apt use of the word "convergence" by Gifford summarises the three stages 
recorded by Gulliver: narrowing the differences, preliminaries to final bargaining and 
final bargaining.60 The bargaining is induced by the pressure of approaching deadlines. 
The intensity of the negotiation increases as the deadline approaches eg a trial date or 
an arbitral hearing. Because of the external factors that pressurise the negotiations, this 
moment in the negotiations is more akin to a point of crisis than a stage of the 
negotiations. 61 The element of urgency is confirmed by Williams who describes this 
53 Legal Negotiation 34. 
54 Legal Negotiation and Settlement 79-81. 
55 See text to note 26 above. 
56 See, respectively, text to notes 37 and 31 above; see also comment in note 37. 
57 See text to note 41 above. 
sa Legal Negotiation 34. 
59 
"Legal negotiation" 777. 
60 See text and note 32 above. 
61 Leeson and Johnston Dispute Resolution in America 105. 
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stage as that of emergence and crisis that is marked by the pressure of approaching 
deadlines, the adaptation of positions along with alternative offers as well as the 
formulation of final demands.62 Anstey also identifies the bargaining process as the 
dominant activity of the third stage. According to his description, the third stage entails 
signalling,63 proposing,64 as well as packaging and bargaining.65 Pienaar and Spoelstra 
describe this stage as the constructive phase,66 a term which at first seems rather vague 
until it is placed in the context of the parties bargaining with the serious intention of 
concluding the negotiations. Raiffa's flamboyant use of the phrase "the negotiation 
dance'.s7 captures the mood of the third stage: trade-offs, concessions and the 
continuous re-assessment of changing perceptions. 
The final stage of the negotiations is expressively named by Raiffa as "end play",68 by 
Pienaar and Spoelstra as the ''final socio-emotional phase'.s9 and by Gulliver as "ritual 
affirmation".70 The conclusion of the negotiations involves either the agreement to settle 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
Legal Negotiation and Settlement 81-83. 
Signalling means the method of "infonning the other party of a willingness to 
move provided that this is reciprocated, in other words, a process of two-way 
movement is being undertaken. It means breaking out of unproductive circular 
arguments ... and opening the way to a course of bilateral concessions". 
Negotiating Conflict 146. 
Proposing is explained by Anstey in the following tenns: "A reciprocation of 
signals of willingness to move allows the parties greater confidence in moving 
from argument to making proposals. While argument locks them into defend-
attack exchanges, proposals initiate an active search for remedies". Negotiating 
Conflict 147. 
Packaging and bargaining is explained by Anstey in the following terms: "As 
proposals begin to finn it is suggested that they be bargained as packages rather 
than as individual items. This initiates a process of concession exchanges and 
trade-offs, allowing each party to secure certain benefits or guarantees in 
exchange for movement on the same or other items". Negotiating Conflict 148. 
See text to note 42 above. 
See text to note 27 above. 
See text to note 28 above. 
See text to note 43 above. 
See text to note 33 above. 
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or a deadlock. 71 A temporary impasse may occur at various stages of the negotiations 
but a final breakdown signifies a refusal to re-enter and continue with negotiation. On the 
other hand, where the parties agree to settle, their agreement is formalised. Gulliver's 
model goes beyond formalisation and includes a distinctive stage that accommodates 
the execution of the outcome. 72 
Although these stages of negotiation are distinct, they do not establish a rigid model. 73 
The conceptual model differs from the real-life model. Social interaction is never very 
tidy. Consequently, the stages of negotiation may follow in order of sequence but often 
the sequence varies according to the content and context of the substantive issues in 
dispute. The various stages may at times overlap. For instance, during the bargaining 
stage the parties might need to revise the agenda, thereby reverting to an activity that is 
characteristic of the first stage. Another situation that arises in practice is that the 
negotiations normally relate to multiple issues with the result that the parties may have 
concluded the negotiations on some issues but not have reached the bargaining stage in 
regard to other issues.74 Moreover, the manner in which the negotiations are conducted 
in each stage is influenced by the strategies and personal styles adopted by the 
negotiators.75 Furthermore, a particular strategy need not be maintained throughout the 
four stages but negotiators may change strategy from one stage to the next, depending 
on the opportune timing for the alteration of strategy. 76 The developmental model for 
negotiation is therefore a first approximation of the total process based on the 
assumption of a positive outcome and without any indication of absolute or relative time-
frames involved for each stage. 77 
71 
n 
73 
74 
75 
76 
n 
Gifford Legal Negotiation 35; Mankel-Meadow "legal Negotiation" 77; Williams 
Legal Negotiation and Settlement 84-85; Anstey Negotiating Conflict 145-
147. 
See text to note 34 above. 
Gifford Legal Negotiation 33; Gulliver Dispums and Negotiation 171-173. 
Gifford Legal Negotiation 33. 
Williams Legal Negotiation and Settlement 41-42. 
Gifford Legal Negotiation 35. 
Gulliver Dispums and Negotiation 173. 
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The identffication of the stages of negotiation and their consistency confirms the 
processual characteristics of negotiation. Negotiation is a process and not some random 
event. 78 As process, negotiation is a continuous event, having a point of departure and 
ending when agreement is reached or the process is abandoned because of a deadlock. 
that causes a breakdown.79 Moreover, the progression is not arbitrary or haphazard.80 
Between the moments of commencement and termination, there is a discernible and 
continuous form of orderly progress. The internal dynamic of the process moves it 
through consistent, though not always sequential, stages that create order and 
structure.81 Although various stages may overlap or be applied simultaneously, their 
processual interdependence is confirmed by anecdotal accounts that the negotiation 
process may be delayed, jeopardised or even abandoned if any stage is not applied or 
side-stepped. 82 
The identffication of consistent stages of negotiation indicates that it is conducted within 
a processual framework. This has important implications for negotiation as a process. 
The first is that the recognition of a processual framework for negotiation leads to a 
normative appreciation of the continuities between negotiation as an informal process, 
and legal process as its institutionalised and official counterpart. Another equally 
important implication is that, because negotiation occurs within a definable processual 
structure, it is possible to regulate the substantive issues in dispute by means of 
identffiable strategies that determine the method by which the negotiations are 
conducted. 
78 See Pienaar and Spoelstra Negotiation 3. 
79 Ibid 18. 
80 Gulliver Dispuies and Negotiation 175. 
81 Ibid 174-175. 
82 See Gifford Legal Negotiation 33; Gulliver Dispuies and Negotiation 175-177. 
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5.3 Negotiation strategy 
5.3.1 Terms and concepts 
Just as commentators consistently state that negotiation has processual characteristics 
that move the process through definitive stages, so too it is universally recognised that 
the manner in which negotiations are conducted throughout the various stages is 
determined by the strategy adopted by the negotiators. In order to appreciate critically 
the dimensions of legal negotiation, it is necessary to describe briefly and appraise the 
strategies that are commonly identified by social scientists and legal negotiation 
theorists. On account of the theoretical nature of this work, the approach to strategy is 
purely descriptive. Prescriptive admonitions are therefore avoided because they are 
more in keeping with an approach that focuses on negotiation skills, techniques and 
tactics. 
A description of strategy is fraught with problems relating to terminology. Negotiation 
theorists use different labels to describe the same term or similar terms that actually 
differ very slightly from each other. For instance, Lowenthal refers to competitive and 
collaborative strategies83 and seems to equate the collaborative strategy with "problem 
solving negotiation".84 "Competitive/hard bargaining" and "co-operative bargaining" are 
terms used by Hartje85 who also recognises that there is a "co-operative problem-
solving" approach. 86 Fisher and Ury use the terms "hard" and "soft" negotiation to 
describe positional bargaining87 and propose an alternative which they name "principled 
negotiation" or "negotiation on the merits" as a method of problem solving. 88 
83 
84 
85 
87 
"General theoiy of negotiation" 73-75. 
lbid72. 
"Lawyer's skills in negotiation" 170-175. 
Ibid 174. 
Getting to Yes 8-10. See also at 9 for a table that lists the differences between 
soft and hard negotiation. · 
Ibid 10-14. See also at 13 for a table that compares positional bargaining with 
principled negotiation. 
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Williams accentuates these difficulties by using the terms "competitive" and "co-
operative" to describe the personal styles of negotiators89 in relation to negotiation 
strategy.90 William's approach is approved by Teply91 • Moreover, on the basis of this 
approach, Leeson and Johnston advocate that a distinction should be made between 
substantive and personal styles of negotiation - a distributive or collaborative strategy 
relates to the substance of the dispute whereas a competitive or co-operative style 
relates to the personal attributes of a negotiator. 92 
In the light of the above, two issues need to be clarified: the first relates to the correct 
usage of terms for the various strategies that may be adopted and the second, to the 
distinction between personal style in relation to negotiation strategy. The latter is less 
important than the former and will be addressed first. Although recognising that personal 
style and strategy are closely interrelated,93 Gifford is critical of William's approach. 
Personal styles of negotiation need to be distinguished from negotiation strategies. For 
instance, it does not necessarily follow that a competitive style of a negotiator 
determines that a competitive strategy will be adopted. There is room for flexibility since 
it is feasible that a negotiator who has a co-operative style, may successfully adopt a 
competitive strategy, and vice versa. Indeed, style and strategy are not static but are 
often interchanged during the various stages of negotiation. 94 
In regard to terminology, the views of the leading negotiation theorists mentioned above 
indicate that there is a common understanding of what is entailed by the competitive 
strategy but that there is little or no consistency in respect of non-competitive strategies. 
Different terms are used to describe the non-competitive strategies: co-operative, 
89 Legal Negotiation and Settlement 18-40. 
90 Ibid 47-54. 
91 Legal Negotiation 88 and 95, respectively. 
92 Dispum Resolution in America 106. 
93 
"Strategy selection in legal negotiation" 47. 
94 Ibid 47-48. 
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collaborative, integrative, soft negotiation, problem-solving and principled negotiation. 95 
The problem, though, is that the drfferences relate not only to terminology but more 
importantly to the method of negotiation. For instance, principled negotiation advocated 
by Fisher and Ury could be applied to both competitive and non-competitive strategies. 
By the same token, distributive principles apply in respect of both competitive and non-
competitive strategies because the aim of negotiation is to share fixed resources. 
The classification proposed by Grfford resolves many of these problems. Three 
strategies are outlined: competitive, co-operative and integrative. 96 The value of Grfford's 
classification of negotiation strategy is that it clearly distinguishes co-operative and 
integrative strategies as derivatives of a non-competitive strategy, thereby resolving the 
related problems in regard to terminology. 
With these distinctions in place, what remains is to briefly explore each strategy in a little 
more detail. 
5.3.2 Descriptive analysis 
The competitive strategy 
The psychology underlying the competitive strategy is to undermine an opponent. This 
stems from a basic assumption that the competitive strategy relates to the division of 
finite resources which both parties value equally and that the one party aims to obtain 
the greater share at the expense of the other party. In negotiation theory, this is known 
as a zero-sum game which strictly speaking means that the total gain for the one party 
minus the loss to the other party equals nought, or zero, 97 to use the American term. 98 
95 
96 
97 
lbid43. 
Idem. 
Numerically a zero-sum is expressed in the following manner: if on a hypothetical 
figure of 10 points, party A scores 7 points and party 8 receives 3 points then A's 
total gain is 2 points above a constant of 5 points and B's loss is -2 below that 
constant, the final sum therefore being nought or zero. 
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Reduced to its essentials, the competitive strategy consists of distributive bargaining in 
conjunction with competitive negotiation between the parties to gain the greater part of 
fixed or constant resources. These theoretical perspectives find practical application in a 
number of negotiation methods that are generally associated with the competitive 
strategy. 
Negotiators who choose a competitive strategy adopt a maximalist position.99 This is 
expressed by a high initial demand that is realistic. 100 The approach of opening with a 
high demand is designed to conceal a negotiator's minimum settlement point and 
thereby prevent an agreement being reached on less favourable terms because of a 
commitment to a modest evaluation of a negotiation situation.101 Underlying this method 
is the assumption of a real base and an aspiration base. The aspiration base represents 
the highest (or lowest) realistic demand which a negotiator makes and the real base 
signifies the minimum at which negotiator is willing to settle. In negotiation literature, the 
aspiration base and the real base are also referred to as a "target point" or a 
"resistance/reservation point", respectively. The negotiating ground between each 
negotiation's real base is known as the bargaining zone in which agreement is likely to 
occur.102 The negotiators reach the bargaining zone by means of a process of demand 
and counter-demand.103 The diagram below graphically represents the manner in which 
the competitive strategy functions.104 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
For descriptions or comments on the zero-sum game, see Lowenthal "General 
theory of negotiation" 95-98; Menkel-Meadow "Legal negotiation" 756 note 4. 
Williams Legal Negotiation and Setuement 73 . 
Gifford "Strategy selection in legal negotiation" 49. 
Gifford "Strategy selection in legal negotiation" 49; Williams Legal Negotiation 
and Setuement 73-74. 
Bellow and Moulton The Lawyering Process: Negotiation 58-63; Pienaar and 
Spoelstra Negotiation 26-28. 
Bellow and Moulton The Lawyering Process: Negotiation 100-101. 
Most of the literature on negotiation contains similar graphic representations in 
some or other form. This diagram has been adapted from those of Anstey ''The 
negotiation process" 19 and Pienaar and Spoelstra Negotiation 27. 
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There are a number of justifications for adopting a maximalist approach. A high initial 
demand allows a negotiator to make concessions without relinquishing the goal of 
attaining the objectives of the real base.105 Moreover, if the demand that is set is high but 
realistic, the negotiator is educated about the manner in which an opponent evaluates 
her own position. 106 
A maximalist stance also has another advantage: it creates a situation within which 
concessions can be made. 107 Few and minimal concessions 108 are made but when they 
are made they have strategic value. A negotiator using the competitive strategy carefully 
times a concession to benefit his own position either to show goodwill and co-operation, 
to break an impasse or to place pressure on an opponent to reciprocate with a 
105 
106 
107 
108 
Gifford "Strategy selection in legal negotiation" 49. 
Williams Legal Negotiation and Settlement 75. 
lbid74. 
Gifford "Strategy selection in legal negotiation" 50 rightly comments that a 
negotiator who has adopted a competitive strategy reluctantly grants 
concessions because of the adverse effects of either "position loss" or "image 
loss". "Position loss" can occur because a concession once granted cannot be 
withdrawn and further, a concession that is granted untimeously might result in a 
lost opportunity at a later stage of the negotiations when a counter-concession is 
needed from an opponent. "Image loss" creates the impression that the 
concession has been granted because of a negotiator's flexibility or that the 
granting of a concession may raise the expectation that more concessions will 
follow. 
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corresponding concession.109 Because of the variance between a negotiator's aspiration 
base and real base, the granting of a concession is very often fictitious in the sense that 
it does not affect the negotiator's position in respect of the real base.11° Concessions 
may also be forced from an opponent by means of threat or argument which are used as 
offensive tactics.111 
A limited disclosure of information is another method that is associated with the 
competitive strategy. Information is shared selectively and strategically.112 By withholding 
information or choosing the strategic moment for disclosing it, a negotiator is able to 
conceal her real base and simultaneously strengthen her O\Ml negotiating position.113 
The co-operative strategy 
The co-operative strategy is the antithesis of the competitive strategy. Even though 
distributive bargaining is common to both, the co-operative strategy involves 
collaboration by the negotiators to achieve a mutually fair outcome based on non-
competitive interaction.114 Rather than taking a maximalist stance, the negotiators 
commence with a moderate opening bid and each moves to their real base as quickly as 
possible.115 The basic assumption is that the parties will not exploit each other by 
maximising gains to the detriment of one another.116 Concessions are used as an 
affirmative technique and are made in order to place a moral obligation on the other 
party to similarly grant concessions.117 Likewise, the interaction is characterised by an 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
Gifford "Strategy selection in legal negotiation" 50-51. 
Ibid 50-51. 
Ibid 51. 
Gifford "Strategy selection in legal negotiation" 49-50. 
See generally Bellow and Moulton The Lawyering Process: Negotiation 87-90. 
Williams Legal Negotiation And Settlement 75. 
Gifford "Strategy selection in legal negotiation" 53. 
Lowenthal "General theory of negotiation" 7 4. 
Gifford "Strategy selection in legal negotiation" 52. 
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open and full disclosure of information.118 Although the element of threat should be 
absent because of the defensive positions it evokes,119 argument is not only permissible 
but in fact necessary for negotiators to establish the credibility of their stances and to 
persuade each other of the rational and objective merits of their committed positions.120 
The co-operative strategy therefore capitalises on the common desire of the parties to 
maintain sound relationships, especially if they are continuous, as well as a mutual 
commitment to reach a fair solution. 121 
The integrative strategy 
Prominence has been given to the integrative strategy by the research done 
independently by Raiffa as well as Fisher and Ury. The value of their research is that it 
forces a critical evaluation of competitive and distributive bargaining methods used in 
both legal and non-legal environments. Although the negotiation models differ 
significantly from each other, common to both is the promotion of negotiation as a 
method of problem solving. From the perspective of legal negotiation, this research 
underlies the problem-solving model devised by Mankel-Meadow that is posed as an 
alternative to the competitive and adversarial attributes of legal negotiation.122 
The research models commence from divergent premises. Raiffa provides a game-
theoretic123 framework for the integrative strategy. A major contribution of Raiffa's work is 
his perceptive categorisation of negotiation into three basic situations: two parties, one 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
Bellow and Moulton The Lawyering Process: Negotiation 155-157; Gifford 
"Strategy selection in legal negotiation" 52. See also Lowenthal "General theory 
of negotiation" 89 for the potential harm that full disclosure can cause to the 
disputant's respective interests. 
Bellow and Moulton The Lawyering Process: Negotiation 155. 
Lowenthal "General theory of negotiation" 89. 
Gifford "Strategy selection in legal negotiation" 52; Lowenthal "General theory of 
negotiation" 91; Williams Legal Negotiation and Settlement 7 4. 
"Legal negotiation" 794-841. 
For a brief explanation of the game-theory model and lawyer bargaining, see 
Bellow and Moulton The Lawyering Process: Negotiation 40-45. 
132 
issue; 124 tvvo parties, many issues 125 and many parties, many issues.126 The situation 
comprising tvvo parties, one issue is described as being distributive and tvvo parties, 
many issues as being integrative.127 Raiffa's treatment of the tvvo parties, many issues 
scenario is one of the clearest expositions of the integrative strategy. Although 
negotiators may not be able to share "zone agreement", 128 they can introduce flexibility 
by exploiting their different perceptions about the future and attitudes concerning risk. As 
a result, they enter into a process of "converting a single-factor problem into a multiple-
factor problem" which, in Raiffa's terms, forms the basis of integrative bargaining.129 
Probably most important of all, the flexibility introduced by the negotiation of more than 
one issue introduces a different value structure in regard to concessions 130 and risk 
sharing.131 This permits the invention of solutions that maximise outcomes, generally 
known as a parento optimum outcome.132 
Like Raiffa's The Science and Art of Negotiation, Fisher and Ury's Getting to Yes is 
also a valuable source for formulating an integrative strategy. Targeted at the lay 
readership, Getting to Yes consists of pithy chapters that are mainly prescriptive and at 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
Science of Negotiation part II 33-130. Raiffa 33-34 identifies the application of 
the competitive strategy in respect of the situation where two parties negotiate in 
regard to a single issue. 
Ibid part 111131-255. 
Ibid part IV 257-334. 
Science of Negotiation 33. 
"Zone agreement" is the equivalent of the term "bargaining zone" that is used in 
this work. See figure 2 above. 
Science of Negotiation 131. 
Ibid 144-165. 
Ibid 187-204. 
A parento optimum outcome means that there is no other agreement that would 
make one party better off without diminishing the outcome of the other party. 
Parento optimum agreements therefore maximise the outcomes of both parties: 
Neale and Bazerman Cognition and Rationality in Negotiation 23 29 and 137; 
Nagel and Mills Systematic Analysis in Dispute Resolution xi; Menkel-Meadow 
"Legal Negotiation" 789 note 128 and 811 note 220. 
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times even border on the setf-righteous.133 The brevity and simplified language of the 
work does not detract from its content which contains novel advice for both legal and 
non-legal negotiators who have experienced the unsatisfactory and often futile results of 
what the authors refer to as "positional bargaining".134 In fact, the one critical stance that 
is consistent throughout the work is the authors' pejorative treatment of positional 
bargaining.135 "Principled negotiation" is posed as the alternative.136 
V\/hat should be clearly understood is that principled negotiation is not the equivalent of 
an integrative strategy; it is based on some of the components of integrative bargaining. 
Fisher and Ury place this matter in perspective. Principled negotiation is "an all-purpose 
strategy'' which can be used "whether there is one issue or several; two parties or many; 
whether there is a prescribed ritual, as in collective bargaining, or an impromptu free-for-
all, as in talking to hijackers".137 However, intrinsic to principled negotiation are sound 
principles of problem solving and some solid advice on integrative bargaining which, if 
applied, can produce substantive outcomes that are able to survive in the long-term 
because they are less costly both in respect of time, money and in regard to sound 
human relationships when compared to some of the results of positional bargaining.138 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
See Getting to Yes 134-149 for the authors' treatment of "dirty tricks". See also 
White "Pros and cons of 'Getting to Yes"' 117-118. 
For an outline of "positional bargaining", see Getting to Yes 1-10. 
See for instance Getting to Yes xii 21 43 59-62 112-118 143-149. 
Getting to Yes 10-14. At 11 principled negotiation is expressed in four succinct 
principles -
People: 
Interests: 
Options: 
Criteria: 
Ibid xiii. 
Ibid 154. 
Separate people from the problem. 
Focus on interests and not positions. 
Invent options for mutual gain. 
Insist that the results be based on some objective 
criteria. 
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5.3.3 Critical evaluation 
The competitive strategy is distinct. It concentrates exclusively on maximising individual 
gains and is characterised by high demands, a limited disclosure of information as well 
as minimal concessions being given. The object is quite clear: the exercise of superior 
power in order to win the greater part of the finite resources in dispute. A winner and a 
loser is always conceived when the competitive strategy is applied. For this reason, 
there is a notional association between competitive bargaining and adversarial litigation. 
Apart from a few notable exceptions, 139 legal negotiation theorists have assimilated the 
co-operative and integrative strategies into a single collaborative strategy that functions 
in two different non-competitive contexts.140 Clearly the continuities between the co-
operative and integrative strategies tend to blur the discontinuities. In each instance the 
disputants function in a non-competitive atmosphere in order to achieve a mutually 
respected settlement. However, the differences between the two are fundamental. The 
reciprocal exchange of concessions involved in the co-operative strategy is directed at 
reaching a compromise in regard to the distribution of limited resources. The co-
operative strategy is therefore essentially a method of distributive bargaining within a 
non-competitive context. The integrative strategy functions within a totally different 
framework. The emphasis is neither on the exchange of concessions to achieve a 
compromise nor initially on the division of fixed resources. Instead, the integrative 
strategy is goal directed, concentrating on the disputants' potential for problem solving in 
order to reach a solution by joint decision making. However, in respect of all three 
strategies, the issues remain distributive with the notable difference being the method of 
distribution. 
139 
140 
Fisher and Ury Getting to Yes seemingly recognise the existence of the co-
operative strategy by contrasting the competitive strategy (hard negotiation) and 
the co-operative strategy (soft negotiation) with their proposed alternative of 
principled negotiation. Mankel-Meadow "Legal negotiation" 757-759 perceptively 
notes that negotiation theorists have tended to confuse collaborative strategies 
with negotiation goals that are accommodated in a problem-solving model of 
negotiation. 
See, for example, text and notes 83-92 above. 
135 
In order clearly to understand the structure of legal negotiation,141 the manner in which 
each strategy deals with distributive issues needs to be examined in more detail. The 
hackneyed simile is that of dividing the proverbial pie which represents the fixed sum of 
finite resources.142 When a competitive strategy is applied, the object is to divide the pie 
in order to gain the greater part of it. The co-operative strategy is not very much different. 
The issues remain distributive subject to the qualification that the aim is to divide the pie 
equitably. In contrast, the principle applied in regard to the integrative strategy is not 
initially to divide the pie but rather to expand it before dividing it.143 
The competitive and co-operative strategies both represent linear models of 
negotiation.144 Either competitively or non-competitively, negotiators on both sides by 
compromise typically reach a settlement at a stereotyped midpoint within a bargaining 
zone. Both strategies are founded on the assumption that finite resources must be 
distributed by compromise based on the trading of concessions. In both instances the 
emphasis is on the method of distribution rather than on the goals of the parties. A pre-
occupation with distributive considerations diverts attention from the substance of the 
negotiations. As a result, the actual goals and interests of the parties are obscured. In 
these respects the integrative strategy differs radically from both the competitive and co-
operative strategies. The dominant thrust of an integrative approach is to invent 
solutions that meet the joint needs of the parties and thereby reconcile their underlying 
interests instead of restricting the outcome to the division of fixed or limited resources.145 
Distributive solutions come into play only once the parties have exhausted goal-directed 
methods of joint problem solving.146 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
See 5.5 below. 
See Lowenthal "General theory of negotiation" 73 for an example of the "fixed 
pie" simile in regard to the distributive attributes of both the competitive and co-
operative strategies. 
See generally Gifford "Strategy selection in legal negotiation" 46-47. 
See figure 2 above in 5.3.2 above. 
For a resume of the integrative strategy, see Gifford "Strategy selection in legal 
negotiation" 54-57. 
Raiffa Science of Negotiation 131 concisely sums up the integrative strategy in 
the following terms: "It is no longer true that if one party gets more, the other 
136 
From a legal perspective, this analysis of negotiation strategy indicates that the process 
of negotiation, like any other process, is conducted according to established forms and 
methods. Moreover, as in the case of adversarial litigation, the issues in negotiation are 
also distributive. These factors, along with the theory that shows that negotiation moves 
through distinct processual stages, 147 illustrate the basic continuities between 
negotiation as a process, and legal process. On the basis of this general model of 
negotiation, the investigation turns to the manner in which the process of negotiation is 
applied in a legal context as well as to the relationship between the structure of legal 
negotiation and negotiation theory. 
5.4 Contextualising legal negotiation 
Whenever negotiations occur in a legal setting, a number of important contextual 
questions arise that relate to the differences between negotiation in a broader social 
environment and negotiation in the legal sphere. What are the distinctions between 
negotiation and legal negotiation? How do these distinctions affect the form and content 
of legal negotiation? Is legal negotiation totally separate from or integrated into the 
conduct of legal process? Does the adversarial ethos influence the structure of legal 
negotiation? To what extent does the unique structure of legal negotiation affect strategy 
and strategy selection? These are the critical questions that will be examined in order to 
contextualise the form, function and structure of legal negotiation. 
An obvious difference between ordinary negotiation and legal negotiation is the 
environment in which the negotiations occur. Standard texts on negotiation emphasise 
the importance of the climate for negotiation: the effect of location and colour, table 
shape, the influence of space, the composition of the negotiation teams, the effect of 
verbal and non-verbal communication.148 These are only some of the factors that create 
147 
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necessarily has to get less: they can both get more. They can co-operate in order 
to enlarge the pie that they eventually will have to divide." 
See, further, 5.2 above. 
For instance, see Pienaar and Spoelstra Negotiation 47-81 for the numerous 
factors that influence the climate for negotiation. 
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the proper climate for negotiation and are equally important for legal negotiation. 
Likewise, the legal environment is also an external factor that fundamentally influences 
the climate for legal negotiation. At least one Of the disputants involved is represented by 
a lavvyer, the location for negotiation is normally the office of a law firm, an advocate's 
chamber or, in many instances, the foyer of the court. An added consideration is that the 
negotiations are conducted in a closed prOfessional milieu in which the lavvyer 
negotiators are often personally known to each other. Moreover, strict rules of 
prOfessional ethics regulate the conduct of the lavvyer negotiators. The legal 
environment therefore provides a setting that is distinct from that in which any other form 
of negotiation occurs. 
But apart from the influence of the legal environment, differences in the negotiation 
relationships can also be identified. Legal negotiation is representative because it occurs 
in the context Of the lavvyer/client relationship. The representative characteristic of legal 
negotiation arises from the fact that the disputants to the negotiations do not confront 
each other in their individual capacities but rather do so indirectly through their legal 
representatives. The negotiations are conducted by legal representatives who engage 
each other as agents for their clients. Agency is therefore an essential element of legal 
negotiation that directly influences the tenor of the process: client consulting and 
counselling, client authority that determines the scope of the mandate between agent 
and principal, the ethical standards to which the lavvyer is bound prOfessionally as well 
as the constraints imposed by substantive rules and legal procedures. The term 
"representative negotiation" therefore describes a specific attribute of the negotiations 
that occur in a legal setting.149 
Legal negotiation also differs from ordinary negotiation in respect of the substantive 
content of the issues that form the subject Of the negotiations. In the context of legal 
negotiation, a definitive distinction exists between rule-making negotiation and dispute 
negotiation.150 Rule-making negotiation is transactional, dealing with the creation of 
149 
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For descriptions of the lawyer/client relationship in the context of legal 
negotiation, see Gifford Legal Negotiation 3-7 184-200; Hartje "Lawyer's skills in 
negotiations" 122-123 125 146-154; Teply Legal Negotiation 7-20. 
See Eisenberg "Private ordering through negotiation" 638; see also 5.1 above. 
138 
future rights or interests eg buying and selling a business; dispute negotiation relates to 
past events that are in contention on account of the alleged infringement of the rights 
involved eg the division of the matrimonial property in a divorce case.151 The differences 
between rule-making negotiation and dispute negotiation are fundamental. In an 
instance where the parties reach a deadlock in respect of a transaction that affects future 
rights and interests, no neutral third party can compel either or both of the parties to 
accept the agreement. However, the situation is different in respect of dispute 
negotiation. If the parties should negotiate to impasse over past events that have led to 
the infringement of existing rights, one of the parties has the option of commencing 
proceedings in a court of law. Unlike any other form of negotiation, dispute negotiation in 
its legal context anticipates adjudicatory outcomes that could become reality if the 
negotiations fail. 152 
The setting in which legal dispute negotiation occurs is unique. In South Africa, the 
courts are an important forum for the resolution of disputes. An aggrieved party may 
commence proceedings to compel an opponent to appear and answer the claim; a court 
is competent to try the dispute in law and is endowed with the authority to make a 
binding order or judgment that is enforceable under the sanction of the State. The image 
of the court is that of power - power to interpret and apply the law. 
However, the irony is that the image of the court is more symbolic than real.153 Most 
cases that are filed are settled privately rather than by means of the public adjudicatory 
process. This does not mean that the function of the court is irrelevant; the relevance of 
litigation ought not to be measured against the number of cases that reach trial stage 
and that are fully adjudicated.154 The parties to litigation do not negotiate in a vacuum. 
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See also 3.2.1 above for the distinction between rights-based and interest-based 
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Kritzer The Negotiation Process in Ordinary Litigation 130. 
Galanter "Landscape of disputes" 32; Kritzer The Negotiation Process in 
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Legal process and its implications impact on the negotiations. The application of 
substantive law and legal procedures expressed through the adjudicatory process 
provides the backdrop for negotiation. It is in this sense that Mnookin and Kornhauser 
state that the parties "bargain in the shadow of the law". 155 Negotiation occurs in an 
environment in which the disputants are aware of the outcome that the legal system will 
impose if they fail to reach an agreement.156 The courts, the law that they apply and the 
power at their disposal to enforce their decisions, confer on the parties what Mnookin 
and Kornhauser refer to as a "bargaining endowment".157 The example they give relates 
to the case of divorce 
[t]he legal rules governing alimony, child support, marital property and custody 
give each parent certain claims based on what each would get if the case went on 
trial. In other words, the outcome that the law will impose if no agreement is 
reached gives each parent certain bargaining chips - an endowment of sorts. 
Hence, the authoritative standing of legal rules and their adjudicatory application confers 
on the parties a substantive entitlement that directly influences the content and outcome 
of their negotiations. 
The "shadow of the law'' concept also has other dimensions. Kritzer rightly observes that 
the threat of legal adjudication and its potential outcome creates an environment in 
which "agreements can occur; that is, without the threat of adjudication, it is unlikely that 
most of what we think of as civil disputes would lead to any agreements".158 The threat of 
the commencement of court proceedings or their continuance, the prospect of a full trial 
as well as the potential for an uncertain win/lose result, coerce the parties to enter into 
settlement negotiations. Moreover, the delay, cost and uncertainty involved in obtaining 
an adjudicated settlement are considerations that affect negotiation that occurs within 
the law's expansive shadow.159 For instance, in an action for damages, the defendanfs 
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"Bargaining in the shadow of the law'' 968. 
Idem. 
Idem. 
The Negotiation Process in Ordinary Litigation 130. 
Galanter "Landscape of disputes" 33. 
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liability might be relatively simple to prove but the delay, cost and uncertainty of proving 
the quantum of damages is an overriding factor that acts as an incentive to enter into 
settlement negotiations. Of these three variables, the transactional cost of litigation is 
probably the most important determinant that compels the parties into settlement 
negotiations. In many instances, rr not in most, the parties are forced to negotiate their 
differences because the substantive legal issues in dispute are outweighed by the 
exorbitant litigation costs involved in vindicating those rights before the courts.160 
Furthermore, the "shadow of the law'' concept emphasises the continuity between 
litigation and negotiation. The actual or potential threat of litigation and the related 
outcome of an adjudicated decision sets legal standards that dominate the substance of 
legal negotiation, provides an environment that coerces the parties into settlement 
negotiations and imposes a cost factor that dissuades the parties from impulsively 
ventilating their dispute before a court. There are other continuities as well. 
The adversarial system of litigation 161 creates the ethos in which legal negotiation is 
conducted. The assumptions underlying legal negotiation are therefore adversarial 
which, in tum, are transformed into behaviour. Menkel-Meadow, a critic of the 
adversarial style of negotiation, describes the situation as follows 
Because litigation negotiations are conducted in the "shadow of the law," that is, 
in the shadow of the courts, the negotiators assume that what is bargained for are 
the identical, but limited, items a court would award in deciding the case. 
Typically, it is assumed that all that is bargained for is who will get the most 
money and who can be compelled to do or not to do something. Indeed, it may be 
that because litigation negotiations are conducted in the shadow of the court that 
they are assumed to be zero-sum games.162 
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The recognition of these adversarial assumptions is extremely important for a critical 
analysis of the structure of legal negotiation as well as the related issue of strategy and 
strategy selection. Being influenced by the adversarial ethos, the strategy for legal 
negotiation is either competitive or co-operative, based on principles of distributive 
bargaining within a linear negotiation structure, 163 to the virtual exclusion of the 
integrative strategy that emphasises problem solving. 164 
There is also another perspective. Not only are the continuities between negotiation and 
litigation acknowledged, but it is contended that both these forms of process are part of a 
single integrated process. This view is based on the assumption that most of the activity 
relating to litigation is concentrated in negotiation and settlement. Negotiation forms the 
background to most civil proceedings and those that are fully litigated indicate that there 
has been a failure to arrive at a viable settlement. 165 Goodpaster summarises this view 
Litigating a dispute is both a major alternative to negotiating it and a way to force 
its negotiation. Litigation arises when the parties to a "mature" dispute have 
attempted to negotiate it and failed, or have ignored, or refused, the possibility of 
negotiating it.. .. Since most lawsuits settle before trial, it is useful to view litigation 
not solely as a way to reach an adjudicated result, but also as a highly structured 
negotiation game, a refined and constrained version of competitive bargaining. 166 
In fact, Mackie suggests that the system of litigation could disintegrate were it not for 
negotiated settlements and cites the following passage from 1987 report167 of the Lord 
Chancellor's Department to support his contention 
In practice it is recognised universally that the functioning of the system of Civil 
Justice depends on the propensity of most cases to settle. Were it otherwise, the 
burden on the system, and the resulting delays, would become intolerable.168 
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See generally Mankel-Meadow "Legal negotiation" 768-775. 
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Galanter takes the matter a step furt~er by asserting that legal negotiation and litigation 
are not two separate processes but rather a single process which he names litigotiation, 
that is "the strategic pursuit of settlement through mobilising the court process".169 Legal 
negotiation is therefore not some marginal activity vaguely related to the litigation 
process - it is at the core of legal process.170 
The continuity between the process of litigation and the negotiation process as its 
informal complement, contextualises legal negotiation as a unique form of dispute 
negotiation. However, only factors that influence the substance of the negotiations have 
been explored to the exclusion of those factors that affect the structure of legal 
negotiation as well as the selection of an optimal strategy. Consequently, the continuity 
between the structure of legal negotiatio·n and the norms that underlie the process of 
litigation, need to be explored. 
5.5 The structure of legal negotiation 
Legal negotiation occurs in a milieu in which the norms and standards of the system of 
adversarial litigation prevail. The application of a number of principles converge to 
create an adversarial mindset to negotiation. South Africa, in keeping with the practice of 
other countries that are part of the family of Anglo-American civil procedure, employs a 
negative system of pleading whereby every allegation of fact is joined by denial (and 
thus subsequently tested a trail) and any allegation that is not so denied is deemed to be 
admitted.171 Individualism is bred by the application of the principles of party prosecution 
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"Negotiation and Mediation" 75. A similar view regarding the position in the 
United States of America is expressed by Teply Legal Negotiation 3: 
"Negotiation of legal disputes has a broader institutional and economic 
significance that extends beyond a particular client's interests. From an 
institutional perspective, negotiated settlements reduce the wor1doad placed on 
the judicial system. Because of negotiated settlements, both trial and appellate 
courts have more time to consider cases that require trial and appellate review''. 
"Negotiation and legal process" 268. 
Ibid 269. 
See Millar "Principles of the ficta confessio" 215; Faris 'The ficta confessio in 
South African civil procedural law'' 76-80 129-135. 
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and party presentation that respectively make each party accountable for the 
prosecution of the related caused or defence as well as for the investigation and 
presentation of evidence that is adduced at a trail, which also implies the burden of 
refuting the evidence presented by the other party.172 The principle of dialectic underlies 
the conduct of the trial thereby promoting partisan argumentation and debate in favour of 
either a cause or defence, as the case may be.173 The process of adjudication and its 
outcome is based on the ethics of conscience that accordingly recognises only a binary 
solution to a dispute. This means that there is not an opportunity for conciliation because 
the outcome of a court's decision is always that there will be a winner and a loser, and 
the winner takes all. 174 These principles not only sustain the system of adversarial 
litigation but also mould the behaviour of its participants. Legal negotiation does not 
stand immune - it is part of the system.175 Adversarial behaviour as it relates to litigation 
does not suddenly cease when negotiations are to be conducted. The upshot is that the 
norms of the system of adversarial litigation are transposed as assumptions that underlie 
legal negotiation. The structure of legal negotiation is the product of these adversarial 
assumptions. 
The system of pleading focuses on various material allegations of fact that are brought 
to issue by a conclusive admission or denial in regard to each allegation. Although the 
system of fact-pleading determines with particularity the various factual issues that are in 
dispute for the purposes of the trial, each allegation of fact that is in issue may be traced 
to a single cause or defence that is founded on substantive legal principles eg breach of 
contract, liability on the grounds of a delict, the division or forfeiture of the joint estate in 
respect of the dissolution of a marriage in community of property and the like. The 
inevitable assumption is that two parties are involved in the determination of a single 
issue in dispute. This same assumption is transferred to the process of legal negotiation, 
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thereby casting the process into the competitive and distributive terms of Raiffa's 
situational analysis of "two parties, one issue".176 
The application of the principles of party prosecution and party representation 
accentuate a practitioner's responsibility for taking a partisan stance to both serve and 
protect the interests of a client. With regard to legal negotiation and especially in respect 
of its representative attributes,177 the assumption is that a legal practitioner must take a 
maximalist stance on behatf of a client which is in keeping with the method of the 
competitive strategy. 
The conception of negotiation strategy is also influenced by the dialectic nature of the 
trial process. The adversarial system promotes the principle that the truth will be 
established by a neutral third party if contradictory versions of the same dispute are 
argued and debated. By thesis and antithesis, synthesis occurs in the form of a 
judgment.178 This might be true in an ideal situation but this philosophical principle is not 
actualised in practice. To the contrary, the dialectical principle has been interpreted as 
an invitation for competitiveness in order to achieve the greatest advantage for a client. 
However, at the core of the adversarial principle is the assumption that each party 
values the limited resources in dispute equally and the argumentation, both in law and in 
fact, is directed at establishing the grounds for awarding the total sum or the greater part 
of these resources to the party who is able to achieve this objective. This same 
assumption accounts for the application of a competitive strategy for legal negotiation 
and forms the basis of distributive bargaining that is so characteristic of legal negotiation. 
Two aspects of the adjudicative process are particularly relevant to the process of legal 
negotiation. The first relates to the outcome of adjudication. The very reason for a party 
resorting to adjudication is to obtain a definitive and conclusive outcome. The binary 
character of adjudication accommodates this need: given propositions are treated as 
being conclusive or inconclusive; when norms are in conflict, the dominant norm is 
176 See text and note 124-127 above. 
See text to note 149 above. 
178 Couture "Judicial process" 19-20. 
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preferred and ultimately, the case put by each party is either "right" or "wrong".179 Court-
based adjudication always produces a win/lose outcome.180 In game theoretic terms 
adjudication may therefore be described as a zero-sum game - one party's gain is the 
other party's loss.181 Another aspect of an adjudicative outcome 182 is that it is mainly 
expressed in fungible commodities, usually in the form of money.183 Unquantifiable 
claims are converted into monetary terms eg claims for pain and suffering, defamation, 
personality infringement, and indeed, even child and spouse maintenance in cases of 
divorce. These two aspects of the adjudicative outcome are reflected as basic 
assumptions that underlie legal negotiation: negotiation is a zero-sum game and 
outcomes are expressed as monetary solutions. 
Reviewed cumulatively, these adversarial assumptions are expressed in the form of a 
linear structure for legal negotiation.184 Negotiation is conceptualised as dealing with 
only single issues in dispute between two parties thereby introducing the element of 
distributive bargaining.185 This enhances a polarised view of negotiation based on the 
assumption that the parties are in conflict because they value equally the limited 
resources in dispute. The object of the negotiations is to distribute the fixed sum of finite 
resources which is normally expressed in money and if not, then quantified in monetary 
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terms. Normally, due to the partisan ethics of the adversarial system, a maximalist 
approach is taken to negotiation. Typically each party bargains for a maximal (best) 
result: the plaintiff commences with a high demand and the defendant counters by 
conceding the minimum. Accordingly, an aspiration base and a real base are focal for 
proper planning of the negotiations. Moreover because the outcome of adjudication is a 
zero-sum, each party attempts to obviate a potential adjudicative outcome as well as the 
transactional costs involved in litigation. This creates the incentive for the parties to 
make concessions in order to reach an agreement within the bargaining zone where 
each party's real base overlaps. Agreement at the hypothetical midpoint within the 
bargaining zone is considered an advantage when compared with the uncertain 
outcome of a binary adjudicative solution to which transactional costs are added. In this 
particular context, a negotiated settlement also avoids the potential of a minus-sum 
game which entails one party winning but both parties losing because each must pay the 
exorbitant costs of litigation.186 The structure of legal negotiation is therefore highly 
stylised, being restricted to linear solutions for the distribution of the finite resources in 
dispute in terms of which bargaining occurs on the basis of a competitive strategy.187 
5.6 Strategy selection 
Having established an outline of the structure of legal negotiation, it becomes possible to 
deal with strategy selection for legal negotiation. Objectively, a competitive, co-operative 
or integrative strategy should in theory be applicable to any negotiation situation. 
Essentially, what needs to be determined is vvhether the structure of legal negotiation 
sets pre-conditions for the selection of a negotiation strategy or whether it is able to 
accommodate any negotiation strategy. 
A preliminary response is that the competitive strategy is best suited to the structure of 
legal negotiation. All the elements of the competitive strategy are satisfied within the 
186 
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See Kritzer The Negotiation Process in Ordinary Litigation 67; Menkel-
Meadow "Legal negotiation" 767 note 44. 
This particular form of negotiation has been described by Menkel-Meadow "Legal 
negotiation" 576 note 3 as "adversarial negotiation" and instead promotes a 
problem-solving negotiation model as an alternative. 
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structure of legal negotiation: the presumption of conflict, a ma:ximalist approach to the 
negotiations, distributive bargaining and the ritualised granting of concessions.188 
Indeed, because of the unique structure of legal negotiation, the competitive strategy is 
traditionally applied. However, this need not necessarily indicate that strategy selection 
for legal negotiation is inflexible. The traditional association between the competitive 
strategy and legal negotiation is a symptom of a mindset that has been conditioned by 
adversarial behaviour rather than a rigid usage.189 
At first glance it might seem that the competitive and co-operative strategies are 
antithetical to each other. By comparison with the competitive strategy, the co-operative 
strategy is non-competitive and therefore shuns a ma:ximalist approach to the 
negotiations instead favouring collaboration as means of achieving a fair solution to the 
dispute.190 Given this vital difference, the continuities between the two strategies should 
not be overlooked. A major continuity between the competitive and the co-operative 
strategies is that both function within the linear structure of distributive bargaining based 
on a pattern of concession making in order to compromise on the sharing of finite 
resources. Essentially the differences relate to negotiation style rather than to the actual 
structure of the negotiations. This would be in keeping with Williams's distinction 
between competitive and co-operative styles of negotiation. 191 What is evident is that 
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explicitly teaches competitive partisan advocacy as an ultimate process. . . . The 
danger for lawyers is that the mind set of partisan advocacy imputes to clients a 
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Williams Legal Negotiation and Settlement 18-40 on the basis of empirical 
studies dealing with negotiation effectiveness in respect of legal disputes, 
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competitive strategy need not monopolise legal negotiation because of the nature of its 
negotiation structure. Distributive bargaining is common to both strategies and therefore 
both are amenable to the linear structure of legal negotiation. 
In order to circumvent the traditional choice of automatically adopting a competitive 
strategy for legal negotiation, legal negotiation theorists suggest that the negotiations 
should be contextualised before deciding on an appropriate strategy. Lowenthal limits 
the scope of his work to only the competitive and co-operative (or as he calls it, 
collaborative) strategies. What is recognised is that the choice between one of the two 
strategies is "influenced strongly by certain characteristics of the particular negotiation". 
In this respect the following factors are identified: "(1) the subject matter of the 
negotiation; (2) the normative constraints on the negotiators; (3) the on-going 
relationship between the parties; and (4) the personality and values of the respective 
negotiators".192 For the purposes of the present discussion, the emphasis falls on the 
subject matter of the negotiations. In this respect, Lowenthal distinguishes between the 
"pay-off structure" and the "trade-off structure" of the negotiations. The first relates to 
"the extent to which the negotiators must share or ration the items bartered" that in tum 
forces an assessment of whether the negotiations are zero-sum or non-zero-sum.193 The 
second consideration relating to the subject matter of the negotiations deals with the 
number of items on the bargaining agenda. This is an important factor because when a 
multiple agenda contains a number of non-zero-sum items, there is a greater opportunity 
to employ a co-operative strategy on account of the trade-offs arising from the relative 
value of different items to each party.194 In brief, zero-sum negotiations normally 
necessitate the adoption of a competitive strategy, non-zero-sum negotiations allow for 
"problem-solving approaches" and lastly, "many rationing situations permit limited 
collaborative negotiation when it is possible to add agenda items".195 Although 
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Lowenthal furnishes useful grounds for strategy selection, he confines himself to the 
linear structure of distributive bargaining that is characteristic of legal negotiation. This is 
evident from his equivocation regarding "problem-solving approaches" as forming part of 
a distinct and independent integrative strategy.196 
The competitive and co-operative strategies present different sides of the same coin 
because both share a common linear structure of distributive bargaining. The differences 
between the two relate to negotiation style rather than to structure. Both are therefore 
compatible with the structure of legal negotiation which makes strategy selection a 
relatively uncomplicated task when the choice is a toss up between one of these two 
strategies. However, the matter of strategy selection becomes a little more complicated 
when the integrative strategy is introduced as another option. 
The purpose and function of the integrative strategy are in diametrical opposition to 
those of the competitive and co-operative strategies. The integrative strategy is goal 
directed, based on methods of joint problem solving and concerned with outcomes that 
give effect to mutual decision making. The objective is articulately expressed by Menkel-
Meadow 
In addition to focusing on the parties' needs as a source of solutions, negotiators 
can attempt to expand the resources that the parties may eventually have to 
divide. In essence, this aspect of problem-solving negotiation seeks whenever 
possible to convert zero-sum games into non-zero-sum or positive-sum games. 
By expanding resources or the material available for division, more of the parties' 
total set of needs may be satisfied.197 
Distributive issues are therefore only of secondary importance. 
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A major criticism of the integrative strategy is its failure to address the reality of 
distributive bargaining. However the criticism is not unqualified. According to Eisenberg's 
contextualisation of rule-making negotiation and dispute negotiation, 198 an integrative 
strategy would suit the circumstances of rule-making negotiation which is directed at the 
creation of future rights that usually determine in advance the manner in which 
resources or material will be distributed by mutual agreement between the parties. As its 
name indicates, dispute negotiation relates to the re-allocation of a finite sum of 
resources as a result of past events that led to the infringement of rights. In most 
instances of dispute negotiation, distributive issues are a practical reality which 
proponents of the integrative strategy tend to underestimate. 
Ury and Fisher's Getting to Yes serves as an extreme example of a problem-solving 
approach that overlooks distributional issues. White's criticism of the book is telling 
Unfortunately the book's emphasis upon mutually profitable adjustments, on the 
"problem-solving" aspect of bargaining, is the book's weakness. It is a weakness 
because emphasis of this aspect of bargaining is done to almost the total 
exclusion of the other aspect of bargaining, "distributional bargaining," where one 
for me is minus one for you. .. . One can concede the authors' thesis (that too 
many negotiators are incapable of engaging in problem solving or finding 
adequate options for mutual gain), yet still maintain that the most demanding 
aspect of nearly every negotiation is the distributional one in which one seeks 
more at the expense of the other.199 
The essence of the controversy is whether distributional issues are amenable to joint 
problem solving. In response to this point of criticism, Fisher contends that White has 
overemphasised substantive issues in respect of which the parties' interests are directly 
opposed and accordingly "overlooks the shared interests that the parties continue to 
have in the process for resolving that substantive difference". Distributional issues 
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should therefore be treated as a shared problem.200 White and Fisher obviously evaluate 
the integrative approach from totally different vantage points: the former from the harsh 
reality of adversarial and distributive bargaining within the arena of legal negotiation,201 
the latter from an idealistic and morally prescriptive conception of negotiation.202 
Polarised approaches such as these make strategy selection an extremely difficult task, 
particularly because the compatibility between distributional issues and joint problem 
solving is not directly addressed. The lack of clarity is especially pertinent in the context 
of the distributive principles applicable to the linear structure of legal negotiation. 
Menkel-Meadow is highly critical of the linear structure of legal negotiation along with the 
adversarial orientations which it promotes. As an alternative, she has developed a 
problem-solving model. The passage that follows concisely summarises the contrast 
between both approaches 
The adversarial structure encourages compromise in its conventional sense; that 
is, both parties must give up something in order to reach agreement. In contrast, 
the problem-solving model substitutes a negotiation structure that does not 
require unnecessary compromise but permits the parties to come to an 
agreement without having to give up their preferences.203 
Although biased in favour of a problem-solving structure for legal negotiation, Menkel-
Meadow acknowledges the limits of the problem-solving model204 and concedes that in 
200 
201 
202 
203 
204 
"Comment" 121. 
In conjunction with Edwards, White is the co-author of the book The Lawyer as a 
Negotiator: Problems, Readings and Materials (St Paul Minn, West Publishing 
Co 1977) which is noted for its competitive or adversarial approach to legal 
negotiation. 
This is evident from an extract contained in Fisher's "Comment" 120: "To some 
extent, I believe, White is more concerned with the way the world is, and I am 
more concerned with what intelligent people ought to do. One task is to teach the 
truth - to tell students the unpleasant facts of life, including how people typically 
negotiate. But I want a student to negotiate better than his or her father. I see my 
task as to give the best possible prescriptive advice, taking into account the way 
other human beings are likely to behave as well as one's own emotions and 
psychological state." 
"Legal Negotiation" 794. 
Ibid 829-840. 
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certain instances a binary solution is the only manner of resolving a dispute.205 Even 
though Menkel-Meadow's trenchant criticism of "adversarial negotiation" does expose its 
defects, a major flaw in the structure of problem solving that is proposed as the 
alternative, is that it is not in all cases an adequate substitute for distributive bargaining 
within the linear structure of legal negotiation. Only polarised options for strategy 
selection are posed: either adversarial negotiation or the structure of problem solving, 
with an obvious bias for the latter. Consequently, strategy selection for legal negotiation 
is not contextualised in regard to the specific attributes of a particular dispute. Gifford's 
contribution to strategy selection deals pertinently with this problem. 
Proponents of a particular negotiation strategy usually argue that the adoption of their 
approach will achieve the best results. For instance, Fisher and Ury steadfastly promote 
principled negotiation, Bellow and Moulton support the competitive strategy and Menkel-
Meadow favours the structure of problem solving for legal negotiation. Gifford's 
approach is systematic rather than dogmatic. If he does hold any fixed viewpoint, it 
would be that strategy selection should be flexible and that the context of the 
negotiations is a critical variable for the selection of the optimal negotiation strategy. He 
sums up his context-based theory of strategy selection in legal negotiation as follows 
Within each substantive area of negotiation, certain systematic characteristics 
recur; in choosing a negotiation strategy, the importance of these characteristics 
outweighs the effects of idiosyncratic facts in most negotiations. Accordingly, by 
applying these factors to be used in choosing a negotiation to the characteristics 
of a particular type of negotiation, a negotiator can determine systemically a 
recommended strategy. Although a somewhat different strategy may sometimes 
be dictated by the particular facts of a specific transaction, the recommended 
strategy for the context in which the negotiation occurs can serve as a guideline 
or starting point for the negotiator. The ability to prescribe a strategy for a specific 
type of negotiation enables negotiation theory to provide meaningful advice for 
the real world negotiator: by doing so, the study of negotiation in professional 
education is legitimated. 206 
In order to illustrate these principles Gifford analyses negotiation strategy in the context 
of the defence attorney's strategy in plea bargaining,207 the plaintiff's attorney's 
205 Ibid 835-836. 
206 
"Strategy selection in legal negotiation" 45. 
207 Ibid 73-82. 
153 
negotiation strategy in personal injury negotiations208 and lastly, the management 
attorney's strategy in labour relations.209 In each instance, the analysis of the context of 
the negotiations prescribes the predominant strategy to be adopted as well as the 
combination of strategies that may be used during the various stages of the negotiation 
process. 
Gifford teaches some important lessons. Strategy selection for legal negotiation ought 
not to be confined to preconceived notions about a particular negotiation structure. 
Because of his insight into the fluidity of the process of negotiation, the selection of a 
competitive, co-operative or integrative strategy need not be an irrevocable choice. 
Strategy should alter as the circumstances of the negotiations dictate. Although most 
negotiations commence by means of a competitive approach, any combination of the 
three strategies might be used during the various stages of the negotiation process. The 
competitive, co-operative and integrative strategies are therefore not mutually exclusive 
since more than one of these strategies may be used in a single negotiation.210 The only 
parameters are those that are naturally set by the context in which the negotiations 
occur. 
These insights challenge conventional perceptions about the linear structure of legal 
negotiation that is dominated by adversarial assumptions and the habit of treating 
disputes as distributional issues that are mainly concerned with the division of the total 
sum of finite resources. So too, the contributions of Fisher and Ury and Menkel-Meadow 
point to the need for an attitudinal change that regards the lawyer negotiator as a 
problem solver rather than a pugilist. 
208 Ibid 82-88. 
209 Ibid 88-92. 
210 See, further, Gifford "Strategy selection in legal negotiation" 57-58. 
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5. 7 Negotiation and legal negotiation 
The legal mind is prone to sorting its rules and procedures into neat packages that 
exclude any social concepts, models or institutions that do not meet the abstract and 
rational standards of legal thought. Consequently, there is a general failure to recognise 
the continuities and discontinuities between legal and private institutions. Some of the 
resultant dichotomies have already been explored: non-litigious/ litigious processes, the 
non-legal/legal dispute, non-adjudicative/adjudicative decision-making. Although 
dichotomies are useful for constructing analytical models, they tend to absolutise 
discontinuities and disregard continuities. Similarly, a negotiation/litigation dichotomy 
has until recently veiled the continuity between litigation as a public legal institution and 
negotiation as a private institution. 
Dating back to 1976, Eisenberg perceived the fallacy inherent in these strained 
dichotomies and their tendancy to artificially divorce the legal process from the social 
system. In this vein of thought, he commented as follows, specifically in the context of 
legal negotiation 
Little attention . . . has been given to the continuities between specific legal 
processes and their official counterparts. Indeed, these categories are often 
viewed as essentially dichotomous. Yet the two great tasks of the legal system -
the settlement of disputes that have arisen out of past actions, and the 
establishment of rules to govern future conduct - are also performed daily without 
resort to that system, and it would be surprising if processes as integral to the 
social fabric as those of the law failed to exhibit significant continuities with 
private institutions directed toward accomplishing these tasks.211 
In retrospect, Eisenberg's ideal has been fulfilled in some measure. 
The sources cited in this text indicate the progress that has been made in the field of 
negotiation and in particular, legal negotiation. Negotiation research over the past two 
decades is changing myopic conceptions about the process of negotiation in relation to 
legal process. One salient aspect of these developments is the growing understanding 
211 
"Private ordering through negotiation" 673. 
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of the continuity between legal negotiation and the process of litigation as informal and 
formal methods of dispute processing and dispute resolution. Legal negotiation can no 
longer be regarded as some random event vaguely related to the process of litigation 
and public adjudicative decision making nor as a totally private occurrence that lacks 
processual structure. 
Moreover, these developments have occurred within the context of the system of ADR in 
which negotiation is posed as an alternative to litigation and legal decision making. 
However, legal negotiation theorists go even further. The one view is that, in terms of 
"the shadow of the law" concept, the substance and structure of legal negotiation 
anticipates adjudicative outcomes should the negotiations fail; the other is view that legal 
negotiation is not merely an alternative to litigation but an integral part of its informal 
processes. 212 
The heightened awareness of the interdependence between legal negotiation and the 
litigation process creates some very interesting dilemmas for both ADR and the litigation 
system. If legal negotiation and litigation are inseparably connected, then in the context 
of ADR, it is misleading to assert that legal negotiation is a process alternative to 
litigation. On the other hand, because most civil proceedings are settled by negotiation 
in anticipation of adjudicatory outcomes, the litigation system therefore provides a non-
voluntary adjudicative alternative should the negotiations fail.213 This inverted logic is not 
merely a matter of verbal gymnastics but rather raises pertinent issues about the context 
of negotiation in relation to both ADR and the system of litigation. From the vantage of 
ADR it may be asserted that negotiation is an important alternative process that may be 
used in support of legal decision making; from the perspective of the litigation system, a 
I 
particular form of negotiation, characterised as legal negotiation, may be identffied as 
being inseparably intertwined with legal process. 
212 See 5.4 above. 
213 Kritzer The Negotiation Process in Ordinary Litigation 137. 
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6.1 Mediatory intervention 
6.1.1 The nature of third-party intervention 
Mediation is a form of process that relies on the intermediary intervention of a neutral 
third party for the resolution of a dispute. Although this statement does describe a 
fundamental attribute of the process of mediation, it remains vague because there are a 
variety of processes that also rely on third-party intervention for the resolution of a 
dispute: expert appraisal, neutral fact-finding, the ombudsman, umpiring by a referee, 
valuation, arbitration and court-based adjudication, to name but a few. Common to all is 
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a process of trilateral interaction for the transformation and resolution of the dispute. 
Therefore in theory, every form of process that depends on third-party intervention for 
the resolution of a dispute may be posed as an alternative to mediation.1 Accordingly, 
the intrinsic nature of mediatory intervention must be established in order to distinguish 
--- , .. -
the process of mediation from other forms of third-party intervention. 
The extent to which the disputants submit the dispute to a neutral third party and grant 
authority for its settlement, directly determines the form and function of any 
interventionist process. The submission of the dispute to an outsider realigns the original 
bilateral relationship between the disputants. On the basis of their bilateral relationship, 
the disputants retain their independent decision-making powers. However, when a 
trilateral relationship is effected, the disputants' decision-making powers are diminished 
in proportion to the scope of authority granted to the neutral third party to resolve the 
dispute.2 Within the framework of a trilateral relationship a number of variables operate 
to determine the degree of intervention by the third party. 3 The third party may be 
competent either to give a non-binding opinion, impose a binding decision or merely 
-- --•'-"' --·--R••'-'''"'-~~- --
facilitate the resolution-Of the dispute. Accord-ing t~ this construction, the nature of the 
-------·---··--···· .. 
outcome envisaged by the disputants determines the degree and intensity of the 
intervention as well as the extent to which the parties surrender their decision-making 
powers. Against this background, the processual form of mediatory intervention may be 
assessed. 
By comparison to other forms of third-party intervention, mediatory intervention does not 
result in the imposition of a binding decision or produce a non-binding opinion. 4 As a 
2 
3 
4 
Mackie "Negotiation and mediation" 87. See also Moore The Mediation Process 
8-9. 
See Roberts "Mediation in family disputes" 548-549. 
Rogers and Salem Mediation and the Law 245-254 describe the various 
methods of third-party intervention by means of a continuum "ranging from purely 
consensual procedures to adjudicative ones". Although a continuum is a useful 
tool for analysing the characteristics of the various forms of third-party 
intervention, it should be regarded only as a method of analysis rather than as a 
prediction of the development of a dispute. 
See Mowatt 'Thoughts on mediation" 730. 
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starting point, mediatory and adjudicative intervention may be compared. 
Paradigmatically, both share the same trilateral structure for the transformation and 
resolution of a dispute but conceptually, mediation and adjudication have nothing in 
common. Adjudicative intervention is supported by a systematic power base originating 
in jurisdictional rules or a contractual submission consenting to the implementation of an 
adjudicative process. The authoritative standing of adjudicative intervention hence 
permits the imposition of a binding decision thereby effectively divesting the disputants 
of their decision-making powers. 5 Mediatory intervention has no recourse to any such 
_< _____________ _ 
structured authority. If mediatory authority is sought, then it can be traced only to the 
individual and mutual consent of the disputants to enter into the mediation process.6 
likewise, the power that sustains the intervention of the third party is not external to the 
process or sanctioned but is rather reliant on the skill and personal authority of the 
mediator to effect a realignment of private relationships as a means of resolving the 
dispute.7 What is immediately apparent is that the outcome of mediatory intervention can 
never be imposed on the disputants as a binding decision. Whether a non-binding 
opinion may be an outcome of mediatory intervention, is a separate issue. 
In its purest form, mediatory intervention should not produce a non-binding opinion. 
Theoretically, the third-party neutral to the process of mediation should intervene only as 
an intermediary between the disputants in order to facilitate the resolution of the 
. d°ispute.if"ldeally slie.aking, .. the intermediary function and mediatory intervention should 'l 
-----·- j 
be synonymous. Should the third-party neutral's intervention extend beyond the role of II . 
I 
that of an intermediary, strictly speaking, the form of the process is something other than [~ 
mediatory intervention. 
5 
6 
7 
a 
Fulton Commercial ADR 78 
Newton "ADR and the lawyer'' 564. 
Fulton Commercial ADR 78; Riskin ''Mediation in alternative dispute processing" 
25. 
Levy and Mowatt ''Mediation in the legal environment" 64. 
! 
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However, the underpinning of the intermediary role and function is not always clear 
because certain processes that rely on third-party intervention combine in varying 
degrees elements of both mediatory and adjudicative intervention. Prime examples are 
expert appraisal and neutral fact finding. The outcome of these processes is invariably a 
non-binding opinion that is reminiscent of either adjudicative fact determination or 
decision making. By the same token, the very reason for the selection of such processes 
is to enable the disputants to resolve their dispute through interaction with a third-party 
neutral whose conduct is more in keeping with mediatory rather than adjudicative 
intervention. As a result, in other contexts, the predominant intermediary purpose and 
function of mediatory intervention are Often dissipated by granting the third-party neutral 
the competence to give a non-binding opinion. The "mediation" clause contained in both 
the JBCC and GCC may once again be used as an example.9 Both clauses describe a 
process of mediation in which the neutral third party has an intermediary function.10 
However, these clauses go beyond the theoretical limits of mediatory intervention by 
placing a positive duty on the third-party neutral to prepare a non-binding opinion which 
each disputant may either accept or reject. 11 The unfortunate part of the matter is that 
these and similar processes are called "mediation" and are purportedly based on 
mediatory intervention when in fact they deviate considerably from the paradigm for 
mediatory intervention in terms of which a non-binding opinion is a foreign element. Any 
form of third-party intervention that produces a non-binding opinion is thus in theory in 
··-~---.,__..~~¥>¥~-~·- ·--··..-.-----·-------· 
conflict with the principle of mediatory intervention because in effect the means of the 
mediatory function has been crossed with the ends of adjudicative intervention. 
·-·--------·---···-· . ···~-~--~-~-· ---·-------·~· -··-·- .. --.--- -~-----~-----·---··~---~-·..-·-·~---
Accordingly, a non-binding opinion ought not to be the outcome of any form of mediatory 
intervention. 
By means of this process of elimination, the model for mediatory intervention therefore 
indicates that the mediation process relates solely to third-party intervention for the 
purposes of facilitating the negotiations between the disputants. 
9 
10 
11 
See 3.2.2 above at text to notes 84-101. 
See JBCC 1991cl37.2; GCC 1990 cl 61(2). 
See JBCC 1991cl37.3; GCC 1990 cl 61(2)(e). 
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6.1.2 Mediatory intervention as structured negotiation 
Mediatory intervention transforms the bilateral negotiation process into a trilateral 
process in which the intermediary function of the neutral third party predominates in 
order to facilitate the furtherance of negotiations between the disputants and to assist 
them in achieving a final settlement that is the product of independent and joint decision 
making on their part alone.12 This principle is confirmed by Gulliver 
The intervention of a mediator turns the initial dyad of a dispute into triadic 
interaction of some kind. The disputing parties retain their ability to decide 
whether or not to agree to and accept proposals for an outcome, irrespective of 
the source of the proposals.13 
Mediatory intervention therefore transforms the bilateral structure of negotiation into a 
trilateral format that provides a more elaborate processual framework within which the 
disputants may pursue the negotiation process. The change is structural.14 The process 
of inter-party negotiation is extended through the intervention of the mediator without 
Jimiting the disputants' decision-making powers. The outcome belongs to the disputants 
because they retain their independence ro·seltle the dispute according to their own 
norms and standards. 15 Moore-;;:;-pp~rts thlS princi-pie ________ _ 
Mediation is essentially negotiation that includes a third party who is 
knowledgeable in effective negotiation procedures, and can help people in 
conflict to co-ordinate their activities and to be more effective in their bargaining. 
Mediation is an extension of the negotiation process in that it involves extending 
bargaining into a new format and using a mediator who contributes new variables 
and dynamics to the interaction of the disputants. Without negotiation, however, 
there can be no mediation.16 
12 Levy and Mowatt "Mediation in the legal environment" 65. 
13 Disputes and Negotiations 213. 
14 Carnevale "Strategic choice in mediation" 42. 
15 Moore The Mediation Process 6. 
16 Ibid 14. 
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The fact that mediation is an extension of the process of negotiation does explain a 
fundamental characteristic of mediatory intervention. The continuities between the 
processes of negotiation and mediation are clearly evident. For example, the processual 
stages of negotiation and mediation are similar to each other;17 both processes are 
consensual with the result that party control of the outcome is common to both. However, 
an uncritical reliance on these continuities perpetuates the notion that mediation is an 
adjunct to the process of negotiation.18 Any such notion is flawed because it assumes 
that the interventionist role of the mediator is merely passive. 
Designating the mediator as an intermediary for the furtherance of the negotiations does 
not necessarily imply that in all instances the role of the mediator is static, passive and 
impersonal. 19 Although the process of mediation might be the least intrusive form of 
---··"' 
third-party intervention,20 mediatory intervention is not always unobtrusive. The analogy 
between bilateral negotiation and mediation remains feasible only when the mediator's 
function is strictly that of a passive and impartial intermediary between the disputants, as 
in the case of facilitation or chairing a meeting between disputants. But these forms of 
mediation are rare.21 Whenever active control of process becomes a feature of 
mediatory intervention, the dynamics of the bilateral negotiation process is changed. 
Control of process assumes that a directive form of intervention occurs. The more 
directive the form of mediatory intervention becomes, the more the mediator will direct 
the outcome of the dispute and the less any analogy to bilateral negotiation remains.22 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Compare 5.2 above and Moore The Mediation Process 29-30, 32-33. 
See Roberts "Mediation in family disputes" 548 where he rightly comments: 
"Studies of the structure of settlement institutions have [also) generally indicated 
that the most important contrast is between negotiation and adjudication; 
between processes, on the one hand, in which the power to determine the 
outcome remains with the parties themselves, and, on the other, is surrendered 
to an umpire. One reason for this treatment of mediation appears to be that it is 
generally regarded as a sub-category of negotiation, or as a process auxiliary to 
negotiation." 
See Gulliver Disputes and Negotiation 213-219. 
Goldberg, Green and Sander Dispute Resolution 91. 
See Roberts ''Mediation in family disputes" 549. 
Ibid 550. 
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The above comments might seem to negate the initial premise that mediatory 
intervention is an extension of the process of bilateral negotiation and that the disputants 
retain their competence to independently settle the dispute. This is only partially true. 
Negotiation between the disputants is a fundamental characteristic of mediation, subject 
to the qualification that the negotiations are no longer bilateral. Moreover, although the 
mediator participates in a directive capacity in the outcome of the dispute, mediatory 
,....,,.,..,. ... ,.,....._,--.. ~-~-. 
intervention does not permit the imposition of a decision, thereby protecting the 
independence of the disputants' decision-making powers. The analogy to negotiation in 
general is therefore valid but not to the extent that mediatory intervention is an extension 
of bilateral negotiations. Mediatory intervention is chosen by the disputants precisely 
because bilateral negotiation has failed. Mediation does not and cannot continue 
negotiations in bilateral form. Bilateral negotiation and mediation are processes that are 
distinct and separate. To reason otherwise would be to admit that mediation is an 
adjunct or accessory to the process of bilateral negotiation.23 
Mediation is an independent process. Although negotiation is an intrinsic part of the 
mediation process, negotiation in the context of mediation differs in form from bilateral 
negotiation. The reason is that mediatory intervention structures the negotiations 
between the parties and as a result the dynamics of bilateral negotiation is altered. 
Mediatory intervention provides a processual frame of reference within which the 
mediator participates with the disputants in their negotiation of the dispute. There is the 
temptation to name this form of negotiation "trilateral negotiation". Despite the fact that 
this term represents the reality of the interaction between the mediator and the 
disputants, it is technically incorrect because ultimately the mediator does not share in 
the settlement, which is based solely upon the joint decision making and mutual 
agreement of the disputants. The negotiation that occurs within the process of mediation 
is not bilateral negotiation but rather a distinct form of structured negotiation. Mediation 
may thus be aptly described as a process of structured negotiation that is facilitated 
through the intervention of a third party, known as a mediator. 
23 See, further, note 18 above. 
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6.1.3 The scope and limits of mediatory intervention 
In contrast to adjudicative forms of intervention, mediatory intervention is not bound by 
the uniform application of stylised procedures and to conventional or institutionalised 
/ 
methods for the conduct of process. By comparison to adjudicative processes, mediatory 
intervention can be adapted according to the context of the dispute and the needs of the 
disputants. Accordingly, mediatory intervention cannot be reduced to a single 
comprehensive description. The scope of intervention is infinitely varied - from the 
perfunctory attempt of a friendly neighbour or teacher to settle a dispute to the directive 
and assertive intervention of a professional.24 So too, the context of mediatory 
intervention is equally varied. Mediatory intervention for the purposes of resolving labour 
unrest is essentially different from the form of intervention directed at resolving family 
disputes.25 The literature is replete with examples of the diverse contexts to which 
,...~- -~-·-·-·----~--·-~----,--
mediatory intervention is suited: environmental,26 gender27 and discrimination28 issues; 
W~---·~·-M<' -" ._-~-- -
corporate and commercial disputes;29 the settlement of the personal and proprietary 
consequences of divorce30 and community dispute resolution.31 The list is unending, 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
Astor and Chinkin Dispute Resolution 96; Roberts "Mediation in family disputes" 
550. 
See Mowatt 'Thoughts on mediation" 738-739. 
See, for instance, Lyster "Environmental dispute resolution" 156-160; BNA 
Report 47-48. 
See Astor and Chin kin Dispute Resolution 109-112. 
Ibid 261-276. 
See, for instance, Antrobus and Sutherland "ADR in commercial disputes" 163-
173; Green "Corporate ADR" 264-266; Finsen "Arbitration and mediation in the 
construction industry" 184-186; Fulton Commerical ADR 74-110; Singer Settling 
Disputes 72. 
Burman and Rudolf "Repression by mediation" 251; Cohen "Divorce mediation" 
73; Hoffmann (ed) Family Mediation in SA 35-79 104-111; Mowatt 'The 
Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 1987" 611; Mowatt "Divorce mediation" 
47; Mowatt 'The family court and divorce mediation" 289; Scott-Macnab 
Mediation Arbitration 210-242; Scott-Macnab "Mediation in the family context" 
709; Scott-Macnab and Mowatt ''Mediation and arbitration as alternative 
procedures" 313; Scott-Macnab and Mowatt "Family mediation" 41. 
For the position in South Africa, see Steadman "Settling disputes in communities" 
124. 
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creating the impression that the scope of mediatory intervention is as expansive in its 
application as is bilateral negotiation. This is not the case. Enthusiasm for the process of 
mediation tends to blur the fact that mediatory intervention is not a panacea for all forms 
of conflict and dispute. As a form of third-party intervention, the process of mediation is 
restricted to the interventionist functions that the mediator may perform and limited by 
the nature of the outcome that can be achieved by this particular form of intervention. 
An essential feature of mediatory intervention is the intermediary function of the third-
party neutral. This quality distinguishes mediation from other forms of third-party 
intervention and also determines the scope and limits of the intervention. Accordingly, 
any function that overreaches the intermediary role of a mediator alters the process into 
something other than mediation. Within the processual framework of third-party 
intervention, obvious examples would be instances where the mediator might give a non-
binding opinion or impose a decision on the disputants.32 However these examples are 
too elementary because they do not distinguish the intermediary function of the process 
of mediation from other non-processual activities involving a third party who fits the 
description of an intermediary. 
According to the legal construction of agency and representation, an agent acts as an 
intermediary between the principal and third party. The agent may act as a broker, an 
auctioneer, an estate agent, a factor or a legal representative. The role of the agent 
merely indicates the nature of the mandate involved. The crucial point is that the agent 
enters into a transaction on behalf of the principal thereby intervening in the otherwise 
normal bilateral relationship between the contracting parties. Although the ensuing 
contractual obligations bind only the two contracting parties, the agent is responsible for 
the formation and at times, even the execution of the contract when the authority to 
perform a juristic act on behalf of the principal has been conferred. The intermediary 
function is clearly evident not only from the perspective of contract formation and its 
execution, but also in respect of the pre-contractual stage when the agent acts as a go-
between or might even resolve differences and disputes between the parties in order to 
ensure the eventual execution of the contract. However, the agent's intermediary role is 
32 See, further, 6.1.1 above. 
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not neutral and impartial nor does it relate to the directive control of dispute negotiations. 
As an intermediary, the agent has a definite interest, be it financial or otherwise, in the 
outcome of her mandate and moreover, acts as a partisan for the principal.33 If any 
dispute happens to be resolved on account of the agent's intermediary function, this is 
coincidental to the agent's mandate and not in any manner related to any expressed 
process of dispute resolution. 
The agent is an example of an intermediary in a commercial setting. Pertinent to 
mediation and particularly divorce and family mediation, is the situation of a social 
worker or psychologist in counselling spouses or parents and their children. 34 As an 
intermediary, the counsellor attempts to resolve the personal conflict between the parties 
by therapeutic means. The social services professional has no direct interest in the 
outcome of the dispute but has an obligation to analyse the source of the conflict in 
psychological terms in order to resolve the dispute. Clearly, the professional is involved 
as an intermediary for the purposes of dispute resolution. However, the outcome is 
measured in therapeutic terms, depending on the extent to which the parties are capable 
of altering their behaviour.35 
The intermediary function is therefore not unique to mediatory intervention. Both the 
agent and social services professional are examples of intermediaries. However, the 
33 
34 
35 
See, further, Neale and Bazerman Cognition and Rationality in Negotiation 
142-146. See also 146-153 for a critical analysis of the manager as an 
intermediary. 
Counselling in the context of social services is a common situation and 
problematic in regard to family and divorce mediation. For instance, Astor 
and Chinkin Dispute resolution 63-64 245-246, commenting on the situation 
in Australia, explain that under the Family Law Act of 1975 (Cth) the term 
"conciliation counselling" is used but that the term is not defined. The practice 
that has evolved is described as follows: "The rote of the counsellor is to 
resolve disputes, and will, in many cases, have elements of both mediation 
and therapy. It will be directed to changing the behaviour of the parties, to 
improve their relationship with each other and with their children." 
See Pears Beyond Dispute 41; Keltner Mediation 9; Kelly "Mediation and 
psychotherapy'' 44. See also Roberts "Mediation in family disputes" 551-553 for a 
discussion of "mixed interventions" as well as Coombs "Noncourt-connected 
mediation and counseling" for a critical analysis of mediation as practised by 
mental health professionals. 
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intermediary function of the agent and social services professional cannot be equated 
with mediatory intervention for the purposes of dispute resolution. As a partisan for the 
principal, the agent has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the transaction 
concerned. The agent's mandate might include the settlement of disputes between the 
principal and the third party. Should this be the case, dispute resolution is only incidental 
to the main object of the transaction which is to conclude the contract successfully. The 
agent therefore does intervene as an intermediary but not for the sole purpose of dispute 
resolution. 
On the other hand, the social services professional fulfils a therapeutic and support 
function in an attempt to directly resolve personal conflict. The interventive intermediary 
function is, in contradistinction with that of the agent, directed at the resolution of a 
dispute thereby presenting a closer analogy to mediatory intervention than the 
intermediary model of agency. However, dispute resolution is the only element common 
to mediatory intervention and counselling. With specific reference to divorce mediation, 
Kelly draws a definitive line between mediatory intervention and counselling 
The role of the therapist is to encourage exploration of the meanings and levels of 
dysfunctional psychological reactions. In contrast, the role of the mediator is to 
manage and contain emotional expression so that the process of reaching 
settlement can proceed.36 
The intermediary function of the social services professional operates within the context 
of the counsellor/client relationship and therefore in professional terms is client centred 
and therapeutically orientated, with the aim of assisting the clients to cope 
psychologically with the causes underlying the dispute. 37 
By comparison with other types of intermediaries, the intermediary function of mediatory 
intervention is therefore concerned with dispute resolution for the purposes of achieving 
a settlement of a dispute on the basis of the mutual agreement of the disputants. 
Conceptually, this occurs within the broader processual context of third-party 
"Mediation and psychotherapy" 44. 
37 Keltner Mediation 8. 
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intervention. Within this framework, the interventionist role of the mediator is that of an 
intermediary whose principal function is to structure and control the process of 
------·----···'·------~~---· ------··-'"' -~---·----~-- ., ... -- "'- ---- k~~~·-·'··-·-~"---
negotiation be~_:!.:!_ the dispu~n_ts, thereby empowering the disputants to control the 
content and outcome of the process. The intermediary function of the mediator is 
therefore concerned with the consensual resolution of a dispute. This determines both 
the scope and limits of mediatory intervention. The mediatory intermediary function is 
neither representative nor therapeutic. As an intermediary, the mediator's intervention 
may be active or passive, directive or persuasive or a combination of any of t~_~se at any 
stage of the mediation process. Beyond this there is little room for manoeuvre. 
Ultimately, the disputants determine the outcome of the dispute. Processually, this is 
both the strength and weakness of mediatory intervention:. flexibili!Y_ Qf_~~~i~ion f!!Ci!<!!'l.g 
by the disputants is retained but at the same time a joint decision cannot be guaranteed. 
6.2 The nature of the mediation process 
6.2.1 Mediation: process without an external structure 
Mediatory intervention provides the framework for the mediation process. Apart from this 
framework there is no other identifiable structure, for mediation is "all process and no 
structure". 38 The search for structure is in fact futile for it does not exist in any formal 
body of rules. And indeed, any attempt to predetermine a structure for the mediation 
would not only be contrived but would negate the intrinsic nature of the mediation 
process.39 Essentially, there are no formal rules that sustain any processual structure for 
~ " -----------•--··---·-••+•><'•--~-----~o.~.,_F_+·---··••·--•<c_•_ 
the mediation process and hence there are no processual norms that are imposed to 
--- ·------···-
structure the process. The concept is articulated by Lon Fuller 
38 
39 
Fuller "Mediation - its forms and functions" 307. 
Meggs "Divorce mediation methodology and ethics" 199 describes the various 
instances of what he regards as being the "high degree of methodological 
structure in mediation", referring to, for instance, "(a) the maximum focus on 
content and the overt issues drawn up in the form of an agenda of matters to be 
discussed". Thereafter he makes the following oblique statement on 200: ''No 
author that I know argues that there should be no structure at all. The . only 
discussion is over the issue of how much structure there should be." Seemingly, 
Meggs has confused process with structure because what he identifies as 
structure are not processual rules imposed externally to the mediation process, 
but rather norms of conduct generated by and within the mediation process itself. 
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[M]ediation is commonly directed, not towards achieving conformity with norms, 
but towards the creation of the relevant norms themselves. This is true, for 
example, in the very common case where the mediator assists the parties in 
\11/0rking out the terms of a contract defining their rights and duties towards one 
another. In such a case there is no pre-existing structure that can guide the 
mediation; it is the mediational process that produces the structure.40 
If structure for mediation is to be sought, then ironically it is not to be found within the 
structure of its own process but instead within the structure of the process of negotiation. 
Mediatory intervention is sought by the disputants precisely because bilateral 
negotiations have failed or are at a deadlock. Conceivably, the disputants could submit 
the dispute to adjudication by means of arbitration or litigation or any other informal ADR 
process for that matter. However, where there is a continuum between the process of 
bilateral negotiation and the process of mediation, the disputant's private agenda is 
merely transferred from the former to the latter process. Negotiation continues but in the 
altered format of mediatory intervention. The intermediary intervention of the mediator 
structures the content of the negotiations between the disputants with the object of 
achieving a consensual outcome. It is in this particular sense that "the mediational 
process produces the structure".41 ,The structure of the mediationat process is produced 
in each individual instance because it is not pre-existent to the process. Mediation is 
therefore a process without any structure and ifanystruci:ure~-does-eventually come into 
existence, it is created in each individual instance by the mediation process itself. This 
does not at all imply that the mediation process is unstructured in an absolute sense. 
Mediation is structured by the process of intermediary intervention and not by rules 
external to or imposed upon the process. 
A number of important elements of the process of mediation arise from the principle that 
mediation is "all process and no structure", namely, that the mediation process is -
(a} 
(b} 
40 
41 
consensual in its nature; and 
suited to only certain types of disputes. 
"Mediation - its fonns and functions" 308. 
See quotation to note 40 above. 
170 
Each of these elements explains the intrinsic nature of the mediation process. 
Essentially, the absence of structure and the emphasis on process is a feature of 
mediation that distinguishes it from other forms of third-party intervention. 
6.2.2 Consensual nature of mediation 
A central quality of the mediation process is that it is consensual in its nature. As obvious 
as this statement might seem, it needs to be explored because it raises a number of 
important aspects relating to the form of dispute processing and the method of decision 
making that are characteristic of the mediation process. In this respect, a primary 
principle may be formulated but in negative terms. Dispute processing for the purposes 
of mediation is .not based on the adversarial determination of the facts in dispute nor is 
its method of decision making· founded on the rational evaluation of evidence and the 
application of substantive rules within a conventional procedural structure. In this 
context, the word "consensual" is understood in contrast to other forms of process that 
are either litigious or adjudicative. But, beyond the dichotomy between forms of process 
that are either litigious/adjudicative or consensual, no other useful analysis can be made 
to explain the meaning of the term "consensual". A comparison with the process of 
negotiation is more suitable. 
Like mediation, the process of negotiation is also a consensual process. Dispute 
processing is based on the interdependent participation of the disputants who determine 
their owi procedural and substantive agenda for the negotiations and the resultant 
outcome is the product of joint decision making. The mediation process also transforms 
a dispute by means of the same consensus-producing dynamic with one notable 
exception: the interdependent participation of the disputants in the process is replaced 
by the intermediary intervention of a neutral third party, the mediator, who structures the 
negotiations. For the rest, the consensual foundations of both processes are identical. In 
these terms, the word "consensual" describes a process that is not directed at the 
unilateral imposition of a decision or a non-binding opinion but instead at joint decision 
making achieved by interactive communication between the disputants. In the case of 
mediation, this process is guided and controlled by the mediator with the purpose of 
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effecting a realignment of personal relationships. Lon Fuller captures the essence of the 
consensual nature of the process of mediation by describing its "central quality" as 
... its capacity to reorientate the parties towards each other, not by imposing rules 
on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of their 
relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitude and dispositions toward 
one another.42 · 
The term "consensual" classifies mediation as an agreement-producing process. The 
process itself therefore affords the disputants the right to the self-determination of the 
dispute in order to attain the pragmatic ends of adjudication by means of mutual 
agreement based on their direct and active participation in the process. 
The consensual nature of the mediation process is reflected as a shift from the ethics of 
conscience resulting in a binary adjudicative solution, to the ethics of self-responsibility 
expressed through a shared outcome founded on mutual agreement. 43 The mediation 
process is disposed to the principle of self-responsibility. The disputants bear only the 
burden of persuasion.44 The evidential burden of proof is therefore irrelevant. 
Accordingly, the attribution of blame for past events has no place in the process.45 The 
emphasis is instead on the personal needs of the disputants and on redefining their 
future relationship as the basis for settlement. Culpability for past events is accordingly 
not characteristic of the mediation process. The process is rather future orientated. 
Because the proof of past events as the basis for civil liability is not in issue, the law and 
the legal rights that are endowed, are not directly relevant to the process. Where there is 
fault, and there is always fault, the underlying causes of grievances are probed not to 
eventually apportion blame but rather to enable each disputant to understand the other's 
42 
43 
44 
45 
''Mediation - its forms and functions" 325. 
See Trollip ADR 3. 
Leeson and Johnston Dispum Resolution in America 140-141. 
Fulton Commerical ADR 79. Rosenberg "Resolving disputes differently" 814 
explains, in contrast to litigation, the reason for proof of past events being 
irrelevant to the mediation process: 'There is no need to reach a decision as to 
whose version of the facts is correct. Each party can be allowed to retain a 
different perception of the facts as long as agreement is reached." 
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needs and interests. The substantive content of the process is therefore personal to the 
disputants and the resultant remedies promote the interests of the parties rather than the 
principled pursuance of legal rights. Based on the principle of intermediary intervention, 
the mediation process itself acts as the medium for the attainment of disputant 
consensus which, in turn, cannot be achieved if the disputants do not or are unwilling to 
take responsibility for the outcome of the process. The term "consensual" therefore 
describes the intrinsic nature of the mediation process and not merely its form in 
contradistinction with other litigious/adjudicative forms of process. 
,.c1;<.t< i<\ .\ I;'" ~- tvi>'· 
Mediation is also described as being a vol ary process. 46 The temptation is to regard 
·-----·~-----·•c-
the words "consensual" and "voluntary" as being interchangeable. To do so would distort 
the meaning of each term. Both descriptions should be kept analytically distinct. The 
term "voluntary" indicates that a mediator will intervene in the dispute only by the 
expressed invitation of the disputants.47 The disputants initiate the process, choose the 
mediator and in conjunction with the mediator, select the venue, determine the operative 
rules and apportion costs.48 But in this particular context, the term "voluntary" is only one 
particular description of the process of mediation. Mediation can also be mandatory in 
cases where the disputants are compelled by statute to enter into the process of 
mediation49 or in instances where, by an order of court, the disputants are referred to 
mediation.50 The words "consensual" and "voluntary" are therefore not equivalent 
descriptions of the mediation process. For instance, the process of mediation remains 
consensual even though it is mandatory. Similarly, the process of arbitration is voluntary 
but not consensual. Conceptually then, the terms "consensual" and "voluntary" express 
distinct and separate aspects of the mediation process. 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
See Moore The Mediation Process 19: "Voluntary refers to freely chosen 
participation and freely chosen settlement. Parties are not forced to negotiate, 
mediate, or settle by either an internal or external party to a dispute". 
Anstey Negotiating Conflict 278. 
Leeson and Johnston Dispute Resolution in America 133 135. See also Bevan 
ADR27-28. 
See, for instance, the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 s 44. 
See, for instance, Astor and Chinkin Dispute Resolution 161-165; Leeson and 
Johnston Dispute Resolution in America 141-142; Levin and Golash "ADR in 
the Federal Courts" 36-38 40-41; Moore The Mediation Process 19. 
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Because it is a consensual process, only certain types of disputes can be resolved by 
means of the process of mediation. 
6.2.3 Mediation and the nature of a dispute 
The principle of selecting the appropriate process to accommodate the nature of the 
dispute concerned51 is especially relevant in the case of the process of mediation.52 An 
equilibrium must be achieved between the nature of the process and that of the dispute. 
Built-in limitations are inherent in the nature of every process. These limitations must be 
weighed against the nature of the dispute and the envisaged outcome. 
In regard to the mediation process, a major limit~t~()'.1. is that it has no formal ~~ructur~ 
based on predetermined and formal rules of conduct. 53 Consequently, the mediation 
process is open-ended in the sense that the disputants make and accept their own 
decision through the intermediary intervention of the mediator. The consensual nature of 
the process is an inherent functional limitation. For this reason, the mediation process is 
altogether inappropriate for disputes that need to be resolved by means of adjudicative 
decision making. More specifically, any dispute that is based on a disputanfs legitimate 
legal claim cannot be satisfactorily resolved by the process of mediation because the 
resolution of this type of dispute is dependant upon the vindication of rights. In such an 
instance, an adjudicative process would probably be the most appropriate method for 
resolving a rights-based dispute. 
In no manner does this imply that a rights-based dispute cannot be resolved by the 
process of mediation. Indeed, both rights-based and interest-based disputes can be 
mediated54 subject to the reservation that the consensual nature of the mediation 
process would in both instances produce an outcome based on an integrative solution. 
51 
52 
53 
54 
See, further, 2.1.4 above. 
See, for instance, Riskin and Westbrook Dispute Resolution and Lawyers 244-
247. 
See, further, 6.2.1 above. 
See Goldberg, Sander and Rogers Dispute Resolution 243-244 251. 
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An integrative solution to interest-based dispute is the optimum outcome. However, the 
same cannot be said in respect of the mediation of a rights-based dispute.55 The tension 
between the divergent outcomes of consensual and adjudicative processes comes to the 
fore. The crux of the problem is that should a dispute be based on a disputant's 
legitimate claim of right, the rights involved will most likely remain alienated or 
compromised even if the mediation process produces an integrative solution for the 
rights-based dispute. Quite simply, the reason is that mediation is not an appropriate 
process for vindicating and enforcing legal rights. The incompatibility between 
consensual and adjudicative processes is expressed by Lon Fuller 
It is not difficult to see why, under a system of state-made law, the standard 
instrument of dispute settlement should be adjudication and not mediation. If the 
question is whether A ... has paid his grocery bill ... , even the most ardent 
advocate of conciliative procedures would hardly recommend mediation as the 
standard way of dealing with such problems. A persuasive use of mediation could 
here obliterate the essential guideposts and boundary markers men need in 
orientating their actions toward one another and could end by producing a 
situation in which no one could know precisely where he stood or how he might 
get to where he wanted to be. As between black and white, grey may sometimes 
seem an acceptable compromise, but there are circumstances in which it is 
essential to work hard toward keeping things black and white .... It is, then, not in 
the making of legal rules, but in their enforcement and administration that a 
certain incompatibility may be perceived between mediative procedures and "the 
rule of law''. We may express something of this incompatibility by saying that 
whereas mediation is directed towards persons, judgments of law are directed 
towards acts; it is acts, not pe~le, that are declared proper or improper under the 
relevant provisions of the law. 
The process of mediation is therefore person-orientated and not act-orientated. This is a 
crucial distinction because functionally the mediation process is personal rather than 
authoritative in its style; its method of dispute processing is conciliative and not 
55 
56 
See Bevan ADR 69: "Unlike litigation and arbitration, the mediation is not 
primarily aimed at discovering what happened and then imposing a decision 
based solely on the principles of law and justice. It is a process where 
lawyers/disputants invite a trained neutral to assist them to negotiate. Thus, a 
lawyer taking part must appreciate that he will not win a legal argument, and if 
the process ends in a settlement, there may never be a clear statement as to 
who was right and what the 'true' legal position was." 
''Mediation - its forms and functions" 328. 
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adversarial and its outcome results in an integrative instead of a binary solution to the 
dispute. 
In this context, only certain types of disputes can be resolved by mediation. An important 
category relates to disputes that involve disputants who are bound to each other in an 
interdepender:lt or continuing relationship as in _the case of a manufacturer _~n~-~~~~~~!· 
subsidiaries of the same holding company, divorcing ~.P~.us~e-~_{!!!~P~~!~Jl_yjf_~bM.dr~i::Lb~~~~-­
been born of the marriage) and neighbours or members living in the same community. In 
---·------· -·-~-··· ,,,, 
these and similar instances, a binary solution typified by adjudicative methods of dispute 
resolution would resolve the dispute only on the basis of objective or public norms but 
fail to conciliate the disputants. In all probability, a binary solution has the potential of 
damaging the future relationship between the disputants and heightening the tension, 
especially because of the adversarial nature of adjudicative processes. The consensual 
nature of the mediation process is better suited to disputes that require the reconciliation 
of the conflicting interests of the disputants which in the first place precipitated the 
dispute, irrespective of any legal issues involved. By means of the mediation process, it 
is possible for the mediator to probe the underlying issues of the dispute, to uncover 
hidden agendas, clarify different perceptions of the facts in dispute, enable the 
disputants to discard the emotional baggage of the past and generally bring them to the 
realisation that by revising their relationship it is possible to accommodate each other's 
continuing needs in the future. In this manner, the mediator facilitates the negotiations 
between the disputants and directs the process to a consensual outcome. What is 
immediately evident is that the mediation process itself is not at all inhibited by formal 
rules of process, adversarial posturing or the tedium of proving past events. In such a 
setting it is possible for the disputants to take responsibility for their own decisions, 
formulate the boundaries of a continuing relationship and pro-actively determine the 
rules of their future behaviour toward each other. 
An obvious conclusion is that the consensual nature of the mediation process makes it 
amenable to the resolution of disputes involving interdependent or continuing 
relationships. However, analysis of the dispute itself shows that there are other intrinsic 
reasons. An adjudicatory approach is not the most appropriate method of resolving these 
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type of disputes because inevitably these disputes are "polycentric" in nature. The term 
"polycentric" is attributed to Lon Fuller who explains its meaning as follows 
We may visualise this kind of [polycentric] situation by thinking of a spider web. A 
pull on one strand will distribute tensions after a complicated pattern throughout 
the web as a whole. Doubling the original pull will, in all likelihood, not simply 
double each of the remaining tensions but will rather create a different 
complicated pattern of tensions. This will certainly occur, for example, if the 
double pull caused one or more of the weaker strands to snap. This is a 
"polycentric" situation because it is "many centred" - each crossing of strands is a 
distinct centre for distributing tensions.57 
For example, one of the most complex disputes involving interdependent or continuing 
relationships relates to divorce. The polycentricity of the dispute is evident from the 
variety of issues that need to be determined: the division of the matrimonial property, / 
I 
spouse and child maintenance, custody and control of minor children, access and \ 
visitation rights. Each of these issues is a "centre" which directly affects the resolution of \ 
other related issues - a single issue cannot be resolved without being integrated with the \
1 resolution of the other issues.
58 Although these and similar issues can be and are 
determined by court-based adjudication,59 it is important to realise that the dispute is \ 
polycentric and would be best resolved by consensual processes, such as negotiation or i 
mediation, because of the capacity of these processes to achieve an inte~~) 
outcome.60 
57 
58 
59 
60 
"Forms and limits of adjudication" 395. 
See also Rogers and Salem Mediation and the Law 50. 
Fuller "Forms and limits of adjudication" 397-398. 
Fuller "Forms and limits of adjudication" 394 gives the example of a testamentary 
donation to two art galleries of a valuable but miscellaneous art collection "in 
equal shares". The crux of the problem, which classifies it as a polycentric 
dispute, is as follows: "[T]he disposition of any single painting has implications for 
the disposition of every other painting. If it gets the Renoir, the Gallery may be 
less eager for the Cezanne but all the more eager for the Bellows, etc. If the 
proper apportionment were set for legal argument, there would be no clear issue 
to which either side could direct its proofs and contentions. Any judge assigned 
to hear such an argument would be tempted to assume the role of mediator ... ". 
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In this particular context, an analysis of the nature of the dispute determines whether the 
selection of mediation is the most appropriate process for its resolution. Whenever the 
dispute relates to interests rather than the pursual of rights, is "polycentric" and arises 
between disputes who are committed to each other in an interdependent or continuing 
relationship, then the consensual rationale of the process of mediation should dictate its 
selection. 
6.3 Basic Principles 
/~§~r:).Jeutrality 
The principle of neutrality is generally accepted as being one of the cornerstones of the 
mediation process. On the level of concept, the mediator is PE3!.~~~~~L~~--Q-~!l-9_~n~utral 
___ intermediary. However, as the practice of mediation has expanded and been applied in a 
»•--M••·-·--M----,~ 
variety of ADR contexts, differing views on the essential nature of mediator neutrality 
have emerged, leading to a revision of the traditional concept of the principle of 
neutrality.61 
The prevalent Anglo-American view is that the mediator should be neutral and impartial. 
Moore succinctly summarises this approach 
Impartiality refers to the attitude of the intervenor and is an unbiased opinion or 
lack of preference in favour of one or more negotiators. Neutrality, on the other 
hand, refers to the behaviour or relationship between the intervenor and the 
disputants. .. . Neutrality also means that the mediator does not expect to directly 
gain benefits or special payments from one of the parties as compensation for 
favours in conducting the mediation. People seek a mediator's assistance 
because they want procedural help in negotiations. They do not want an 
intervenor who is biased or who will initiate actions that are detrimental to their 
interests. 62 
Moore is seemingly explaining the principle of neutrality in conceptual terms because he 
does concede that in practice a mediator does have personal opinions about the 
61 Rogers and Salem Mediation and the Law 137. 
62 The Mediation Process 15. 
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outcome of the dispute and cannot be entirely impartial.63 This has important implications 
for mediation as a process of structured negotiation.64 
Although the disputants interact through the mediator, by reacting to the ~i~e_~§lllts __ ~~­
mediator becomes ariother p(lrty to the process and hence part of the negotiations.65 
·-·· .. ,---~ ----<~• -~ ·~---~---··-- ---··--~,~----·--·· ., ... 
The mediator cannot remain absolutely neutral. As part of the process of transforming 
the dispute, the mediator inevitably offers opinions and makes suggestions, evaluates 
the positions of the disputants, introduces options as incentives for settlement, controls 
power imbalances between the disputants, clarifies areas of uncertainty, diffuses conflict 
by pointing to objective criteria and assesses whether the outcomes proposed by the 
disputants are realistic. Only in exceptional instances will the role of the mediator be 
totally passive, if this is possible at all. Reality is that the principle of neutrality is directly 
related to the person and personality of the mediator. In the setting of a process of 
structured negotiation, the mediator is not a neutral umpire but rat11er a participant irHhe 
capacity of an intermediary who controls the process and moulds the content of the 
dispute to achieve a consensual agreement between the disputants. The image of the 
mediator as a totally disinterested intervenor is therefore ill-conceived for ultimately the 
status, rank, personality and expertise of the mediator also modifies the behaviour of the 
disputants and their perception of the dispute. Accordingly, the principle of neutrality has 
a subjective quality. 
The human tendencies of the mediator preclude fixed notions of impartiality or 
disinterested status as moral requirements for neutrality. Anthropological studies affirm 
the subjective element inherent in the principle of neutrality. With reference to a broad 
cross-cultural perspective, Gulliver asserts that 
... he (the mediator) is not, and cannot be neutral and merely a catalyst. He not 
only affects the interaction but, at least in part, seeks and encourages an 
63 Idem. 
64 See 6.1.2 above. 
65 Gulliver Disputes and Negotiations 213. 
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outcome that is tolerable to him in terms of his own ideas and interests. He may 
even come into conflict with one or both of the parties.66 
In fact, Gulliver casts aside the stereotyped Western notion of the mediator having to be 
an impartial or disinterested intervenor.67 On the basis of ethnographic examples, he 
depicts the mediator as having either an disinterested or interest-related status. 
Disinterested status is derived from -
(a) an institutionalised social role eg mediators appointed from a panel 
established by ADRASA, SAAM or IMMSA; 
(b) a mediator's acknowledged prestige or ability along with the assurance 
that the mediator would have no direct interest in the issues or outcome of 
the mediation; 
(c) the fact that the mediator is an outsider who has no attachment to the 
social structure of a particular group or grouping; or 
( d) expertise in respect of the issues in dispute eg a lawyer or professional 
engineer.68 
On the other hand, it is equally possible that a mediator may have an interest-related 
status as would be the case in the following instances -
(a) a person whose interests are affected by the continuation of the dispute 
and would like to affect its speedy resolution irrespective of the outcome; 
(b) an intervenor may not only have an interest in the resolution of a dispute 
but may also be partial to one of the parties yet at the same time be 
acceptable as a mediator because of the influence and control that she is 
able to exercise over the disputants without renouncing her partiality; 
(c) a person may seek to protect her own interests by acting as a mediator in 
circumstances where she is structurally an intermediary between both 
66 Ibid 213-214. 
67 Ibid 217. 
68 Ibid 214-215. 
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parties who are involved in a network of relationships eg kinsmen or a 
political ally of both parties; or 
( d) a mediator may sometimes be a leader in a particular community and 
intervenes in the dispute not only to resolve it for the sake of the 
disputants but also to promote the interests of the community as well as 
her own moral values.69 
What Gulliver teaches is that from a cross-cultural perspective, Western notions of the 
principle of neutrality tend to be too dogmatic. His personal opinion is that "the truly 
disinterested, impartial mediator is in fact rather rare".70 
Apart from subjective factors regarding the individual standing of a mediator, situational 
ethics also play their part in diluting the principle of neutrality. The tension between 
r--· 
neutrality and fairness is ever present, especially as the growing importance of ADR 
extends the process of mediation beyond the scope of its traditional domain.71 A 
mediator cannot stand immune to the interests of third parties who are not directly 
involved in the mediation process. An outcome that might be fair from the point of view of 
the disputants may be detrimental to the interests of a third party. For instance, the 
interests of minor children in relation to divorce mediation or those of co-partners or co-
directors in regard to commercial mediation, could be seriously compromised if they are 
not considered during the process of mediation. By raising issues concerning the 
interests of third parties, the mediator is likely to introduce personal values and norms of 
fairness that might be in conflict with those of one or both of the disputants. Ethical 
considerations could demand that traditional notions of impartiality or disinterested 
status be waived by a mediator to safeguard the interests of non-participating parties. 72 
69 
70 
71 
72 
Ibid 215-217. 
Ibid 217. Riskin "Mediation in alternative dispute processing" 25 expresses a 
similar view: "In many situations, the mediator may have personal or professional 
interests which interfere with his neutrality. Most mediators will see their 
professional advancement enhanced by achieving agreements in cases they 
mediate." 
For the extension of the process of mediation beyond the scope of its traditional 
application, see 3.1 above. 
See in this regard Rogers and Salem Mediation and the Law 143-144147148. 
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Working in tandem with the principle of mediator neutrality, is the acceptance of the 
mediator by the disputants.73 This aspect of the mediation dynamic is often disregarded 
----~*~-~·,,.._.,--~-~---·--~~-"''"""'~"~ .... -~- " 
or at least, underrated. Mediator acceptability explains Gulliver's categorisation of the 
mediator who has an interest-related status.74 Although the maintenance of neutrality 
through the disinterested status of the mediator is the ideal, the absence of neutrality is 
counterbalanced by mediator acceptability, failing which, the mediator will most likely be 
rejected by the disputants. Moore confirms the importance of mediator acceptability 
The final test of impartiality and neutrality of the mediator ultimately rests with the 
parties. They must perceive that the intervenor is not overly partial or unneutral in 
order to accept his or her assistance.75 
In South Africa, acceptance of the mediator by the disputants tends to override the 
requirement of neutrality. Given the general lack of trust prevalent in labour relations and 
the current socio-political climate, mediator neutrality is difficult to achieve.76 The 
remarks by Radford and Glaser are instructive 
In South Africa, with the very low levels of trust between the parties in labour, and 
broader socio political contexts, the issue of trust in mediator acceptability has 
come under focus. Linked to the issue of trust is the impartiality of the mediator. 
Although this concept has been explained as the extent to which the mediator is 
believed to be truly neutral by both sides, it is our belief that it is impossible (at 
least within the South African context) to be truly neutral .... From a psychological 
understanding of the dispute system, it makes more sense to view the mediator's 
impartiality as the extent to which he/she is able to empathize with the perceptual 
positions of both parties. 77 
Nupen is also of the opinion that the mediator need not be neutral but that "mediators 
derive their acceptability by being perceived as independent and impartial by the parties 
73 
74 
75 
76 
n 
For an extensive treatment of mediator acceptability, see Anstey Negotiating 
Conflict 250-259. 
See text to note 69 above. 
The Mediation Process 15. 
Possible exceptions would be the case of commercial as well as divorce and 
family mediation. 
"The psychology of mediation" 64. 
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and having the necessary skills to facilitate agreements".78 Essentially, mediator 
acceptability means the confidence of the disputants in the integrity, if not in the 
neutrality, of the mediator to control the mediation process in a fair and equitable 
manner. 
Taking into consideration the personal and situational factors that influence mediator 
neutrality as well as the disputants' perceptions in regard to mediator acceptability, it is 
clearly evident that the principle of neutrality is infused with subjective elements. 
Irrespective of these subjective elements, the principle of neutrality does have a 
minimum content. Structurally, the mediator is neutral in the particular sense of a 
"stranger''79 who enters the process as a third-party intervenor in the capacity of an 
intermediary. As a "neutral", the functional role of the mediator is to control directly the 
mediation process. Control of process entails that the mediator must establish the 
ground rules and ensure their compliance, direct the process through its various stages, 
allow a fair exchange between the disputants during each stage, control the balance of 
power between the disputants, maintain transparency and trust in regard to private 
consultations or caucusing with a disputant and direct the process towards a consensual 
outcome that will be both enforceable and durable over time. In the broader setting of the 
principles of third-party intervention80 and the more specific context of mediatory 
intervention, 81 the fair conduct of process and its processual equity therefore establishes 
objective grounds for assessing mediator neutrality and hence forms the basis of the 
principle of neutrality. 
In brief, the essence of mediator neutrality is a commitment to process if not to the 
substantive content of the mediation. Undoubtedly, subjective elements relating to the 
content of the process, do intrude. This is not a direct threat to the principle of neutrality 
78 
79 
so 
81 
"Mediation" 41. 
See Eisenberg "Private ordering through negotiation" 655-660 for the concept of 
the "stranger'' in relation to third-party intervention and more specifically, in 
relation to the process of adjudication. 
See 6.1.1 above. 
See 6.1.2 above. 
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because mediator acceptability functions to maintain a semblance of neutrality in regard 
to the mediator's involvement in the substance of the mediation. However, when 
processual standards are compromised, the principle of neutrality is placed in jeopardy 
and indeed the process itself. For instance, even if a mediator is partial to a particular 
disputant's position, the processual standard of impartiality would demand that the 
mediator must nevertheless ensure a fair exchange between both disputants. In the final 
analysis, because mediation is all process without structure, 82 only processual standards 
can sustain the principle of neutrality irrespective of whether the mediator's status is 
disinterested or interest-related or the mediative style is active or passive, directive or 
accommodative. The principle of neutrality should therefore not be equated with an 
absence of involvement by the mediator but rather with the mediator's commitment as a 
third-party intervenor to the control of the mediation process and the maintenance of its 
processual integrity. 
5 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is an important principle of the mediation process. The underlying 
rationale is that, because mediation is a consensual process, free and open 
communication should occur between the mediator and the disputants as well as 
between the disputants inter se without the threat that any admissions or documents 
pertaining to the mediation process will be used as evidence in legal proceedings, 
especially if the mediation should fail. The principle of confidentiality therefore promotes 
open negotiation in good faith between the disputants, acting through the mediator, 
concerning their respective perceptions of the dispute as well as the revision of their 
common interests. 83 
The principle of confidentiality has internal and external dimensions.84 Confidentiality 
internal to the mediation relates to the ethical duty of a mediator not to disclose 
information obtained during a private consultation or caucuses with an individual 
82 See 6.2.1 above. 
83 Levy and Mowatt "Mediation in the legal environment" 73. 
64 Astor and Chinkin Dispute Resolution 232. 
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disputant who does not wish to reveal this information to the other disputant.85 As a 
confidante to both disputants, the mediator would breach the position of trust if 
confidential information given privately by the one party was disclosed to the other party 
without the necessary consent to do so.86 This would have disastrous consequences for 
the mediation process itself. In this context, the principle of confidentiality as it applies to 
the internal dynamics of the mediation process, is adually ancillary since it is diredly 
subsumed under the principle of mediator neutrality and the related issue of mediator 
acceptability. 87 
The crux of the problem deals with confidentiality external to the mediation. In South 
Africa, there is limited common-law protection and no dired statutory regulation of 
confidential information disclosed during the mediation process. 88 This problem is not 
confined to South Africa. Astor and Chinkin, writing from the Australian perspedive 
which is common to other countries where ADR is practised, explain the limits of 
confidentiality in the absence of legal protedion 
Confidentiality may be challenged by a request from a party or third party for 
production in court of notes, evidence, a transcript of matters that took place in 
the mediation or details of the agreement. Such a request might occur if no 
agreement was reached, and the parties, or one of them, proceeded to litigation, 
if a third party wished to make claims arising out of some asped of the mediation 
or if one of the parties wanted to bring an adion against the mediator, for 
example for breach of contrad. 89 
In the United States there is considerable statutory protedion given to the confidentiality 
of the mediation process,90 very limited protedion is afforded in Australia91 and, as in 
South Africa, statutory regulation is non-existent in the United Kingdom. 92 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
See Moore The Mediation Process 267-271 for the various strategies of dealing 
with confidential information revealed during caucusing. 
See the ADRASA CODE OF CONDUCT cl 3, for details, see text to note 93 
below. 
See 6.3.1 above. 
See also Nupen ''Mediation" 49. 
Dispute Resolution 232. 
Roger and McEwan Mediation ~43-272. 
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Three aspects pertaining to the application and limitations of the principle of 
confidentiality are involved, each relating to different parties: the mediator, the disputants 
and lastly, third parties. In the first instance, the application of the principle of 
confidentiality is reliant upon the co-operation of the mediator and both disputants. In 
practice, an accredited mediator must comply with a code of ethics that invariably 
contains a confidentiality clause. The ADRASA Code of Ethics clause 393 is typical of 
many others94 
A mediator shall respect the confidentiality of the parties and their dispute and 
shall make no disclosure to any other person concerning the fact of the dispute, 
or that he is mediating between the parties in question and shall also not 
communicate any fact or circumstance to any party in dispute which has been 
communicated to him by any other party in dispute, without express and 
unequivocal authorisation so to do. Provided that, in circumstances where the 
mediator is of the view that adherence to this Rule would lead to circumstances 
which are in his opinion manifestly repugnant to the public interest, it will lead to 
intolerable justice, the mediator may apply to the Professional Committee for a 
directive as to whether or not in the given circumstances, a refusal to abide by 
this Rule is justified, and in regard thereto the Professional Committee will 
authorise such disclosure as in its opinion is appropriate to balance the interests 
of the integrity of the mediation process, and the moral imperative not to thwart 
justice. 
The responsibility for maintaining the confidentiality of the mediation process is also 
placed on the disputants. This is effected by means of a mediation agreement that must 
be signed by the mediator and the disputants before the mediation process commences. 
Standard mediation agreements contain a confidentiality clause. Once more ADRASA 
source material may be used to illustrate the usual content of these types of clauses 
91 
92 
93 
94 
See Astor and Chinkin Dispute Resolution 233. 
See commentary by Levy and Mowatt "Mediation in the legal environment" 75. 
Code of Conduct for Mediators Admitted to the General Register of 
Mediators of the ADRASA ADR Service, contained in annexure B of the 
ADRASA General Statement of Policy of Procedures 1992. 
See for example clause 6 of the Guidelines for Solicitors Who Act as 
Mediators prepared by the Dispute Resolution Committee of the New South 
Wales Law Society (1988) as cited by Astor and Chinkin Dispute Resolution 
311. 
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All communication made by the disputants to the mediator during or in connection 
with the mediation or to each other are made without prejudice to any rights which 
they have and form part of bona fide settlement negotiations. The mediator shall 
not be compelled by any disputant to disclose any fact learnt by the mediator in 
the course of the mediation in any subsequent legal proceedings which may take 
place. In this regard, all disputants shall by their signatures to this agreement, 
waive any rights which they may have to require a mediator to testify regarding 
what transpired in the mediation or to produce any information or documents 
used in the mediation before any authority, including a court of law. 95 
No matter how finely worded a code of mediator ethics or a confidentiality clause might 
be, they do not guarantee the confidentiality of the mediation process. In the final 
analysis, disinterested third parties may use legal methods to force a disclosure of 
confidential information pertaining to a mediation, for evidentiary purposes in legal or 
administrative proceedings. In certain instances, one or both disputants can similarly 
gain access to confidential information. This is definitely the case in South Africa and 
other jurisdictions in which limited or no statutory protection of the confidentiality of the 
mediation is accorded. 
The most vulnerable party is the mediator. It is often said that mediators have short 
memories. Jocular as this quip might be, feigned loss of memory does not stave off the 
demand to give evidence or produce the relevant documents in legal or administrative 
proceedings. There is very little that a mediator can do in the South African context to 
protect the integrity of the mediation process since mediator privilege is neither regulated 
by statute nor recognised at common law. By analogy to arbitration proceedings in terms 
of which an arbitrator can be compelled to give evidence regarding the content of the 
arbitration process (though not to contradict or vary the award), it is likely that a mediator 
could be similarly compelled to give evidence regarding the negotiations that occurred 
during the mediation process. 96 The unenviable position of an intermediary tends to 
perpetuate itself. In this particular instance, the mediator is the person in the middle who 
can be badgered either by third parties or by one or both of the disputants, 
notwithstanding agreements to the contrary. 
95 Draft Mediation Agreement clause 9 contained in the ADRASA Handbook 32. 
96 See Levy and Mowatt "Mediation in the legal environment" 73-74. 
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On the other hand, the disputants have a limited right at common law to withstand a 
demand to disclose confidential information directly related to the mediation process. 
Since mediation is a consensual process of structured negotiation, the likely judicial 
interpretation would be to equate the process of mediation with settlement negotiations. 
Consequently, both disputants may rely on the "privilege" afforded to parties who 
conduct bona fide settlement negotiations "without prejudice". The "without prejudice" 
rule is formulated on the grounds of public policy that discourages litigation by protecting 
the parties to bona fide settlement negotiation against the threat of any admissions made 
during the negotiations being held in evidence against either of them should the 
negotiations fail. 97 The effect of the rule is to render admissions inadmissible in so far as 
they are directly relevant to the content of the negotiations. 98 
However, the "without prejudice" rule has a number of limitations in regard to the process 
of mediation. The "privilege" belongs to the disputants and does not extend to third 
parties. Therefore, in theory, a mediator may be compelled to testify at a trial.99 
Moreover, the scope of the privilege is confined to matters directly relevant to the 
settlement negotiations.100 In this regard, the application of the "without prejudice" rule to 
the mediation process is unsatisfactory because in any typical mediation underlying 
issues need to be probed in order to resolve disputes that have been explicitly defined, 
with a result that admissions relating to issues latent to the dispute would fall outside the 
ambit of the rule. 101 Lastly, because the extent of the protection under the rule is 
restricted to admissions made in respect of settlement negotiations that have failed, the 
grounds for non-disclosure no longer serve any purpose rr the negotiations result in a 
settlement.102 From the point of view of the disputant, this aspect of the rule could be 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
Hoffman Zeffertt SA Law of Evidence 197; Schmidt Bewysreg 529. 
Hoffmann and Zeffertt SA Law of Evidence 197-198; Schmidt Bewysreg 529 
530-532. 
Nupen "Mediation" 49. 
Hoffmann and Zeffert SA Law of Evidence 197; 9 LAWSA par 486. 
See Levy and Mowatt ''Mediation in the legal environment" 7 4. 
Hoffmann and Zeffert SA Law of Evidence 199; 9 LAWSA 486; Schmidt 
Bewysreg 532. 
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advantageous in instances where it might be necessary to prove breach of the 
agreement1°3 but at the same time could severely compromise the position of the 
mediator if compelled to testify. Although the ''without prejudice" rule affords a degree of 
protection against disclosure to the disputants to a mediation, its adaptation for the 
process of mediation clearly offers less protection than in the case where it is applied to 
settlement negotiations. The reason is obvious: the rule has been devised to 
accommodate the circumstances of settlement negotiations and not with the specific 
intention of upholding the principle of confidentiality as it relates directly to the process of 
mediation. Consequently, should the ''without prejudice" rule be applied to the process of 
mediation, this should be regarded as an ad hoc measure in the absence of any 
statutory provisions that expressly recognise and support the principle of confidentiality 
in mediation. 
Although the common perception is that mediation is confidential, the scope and limits of 
the principle of confidentiality are technically so indistinct that its relevance can be 
seriously questioned. This is certainly the case in South Africa where there is obviously 
a dire need for statutory intervention to define and prescribe mediator privilege. 
However, both in this and other countries, it would be far too idealistic to expect 
complete confidentiality of the mediation process. Tension continually exists between 
public policy demanding the disclosure of information and the right to prevent the 
revelation of confidential communications.104 Within this broad perspective, there is no 
reason for singling out mediation confidentiality as the exception when the public interest 
would be defeated by non-disclosure.105 Reduced to its essentials, mediation 
103 
104 
105 
Levy and Mowatt 'Mediation in the legal environment" 7 4. 
See Rogers and Salem Mediation and the Law 63-71 for a summary of the 
related policy debate. 
See for instance, the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 s 42(1) that places a duty on 
certain professionals, notably a social worker, to report any circumstances that 
give rise to the suspicion that a child has been ill-treated or suffers from 
nutritional deficiency. Likewise, the Prevention of Family Violence Act 113 of 
1993 s 4 places an obligation on any person who examines, treats, attends to, 
advises, instructs or cares for any child, to report any instance of the ill-treatment 
of such child. These provisions are so widely stated that it is conceivable that a 
mediator might be obliged to report the ill-treatment of a child on the basis of 
information obtained during the process of mediation. 
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confidentiality relates to the content of the process of mediation. For this reason, it will 
never be immune to competing public interests and hence policy on mediation 
confidentiality is likely always to be in a state of flux. 
Irrespective of the flaws in the application of the principle of mediation confidentiality, no 
matter how serious they might be, the processual principles that sustain it, remain intact. 
The principle of confidentiality is rooted in the notion that mediation is a private process. 
In this respect, the ADR/litigation dichotomy is useful for analytical purposes because in 
the present context it emphasises the distinction between private and public processes. 
Litigation is a public dispute resolution process that is conducted in an open court of 
record under the direct supervision of the judicial arm of government.106 In contrast, as 
an extra-curial form of dispute resolution, the process of mediation is conducted at a 
private venue without official transcripts and supervised solely by the mediator with the 
co-operation of the disputants. No matter the extent to which the content of the process 
of mediation might be subject to public scrutiny in order to prevent the loss of information 
to the public and the court system, this in itself does not impinge upon the related 
principles of processual privacy. Processual privacy is the permanent baseline upon 
which the principle of mediation confidentiality is founded. In the final instance, 
processual privacy is maintained and safeguarded only by the commitment of the 
mediator and both disputants to the integrity of the mediation process. Although statutory 
protection establishes the boundaries of mediator privilege, the best guarantee of the 
principle of processual privacy is the voluntary respect of all the participants for the 
confidentiality of information disclosed during the mediation process. 
('6.3;3, Processual equality 
'"---~ --··"' ·"' ,./ 
The very charactert~tics of the process of mediation that make it attractive as a dispute 
resolution process at the same time raise concerns about whether it is a fair process that 
produces an equitable result As a non-adversarial, anti-legal and non-structured 
process based on the consensual resolution of disputes, the process of mediation is 
106 See the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 s 16 and the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 
of 1944 s 5. 
190 
devoid of any formal checks and balances that are inherent in adjudicative processes.107 
Because mediation is a person-orientated process,108 private standards of process are 
applied. Precedent, substantive law or considerations of public policy consequently need 
not directly affect the conduct of the process of mediation or its outcome. Moreover, the 
privacy of the process of mediation, 109 places it beyond public scrutiny. Sanctioned rules 
of conduct (comparable to the rules of court) that give notice of the complaint as well as 
due notice of material allegations and counter allegations in order to guarantee 
compliance with the natural rules of justice under the audi alteram partem rule, are 
absent from the mediation process. Similarly, rules of evidence that determine the 
admissibility, relevance and weight of factual allegations as well as methods for testing 
their veracity, have no bearing. In brief, the long historical development of public 
processes has established structures of procedure (which in the case of litigation has 
been institutionalised) that guarantee the fundamental rights of the disputants and 
ensure adherence to standards of due process.110 The same cannot be said of the 
process of mediation. This is disconcerting for any proceduralist because one of the 
tests for the efficiency of any process is the extent to which it meets the standards of due 
process. 
It is difficult to compare the process of mediation and adjudicative processes on the level 
of due process. The reason has already been discussed: "mediation is all process 
without structure" .111 If the intrinsic quality of mediation is that it is not subject to any 
recognised or sanctioned structures, then the structures of adjudicative processes 
should not be raised as a definitive basis for comparison. The search for due process in 
mediation must therefore start and end with the mediation process. In other words, the 
107 
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See further Folberg and Taylor Mediation: A Comprehensive Guide to 
Resolving Conflicts vvithout Litigation cited in Goldberg, Green and Sander 
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enquiry should be directed at the standards of due process inherent in the mediation 
process itsetf. 
Ensconced in the mediation process are principles akin to the structures of due process. 
The principle of neutrality112 is one, but it is limited to the personal capacity of the 
mediator to conduct the process of mediation. There is also the principle of 
confidentiality113 that ensures the privacy of the process, yet once again is restricted to 
the protection of confidential information disclosed during a mediation. Neither of these 
principles satisfactorily explains the control of the mediation process in a fair and 
equitable manner. In this respect, fairness may be regarded as a relevant principle114 but 
being endemic to all forms of process based on third-party intervention, it is certainly not 
unique to the process of mediation. However, processual equality is one aspect of 
fairness which relates specifically to the maintenance of the balance of power between 
the di~~~nt§,Jhat is part~y. r~;;;,~-~;,;;-;~di;;i~~·,,~;~;;;·"Ttii;~~.i9i1tt>estT>e""'' 
illustrated by reference to adjudicative processes. 
In adjudicative processes, the principles of party prosecution and party presentation 
permit each disputant to independently pursue a cause of action or raise a defence; the 
structures of due process level the playing field by means of checks and balances that 
acknowledge and maintain equality between both disputants.115 Because there are no 
pre-existing structures of due process in mediation that ensure equality, it is therefore 
incumbent u~~:_m:.~!.~~~ .. ~!~,.-£2D!r~L .. !b.~ ... D'1.E!~!.~!i_~.[LJ:?!~.~;.;s by mai_ntaini~~--~= 
balance of power between the disputants in such a manrier .that e~uivalence or fairn~ss 
is refleciecfin.th~-~~-t~~;;·~h~~-;e~~~;j~~:~~~"~~j~~~~~~~~~~f-th;··b·;;;~~;,,~;~;~~~-i-~-A 
..._______....,.,...,.«»,,,,.,___.-,,..-,..,,,,.,...,-..,,,...,,.., __ ,,_,_1!! __ ,,,,"""'""""""''","t~•'•<>",•«u 
mediation therefore ensures processual equality between the disputants. 
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See, further, 6.3.1 above. 
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For a discussion of the various aspects of the principle of fairness, see Rogers 
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The principle of maintaining the balance of power in mediation cannot be properly 
understood unless it is placed in the broader context of the function and exercise of 
power common to all forms of process based on third-party intervention. Power is an 
inevitable ingredient of all forms of third-party intervention. The institutionalised authority 
of a judge originates in the constitutive powers conferred by statute or the rules of 
court; 116 the power of the arbitrator is derived from the arbitration agreement that is 
contractually binding.117 In mediation there is also power but of a different nature. It is 
neither constitutive nor contractual but rather personal. Mediator authority is based on 
the personal consent of both disputants to permit intermediary intervention as a method 
of resolving the dispute.118 
In all instances, the power to resolve the dispute may be traced to the failure of the 
disputants to maintain or control the balance of power in bilateral negotiations. In the 
case of court-based adjudication and arbitration, the disputants divest themselves of 
their power to settle the dispute by vesting it in the adjudicator whereas in the case of 
mediation, the power to facilitate the negotiation of the dispute is transferred by the 
disputants to the mediator. By submitting the dispute to a third-party intervenor, the 
disputants either seek the imposition of power through adjudicative processes as a 
means of settling the dispute because of their failure to resolve it or alternatively, resort 
to mediation in order to restore the balance of power that they were unable to achieve on 
their own in bilateral negotiations. 
There is a vast difference between the imposition of power and the restoration of the 
balance of power. Adjudicative forms of third-party intervention eventuate in an outcome 
that is coercive, which in the case of court-based adjudication, is imposed under the 
sanction of the State or in the case of arbitration is binding under the rules of contract, if 
the award is not made an order of court. In addition, the power emanating from court-
based adjudication encompasses the rectification of social inequalities, applies or 
extends existing public norms or conclusively determines individual disputes on the 
116 See Nagan "Civil process and power'' 456-461. 
117 See generally Davis Law and Practice of Arbitration 25-38. 
118 See Mayer "The dynamics of power in mediation" 80. 
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basis of legal principles. So too, arbitration produces a definitive and binding decision 
within the ambit of the arbitration agreement. However, as a consensual process, 
mediation is non-coercive and therefore can only effect the resolution of a dispute 
through the realignment of personal relationships that is accomplished through the 
mediator's control of the balance of power between the disputants. 
In the light of the above, the dynamics of power is integral to all forms of process that 
rely on third-party intervention. However, its application differs, depending on the nature 
of the process concerned. In respect of adjudicative processes, the dynamics of power 
between the disputants is tightly controlled and constrained by rules of due process 
external to these processes. In regard to the mediation process, the dynamics of power 
still functions between the disputants because the substance and outcome of their 
negotiations belong to them but it is restrained by the mediator who is responsible for 
maintaining processual equality in order to restore the balance of power that had gone 
awry in bilateral negotiations. It is evident that the control and exercise of power in 
adjudicative processes and the process of mediation is analytically distinct. Power in 
adjudicative processes is consolidated and externally regulated. In mediation there is a 
duality of power: the dynamics of power functions between the disputants in the same 
manner as it does in bilateral negotiations and power is also exercised by the mediator 
to control the balance of power in the negotiations between the disputants. This 
accentuates the importance of maintaining the balance of power in the mediation 
process. On the one hand, if the mediator dominates the substance of the negotiations · 
between the disputants under the guise of controlling the balance of power, the process 
is no longer consensual. Yet, on the other hand, if the dynamics of power between the 
disputants in their negotiations is left unfettered processually, the equivalence or 
fairness of a consensual outcome is open to doubt because it could reflect the will of the 
stronger party over the weaker party.119 Evidently, there is yet a deeper dimension to the 
balance of power in mediation: it relates not only to the negotiations between the 
disputants but also to the relationship between the mediator and the disputants. 
119 A similar view is expressed by Mowatt "Thoughts on mediation" 735: "The 
mediator's role should not eclipse the roles of the disputants, as the essential 
nature of the mediation process may be lost. However, if he does not assume 
sufficient control, he may not achieve the balance of power, and the resulting 
settlement may be inequitable." 
194 
In this context, the maintenance of the balance of power in both its dimensions is 
achieved by the mediator's commitment to process and more specifically, by ensuring 
processual equality as a means of promoting fairness. Processual equality is based on 
the presupposition that the disputants must be treated equally but that inequalities 
between them do exist. Equal treatment cannot be realised if the inequalities, whether 
expressed or latent, are ignored. Inequalities are manifested as discrepancies in 
financial resources, inexperience in bargaining skills, different levels of intelligence, 
education or self-expression, the threat of physical violence or .emotional abuse as well 
as an individual's own feelings of inadequacy.120 If a continuum is presumed, then the 
inequalities prevalent during the process of bilateral negotiation are merely transferred to 
the process of mediation.121 These and similar inequalities affect the power relations 
between the disputants. 
The effect of power relationships on the mediation process should not be 
underestimated. Power does not exist in a vacuum but rather in terms of a relationship. 
Moore defines power or influence as " ... the capability of a person or group to modify the 
outcome, benefit, or costs of another in the context of a relationship".122 Mayer123 
identifies ten sources of power as follows: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
120 
121 
122 
123 
Formal authority which is derived from given formal or official status within 
a recognised structure that confers a decision-making competence. 
Expert/information power based on expertise in a particular field of study 
or information in respect of a certain matter. 
Associational or referent power that is derived from an association with 
other people who are powerful. 
See generally Clarke and Davies "Mediation - when it is not appropriate" 72-73; 
Mowatt 'Thoughts on mediation" 733; Pears Beyond Dispuis 52. 
Keltner Mediation 33. 
Moore The Mediation Process 271. 
''The dynamics of power in mediation" 78. 
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(d) Resource power refers to control over "valued resources" (eg money) or in 
its negative sense, the power to withhold these resources or compel 
another to expend them. 
(e) Procedural power indicates control over decision-making procedures but 
without control of the decisions themselves as in the case of judge in a jury 
trial. 
(f) Sanction power is the actual or potential ability " .... to inflict harm or to 
interfere with a party's ability to realise his or her interests". 
(g) Nuisance power is the ability to cause discomfort to another person but" ... 
falling short of the ability to apply direct sanctions". 
(h) Habitual power is that of" ... the status quo that rests on the premise that it 
is normally easier to maintain a particular arrangement or course of action 
than to change it". 
(i) Moral power is derived from " ... an appeal to widely held values" and is 
also related to the conviction that one is right. 
(k) Personal power " ... derives from a variety of personal attributes that 
magnify other sources of power, including self-assurance, the ability to 
articulate one's thoughts and understand one's situation, one's 
determination and endurance, and so forth". 
As in bilateral negotiations, power is a very real factor in the mediation process. It is 
therefore of the utmost importance the1t ,~Jnediator.,.sbould"be0awar:e,,,of,,.tRe,-effect ... of its 
'-· dynamics--i:;-p;~-th;, ~;di~;j~~-~~~~~~~~~;4 Unless a mediator is sensitive to the resultant 
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power relationships, difficulty will be experienced in rectifying the inequalities between 
the disputants which consequently determines the mediator's ability to maintain 
processual equality. 
Moore distinguishes between two forms of power relationships ie symmetric or 
asymmetric.125 Symmetrical power relations are more the exception than the rule and 
occur in instances when the disputants are equally matched. The tendency is that equal 
124 lbid82. 
125 The Mediation Process 278. 
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power produces greater co-operation between the disputants, reduces manipulative 
behaviour and enables the disputants to function more effectively.126 The problems that 
are encountered relate to "(1) perceptual difficulties between the parties about symmetry 
and (2) the negative residue of emotions resulting from past exercise of coercive power 
within the relationship".127 Because the disputants are on an equal bargaining footing, 
the mediator's approach should be to develop an accurate assessment of power 
mechanisms in order to shift the emphasis of power relations and to focus on the 
disputant's mutual interests.128 
In instances when the power relationship is a asymmetrical, which is in the majority of 
cases, two situations are likely to arise 
(1) perceptual problems - situations in which the stronger party believes that the 
weaker party has equal power, or situations in which the weaker party has an 
inflated view of his or her strength; and (2) extremely asymmetrical relationships -
situations in which a party is in a much weaker position, and both parties know 
it.129 
In these situations, the mediator's task is to ''work with both the weaker and the stronger 
party to minimise the negative effects of unequal power".13° For instance, if the weaker 
disputant . resorts to bluffing in order to exert influence and the stronger disputant 
believes the bluff, the mediator should educate the weaker disputant about the 
consequences of such a deception. Moreover, the mediator may also cause doubt in the 
mind of both disputants in regard to the accuracy of their assessment of the power 
balance.131 However, by far the greatest problem for the mediator relates to extreme 
divergence in the power relationship between the weaker and the stronger disputant. In 
these cases the mediator is tempted to become an advocate for the weaker which 
126 Idem. 
127 lbid279. 
128 Ibid 282. 
129 Ibid 280-281. 
130 Ibid 281. 
131 Idem. 
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should be resisted because of the ethical problems it would create in respect of mediator 
neutrality. Instead, the mediator should assist the weaker disputant in utilising the power 
that is already possessed.132 
Moore's analysis explains the inequalities inherent in the power relationships between 
the disputants. The crucial question is the extent to which the mediator must 
accommodate inequalities within the mediation process yet simultaneously ensure that 
each disputant is treated equally. The use of various tactics by the mediator is 
advised, 133 but their description falls beyond the scope of this work. 134 Yet, essentially 
the answer lies in the principles of process. Other than in the case of adjudicative 
processes that rely on formal and external rules to enforce due process, the necessary 
checks and balances of the mediation process are concentrated in the person of the 
mediator.135 This follows from the basic principle that the mediator is primarily 
responsible for controlling the mediation process. However, the principle is subject to the 
important reservation that mediator control applies in theory only to process and not to 
the consequences of such control. To argue otherwise, would extend mediator control 
over the substance and outcome of the mediation process which would be inconsistent 
with its consensual nature.136 These same qualifications apply to the maintenance of 
processual equality. Mayer notes the distinction 
Mediation ... can provide procedural equality but cannot usually alter the division 
of resources or the structural conditions that determine the basic relations 
between the parties.137 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
Ibid 281-282. 
See, for instance, Mayer ''The dynamics of power in mediation" 82-83; Moore 
The Mediation Process 272-278. 
The reader is reminded that this work deals with the theory and principles of ADR 
processes and not tactics and skills. 
See Folberg and Taylor Mediation: A Comprehensive Guide to Resolving 
Conflict without Litigation cited in Goldberg, Green and Sander Dispute 
Resolution 115. 
For the consensual nature of mediation, see 6.2.2 above. 
''The dynamics of power in mediation" 81. 
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Processual equality therefore ensures a commitment to fair process as a means of 
redressing any imbalance of power but fair process does not entail the alteration of the 
substantive realities of the negotiations. 
By no means does this imply that the processual and substantive components of the 
process of mediation are divorced from each other. Admittedly the distinction is subtle. A 
mediator may legitimately educate the weaker disputant to understand and deal with the 
mediation process itself but would transgress the boundaries of processual equality if 
she assists that weaker disputant in regard to the substance of the negotiations. Ye~ 
process and substance remain interrelated: by empowering one or both the disputants in 
regard to and by means of process, the substance of the negotiations is affected and the 
outcome, while still reflecting the agreement of the disputants, is markedly different to 
what it might have been in bilateral negotiations. Although the maintenance of 
procedural equality might not always produce a substantive outcome to the satisfaction 
of the weaker party or even the mediator, it should in processual terms be characterised 
by its equivalence or fairness. 
The standards of equivalence or fairness should also be assessed within the context of 
the process of mediation itself, taking into consideration all its limitations as a dispute 
resolution process. By comparison to public adjudication, mediation cannot, because of 
its consensual nature, impose a binding decision, vindicate and enforce legal rights, alter 
the position of third parties or apply public norms to cure systemic social problems. 
Whenever problems of a structural nature are involved, the outcome of mediation can 
rarely result in equivalence since it is beyond the scope of the mediation process to deal 
with inequalities and power relationships that can only be rectified by means of coercion 
or on the basis of public policy. Under these circumstances, only a fair outcome can be 
guaranteed on the understanding that mediation has provided the weaker party with the 
best outcome in comparison with other available processual options. Mayer is similarly 
aware of the limitations of mediation in dealing with certain types of power 
When basic structural inequalities in power do exist, mediation may be. the 
vehicle through which the weaker party has to choose between two unfavourable 
outcomes. Such a choice may be inevitable regardless of the conflict resolution 
processes used. If mediation provides someone with the best (albeit not always 
entirely favourable) outcome, then thi.s process may still be the preferable one. If, 
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however, mediation increases the power differential, it should probably not be 
used.138 
The process of mediation is therefore limited in its exercise of power and the resultant 
outcomes that it can produce. In the final analysis, it provides processual equality as a 
means of balancing the inequalities and power relationships between the disputants in 
order to achieve the single objective of realigning their future relationship on a 
consensual basis through a process of structured negotiation. If more is required than 
the equivalence or fairness of a consensual outcome, then recourse should be made to 
other informal or institutionalised dispute resolution processes. 
6.4 Evaluation of the process of mediation 
Distinctive continuities and discontinuities exist between mediation and negotiation on 
the one hand, and adjudication and mediation, on the other hand. An analogy between 
negotiation and mediation shows that both are consensual processes but that they differ 
from each other in that negotiation is based on the bilateral interaction of the disputants 
whereas mediation is a process of structured negotiation on account of the intermediary 
intervention of the mediator. Common to mediation and adjudication is that both are 
forms of third-party intervention. However, adjudication is authoritative in its style and 
renders a definitive binary decision in contrast to mediation which is consensual both in 
its nature and outcome. The process of mediation therefore takes a rather ambivalent 
position in the hierarchy of dispute resolution processes. 
The processual model of mediation posits a highly individualised form of third-party 
intervention. It is based on the supposition that the disputants may privatise their dispute 
by taking self-responsibility for its content and outcome on the basis of their own rational 
decisions, facilitated through the intermediary intervention of a third-party neutral who 
channels and controls the process. This is consistent with the dominant Anglo-American 
notion that the object of the process of mediation is the attainment of private consensus. 
Although classified as a form of third-party intervention in the ilk of arbitration and court-
138 Ibid 84. 
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based adjudication, the nature of the intervention is by comparison unobtrusive because 
the process of mediation is intrinsically consensual. 
Compared to other formal methods of third-party intervention, the process of mediation 
permits and encourages the full participation of the disputants in the resolution of the 
dispute. Without regard for public policy or legal rules, the disputants may through the 
mediator devise a private agreement that revises or realigns their future relationship 
without being involved in the expense, delay, publicity or procedural technicalities of 
other public and formal processes. Although the mediated agreement is not enforced by 
means of public sanctions, the absence of standards of fault and of any attribution of 
liability compensate for the lack of certainty and finality of outcome. The extent to which 
the disputants are able to compromise on the basis of self-interest is the only measure of 
the durability of the outcome. This is inevitable because the consensual dynamic of the 
mediation process of necessity elicits personal compromise at the expense of legal 
principle, precedent or public policy. The needs and wants of the disputants are 
paramount, thereby sublimating the vindication of their legal rights. The process of 
mediation is therefore an anti-legal and anti-normative method of dispute processing. 
Within the broader normative and processual setting of third-party intervention, 
mediation may accordingly be interpreted as a process through which the individual 
interests of private parties are permitted to predominate over the interests of third parties 
as well as considerations of law and public policy. 
The above analysis of the process of mediation reflects an instrumentalist view of 
disputing. A dispute is regarded as being private and discreet. As a result it is divorced 
from the social and cultural setting which gives it substance and meaning. In this context 
"many or most interpersonal problems are fundamentally conflicts pursued by rational 
actors making choices between sets of instrumental goals".139 The disputants are 
conceived as being rational actors who participate in a normless and anti-legal problem-
solving process on the bases of self-interest, economy of cost, expediency and a risk 
evaluation of probable outcomes.140 Whenever a mediated settlement is reached, it is 
139 
140 
Merry and Silby "Reexamining the concept of dispute" 154. 
See generally Ellison "Dispute resolution and democratic theory" 253-254 for an 
appraisal of the rational-actor model. 
201 
achieved by means of a private compromise between the disputants which in turn may 
be construed as compromising public and legal values.141 Although the rational-actor 
approach promotes the process of mediation as a useful adjunct to legal decision 
making, it should not be absolutised. For to do so, would "create a culture of mediation 
without public purpose", thereby encouraging "privatised forms of public policy".142 
An uncritical acceptance of the rational-actor approach to mediation would establish a 
dangerous principle in the context of the South African situation. As this country discards 
its legacy of apartheid, there is a definite need to develop a normative framework that 
propagates common values based on principles of reconciliation. Disputes and disputing 
should therefore not be regarded as being private and discreet but rather as events that 
are deeply rooted in culture and the social fabric of this country. The rational-actor 
approach privatises a dispute by separating it from its historical and cultural context that 
in fact explains the substance of the dispute and gives meaning to its resolution. 
Disputes are not isolated events. To the contrary, they occur within the culture of the 
family, marital relations, the group, a neighbourhood, the township, a rural community, 
the public or the private sectors, and so on. Each entity has its own set of individual 
values and social norms. Disputes arise within the unique context of these cultures, most 
often because of the interdependent or continuing nature of the relationships formed in 
these closed environments. In many cases, disputes of this nature might need to be 
processed by the courts on the basis of legal and public norms in order to uphold and 
maintain public values. Yet, by the same token, there might equally be a need to resolve 
these types of disputes by means of informal and consensual dispute resolution 
processes. In this latter respect, the process of mediation is capable of effecting a 
realignment of relationships within a particular culture or social setting, thereby altering 
future behaviour without recourse to formal or public structures of dispute resolution. 
141 
142 
See generally, Faris "Reconciling ADR and judicial dispute resolution" 10: ''The 
real danger lies in the supposition that non-legal values are an adequate 
replacement for legal nonns and related institutions. The mere fact that a dispute 
has been resolved infonnally does not mean that the broader public interest has 
been served. In fact the opposite could prove true: The application of non-legal 
values by means of infonnal dispute resolution processes could legitimise 
existing power imbalances that could otherwise have been corrected by the 
application of legal principles through judicial procedures." 
Ellison "Dispute resolution and democratic theory" 254. 
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Furthermore, because its consensual nature makes it inherently flexible, the process of 
mediation may be assimilated easily into community dispute resolution programmes, as 
in the case of community dispute resolution centres.143 
Somehow a balance must be struck between the rational-actor approach to mediation 
and the approach that regards mediation as having the potential of fulfilling a public 
purpose. On the one hand, the process of mediation by its very nature privatises a 
dispute on the basis of compromise and self-interest, yet it also has the capacity to deal 
with structural or social problems within a particular cultural context. The greatest 
mistake of the fledgling ADR movement in this country would be to divorce the process 
of mediation from the cultural context within vvhich disputes arise. At risk would be the 
development of a culture of mediation without public purpose. 
Probably because of its ambivalent position in the hierarchy of dispute resolution 
processes, the process of mediation abounds with contradictions. One last issue needs 
to be examined in this respect. A question that is often posed is vvhether mediation is an 
art or a science. Mediation as an art-form is based on the highly individualistic skills of 
the practitioner in conducting the inter-party negotiations in order to achieve a 
consensual agreement. These skills involve an intuitive understanding of the po\l\ler 
balance, supplying structure vvhere there is no structure, timing interventions vvhen there 
is no system to dictate the timing, discerning the underlying causes of the dispute and 
probing needs and wants to test reality. Crossing from art to science-form, the emphasis 
is on research relating to the effectiveness of mediation in certain contexts, 144 the 
durability of its outcome 145 and generally an analytical and systematic understanding of 
mediation as a process. 146 Some commentators conclude that mediation is a mixture of 
143 
144 
145 
146 
See, for instance, Van der Meiwe and Mbebe The Alexandria Justice Centre; 
Steadman "Settling disputes in communities" 128-129. 
See, for instance, Kolb "Expressive tactics in mediation"; Kresse! and Pruit 
"Mediation of social conflict". 
See, for instance, Kelly ''Mediated and adversarial divorce resolution processes". 
The most comprehensive study of this aspect of mediation is by Moore The 
Mediation Process. 
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both art and science.147 This is basically true because there is continual tension between 
theory and practice. However, a personal preference is to opt for mediation as a science 
for one salient reason. As a form of process based on third-party intervention as well as 
on the consensual principles of negotiation, mediation is founded on a complex 
amalgam of processual principles that should be the subject of intensive research not 
only to enable practitioners to improve their skills but more especially, to fully understand 
the systematics of the process of mediation as well as the importance of its processual 
function in the broader domain of dispute processing and dispute tranSformation. 
147 See Nupen "Mediation" 41-42. 
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7.1 Arbitration in the context of ADR 
The process of arbitration is universally accepted as being an established institution of 
the legal system. 1 Law students in the course of their studies become aware of the 
process of arbitration. In substantive terms, the theory of arbitration is developed and 
systematic, deriving authority from common-law writers, statutory law and decided cases. 
The practice of arbitration compliments the related substantive principles. Every well-
drafted contract usually contains an arbitration clause and as process, arbitration is 
For a resume of the history and concept of arbitration, see 3.2.3 above. 
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applied in both the public and private sectors in its mandatory or voluntary forms,2 as the 
case may be. As such, arbitration is part of every lawyer's professional map. 
However, within its legal frame of reference, arbitration is mainly understood in its 
conventional form. 3 Consequently, as a form of process, arbitration is regarded as a 
method of avoiding the ordinary jurisdiction of the courts of law in order to facilitate the 
swift extra-curial determination of disputes in a judicial manner. 4 On the processual level, 
arbitration is conducted adversarially and hence given to procedural technicalities and 
formalities, resulting in delays and often inordinate expense. 5 This mindset extends to its 
method of decision making, which being adjudicative, is exploited to obtain the 
advantage of a binding and often binary decision.6 Consequently, within the theoretical 
structure of ADR, there are valid reasons for rejecting the process of arbitration as one of 
the primary ADR processes. 
As an alternative to the judicial model of dispute resolution, the process of arbitration 
could be considered as a misfit in the context of ADR.7 On account of its adjudicative 
structure and its affinity with the process of litigation, the general assumption is that 
2 
3 
4 
5 , 
6 
7 
See Davis Law and Practice of Arbiiration 1; Brand "Nature of arbitration 
process" 94. See, further, note 46 below for details regarding compulsory 
statutory arbitration. 
The word "conventional" as it is used in relation to arbitration, refers to the formal 
conduct of the arbitration process in a manner that emulates judicial proceedings. 
Refening to English practice, Shilston "Modem commercial arbitration" 62 
expresses what arbitration in its conventional forms entails: "Apart from privacy, 
there was no procedural difference between arbitration and litigation, since the 
pleading practices necessarily adopted in the civil courts were being followed 
unnecessarily in arbitration, through the lawyers' habits .... Hence the use of the 
traditional English adversary system was unquestioningly being applied to private 
commercial arbitration - and probably more often than not, still is." 
See Jacobs Law of Arbitration in SA 1. 
See, for instance, Brand "Nature of arbitration process" 95; Butler and Finsen 
Arbitration in SA 26-28. See also Astor and Chinkin Dispute Resolution 121. 
See the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 s 28. See also Davis Law and Practice of 
Arbitration 48-49; Jacobs Law of Arbiiration in SA 130-131. 
See Bevan ADR 7. 
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arbitration is a hybrid of the judicial model8 and therefore has very little in common with 
the consensual nature of other ADR processes. This view cannot be summarily 
discounted because, according to its conventional practice, the process of arbitration 
does mimic the judicial model. This is clearly evident from its procedural attributes 
described above. 
Apart from these procedural considerations, the process of arbitration functions in a co-
ordinate relationship with the judicial model as its official alternative operating within the 
legislative framework of the Arbitration Act of 1965. 9 The integration is evident in many 
respects, but mainly, in that court proceedings may be stayed if an arbitration is pending 
in regard to the same dispute,10 an abuse of the arbitral process is subject to judicial 
review11 and an arbitral award may be judicially enforced.12 Small wonder that 
conventional arbitration has been described as "litigation without wigs".13 
Because conventional arbitration is such a close imitation of the judicial model, there are 
diverse opinions regarding the acceptance of the process of arbitration within the system 
of ADR. Some commentators reject arbitration outright as a primary ADR process. 
Another takes the rather ambivalent view that the process of arbitration is a "semi-
alternative". And lastly, arbitration is unconditionally recognised as one of the primary 
ADR processes. This apparent divergence of opinion 14 would be best resolved by 
diagnosing the norms and values that underlie the process of arbitration. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
See, further, 2.1.3 above. 
42of1965. 
s 6. See also Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 63-64; Davis Law and 
Practice of Arbitration 19-21; Jacobs Law of Arbitration in SA 48-56. 
s 33. See also Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 291-295; Davis Law and 
Practice of Arbitration 55-60; Jacobs Law of Arbitration in SA 137-145. 
s 31. See also Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 272-275; Davis Law and 
Practice of Arbitration 50-52; Jacobs Law of Arbitration in SA 132-136. 
See Fulton Commercial ADR 55. 
For details of these various views, see 2.1.3 note 17 above. 
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On level of concept, arbitration may be explained as a process that excludes a dispute 
from the court system by diverting it to a private adjudicative forum.15 Consequently, the 
process of arbitration establishes an adjudicative framework that functions as an 
alternative to the traditional reliance on a judge-centred adjudicative process.16 Although 
the process of arbitration and the judicial model share the same procedural and 
adjudicative paradigm, the differences between the two are fundamental. The most 
intrinsic difference is that the process of arbitration accommodates the principle of 
disputant autonomy in its most plenary form.17 Although arbitration is not wholly a 
consensual process in the nature of negotiation and mediation, it may be characterised 
as being fundamentally a procedure by consensus. Precisely because a private 
adjudicative forum is established, the disputants retain the fullest control of the 
proceedings. They are able to make meaningful decisions about the manner in which the 
dispute is to be adjudicated18 without being fettered by the formalities, technicalities and 
delays of judicial proceedings. Irrespective of the continuities that exist between the 
process of arbitration and the judicial model, the principle of disputant autonomy is the 
most salient distinguishing feature that poses arbitral adjudication as an alternative form 
of dispute resolution to the judicial model. 
Although the external attributes of the arbitration process correspond closely to those of 
the judicial model, its internal dynamic is essentially consensual. An emphasis on the 
quasi-judicial characteristics of the arbitration process in its conventional form does not 
detract from the fact that its inner dimensions are consensual. Disputant autonomy still 
remains intact as an independent principle that both expresses and affirms the 
consensual nature of the process of arbitration. The arbitration_~e~rne1JtU.OJierline.sJhe 
consen!S~-~!l~Jyr~ _gf_!b_~_§!rt.>Jtration pr()~ss. It indicates the mutual agreement of the 
parties to surrender themselves to the process of arbitration as well as their intention of 
accepting a binding adjudicative outcome. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Carbonneau Alternative Dispute Resolution 136; Du· Plessis "Arbitration - a 
new approach" 378. 
Ibid 138-139. 
Ibid 105. 
Ibid 139. 
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Furthermore, the principle of disputant autonomy encourages the disputants to 
collaborate in prosecuting the arbitration. In terms of their mutual consent, the disputants 
select the arbitrator, 19 in conjunction with the arbitrator delineate the applicable process 
and procedure for the arbitration and also take responsibility for conducting the 
process.20 Intervention by the court is restricted.21 However, in the main, a court is 
permitted to apply the rules of natural justice in instances of alleged arbitral abuse.22 
Even in this regard, judicial intervention is kept to a minimum for a court is permitted only 
to regulate any processual abuse and not to interfere with the content of an arbitral 
award.23 This same rationale explains the prohibition of an appeal from an arbitral award 
for to concede that an award is appealable would violate the content of the process. 24 
In addition, the principle of disputant autonomy accounts for the fact that the process of · 
arbitration is private and confidential.25 The disputants processually pursue their dispute 
and resolve it, outside the public domain. The substance of the dispute remains the 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
See Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 79-80; Davis Law and Practice of 
Arbitration 22-23; Jacobs Law of Arbitration in SA 58-59. However, it is 
possible for an arbitrator to be nominated: Butler and Finsen ibid 80-83; Jacobs 
ibid 60. In terms of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 s 12, a court may in certain 
prescribed instances appoint an arbitrator: Butler and Finsen ibid 84-85; Jacobs 
ibid 65-68. 
See Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 22. 
The balance between disputant autonomy and curial intervention is extremely 
delicate: Christie "Arbitration: party autonomy or curial intervention: historical 
background" 144. For a discussion of the instances in which a court may 
justifiably intervene, see Christie "Arbitration: party autonomy or curial 
intervention Ill: domestic arbitration" 552-526. 
Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 s 33. See also Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 
290-295; Davis Law and Practice of Arbitration 55-60; Jacobs Law of 
Arbitration in SA 137-145. 
For a discussion of the finality of an arbitral award, see Cowling "Finality in 
arbitration" 306 et seq; Scott-Macnab Mediation Arbitration 52-56. 
See Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 271; Jacobs Law of Arbitration in SA 
128. 
See Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 21 55-56 213-214; Scott-Macnab 
Mediation Arbitration 45-48. See also Effron "Alternatives to litigation" 483-484. 
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private concern of the disputants. Hence, confidential information disclosed during the 
arbitration process is protected from public scrutiny.26 
The technicality and formality of conventional arbitration has tended to blur the 
underlying consensual structure of arbitration. This has created the perception that the 
process of arbitration is a privatised replica of the judicial model. This is misleading. The 
consensual ele!!!_~!lt~ ~f arbitration, as actual is~~ t~E?ugh the principle of disputant 
~~~f"l_~l'\1Y·_ make its process analytically distinct and independent of the_judi<?i~!_fl'!('.)del. 
Unlike the judicial model, the process of arbitration has a bipartite structure consisting of 
the unlikely mix of adjudicative and consensual elements. Although the quasi-judicial 
element has been exaggerated in the form of conventional arbitration, the consensual 
base ha~~ been preserved. Precisely because of its consensual characteristics, it is 
possible to integrate the process of arbitration into the system of ADR as one of its 
primary processes. 
Within the framework of ADR, the conventional attributes of the process of arbitration are 
moderated. 27 On account of its consensual elements, the inherent flexibility of the 
process of arbitration has been adapted to suit contemporary needs. The results have 
been extremely creative. Derivatives of the process of arbitration have been 
developed.28 Moreover, the process of arbitration has been extended into context-based 
applications other than in the commercial sector. 29 In addition, because it ranks as a 
primary process, the elements of arbitration have been combined with other public or 
private processes to form hybrid processes. 30 This could never have been achieved if 
the process of arbitration was merely an offshoot of the judicial model. 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Although privacy and the confidentiality of arbitration proceedings should be 
upheld as a primary principle for private arbitration, there is doubt whether it is 
advisable to maintain this principle in the case of public arbitrations where the 
disclosure of information could be vital to the public interest: Scott-Macnab 
Mediation Arbitration 45-46. 
BevanADR8. 
See, further, 7.4 below. 
See, further, 7.3 below. 
See, further, 8.3.1 and 8.3.3 below. 
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Even though arbitration may be recognised as an independent process, the norms and 
values of the process of arbitration need to be examined in order to confirm its 
processual ~~_mp~-~~!!!!Y with those of the system of ADR. To do so, it is necessary to 
expfore the norms and values of the process of arbitration in the setting of the principles 
of third-party intervention31 as well as its various context-based applications32 and 
derivative extensions. 33 
7 .2 Arbitration and third-party intervention 
7 .2.1 Introduction 
Within the broader context of ADR, it is extremely simplistic to regard arbitration as a 
hybrid of judicial proceedings merely because the adjudicative process is common to 
both. If this reasoning is to be taken to its ultimate conclusion, then it is equally true that 
arbitration is a hybrid of the processes of negotiation and mediation because of the 
consensual elements inherent in all three processes. Although there are continuities 
between the adjudicative structures of arbitration and judicial proceedings on the one 
hand, and between the consensual natures of arbitration and negotiation and mediation 
on the other hand, arbitration essentially remains an independent and primary process 
within the system of ADR. The unique processual qualities of arbitration are brought to 
the fore when assessed within the theoretical context of the principles of third-party 
intervention. 
7 .2.2 Structure of power 
All forms of third-party intervention are derived from the exercise of power. The 
intrusiveness of the intervention is in proportion to the extent to which the disputants 
divest themselves of the control of the dispute and vest it in a neutral party or forum. 34 
31 See, further, 7 .2 below. 
32 See, further, 7 .3 below. 
33 See, further, 7.4 below. 
34 Effron "Alternatives to litigation" 482. See also 6.1.1 above. 
Although in practice disputes are not necessarily resolved according to the strict 
adherence to a continuum, in theory a continuum of third-party intervention based on the 
structure of power explains the degree of intrusiveness. 
By comparison to arbitration and judicial proceedings, the power in mediation is 
unobtrusive. 35 _The fQ_l::!_l1_g_~~Q_!!_ of ip~_tji?!~Qry_pQ~!i~- so~_~Qn!r~ctu~~~ "'!B~-'!!~~i-~~ion 
agreerT1ent between the disputants and the mediator justifies the intrusion and limits the 
intervention to the facilitation of a negotiated agreement. Within the ambit of the 
mediation agreement, the mediator may assume a directive or passive role but only as 
a'l_j~t~~~~ic:t_I)' __ !~~ a negotiated settlement.37 Essentially, power and process are 
derived from the terms of the mediation agreement while processually, both are 
intermeshed within the internal mediational structure. In the final analysis, the exercise of 
power in mediation is su_l?j~ctiy~_ since there are no external rules or sanctions that either 
confirm or bolster the personal power of the mediator or ensure the fairness of the 
process.38 
As an extension of the judiciary, cou!ls exercise the judlc_i~IJu11ct!on~-~~_Jl~ver':!l'l1.~f'lt.39 
Hence, courts are vested with the jt.Jrisdictiof'l, both ~~a-~~~1)'40 and at common law, 41 to 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
The situation is explained as follows by Effron "Alternatives to litigation" 482: 
"Courts, for example, are the most intrusive form of dispute resolution: the parties 
must accept both the decision that the judge makes and the process by which 
the judge will reach the decision. Arbitrators are less intrusive than courts: the 
parties may provide by agreement the process which the arbitrator uses to reach 
a decision but the arbitrator provides the parties with a decision. The least 
intrusive processes are those often called "mediation" or "conciliation": while the 
third-party neutral may take control of the process ... , the ultimate decision on 
how to resolve the dispute is normally left to the parties themselves." See also 
Mowatt ''Thoughts on mediation" 733 and 6.4 above. 
See Trollip ADR appendix A for an example of an mediation agreement. 
See, further, 6.1.2 above. 
See, further, 6.2.1 above. 
See Carpenter SA Constitutional Law 156-157. 
See, for instance, the Supreme Court Ad 59 of 1959 s 19( 1) and the Magistrates' 
Courts Ad 32 of 1944 ss 28-29 and 46. 
For a summary of civil jurisdiction at common law, see Forsyth Private 
International Law 140-233. 
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adjudicate or deliberate on all causes arising within their prescribed territorial 
boundaries. The power and process of the courts as expressed through judicial 
proceedings, is therefore institutionalised and accordingly regulated by external rules 
that are sanctioned by the State. Ultimately, the power that sustains judicial proceedings 
is not only objective but also derived from the sovereign power of the State. 
The temptation is to ascribe the power exercised in arbitration only to the contract~_~! 
agreeme~t between the parties. This is partially correct. Other than in the case of 
mediation, the contractual basis of arbitration is antecedent to the dispute. 42 Arbitral 
power was originally derived from the extension of the contract by means of the 
stipulation that future <:!~~p~tes arising from the interpretation or performance of the 
contract would be resolved by arbitration.43 However, consensus to extend the contract 
explains the historical origins of arbitral power but does not fully account for its 
contemporary application. Tl'lE!_f'l"IOdern notion __ of arbit~ation is that it is an if1dependent(tp' 
dispute resolution process and an intE!gral part of the administration of civiljustice.44 ''> 
Indeed, the residual element of its origins is still found in the fundamental legal 
assumption, basically expressed through the standard arbitration clause, that the 
disputants may anticipate the resolution of disputes through a permissible extension of 
the contract. But arbitral power has developed beyond its contractual foundations for in 
our time it is possible to distinguish between agreement and process. 45 Tu~PrQ.~~-~!_of 
arbitration is recognised as an independent method of dispute resolution that is no 
42 
43 
44 
45 
Although contract is the basis of both mediation and arbitration, the distinctions, 
however slight, are fundamental. In the case of mediation, the normal practice is 
to enter into an ad hoc mediation agreement only after the dispute has arisen 
whereas in the case of arbitration, the contract itself presupposes the potential 
for dispute, hence accounting for the standard arbitration clause which extends 
the existing contract to accommodate the regulation of a dispute by means of 
arbitration, should the dispute in fact arise. An ad hoc arbitration agreement is 
possible after the dispute has arisen, but this is not the rule. 
See Carlston ''Theory of the arbitration process" 631. See also Butler and Finsen 
Arbitration in SA 3. Hence, arbitral power may be undermined by contesting the 
validity of the arbitration agreement: Butler and Finsen ibid 56-60; Jacobs Law of 
Arbitration in SA 29-38. 
Fischer-Zemin and Junker "Arbitration and mediation" 24. 
Carlston ''Theory of the arbitration process" 632. 
~f'l~~I"_ r~liC)f1! <?11.<::~ntrC)r;:tuCll in~rporatiof1_ ~irice C1r_l:l_i!':~Le~"8Jer. af'l~ ~y~n the_ scc~p~ _()f 
__ t!1a!p~~r, mC}y_ r~~E~~~"~~y_ be_ ~nferred and dete~ined by statutory pr~vision.46 
Ar~!~Leo~r the!refore vests in a complex amalg~f11 of disputant consensus and 
_C)t.Jt~!:'~my of _l)roCE}SS. The opposite side of the coin is that both internal and external 
rules determine the exercise of arbitral power, regulate its processual equivalence and 
ensure objective decisional standards for a full and final adjustment of the dispute. 
7.2.3 Decisional methodology 
All three forms of third-party intervention have the common purpose of resolving disputes 
yet in each instance the decisional methodology differs. The mediational model relies on 
the co-operative negotiations between the disputants, acting through an intermediary, to 
effect a realignment of relationships through joint decision making that culminates in a 
consensual agreement. 47 Because its nature is intrinsically consensual, decisionH'!'~~~f'lJJ 
~!'~~- intervenor is totally alien to th: __ '!l:~i~-t~_~_pr~~=ss - th~ __ c:t_i~_pu!_C1!1~~~~i~--~nd 
_e1xercise their original decision-making powers. 48 This is the_~nti~-~~i~_ !Jf arbitration and 
judicial proceedings. Both depend on adjudicative methods of decision making. 
However, the comparison goes no further since in each instance the adjudicative 
technique differs.49 · 
46 
47 
48 
49 
Although the provisions of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 are merely regulatory, 
there are numerous statutes that prescribe compulsory forms of arbitration eg the 
Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 s 46. The Arbitration Act of 1965 s 40 expressly 
provides that its provisions apply to all compulsory statutory arbitrations except in 
so far as its provisions are inconsistent with that of the other statute, the 
regulations thereunder or the procedure so authorised. See, further, Butler and 
Finsen Arbib'ation in SA 67-68; Jacobs Law of Arbitration in SA 4-5. What is 
clearly evident is that compulsory statutory arbitration has extended the process 
of arbitration beyond its contractual origins and given it the standing of an 
independent process. 
See, further, 6.2.2 above; see also Fischer-Zemin and Junker "Arbitration and 
mediation" 23. 
See, further, 6.1.3 above; see also Fischer-Zemin and Junker "Arbitration· and 
mediation" 26. 
See Menschikoff "The significance of arbitration" 700. 
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Court-based adjudication is concerned with the creati<:>.l'l .. 9.f.!!~-~!~ __ while arbitral 
adjudication is involved with the int~rpr~~!_<?n ~-~!9~!s. 50 The difference is fundamental 
and distinct. The public ordering of society according to legal precepts is the subject of 
court-based adjudication. As a social process, adjudication has the broader purpose of 
regulating and maintaining public policy; of giving meaning to public values by providing 
guidance for future behaviour.51 The decisional structure is therefore primarily directed at 
creating rights that are binding on third parties through the creation of precedent and in 
so doing resolving the particular dispute at hand.52 Court-based adjudication is therefore 
instrumental in determining a specific dispute and yet in so doing, effecting systemic or 
structural social change._~i~C)I_ C)~j_ljdication i~_ far more limited. It i~ bound to the 
determination of the specific issues, stated in the arbitration ag~E!ement. 53 Accordingly, 
the scope of its decisional competence is restricted to the immediate dispute between 
the disputants, without having any precedential implications for third parties. 54 This 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
Carlston ''Theory of the arbitration process" 631. 
See Fiss ''The forms of justice" 2. 
See Landes and Posner "Adjudication as a private good" 236 who succinctly 
express this view as follows: "A court system . .. produces two types of service. 
One is dispute resolution - determining whether a rule has been violated. The 
other is rule formation - creating rules of law as a by-product of the dispute-
settlement process. When a court resolves a dispute, its resolution ... provides 
information regarding the likely outcome of similar disputes in the future. This is 
the system of precedent, which is so important in the Anglo-American legal 
system." 
For the distinction between arbitral and court-based adjudication, see Fiss ''Thi\ 
forms of justice" 30-31 where he states: "Arbitrators are paid for by the parties~ \ 
chosen by the parties; and enjoined by a set of practices ... that localizes or \ 
privatizes the decision. The function of the arbitrator is to resolve the dispute. The I 
function of the judge, on the other hand, must be understood in wholly different \ 
terms: he is a public officer; paid by public funds; chosen not by the parties but l 
by the public or its representatives; and empowered by the political agencies to j1 
enforce and create society-wide norms .. . as a way of giving meaning to our_ 
public values." 
This proposition does not imply that arbitration is merely an isolated ad hoc 
. event. Arbitrators are probably influenced by earlier awards on similar facts: 
Harris "Precedent in labour arbitration" 26 et seq. However, there is no definite 
information that confirms the precedential value of arbitral awards: Mentschikoff 
"Commercial arbitration" 866, ''The significance of arbitration" 702. See also 
Scott-Macnab Mediation Arbitration 29-31. What is emphasised in the text is 
216 
decisional technique therefore differs vastly from court-based adjudication since what is 
being applied is in reality a method of adjudicative problem solving. 55 In this particular 
respect, although their decisional methodologies might differ, there is more in common 
between mediation and arbitral adjudication than between arbitral and ·court-based 
adjudication because in the case of mediation and arbitral adjudication, problem solving 
is foundational for both. 
7 .2.4 Role and function of the third-party neutral 
The mediator, arbitrator and judge - all three fulfil the role of resolving disputes yet each 
has disparate functions. Although the association of these functionaries is strained from 
the vantage of practice, in theory, each is linked to the other within the framework of the 
principles of third-party intervention. In terms of these principles, common attributes may 
be identified. Aecordingly, within the specific context of third-party intervention, what is 
true of all these three types of dispute resoluters is that each -
(a) participates as an intervenor in a process of dispute resolution; 
(b) controls the related process; and 
(c) enters the process as a neutral "stranger".56 
55 
56 
that arbitral awards do not acquire a binding authority that by analogy is 
applicable in similar instances as decisional criteria which in the future would 
accordingly affect the rights of third parties. 
The essence of this notion is captured by Shilston ''Modem commercial 
arbitration" 46: "Commercial arbitration is a problem-solving process. ... The 
resolution of disputatious contractual problems through arbitration rather than 
court litigation should follow procedural paths broadly similar to those adopted by 
professional managers in the normal course of business. The art of arbitration is 
geared to designing the appropriate procedure for solving the instant problem in 
view." See also Note "The California rent-a-judge experiment" 1611-1612. 
The word "stranger'' is used to denote the same meaning given to it by Eisenberg 
"Private ordering through negotiation" 655-660 in regard to the selection and 
application of norms, the determination of fads, the choice of remedy as well as 
the emotional effect of participation. 
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In each instance the roles of the mediator, arbitrator and judge are identical. However, 
each may be distinguished from the other according to the differing functions that each 
performs in the process of dispute resolution. 
Although it is an unsettled issue whether a mediator's control of the mediation process 
should be passive or directive, 57 there is little doubt regarding a mediator's intermediary 
function as the facilitator of a negotiated settlement between the disputants.58 In the case 
of the arbitrator and judge, the matter is a little more complex. 
The function of both the arbitrator and judge can be described as being adjudicative. As 
a first description, this is satisfactory. What is conveyed is that, as adjudicators, both the 
arbitrator and judge must conduct the proceedings according to the rules of natural 
justice in order to ensure fairness of process. 59 Because a judge and an arbitrator must 
apply the rules of natural justice, both are bound to act in a judicial manner. However, 
allowing the matter to rest there, without further qualification, has led to certain false 
assumptions. 
One such fallacy is founded on the assumption that an arbitrator is a private judge. 60 The 
mere fact that an arbitrator performs an adjudicative function does not necessarily justify 
this assumption. The respective appointment and qualifications of an arbitrator and a 
judge rest on different grounds. A judge is appoint~d by the President,61 on the advice of 
the Judicial Services Commission,62 as a fit and proper person, to hold permanent and 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
See, further, 6.1.2 above. 
See, further, 6.1.3 above. 
See, further, Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 98-99 165-167 190-191. 
See also Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 95; Scott-Macnab Mediation 
Arbitration 56-58; Solove "Alternative means to resolve corporate disputes" 138. 
See the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Ad 200 of 1993 ss 99(1) 
and 104(1). 
See the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Ad 200 of 1993 ss 99(5) 
and 104(1) read withs 105 and the Judicial Services Commission Ad 9of1994. 
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independent judicial office63 which may not compete with any other office of profit64 and 
hence, the payment of all judges' salaries and allowances65 are guaranteed out of a 
separate fund.66 In contrast, an arbitrator is appointed by the disputants in a personal 
capacity or as a member of an institution, on the grounds of professional or technical 
expertise (whether it be non-legal or legal),67 and is paid by the disputants for the 
adjudicative services rendered in an open and competitive market 68 Although there is a 
functional continuum between an arbitrator and a judge,69 the diverse nature of their 
appointment and qualifications indicates that each has distinctive qualities that are 
suited to different forms of adjudication. 7° Consequently, an absolutisation of the 
adjudicative analogy between the arbitrator and a judge leads to the erroneous 
conclusion that an arbitrator is a judge in a private or lay capacity. Uncritical acceptance 
of this proposition misrepresents the actual functions of an arbitrator. The correct 
approach is to differentiate between the functions of a private and a public adjudicator 
respectively for in so doing variations in the form and function of adjudication are 
acknowledged. 
An arbitrator is irrefutably a private adjudicator. The reason is clear: the arbitrator 
acquires adjudicative power over a private forum from the consensual authority of the 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 s 104(4) 
provides that a judge may only be removed from office by the President on the 
grounds of misbehaviour, incapacity or incompetence which must be established 
by the Judicial Services Commission and upon receipt of an address of the 
National Assembly and the Senate requesting such removal. 
See the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 s 11. 
See the provisions of the Judges' Remuneration and Conditions of Employment 
Act 88 of 1989. 
See, further, 8.3.1 below where similar considerations are also discussed in 
relation to the rent-a-judge process. 
See, further, Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 79-86. So too, the disputants 
may terminate the appointment of an arbitrator: Butler and Finsen ibid 103-106. 
See, further, Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 86-88. 
Bayles "Principles for legal procedure" 39. 
For a detailed comparison between an arbitrator and a judge, see Butler and 
Finsen Arbitration in SA 95-97. 
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disputants. However, the basic reason for vesting this power in an arbitrator rests mainly 
on the disputants' selection of a person who is a specialist and therefore competent to 
adjudicate the specialised nature of the dispute on the basis of expert knowledge. On 
the other hand, a judge is a public .adjudicator who presides over a public forum to apply 
substantive legal norms and maintain public values. As a public adjudicator, a judge thus 
fulfils a societal function that accords with the obligation of government, acting through 
the judiciary in this instance, to maintain social harmony between citizens. In these 
terms, the adjudicative function of an arbitrator is more specific since it is limited to the 
resolution of technical and specialised disputes while that of the judge fulfils the broader 
governmental obligation of the public ordering of society. 
The style of adjudication also differentiates the respective functions of an arbitrator and a 
judge. In the Anglo-American system of procedure, the judge is cast as an umpire who, 
in an adversarial setting, passively and impartially controls the court process as well as 
the hearing at a trail. As such, a judge performs a supervisory rather than a managerial 
function in regard to the conduct of the litigation and the trial.71 By comparison, the 
procedural functions of an arbitrator are not so stereotyped. The consensual foundations 
of the process of arbitration72 make it possible for the arbitrator to break the mould of a 
passive "umpireal" adjudicator and to enter the arena as an active manager of the 
dispute. 73 In fact, the managerial function of an arbitrator is implicit and the failure of an 
arbitrator to manage the arbitration process is at the root of many of the criticisms of 
conventional arbitration.74 Arbitration should be managed differently from court 
71 
72 
73 
74 
In the United States this is a moot point since in various jurisdictions judges are 
permitted to exercise managerial functions in regard to complex litigation. See, 
further, Resnik "Managerial judges" 376 et seq. 
See, further, 7.1 above. 
For example, an arbitrator to an expedited arbitration may actively manage the 
process through increased participation and interrogatory competence. Quality 
arbitration is yet another example of an arbitrator being given total investigative 
and procedural control. See, further, 7.4 below. 
See Shilston "Modem comm~rcial arbitration" 60-61 in which he expresses this 
view as follows at 60: '1B]usinessmen who might otherwise regard, and use, the 
private arbitration service as a useful adjunct to the conduct of their commercial 
activity view arbitration with disdain, because it is seen to be as unattractive as 
'going to law' with all the formality, attendant delay, cost and disruption to 
220 
proceedings for ultimately, as a private adjudicator, the arbitrator's responsibility is to the 
consumer of his services and not the public at large.75 
In these terms it is insupportable to contend that an arbitrator is a private judge. The 
functions of an arbitrator and a judge are distinctive. The one functions as a private 
adjudicator, the other as a public adjudicator. To reason otherwise legitimises the notion 
that the process of arbitration is no more than a parody of judicial proceedings. In the 
final instance, if an arbitrator is regarded as being a private judge, it takes but a very 
short jump in logic, as fallacious as it might be, to conclude that arbitration is a privatised 
form of judicial proceedings. 
7 .3 Contextualised applications 
An analysis of arbitration in the context of the principles of third-party intervention 
emphasises its structural qualities. The analysis is also indicative of the instrumental 
considerations that relate to the selection of arbitration as the appropriate dispute 
resolution mechanism in contrast to the attributes of the other forms of third-party 
intervention. However, the assumption created is that the process of arbitration remains 
structurally constant. In theory it is possible to deal with arbitration as a structural 
concept but in practice the position is quite different. Pragmatic objectives and 
expediency force the process of arbitration to shift and change according to the differing 
contexts in which it is applied. 76 
Stated differently: in theory it is possible to deal with arbitration as a stable processual 
model yet, in a practical setting, its processual objectives are dictated by the social 
context in which it is applied. Essentially, the basic structure of the process of arbitration 
is capable of being adapted and moulded to suit the context of a particular dispute. 
Litigation may be adjectivally described as, for instance, "divorce" or "commercial" 
75 
76 
business life. That need not be the position if arbitrators manage the arbitral 
process form inception to conclusion". 
See, further, Shilston "Commercial arbitration" 58-59. 
See also Car1ston ''Theory of the arbitration process" 636. 
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litigation and so on, but the description remains adjectival since what is being explained 
is the nature of the cause of action and not the substance of the process itself. The 
situation is quite different in the case of arbitration. An adjective preceding the word 
"arbitration " conveys the substantive quality of the process within a particular social 
context. This in turn influences the processual norms and values of the process of 
arbitration in its differing settings. 
Consequently, there is a variance between the process of arbitration as a static and 
unitary concept within the theoretical framework of third-party intervention and the 
distinctive forms of arbitration that are identified by the various context-based 
applications that emerge in practice. The form of the arbitration is determined by the 
substantive nature of the dispute. As a result, the description of the arbitration is 
definitive of its form, as in the case of labour arbitration,77 commercial arbitration78 and 
international arbitration.79 Further sub-classification is sometimes possible: commercial 
arbitration has specialist applications in the field of insurance80 and the construction 
industry.81 Even within the internal form of a particular type of arbitration distinctive 
elements arise, the most notable example being that of labour arbitration where rights-
based and interest-based disputes are differentiated.82 
n 
78 
79 
80 
81 
See, for instance, Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 30-36; Lotter and Mosime 
Arbitration at Work . See also Getman "Labor arbitration and dispute resolution" 
916 et seq. 
See Fulton Commercial ADR 55-69 for a description that concentrates on 
commercial arbitration and also Shilston "Modem commercial arbitration" for an 
overview of current perspectives on commercial arbitration. 
See Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 296-316; Christie "Arbitration: party 
autonomy or curial intervention II: international commercial transactions" 360 et 
seq; Aaron "International arbitration I: arbitration clauses" 633 et seq; 
"International arbitration II: the main centres" 93 et seq; "International arbitration 
Ill: choosing an arbitration institution" 306 et seq; International arbitration IV: 
choosing a set of rules" 503 et seq. 
See, for instance, Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 55-56. 
See Finsen "Arbitration and mediation in the construction industry" 176-206; 
Hyman Engineering Construction Contracts 167-169; McKenzie Law of 
Building and Construction Contracts 161-203. 
For the distinction between a right-based dispute and interest-based dispute, see 
Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 30-32. 
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However, because of its pervasive quality, restrictions have been placed on the 
substantive scope of arbitration. Under the provisions of the Arbitration Act of 1965, 83 the 
process of arbitration may not be applied in regard to any dispute that relates to a 
matrimonial cause84 or that affects the status of a person.85 One of the important 
implications of this exclusion is that divorce and family disputes cannot be resolved by 
means of arbitration in South Africa. 86 At common law, it is not permissible to submit 
criminal matters to arbitration. 87 
Apart from context-based applications of arbitration that are determined by the 
substance of a dispute, it is also possible to identify the practice of arbitration in specific 
institutional settings. For instance, Mentschikott88 identifies the following instances that 
relate mainly to commercial arbitration -
(a) individual arbitration where all the necessary arrangements for the 
arbitration are made entirely by the disputants themselves; 
(b) arbitration that arises within the context of a particular trade or commercial 
association that creates it own arbitration structure for the settlement of 
disputes among its members on either a voluntary or compulsory basis; 
and lastly 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
42of1965. 
s 2(a). See, further, Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 52-53; Jacobs Law of 
Arbitration in SA 17-18. 
s 2(b). See, further, Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 53-54; Jacobs Law of 
Arbitration in SA 18. 
It should be recognised that in the United States the process of arbitration is 
used as a method for resolving the issues arising out of a divorce and family 
disputes. See, for example, Coulson "Family arbitration" 22 et seq; Herrman, 
McKenry and Weber "Mediation and arbitration applied to family conflict 
resolution" 17 et seq; Spenser and Zammit ''Mediation-arbitration" 911 et seq, 
"Arbitration under the family dispute services" 111 et seq. For a South African 
perspective on the matter, see Scott-Macnab Mediation Arbitration 192-209. 
Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 53. 
"Commercial Arbitration" 848-849. See also Mustill "Arbitration: history and 
background" 44-45 49-51 for a historical perspective on the development of 
institutional arbitration. 
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(c) arbitration provided by administrative groups89 that supply the rules, 
personnel and facilities to enable certain disputants to conduct the 
process of arbitration as a method of settlement. 
What is clearly evident is that arbitration is an extremely versatile process, 
notwithstanding its adjudicative structure. For this reason, arbitration has been described 
as being a "chameleon word, assuming varying significance as the social setting in 
which it takes place varies".90 Perhaps, the best explanation is that, because the process 
of arbitration has consensual foundations, 91 it is capable of absorbing the substantive 
qualities of a dispute and in so doing, takes on unique and distinctive forms. 
7 .4 Derivative extensions 
Apart from the ability of the process of arbitration to accommodate the substance of a 
dispute in a variety of contexts,92 it is also able to adapt its process without 
compromising the normative integrity of its adjudicative structure. This occurs precisely 
because the consensual elements of the process of arbitration give effect to the principle 
of disputant autonomy93 which permits the disputants, working through the arbitrator, to 
control the process. Accordingly, on the basis of their mutual consent, it is possible and 
permissible for the disputants to alter the processual form of the arbitration process.94 
The fact that arbitration is traditionally applied in its conventional form does not 
necessarily establish this particular form of arbitration as a fixed processual model. The 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
In the South African context these institutions would be identified as the 
Association of Arbitrators, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Association of 
South Africa (ADRASA) and Independent Mediation Services of South Africa 
(IMSSA). 
Carlston 'Theory of the arbitration process" 638. 
See, further, 7.1 above. 
See 7.3 above. 
See, further, 7.1 above. 
See also Rowland Arbitration 63. 
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conventional form of arbitration95 is used more frequently because the disputants 
themselves have agreed that the authoritarian norms of the judicial system should be 
applied to the arbitration process. Similarly, the disputants are at liberty to deviate from 
the conventional form of arbitration and tailor the arbitration to fit their particular needs. 
Although arbitration in its conventional form might have been rejected by the disputants 
in favour of an alternative arbitral form, in theory it is retained as a notional standard for 
determining the extent of the deviation of that alternative arbitral form. For this reason, all 
alternative arbitral forms may in principle be regarded as derivative extensions of the 
conventional model. The derivative forms of arbitration that have crystallised in practice 
are identified as expedited arbitration, last-offer arbitration, documents-only arbitration 
and quality arbitration. 
No matter how far removed an alternative arbitral form might be from the conventional 
model,96 it qualifies as a derivative form of arbitration because it still retains its essential 
arbitral characteristics. Consequently, all the derivative forms of arbitration have the 
following in common with each other -
(a) the disputants submit their dispute to a neutral and impartial third party 
who is named and recognised as an arbitrator; 
(b) the arbitrator applies the rules of natural justice as a minimum processual 
requirement; 
(c) the outcome is in the form of a definitive decision that in most instances is 
binding; and 
(d) the decision itself is based on a finding of fact in regard to quality or on the 
interpretation of rules and standards of conduct. 
95 
96 
For "conventional arbitration", see 7 .1 note 3 above. 
As in the case of quality arbitration which would border on expert appraisal were 
it not for the fad that a binding and final decision is made. See, further, text to 
note 106 for details regarding quality arbitration. For the differences between 
expert appraisal and arbitration, see Astor and Chinkin Dispum Resolution 129-
139. 
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These characteristic are common not only to derivative forms of arbitration but are also 
those of arbitration in its conventional form. These processual qualities characterise the 
related processes as forming part of a primary arbitral model. 
Alternative arbitral forms, both in theory and in practice, hence conform to the norms and 
values of a primary arbitral model and cannot be classified as hybrid processes merely 
because they deviate from arbitration in its conventional form. Derivative extensions from 
the conventional form of arbitration and hybrid processes97 that contain strong arbitral 
elements should therefore be regarded as being analytically distinct. Admittedly, there is 
a very thin dividing line between pure arbitral processes and those processes that rely 
heavily on arbitral elements in combination with the elements of other dispute resolution 
processes, as in the case of the rent-a-judge process98 and mediation/arbitration.99 The 
unfortunate part is that arbitral derivatives and hybrid processes are sometimes 
mistakenly interchanged.100 The crucial test is to determine whether or not the mix 
produces a process that is substantially different from the model of pure arbitration. The 
description of the alternative arbitral processes that follows, indicates that all these 
processes are arbitral in their nature and do not contain any alien elements derived from 
other dispute resolution processes. 
The need to streamline conventional arbitration by reducing delays that in tum 
decreases the potential for cost, is the primary reason for the development of expedited 
arbitration.101 In order to achieve this purpose, the rules that regulate the process of 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
For a detailed analysis of the hybrid processes, see chapter 8 below. 
For the rent-a-judge process, see 8.3.1 below. 
For mediation/arbitration, see 8.3.3 below. 
See, for instance, Henry and Lieberman The Manager's Guide to Resolving 
Legal Dispuies 75-77 who deal with the rent-a-judge process in their chapter 
relating to arbitration. See also Trollip ADR 36 who mentions the rent-a-judge 
process as a variation of conventional arbitration. On the other hand, for 
example, Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 201 describe quality (sniff-look) 
arbitration as "a hybrid type of arbitration". 
In Australia, expedited arbitration is also referred to as "fast track arbitration": 
Astor and Chinkin Dispum Resolution 123. 
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arbitration are attenuated. Some or all of the following steps are taken to abbreviate the 
proceedings: the preliminary meeting is either curtailed or abolished; the exchange of 
pleading is restricted or disallowed; discovery is limited or dispensed with; the rules of 
evidence are modified and simplified; the number of witnesses or expert witnesses may 
be reduced; opening and final statements are restricted in their length. Apart from these 
procedural considerations, the arbitrator is permitted a greater participatory role which 
allows for a more active involvement, with wider powers of intervention coupled with 
interrogatory competence.102 
A variant of expedited arbitration is known as final-offer arbitration.103 In this instance the 
decisional methodology is altered. In order to discourage excessive demands, the 
arbitrator is competent to find only in favour of the one disputant's claim or the other 
disputant's last offer but may not award anything in between this range. The effect is to 
reduce unnecessary delays caused by inflated demands that are inevitably followed by 
counter-rejections.104 
An ingenious method of obviating the need for a hearing has been devised in an arbitral 
form known as documents-only arbitration. The disputants waive their right to an arbitral 
hearing and instead agree that an arbitrator may render a decision only on the basis of 
documents that contain all the necessary evidence that pertains to the issues in dispute. 
Obviously this form of arbitration should not be applied when complex issues are 
102 
103 
104 
See, further, Mulligan "Alternative dispute resolution" 99-100; Trollip ADR 36-38. 
See also Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 201-202 for a brief description of 
summaty procedure arbitrations conducted according to the rules of the 
Arbitration Association. 
In the South African literature, final-offer arbitration is interchangeable with the 
term "pendulum arbitration" while in the United Kingdom, the equivalent terms 
are either "pendulum" or ''flip-flop" arbitration. In the United States of America the 
usage is "final-offer'' arbitration or "baseball" arbitration. The term "final-offer'' 
arbitration is used in Australia. 
See, further, Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 202; Mulligan "Alternative 
dispute resolution" 100; Trollip ADR 37. See also Fulton commercial ADR 70-73; 
Henty and Lieberman The Manager's Guide to Resolving Legal Dispuies 7 4-
75; Goldberg, Sander and Rogers Dispuie Resolution 223-225; Rowland 
Arbitration 68. 
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involved. However, it is suited to disputes that do not justify the time and expense 
involved in hearing and testing oral evidence. 105 
Quality arbitration 106 goes one step further than documents-only arbitration - it not only 
dispenses with an arbitral hearing but also with the need to adduce and test any 
evidence. This form of arbitration vest solely in the technical skill and expertise of the 
arbitrator. Most quality arbitrations are conducted under the auspices of a trade 
association and according to the usages that have developed in a particular trade 
regarding a specific commodity. Arbitrators are entitled to definitively decide the issue on 
the basis of their own personal skill, experience or method of testing as, for instance, 
whether natural cassia oil has been adulterated, wine is of the stated vintage or that the 
quality of coffee beans or Ceylon tea meets stipulated standards. This form or arbitration 
is best known in the United Kingdom and is little used in South Africa.107 
All the alternative arbitral forms described above deviate considerably from the 
conventional model of arbitration yet remain derivative extensions of that same model 
since their essential arbitral qualities have been retained. What distinguishes each 
alternative arbitral form from the other as well as from the general model, is the manner 
and the extent to which the disputants have by their mutual consent adapted the arbitral 
process to suit the needs of the circumstances of a particular type of dispute or have 
streamlined the process so as to save time and expense. In order to achieve these 
objectives, one or more of the following processual adjustments need to be effected, 
namely-
(a) 
(b) 
105 
106 
107 
either curtailing or dispensing with the pre-hearing stage; 
abbreviating the hearing or abolishing it altogether; 
See Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 197-201 for a detailed description of 
documents-only arbitration. See also Rowland Arbitration 66-67. 
Quality arbitration is the term used by Parris Arbitration 94 which is commonly 
referred to as "look-sniff' arbitration or sometimes ''taste-look" arbitration, as the 
case maybe. 
See, further, Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 201; Parris Arbitration 94-105; 
Rowland Arbitration 67-68. 
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(c) modifying or totally disregarding the rules of evidence; 
(d) increasing the degree of the arbitrator's control of and participation in the 
arbitral process; and 
(e) altering the decisional style of the award. 
Once again, what is illustrated, is the inherent flexibility of the process of arbitration not 
only to adapt itself to the substance of a dispute but, in the present instance, to modify its 
process to accommodate the particular demands of specific types of disputes. However, 
although the arbitration process might be versatile, it is not malleable since an 
alternative arbitral form adheres in every instance to the core principles that give 
expression to the norms and values of the primary arbitral model. 
7 .5 Arbitral norms and values 
Of all three primary processes, arbitration is the most complex because it is based on 
the principle of adjudicative decision making in contrast to the consensual decisional 
structure of negotiation and mediation. Consensual decision making by its very nature 
reserves the competence to determine the outcome of a dispute to the disputants 
themselves whereas adjudicative decision making relies on the imposition of an outcome 
by a third-party neutral. The move is one from a simplex to a complex decisional 
structure. 
The complexity of adjudicative decision making lies in the various forms, functions and 
limits of adjudication which in turn are influenced by the extent of the power vested in the 
adjudicator, the social purpose and context of the adjudication itself, the processual 
methods of conducting the adjudication and lastly, the quality of an adjudicated outcome. 
In the case of court-based adjudication, these variables are basically settled - its 
institutionalised norms and values inhibit flexibility which can only be introduced through 
procedural reform. Although arbitration has a co-ordinate relationship in regard to the 
courts, the consensual norms that underlie the process of arbitration instil it with a 
remarkable flexibility that permits pragmatic adaptations of its adjudicative structure, 
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enabling it to assimilate these variables in a variety of arbitral forms 108 and to modify its 
functions in relation to different social contexts.109 
Precisely because arbitral authority is derived from a private and not a public source, it is 
governed by norms and values that promote expertise, processual flexibility, expedited 
decision making and collaboration engendered by economic self-interest. Historically, 
these values originate in the consensual foundations of the law of contract in 
combination with the need of the interdependent business community to resolve 
disputes among it members by means of expedient and binding adjustments, which 
otherwise would threaten cohesiveness and jeopardise dealings in good faith on account 
of litigious wrangling. Although the forms, functions and contexts of arbitration have 
since changed, the contemporary notion of arbitration still advances it as an alternative 
adjudicatory process that has the potential for achieving procedural pragmatism as well 
as expedient and lasting solutions while simultaneously fostering responsibility for the 
self-determination of disputes. 
This leads back to the initial question which so far has only been partially answered: is 
the process of arbitration a misfit in the general context of the system of ADR?110 By 
comparison to the other primary processes, the functional role of arbitration within the 
system of ADR provides processual solutions that the other primary processes cannot 
offer. In contradistinction with the other primary processes, arbitration facilitates the 
establishment of a neutral, private and specialised forum, satisfies the need for stability 
and predictability of the related outcome and provides a fair process that culminates in a 
definitive and final adjustment of a dispute that is judicially enforceable.111 Over and 
above these instrumentalist considerations, there is the overriding principle of disputant 
autonomy which gives the process of arbitration a quality of fle:xibility112 and endows it 
108 See, further, 7.4 above. 
109 See, further, 7.3 above. 
110 See, further, 7.1 above. 
111 Carbonneau Alternative Dispute Resolution 137. 
112 Butler and Finsen Arbitration in SA 22; Finsen "The case for arbitration" 636. 
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with a reservoir of norms and values that are intrinsically consensual in nature. As in the 
case of other ADR processes, these primary characteristics empower disputants to 
manage their own dispute outside the constraints of the court system. 
However, in the final analysis, because arbitration has been integrated within the system 
of ADR, a shift of emphasis has occurred. The prominence of arbitration in its 
conventional form is being undermined as alternative arbitral forms have developed and 
are applied in a variety of contexts. This does not imply that conventional arbitration is 
being relegated to the background. Certainly conventional arbitration still serves a useful 
purpose in regard to certain types of disputes. But, more important than this, its norms 
and values that have proved to be so resilient in the past, establish the basis for the 
modern development of other arbitral forms and their application in substantive areas of 
dispute that extend beyond the traditional ambit of conventional arbitration. Stripped of 
its conventional trappings, arbitral dispute resolution is now being recognised as a 
meaningful method of problem solving113 which is a feature common to all ADR 
processes, with this exception, that in this instance, the method of problem solving is 
based on an alternative adjudicatory ethic. Given these considerations, it is 
inconceivable that the process of arbitration should be excluded as a primary ADR 
process. 
113 See, further, 7 .2.3 above. 
CHAPTER 8 
THE HYBRID PROCESSES 
8.1 Hybridisation of the primary processes 
8.2 Classification of the hybrid processes 
8.3 Descriptive analysis 
8.3.1 The litigation/arbitration combination 
8.3.2 The litigation/negotiation combination 
8.3.3 The mediation/arbitration combination 
8.4 The processual quality of the hybrid processes 
8.1 Hybridisation of the primary processes 
Adherence to convention and procedural formality emanating from its institutionalised 
nature, account for the inflexibility of court-based adjudication as it is expressed through 
the process of litigation. Rigidity is so ingrained that it is only by means of procedural 
reform that any meaningful change can be effected. By comparison, the primary 
processes of negotiation, mediation and arbitration are characterised by an inherent 
flexibility. These processes have never been nor ever will be in need of reform because, 
unlike legal process, they have not been devised to conform to institutionalised 
requirements aimed at the public ordering of society. As informal dispute resolution 
mechanisms, the primary processes are woven into the fabric of society and as social 
patterns change in every age, so too, have these processes adapted to meet the 
demands of that change. 
There is no need to turn to history to prove this point. The contemporary modification 
and extension of the scope of the primary processes through the direct influence of the 
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system of ADR, 1 illustrates their adaptability. Over the past two decades there have 
been a spate of textbooks and journal articles in all fields of the social sciences on the 
subject of negotiation; the process of mediation is being applied in contexts that were 
never traditionally envisaged and, as an informal yet legally recognised dispute 
resolution mechanism, the scope of the process of arbitration has been extended 
through the creation of its derivatives. 2 No conscious reform was needed. The informal 
nature of the primary processes makes them naturally susceptible to change. Apart from 
these developments, flexibility is so intrinsic to the primary processes that the present 
generation has seen how the structural elements of one primary process have been 
compounded with those of another private or public process to form hybrid processes 
that were unknown to previous generations. 
The primary processes were borrowed by the system of ADR but the hybrid processes 
are original to that system. The development of the hybrid processes confirm not only 
the flexibility of the primary processes but especially the creativity stimulated by the 
system of ADR to match a dispute with an appropriate dispute resolution process. 
However, although basically flexible, each primary process is restricted by the form and 
limits of its processual functions. For instance, as a form of third-party intervention, 
mediation provides intermediary assistance to facilitate a settlement by negotiation but 
cannot guarantee a settlement or, if a settlement is reached, that the outcome will be 
binding. By the same token, although the outcome of an arbitral award is binding, that 
outcome is achieved by means of an adjudicative and not a consensual method of 
dispute processing. In order to accommodate disputants who need the certainty of a 
binding decision within the context of a consensual method of dispute processing, the 
fundamental assumptions and methodology of the process of mediation have been 
combined with the finality of an arbitral award by means of the development of a hybrid 
process known as mediation/arbitration.3 Mediation/arbitration is but one example of the 
manner in which various elements of the primary processes have been hybridised. Many 
other mixed processes have been and are being developed by similar methods. 
See, further, 3.1 above. 
2 See, further, 7.4 above. 
3 For mediation/arbitration, see 8.3.3 below. 
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The system of ADR has given impetus to the creation of hybrid processes. It has 
provided a framework within which pragmatic extra-curial settlements can be achieved 
by creating new dispute resolution processes, that are tailored both to meet the needs of 
the disputants and to realistically match the nature of the dispute. The various 
processual components of the primary processes provide a rich source of material for 
experimentation. The elements of private processes may be combined with public 
processes; investigatory aspects of fact determination that is a distinctive feature of 
adjudicative processes may linked to the methodologies of consensual processes; the 
non-binding outcome of consensual processes may be grafted onto adjudicative 
processes that render a binding decision and vice versa; the opportunity to present proof 
on evidence so characteristic of adjudicatory processes may be integrated with 
consensual processes and lastly, the role of the third-party neutral may be adapted to be 
less or more interventionist than would normally be the case. The amalgamation of the 
elements of two or more primary processes has led to the creation of a variety of hybrid 
process, to name only those that have gained general recognition: rent-a-judge, the 
mini-trial, the summary jury trial, early neutral evaluation and mediation-arbitration. Not 
all these processes are familiar within the South African context, but they are 
nevertheless treated in the hope that they will be received into our system. 
A notable feature of the hybrid processes is that they have been structured to facilitate 
dispute processing mainly within the corporate and commercial sectors. A variety of 
reasons have converged to make to the hybrid processes popular within these sectors. 
Commercial contracts, especially in the construction industry, contain complicated 
technical detail relating to performance, the subject matter of these contracts often 
relates to complex matters of science and technology, the risk variables are very high as 
is the value of the contracts, very often the duration extends over a period of years and 
lastly, the performance of the contract is often dependent upon the co-operation of a 
number of interested parties whose functions and duties must be interfaced for the 
proper management of the contract. A prime example would be that of an Eskom 
contract for the construction of a power station which requires the management of up to 
700 sub-contractors, not to mention the functions of professionals such as architects, 
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quantity surveyors, engineers and project managers. 4 Because of the risks involved, 
disputes and disputing are inevitable. Disputes that are not controlled by efficient 
management· could seriously diminish profits. For this reason, effective and speedy 
dispute resolution processes are required. The emergence of the system of ADR has 
stimulated inventiveness in this regard and in many respects explains the creation of the 
hybrid processes. A new management style is in the making. The traditional approach 
regards disputes as being an irritating intrusion that should be managed by in-house 
lawyers or legal professionals. This approach is fast changing as literature on dispute 
management recommends that disputes and their settlement are the direct concern of 
management and are just as important as the other components of project 
management. 5 
A characteristic of all the hybrid processes is that their creation has been prompted by 
expediency. The source material is accordingly either anecdotal or based on 
instrumentalist descriptions and pragmatic considerations, with little consideration being 
given to analysis based on processual theory. Yet, this in itself does not justify the 
outright rejection of the hybrid processes as lacking in processual authenticity. Although 
tenuous·at this stage of their development, the hybrid processes have the latent potential 
to become mature informal processes precisely because they are composed of 
recognised processual elements of the primary processes. Even though the hybrid 
processes are the product of ad hoc experiments, their development does not occur in 
isolation. The future development of the hybrid processes must inevitably occur within 
the broader processual framework of the primary processes. For this reason alone, the 
hybrid processes should be nurtured as the fledglings of the system of ADR. 
Another feature common to the hybrid processes is that the nature and scope of the 
dispute that they address is far more specified and narrowed by comparison to those 
resolved by means of the primary processes. For instance, the mini-trial has been 
developed to resolve disputes between major corporations and which involve claims of 
4 
5 
See Baird "NEC: a new approach" 26. 
See Green "Corporate ADR" 228-229; Hemy and Liebennan The Manager's 
Guide to Resolving Legal Disputes 2 95-96. 
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an extraordinary high amount. Likewise, mediation-arbitration is specifically associated 
with labour disputes. This particular attribute of the hybrid processes possibly represents 
a trend in the development of the system of ADR. Within the system of ADR, the scope 
of the primary processes has already been expanded into different fields of application. 
These processes have also been extended in their ambit by means of the creation of 
derivative forms. The development of the hybrid processes probably indicates a shift 
towards streamlining informal dispute resolution mechanisms by devising custom-made 
processes to deal with specific types of disputes. If this is the case, then the movement 
towards devising hybrid processes should be encouraged since their development would 
give vitality, impetus and authenticity to the system of ADR. 
The concept of a hybrid process is not particularly novel. The ombudsman is historically 
the forerunner of the ADR hybrids. In its original form, the ombudsman had very little to 
do with ADR since it was developed in the Scandinavian countries. In the classic 
Scandinavian model, the ombudsman6 is a respected public official who functions 
independently and outside the judicial system with the express purpose of investigating 
citizen complaints regarding maladministration by public bodies, but does not include the 
competence to give a binding decision.7 As process, the ombudsman combines the 
functions of mediation and fact determination inherent in the process of adjudication. 
The notion of a hybrid process is therefore not unique to the system of ADR. However, 
the existence of a precedent of a hybrid process lends credibility to the creation of hybrid 
processes under the auspices of the system of ADR. The ombudsman sets a conceptual 
model against which newly created hybrid processes may be appraised and evaluated in 
regard to their functional attributes, efficiency and durability, both in regard to the form of 
6 
7 
In gender-neutral terms, the ombudsman is referred to as the ombuds or 
ombudsperson: Singer Settling Disputes 25. 
Singer Setling Disputes 25. The Ombudsman Act 118 of 1979 was modelled on 
these conventional principles. See also Dlamini "An ombudsman for SA" 71; 
Mireku 'The relationship between the courts and the ombudsman" 529. It should 
be noted that the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 ss 
110-113 provides for the appointment, powers and functions of a national public 
protector and s 114 authorises the appointment of provincial public protectors. 
The role of the public protector is based conceptually on the model of the 
ombudsman. See also text to notes 9 and 1 O below for adapted models of the 
ombudsman. 
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process and its outcome. Moreover, as a conceptual model, the ombudsman also 
teaches that hybrid processes are highly flexible and easily adapted to a variety of 
situations. For instance, in the United States the ombudsman is a company official who 
holds a neutral position in the corporate structure and whose only function is to conduct 
grievance procedures in respect of disputes among employees by means of informal 
counselling, mediation and sometimes, investigation and recommendations to 
management.8 Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the role and function of the ombudsman 
has been adapted to deal with consumer complaints within the banking industry.9 
Conceivably, once they have become established, the ADR hybrids will be adapted or 
modified to meet situations other than those for which they were originally devised. 
Although the ADR hybrids have not as yet established themselves as generally 
recognised informal processes, they should be assessed as processes in the making 
that supplement the primary ADR processes. In so doing, they extend the ambit of the 
system of ADR itself. Against this background, the description and analysis of the hybrid 
processes that follow, should be evaluated. Every attempt has been made to ensure 
accuracy. Understandably, this might not always be achieved because the hybrid 
processes are presently processually unstable. The source material is at times 
contradictory both in respect of terminology and the substance of these processes. 
8.2 Classification of the hybrid processes 
Precisely because the hybrid processes are as yet immature forms of process and 
hence processually inconsistent, any classification of these processes is fraught with 
problems. In the first place, any such classification is premature considering the 
development that still needs to occur for the hybrid processes to acquire the processual 
regularity and uniformity that is characteristic of established forms of process. Perhaps, 
because of their inherent adaptability, the hybrid processes might never stabilise. It is 
also possible that some of these processes might eventually be discarded as having 
8 
9 
Green "Corporate ADR" 228; Henry and Liebennan Manager's Guide to 
Resolving Legal Disputes 109-112; Singer Settling Disputes 103-105. 
Birds and Graham "ADR: financial services" 123-130. 
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been merely ad hoc experiments that do not merit universal application. But these are 
issues that will be clarified only in the future. Be that as it may, on the basis of present 
knowledge there is sufficient published literature, albeit tentative, to justify the 
compilation of a classification on the understanding that at this stage it is preliminary and 
possibly even incomplete. 
A second problem is methodological in its nature. A classification of the primary 
processes is a relatively simple matter by comparison to that of the hybrid processes. 
Although the primary processes are informal, they are also established and universally 
recognised processes. On the other hand, the hybrid processes are not only informal but 
novel in regard to the combinations of the various elements of the primary processes out 
of which they have been created. Consequently, it is possible to relate the primary 
processes to the general body of procedural principles for the purposes of classification 
whereas, in respect of the hybrid processes, classification must necessarily relate to the 
principles governing the primary processes since it is from an amalgam of these 
principles, that the hybrid processes were devised in the first place. A classification of 
the FORM of the hybrid processes is therefore subsidiary to a classification of the form 
of the primary processes. 
The issue of form leads on to the next which relates to the method of classifying the 
substantive elements of the hybrid processes. The substance of a process may be 
classified either according to its function, characteristics, or by means of comparison. 
These considerations have already been treated in some detail in a previous chapter 
that deals with the classification of the primary processes.10 However, because of the 
novelty of the hybrid processes, considerations that relate to the classification of the 
substantive elements of the primary processes do not apply equally to those for the 
classification of the hybrid processes. Classification according to function is premature at 
this stage and a classification by means of a comparison would be quite futile because 
the hybrid processes have been tailor-made to suit the circumstance of a particular type 
of dispute and to meet the specific needs of disputants. Contrary to the method of 
10 See 4.2 above. 
TABLE 2 - SYSTEMATIC CLASSIFICATION OF HYBRID PROCESSES 
Voluntary Voluntary Coercive Coercive Voluntary Voluntary 
Private - except when Private Public Public Private Private 
enforcement sought 
Presentation of proofs Presentation of Presentation of Determination of Consensual/ Adjudicative/ 
and arguments "best case" summary proofs pre-trial issues adjudicative consensual 
and arguments 
Party-selected private Party-selected Mock jury Senior lawyer as a Mediator/ Adjudicator/ 
adjudicator with neutral advisor empaneled by private evaluator adjudicator, party mediator, party 
legal/retired acumen, court selected selected I~ normally judge or 
lawyer 
Statutory procedure but Informal and Procedural rules Pocedural rules Informal and non- Formal but not 
very flexible regarding procedural rules set fixed but less fixed but less adversarial/ formal necessarily tech-
time, venue and by parties formal than formal than trial but not necessarily nlcal or adver-
procedures adjudication process technical or sarial/ informal 
adversarial and non-
adversarial 
Legal representation I Legal repre- Legal Legal Self-representation Legal 
sentation or self- res presentation/ representation/ /legal presentation representation or 
representation; litigants must be litigants must be self-
present present representation 
Principled decision, I Agreement I Advisory verdict Advisory opinion Consensual agreement or arbitral award 
sometimes supported 
by finding of fact and 
conclusions of law 
Contractually Non-binding Non-binding or binding 
binding 
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classification of the primary processes, at this stage the best method for classifying the 
substantive elements of the hybrid processes would be on the grounds of their basic 
characteristics. The added advantage of adopting this approach is that it builds onto an 
existing classification of the characteristics of the hybrid processes.11 
In the light of the above, the classification contained in table 2 below is based on the 
form and characteristics of the selected hybrid processes. The horizontal gradient 
classifies the hybrid processes according to their FORM and the vertical gradient 
contains a classification according their individual CHARACTERISTICS.12 
8.3 Descriptive analysis 
8.3.1 The litigation/arbitration combination 
Alternative processes apply outside the system of public dispute resolution. However, 
there is one notable exception. Functioning within the system of public dispute 
resolution, the rent-a-judge process offers an intra-curial alternative to the process of 
litigation. 
The term "rent-a-judge" succinctly explains an essential quality of this process. By 
mutual agreement, the disputants may avoid litigation through the appointment of a 
private judge who essentially conducts a process of private litigation. Yet the term "rent-
a-judge" is not altogether satisfactory. It is actually a journalistic expression that was first 
coined by the Wall Street Journal13 to replace the term "trial by reference". The latter 
11 
12 
13 
See Goldberg, Sander and Rogers Dispute Resolution 5. Their table is for the 
sake of convenience included at the end of this chapter and marked annexure A 
for the purpose of identification. The original version of this table first appeared in 
Green ''Theory and practice of dispute resolution" 257. See also Green "Private 
resolution of civil disputes" 14. 
The information contained in the vertical gradient has been adapted from the 
table contained in Goldberg, Sander and Rogers Dispute Resolution 5. See, 
further, note 11 above and annexure A included at the end of this chapter. 
See Henry and Lieberman The Manager's Guide to Resolving Legal Disputes 
75; Singer Settling Disputes 59. 
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term is historically and technically more correct because it refers to the general 
reference procedure contained in the civil procedural codes of all American states, with 
the exception of Illinois and Louisiana.14 However, the rent-a-judge experiment was 
based directly on the provisions of the California Code of Civil Procedure of 1872 that 
provides that a court may upon the agreement of both parties order a general reference 
for a trial of all matters of fact and law.15 In 1976, the forgotten statute was discovered 
and re-interpreted in the context of the system of ADR as a means of providing an 
alternative method of solving the burgeoning case load in the state of California, vvhich at 
the time was reaching drastic proportions. 16 
The other term used to describe the rent-a-judge process is that of "private judging". 
Although this term aptly indicates that the process rests on the appointment of a private 
judge, "private judging" raises semantic problems if the process of arbitration is brought 
into consideration. More so than the "rent-a-judge process, arbitration is an established 
and legally recognised form of private adjudication. Because the divide between vvhat is 
called "private judging" and arbitration is so tenuous, it is advisable to keep the terms 
analytically distinct so as to avoid confusion. Technically it would be far better to retain 
the term "trial by reference" but unfortunately journalese has popularised the phrase 
"rent-a-judge". No matter how crass the term "rent-a-judge" might seem, it ought to be 
retained to prevent any confusion that might ensue from the use of the word "private 
judging". The term "rent-a-judge" is therefore used in this work and should be construed 
to include any reference to "private judging" or "trial by reference". 
14 
15 
16 
For a summaiy of the various types of reference procedures in the United States, 
see Note "The California rent-a-judge experiment" 1594-1597. 
See Coulson "Private settlement for the public good" 7; Green "Corporate ADR" 
256; Herron "Rent-a-judge" 52; Note "The California rent-a-judge experiment" 
1597. 
Coulson "Private settlement for the public good" 7; Gnaizda "Secret justice for a 
privileged few'' 6; Green "Corporate ADR" 260; Green "Private resolution of civil 
disputes" 17; Heniy and Lieberman The Manager's Guide to Resolving Legal 
Disputes 75. 
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On account of the fact that the rent-a-judge process was originally based on the rather 
liberal provisions of the California general reference procedure, 17 these provisions will 
be used to establish a basic processual model.18 Upon the application of both parties, 
the court (known as the presiding court) may appoint a referee to either try all of the 
issues in the action, whether of fact or of law, and accordingly enter a judgment or 
appoint a special referee to a special reference limited to ascertaining a particular fact or 
set of facts.19 The referee is not required to have any special qualifications.20 Upon being 
appointed, the referee has all the powers of a judge, except the contempt povver and the 
competence to appoint a referee.21 A reference can be obtained at any time, even prior 
to the filing of a complaint or just before the trial by a court of law.22 The trial can be 
heard at any convenient venue, the trial date may be set by the mutual agreement of the 
parties and the general public may be excluded from the proceedings.23 The procedure 
at the trial may be based on conventional court proceedings or the more informal 
procedures of arbitration.24 Witnesses may be called and sworn, but if the parties so 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
See the California Code of Civil Procedure ss 638-645. 
Although the Californian code is used as a basic model, it should be emphasised 
that the reference procedure is a common procedural mechanism in other Anglo-
American systems of civil procedure. For instance, in the United Kingdom, RSC 
Ord 36 regulates a limited form of the general reference procedure; in Australia, 
for example, the NSW Supreme Court Rules rule 72 and the Victoria Supreme 
Court Rules order 50 provide for a general form of the reference procedure. The 
South African model is contained in the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 s 19bis 
which provides for a special reference procedure. What is evident is that in 
theory there is scope for such reference procedures to be manipulated by astute 
lawyers so as to convert them into a rent-a-judge process. 
California Code of Civil Procedures 638(1)-(2). See also Green "Corporate ADR" 
258; Note "The California rent-a-judge experiment" 1597 n 19. 
s 640. See also Green "Corporate ADR" 258; Note "The California rent-a-judge 
experiment" 1597. 
Green "Corporate ADR" 258. 
Green "Corporate ADR" 257; Note ''The California rent-a-judge experiment" 
1597. 
Green "Corporate ADR" 257; Note ''The California rent-a-judge experiment" 
1598. 
Green "Corporate ADR" 257. 
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agree, the evidence need not be reported or recorded.25 The referee's subsequent report 
must consist of findings of fact and conclusions of law that must be stated separately.26 
The findings of the referee are treated as being the equivalent of the findings of the 
presiding court and are just as conclusive as any other final judgment of a court of law.27 
Accordingly, the right to appeal is preserved.28 As at 1985, there were ten states using 
the trial by reference procedure, of which California and New York have particularly 
liberal rules. 29 
As an alternative dispute resolution mechanism functioning within the ambit of the court 
system, the rent-a-judge process is an attractive adjudicative option. It eliminates the 
disadvantages attached to both litigation and arbitration yet synthesises the positive 
aspects of both these processes. An important advantage is that the judge is privately 
appointed rather than randomly imposed. 30 As in the case of arbitration, the principle of 
party selection permits the appointment of an adjudicator on the basis of known 
expertise in a specialist field so as to match the complexity of the dispute. This in itself 
saves the time normally spent during a conventional trial in explaining highly technical 
detail with which the court is unfamiliar31 and generally, enhances the credibility of the 
process. 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
Idem. 
s 644. See also Green "Corporate ADR" 257; Note 'The California rent-a-judge 
experiment" 1598. 
s 644. See also Green "Corporate ADR" 257; Note ''the California rent-a-judge 
experiment" 1598. 
Green "Corporate ADR" 257; Note 'The California rent-a-judge experiment" 
1598-1599. 
Henry and Lieberman The Manager's Guide to Resolving Legal Disputes 75. 
Banks "ADR: a return to basics" 57 4; Green "Corporate ADR" 258; Herron "Rent-
a-judge" 53; Note 'The California rent-a-judge experiment" 1599. 
Fulton Commercial ADR 121; Henry and Lieberman The Manager's Guide to 
Resolving Legal Disputes 76; Note 'The California rent-a-judge experiment" 
1599. 
243 
Flexibility of procedure is another important advantage. 32 In California, where a 
permissive approach has been adopted, the disputants may design the rules of 
procedure and evidence to meet their specific needs, that is if they wish to waive the 
general rules of procedure that are applicable.33 This is not particularly innovative since 
the same applies in regard to arbitration. However, other than in the case of arbitration, 
undue leniency is counter-balanced by the fact that the referee is obliged to apply 
substantive law and the judgment is subject to appeal. On the other hand, in certain 
other states, the referee is bound to follow the prescribed rules of procedure and 
evidence. 34 
Another favourable aspect of the rent-a-judge process is the confidentiality that it affords. 
The only information that is made public is the referee's findi!1QS of facts or conclusions 
of law that are submitted in a report to the presiding court or details that are contained in 
the record if the referee's decision is taken on appeal. For the rest, the disputants are 
spared the publicity of conventional litigation: public attendance at the rent-a-judge 
proceedings may be restricted and testimony or exhibits that are normally of public 
record, remain private. The element of confidentiality alone is in certain cases a primary 
reason for the selection of the rent-a-judge process. The privacy in which the process is 
conducted is an effective means of avoiding negative media coverage, preserving the 
secrecy of evidence relating to intimat~ personal disclosures or trade secrets as well as 
safeguarding the exclusiveness of certain business methods. 35 
Irrespective of any these advantages, there is one that overshadows all: the rent-a-judge 
process retains the conventional stability of institutionalised proceedings but discards 
the related technicalities and formalities that retard the progress of customary litigation 
and accordingly increase the transactional costs involved. In functional terms, the rent-a-
judge process is characterised by its speed, convenience, predictability of proceedings 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Banks "ADR: a return to basics" 574. 
Green "Corporate ADR" 259. 
Henry and Liebennan The Manager's Guide to Resolving Legal Disputes 75; 
Leeson and Johnston Dispute Resolution in America 22. 
See also Green "Corporate ADR" 259. 
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and certainty of a timeous outcome. 36 Unlike the disputants committed to conventional 
litigation who have little control over the scheduling of a trial date or the rendering of a 
judgment, the rent-a-judge participants may exercise uninhibited party-control over these 
aspects. The date of the trial is set by the mutual agreement of the parties, the venue 
and its privacy may be arranged, convenient times for the hearings may be determined 
and in certain instances, even the period within which the referee must submit the report 
of his findings,37 is prescribed.38 In many respects these features of the rent-a-judge 
process resemble the process of arbitration. This may be so, but the rent-a-judge 
process has the added advantage that the disputants are also assured of a legally 
binding decision that is subject to appeal within the traditional court structure. In contrast, 
the process of arbitration only provides a contractually binding decision (if it is not made 
an order of court) in the form of an award that need not be reasoned and which is final 
since it may only be set aside on the narrow grounds for review.39 
Ostensibly, the reference procedure contained in the Californian code and for that 
matter, even other versions of the reference procedure,40 are normal civil procedural 
mechanisms that are integrated within the procedural structure of the court systems 
involved. As purely a procedural mechanism, the reference procedure is far removed 
from the systematics of ADR. Yet, the interpretation of the Californian model of the 
reference procedure within the context of ADR has altered its procedural purpose to 
such an extent that its contemporary application as the rent-a-judge process, is quite 
different from its original intent. 41 Although being highly localised, the re-interpretation of 
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Coulson "Private settlement for the public good" 7 explains the probable origin of 
the Californian reference procedure as follows: ''This process was authorized by 
state law in 1872, probably to facilitate the resolution of property line disputes, 
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the Californian reference procedure has become the most renowned example of the 
rent-a-judge process that sets a precedent for the conversion of reference procedures in 
other jurisdictions. The upshot is that the rather innocuous and often neglected reference 
procedure now poses serious institutional considerations when re-interpreted as the 
rent-a-judge process within the ambit of ADR.42 By comparison to other ADR processes 
that are essentially extra-curial alternatives, the rent-a-judge process represents a 
pragmatic intra-curial alternative to litigation that in fact makes the ADR/litigation 
dichotomy extremely actual. 
The rationale underlying the conversion of the a reference procedure into the rent-a-
judge process is the grafting of the private elements of arbitration onto the public 
attributes of judicial proceedings. The combination of the elements of arbitration and 
litigation is not particularly topical because arbitration and litigation have survived for 
centuries as co-ordinate dispute resolution processes. At the heart of the problem is the 
hybridisation of the role and function of the arbitrator and the judge. Until the invention of 
the rent-a-judge process, the conventional categorisation of formal adjudicators 
consisted of the judge and the arbitrator. The rent-a-judge process has introduced the 
private judge as a third category.43 
The designation of a private judge in itself severely contradicts the sacrosanct principles 
originally enunciated in the Act of Settlement of 170044 that have permeated Anglo-
American systems through their unwavering commitment to the independence of the 
judiciary. 45 Central to the concept of judicial independence is the public responsibility of 
42 
43 
44 
45 
but little use was made of it until the late 1970's, when lawyers in Los Angeles, 
facing a lengthy court backlog, began submitting cases to retired judges." 
In the United States, constitutional considerations also fonn part of the debate. In 
particular, are the issues of due process and equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment as well as under the First Amendment in respect of the 
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the judge vvhose role is to interpret and apply the law, impartially and without fear or 
favour, in order to uphold, maintain and extend public norms and standards for the good 
of society as a vvhole.46 One of the implications of judicial independence is that, as public 
functionaries, 47 judges should not hold any other office of profit. 48 With specific reference 
to civil proceedings, litigants are therefore assured that their respective claim or defence 
will be adjudicated independently and impartially by a publicly appointed judge vvho will 
decide the matter in accordance with public principles of substantive law and procedure. 
The crucial question is vvhether a retired judge is exonerated from the public 
responsibility entailed under the principle of judicial independence. To assert that a 
private judge need not honour the principle of judicial independence would cross the role 
of an arbitrator with that of a judge.49 Arl arbitrator's sole mandate is to resolve an 
immediate dispute as it is concisely stated in the arbitration agreement. Apart from the 
46 
47 
48 
49 
of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 ss 96 and 104, the Supreme Court Act 59 of 
1959 ss 10-11 and the Judges' Remuneration and Conditions of Employment 
Act 88of1989, confirm the independence of the judiciary. 
These principles are expressly upheld by the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa Act 200 of 1993 s 96(2)-(3) in the following terms -
"(2) The judiciary shall be independent, impartial and subject only to 
this Constitution and the law. 
(3) No person and no organ of state shall interfere with judicial 
officers in the performance of their functions." 
See, for example, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 
1993 s 104( 1) that states that judges must be frt and proper persons appointed 
by the President on the advice of the Judicial Seivices Commission. 
For instance, this principle is clearty stated in the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 
s 11 : "No judge of the Supreme Court shall without the consent of the Minister 
accept, hold or perform any other office of profrt or receive in respect of any 
seivice any fees, emoluments or other remuneration apart from his salary and 
other allowances which may be payable to him in his capacity as such a judge." 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 s 104(2) read 
with the Judges' Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act 88 of 1989 
guarantees the salary of a judge and that it will not be reduced during 
continuation of office. 
See, for instance, Coulson "Private settlement for the public good" 9-10 in which 
the confusion between the role of an arbitrator and a judge is evident: the author 
argues that a private judge should be subject to rules of conduct but then 
proposes that the rules of ethics of the Association of American Arbitrators 
should bind private judges. 
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duty to adhere to the rules of natural justice, an arbitrator's only responsibility is to the 
disputants with whom he enters into a commercial transaction for the rendering of his 
adjudicative services. 
On the other hand, judicial integrity is maintained by prohibiting judges from holding any 
office of profit. Yet this does not hold true for a private judge whose appointment in the 
first place is based on a commercial relationship with the disputants.50 Proponents of the 
rent-a-judge process ironically argue that judicial integrity of a private judge is 
maintained because of the constraints of "market forces" to which traditional judges are 
not subjected.51 An arbitrator might be sensitive to "market forces" but this should 
certainly not be applicable to a referee, in the guise of a private judge, who functions 
within the structure of the court system. To argue otherwise, would enhance the 
possibility of procedural abuse which the principles of judicial independence were 
designed to prevent. 52 
Another institutional problem raised by the practice of the rent-a-judge process is that it 
confuses the private duties of an arbitrator with the public functions of a judge. Judges 
function within a public and institutionalised structure and their task is, as Fiss puts it 
... not to maximise the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but 
to explicate and give force to values embodied in authoritative texts such as the 
Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord 
with them. 53 
Settlement is therefore not an end in itself. Ultimately, the effect of a judgment does not 
only finalise the dispute between the litigants but also binds third parties by the authority 
of precedent in regard to the likely outcome of similar disputes in the future. 54 By 
contrast, an arbitrator operates in a free market system that places an economic value 
50 
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on adjudicative services. Arbitrators resolve current disputes in a purely commercial 
setting, without any accountability to the public at large; the rules they create bind only 
the disputants and not third parties and hence have no precedential value. 55 The private 
judge acts within a mixture of these functions. In a judicial capacity, the private judge 
gives effect to public norms and legal values and yet the arbitral function tends to 
predominate, because being bound to the disputants in a commercial relationship, her 
task is to settle the immediate dispute without taking cognisance of the rights of third 
parties or in any manner advancing legal doctrine in the form of precedent. 56 
The rent-a-judge process is a viable alternative to litigation, for those who can afford it. 
As a process, it is highly private and confidential, conforms with standards of procedural 
formality, permits party selection of an adjudicator and blends the problem-solving facet 
of arbitration with the procedural guarantees of judicial proceedings. Irrespective of all 
these advantages, as an intra-curial alternative, it competes directly with judicial 
proceedings. The potential danger is that if the rent-a-judge process is allowed 
unrestricted application, it might in retrospect be regarded by history as the first step in 
establishing a dual system of litigation, similar to the co-existence between common-law 
procedure and Chancery procedure in the classical English system of civil procedure. 
8.3.2 The litigation/negotiation combination 
The grafting of the elements of litigation onto those of negotiation at first glance seems 
rather contradictory because each of these processes is situated on opposite ends of the 
dispute resolution continuum. Yet, in practice, this is precisely what has been achieved. 
In the past such a blend would have been unthinkable primarily because dispute 
resolution processes were compartmentalised. As a result, the discontinuities between 
various processes were emphasised. However, under the auspices of the system of 
ADR, the opportunity was created to treat dispute resolution processes integratively. 
Continuities between various processes were accentuated hence making it possible to 
hybridise elements of processes that have conventionally remained isolated from one 
55 Note 'The Californian rent-a-judge experiment" 1611. 
56 Ibid 1612. 
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another. Within this setting, the mini-trial, the summary jury trial and early neutral 
evaluation have been devised. Of the three, the mini-trial is the best recognised since 
the other two are confined to the practice of the United States. The mini-trial will 
accordingly be analysed in detail. Although the summary jury trial and early neutral 
evaluation will be treated in a cursory manner, there is some functional value in doing so 
because both these processes illustrate further extensions of the litigation/negotiation 
combination and might be classified as intra-curial derivatives of the mini-trial. 
The use of the term "mini-trial" is a misnomer because the process it describes has very 
little in common with judicial proceedings.57 However, the use of the term "mini-trial" may 
be justified in one respect, notably because this process imitates the trial procedure as a 
means of communicating information that eventually forms the basis for a negotiated 
settlement. With this in mind, the phrases "information exchange"58 and "structured 
negotiation"59 have been used to describe the mini-trial. Yet, these phrases have made 
no impact probably because the descriptions they contain are far too general. 
The phrase "information exchange" is a salient description of the mini-trial but is not 
sufficiently precise because this is a characteristic of many other alternative processes. 
So too, the phrase "structured negotiation" is a suitable description but unsatisfactory on 
technical grounds because mediation is par excellence a process of structured 
negotiation. This raises the interesting question of whether the mini-trial is an 
independent process or a derivative of the process of mediation. From the description of 
the mini-trial below, similarities with mediation will become evident and indeed, at times, 
mediation proper is one of the methods of maintaining the negotiations should the mini-
trial reach an impasse. However, the matter is academic since the literature shows that 
57 
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alternative to litigatibn" 13; Henry and Lieberman The Manager's Guide to 
Resolving Legal Disputes 25; Mowatt "ADR: some points to ponder'' 48; Rogers 
''Mini-trials - diverting the adversarial instinct" 28. 
Cheney 'The mini-trial option" 161; Henry and Lieberman The Manager's Guide 
to Resolving Legal Disputes 25; Rogers ''Mini-trials - diverting the adversarial 
instinct" 28. · 
See Henry "Mini-trials: an alternative to litigation" 13; Riekert "ADR: quo vadis?" 
33. 
250 
the mini-trial has been consciously devised as an amalgam of the elements of the 
process of litigation and negotiation. Moreover, the term "mini-trial" has become 
entrenched and in fact does figuratively explain the fundamental features of this process. 
A first description of the mini-trial is that it is a business technique used as a managerial 
tool for the efficient determination of inter-corporate disputes.60 By means of the mini-trial 
a legal problem is translated into a business problem mainly because pro-active control 
of the dispute is returned to the executive management of a corporation. The theory and 
principles underlying the mini-trial as well as its processual structure might best be 
explained by means of a example based on the first-ever mini-trial arising out of a 
prolonged dispute between Telecredit Inc and TWR. 
The dispute between Telecredit and TWR arose out a complex set of legal and 
technical facts. Telecredit was the owner of several patents that enabled retail stores to 
control the creditworthiness of its customers who presented credit cards for purchases. 
The company had licensed its patents to several manufacturers and its annual sales 
were in the vicinity of $ 8 million. However, its patents had never been tested in litigation 
with the probable risk that if they were, its patents might be upset. Based on a number of 
indications that TWR had been infringing its patents, Telecredit commenced 
proceedings against TWR claiming damages in the sum of $ 6 million and praying for an 
interdict to prohibit further infringement. 1WR defended the action, alleging that 
Telecredit's patents were invalid. Both companies had a great deal at stake: if 
Telecredit succeeded in its claim, TWR would lose one of its major products and by the 
same token, if TWR's defence was upheld, Telecredit would lose one of its major 
assets. In any event, TWR contested the amount of the damages claimed by Telecredit, 
contending that this amount was disproportionate to the damages allegedly suffered. 
Proceedings were commenced during the latter part of 197 4 and, 30 months later, by 
1977, some 100 000 documents had been exchanged, numerous interrogatories had 
been sent by Telecredit's lawyers to TWR and many of its employees had been 
deposed. TWR had also begun an inordinately active discovery programme aimed at 
60 See Fulton Commercial ADR 111. 
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proving that Telecredit's patents were invalid. In addition, emotions in both camps 
began to run high and each party's ability to trade normally was being severely 
hampered because of the uncertainty of the eventual outcome of the dispute. Telecredit 
proposed that the dispute be put to arbitration. TWR was not convinced that this would 
be the correct method of resolving the dispute because there was some uncertainly as to 
whether a patent dispute was legally arbitrable and was also concerned that an award 
would "split the difference" which would still result in an exceptionally high amount of 
damages being awarded against it. Under these circumstances, TWR's lawyers began 
to negotiate with Telecredit's patent licensing administrator in order to determine a 
procedure that would lead to settlement. Mer many months of preparation, a procedure 
which at the time was known as an "information exchange" was finally conducted within 
a space of two days, based on eight pages of agreed rules. 
A vigorous discovery programme was conducted over a limited period of six weeks. 
Thereafter, the hearing commenced at a private venue. The tribunal consisted of a 
neutral advisor as well as the executive officer of the respective companies who both 
had an unrestricted mandate to settle. The parties were represented by their attorneys. 
Each party was permitted four hours to make presentations followed by a 90-minute 
reply by the opposite party and a period of 30 minutes for rebuttal. Mer each stage of 
the process, the neutral advisor gave a summary of where the case stood. Because the 
presentations were restricted to a total of 12 hours, each side was forced to present its 
"best case".61 With a clear understanding of the factual and legal difficulties faced on 
both sides, the company executive officers met privately and within 30 minutes had 
reached a working agreement that materialised as a formal agreement several months 
later.62 
61 
62 
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Although the account of the mini-trial between Telecredit and TWR is purely anecdotal, 
it does portray important elements of the process. In the first place, it illustrates that the 
mini-trial has a definite internal processual structure. Two general stages are identified: 
an information exchange and settlement negotiations.63 The information exchange 
seems to predominate. The accent tends to be on the litigation component. Yet, in the 
final analysis, it is of subsidiary importance. The only purpose of the abbreviated trial 
process is to facilitate settlement negotiations on the basis of an information exchange of 
each disputant's interpretation of the facts in dispute and their arguments on legal 
issues. The settlement negotiations between the company executive officers are the 
climax of the mini-trial. Because of the information exchange, the company executive 
officers are fully informed, possibly for the first time, of the factual and legal issues, the 
strengths and weaknesses of each party's case, the moral legitimacy of an opponent's 
claims and ultimately, the basis for a potential settlement and its implications.64 
None of this occurs in a haphazard fashion. Underlying both stages is a structure that 
consists of definitive processual steps.65 The process commences when the disputants 
mutually agree to resolve their dispute by means of a mini-trial. This underpins the 
voluntary nature of the process. In addition, rules of conduct are jointly devised by the 
disputants.66 The disputants must also by mutual agreement appoint a neutral advisor 
and ensure the presence of the senior executives on both sides who must have the 
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authority to settle.67 The neutral advisor and the senior executives form the panel for the 
purposes of the mini-trial. The senior executives must be in attendance during both the 
information exchange and. settlement negotiation stages.68 During the information 
exchange, the neutral advisor must be in attendance to decide on questions of 
procedure and to advise the party representatives when requested to do so.69 Prior to 
the information exchange, the disputants must deliver to each other written summaries of 
the issues relating to their respective cases along with copies of all documents that will 
be presented during the information exchange.70 Discovery must also take place in the 
manner agreed upon by the disputants.71 Rules of evidence may be waived but the 
disputants may prior to the information exchange agree to a limited application of these 
rules that will be enforced by the neutral advisor.72 Legal counsel represents each 
disputant during the information exchange; the function of counsel is to ·prepare and 
present each disputant's "best case".73 Once the information exchange has been 
concluded, the senior executive officers meet privately and in good faith, to voluntarily 
settle the dispute.74 Should a settlement not be reached, the neutral advisor must then 
render an advisory opinion regarding the likely outcome of the dispute in a court of law; 
this opinion ought to identrfy issues of law and fact that would expeditiously dispose of 
the dispute and reasons for the opinion must be offered. 75 On the basis of the neutral 
advisor's opinion, the senior executive officers must meet for a second time in an attempt 
to settle the matter. If a settlement cannot be reached, the proceedings may be 
abandoned or written offers of settlement may be submitted to the neutral advisor who in 
67 
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turn will make recommendations for settlement in terms of these offers.76 In this latter 
respect, the neutral advisor will be cast into a mediational role. The mini-trial will be 
terminated should the neutral advisor's recommendations be rejected.77 The mini-trial 
proceedings are confidential and no written document or oral statement used during any 
part of the process may be used in evidence at any subsequent proceedings. 78 The 
neutral advisor's fee and expenses must be paid by both disputants and each disputant 
will bear his own costs, including legal fees, incurred in connection with the mini-trial.79 
The description of the process for the mini-trial confirms what has been already stated: 
the mini-trial reduces the complexity of legal issues into a managerial problem. During 
the information exchange, trial skills are employed as a business technique to determine 
with clinical precision the issues in dispute. This is not an end in itself. In the final 
instance, during the settlement negotiation stage, the senior executive officers interpret 
the information so exchanged in the light of the related legal implications, but more 
importantly, according to managerial objectives as defined by corporate policy. Although 
inextricably interconnected, the point of focus is not so much on the simulation of the 
litigation process but rather on the negotiation of a settlement. The object of the mini-trial 
is therefore problem solving through negotiation and not, as in the case of the trial 
process, competitive persuasion to ensure a winning position out of a binary adjudicative 
outcome. 
From the perspective of the business sector, the mini-trial has a number of advantages. 
As an extra-curial alternative, the mini-trial has sufficient flexibility to be adapted to the 
particular circumstances of a dispute. As process, it is also cost effective because it 
overcomes the tardiness of the trial process yet is capable of attaining a pragmatic 
decision in a private and confidential setting.80 These advantages are subject to one 
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major disadvantage which is that the disclosure of a disputant's "best case" could give 
the other disputant a tactical advantage in subsequent proceedings, should the mini-trial 
fail. This problem is not particular to the mini-trial, but is a weakness of all alternative 
extra-curial processes.81 
The mini-trial is certainly a unique hybrid process. It is comparable to arbitration, 
especially in its expedited form, in regard to its expediency and processual swiftness.82 
But the comparison goes no further. Unlike arbitration, the mini-trial is not bound by the 
same procedural formalities nor is there the prospect of a binding adjudicative decision. 
Neither is it subject to any legislative regulation. On the other hand, the mini-trial also 
has the attributes of the process of mediation.83 Both are consensual processes. The 
functions of the neutral advisor can be associated with those of a mediator. Moreover, 
like mediation, the mini-trial is essentially another form of structured negotiation. 
However, on technical grounds, the mini-trial is quite different to the process of 
mediation. The processual structure of the mini-trial distinguishes it from the process of 
mediation. The outcome of the mini-trial is the product of independent decision making 
that is achieved without the intermediary intervention of a neutral third party, unless this 
is expressly requested in extreme cases where the parties reach a deadlock. Moreover, 
the capacity of the neutral advisor to intervene is restricted. In brief, the neutral advisor 
controls the conduct of the process of the mini-trial but not the process itself as it is 
devised and prescribed in advance by the mutual agreement of the parties. By 
comparison to mediation, the mini-trial is a highly structured form of negotiation that 
functions on the basis of pre-prepared rules of conduct that are external to the process 
itself. 
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The mini-trial is therefore not a derivative of the processes of either arbitration or 
mediation. It has the standing of an independent process: it contains an internal 
structure which, though externally flexible, is processually consistent; its conduct is 
dependent on predetermined rules and it is capable of achieving a non-binding outcome 
that is pragmatic and expedient. The independence of the mini-trial is also confirmed by 
the fact that it is the model for other litigation/negotiation hybrids, namely, the summary 
jury trial and early neutral evaluation. 
The summary jury trial and early neutral evaluation also follow the broad processual 
structure of the mini-trial in that both consist of an information exchange stage and a 
settlement negotiation stage. Apart from structural similarities, the summary jury trial and 
early neutral evaluation are applied in a context that is totally different to that of the mini-
trial. The summary jury trial and early neutral evaluation are both intra-curial alternatives 
that have been designed to settle pending litigation under the auspices of the courts and 
within the ambit of court administration. The distinction between each of these methods 
of settlement relates to the timing of their application at the various stages of the process 
of litigation. Early neutral evaluation is introduced during the initial stages of the process 
of litigation, even as soon as the pleading stage;84 as its name indicates, the summary 
jury trial relates to the stage when a case is ready for trial and for its presentation to a 
jury. 85 The summary jury trial and early neutral evaluation are therefore litigation 
techniques whereas the mini-trial is essentially a business technique that addresses a 
managerial problem. 
The object of the summary jury trial is to encourage a settlement of pending litigation by 
forecasting the verdict of a civil jury. 86 The decision to adopt the summary jury trial is 
normally taken at the final pre-trial conference.87 The empanelment of advisory jurors 
84 
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signifies the commencement of the summary jury trial.88 The format of a summary jury 
trial is minutely detailed by Judge Lambros, 89 who is credited as being the person who 
originally invented this process.90 The process proper commences when the parties on 
both sides who have the authority to settle, meet in the appointed court presided over by 
a judge in the presence of a jury. Normally the judge who will try the case conducts the 
summary jury trial and, if not able to do so, may delegate this function to a magistrate. 
The presiding judge briefly explains the process and then introduces the jury. It is 
recommended that at this stage the parties should present a brief two to three minute 
overview of their cases in order to give the jury a clearer understanding of the 
presentations that follow. Thereafter, counsel for each party is allowed one hour to make 
formal presentations which normally consists of a 45-minute period for the adduction of 
evidence in chief and 15 minutes for cross-examination and re-examination. The jury is 
then excused to deliberate the matter. During its absence, the court engages the parties 
in settlement negotiations. Once the jury returns, it gives either a unanimous verdict or 
individual verdicts which in both instances are advisory. The judge and counsel then 
engage in a dialogue with the jurors regarding their perspectives on the merits of the 
case and the quality of the presentations, thereby affording the lawyers involved an 
insight into the strengths and weaknesses of their respective client's cases.91 The 
summary jury trial therefore facilitates an appraisal by counsel of the approach a jury 
would take in the actual trial and on this basis normally instigates a settlement, if not at 
the time of the summary jury trial, then normally within a few weeks thereafter.92 
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The summary jury trial is a non-binding court-mandated procedure that applies 
specifically within the United States because of its adherence to the jury system.93 This 
settlement process is therefore of little practical value within other Anglo-American 
jurisdictions that do not any longer rely on a jury in civil cases. However, in theoretical 
terms, the summary jury trial illustrates the manner in which an intra-curial hybrid has 
been devised through a combination of the elements of litigation and negotiation. What 
is surprising is that a summary jury bench has not been devised as a genus of the 
summary jury trial in those Anglo-American countries which do not provide for a civil jury 
trial. 
Early neutral evaluation is a further refinement of the summary jury trial. It is the most 
recently developed intra-curial process and therefore does not have wide-spread 
application. Originally, early neutral evaluation was developed as a pilot project of the 
district court for the Northern District of California and was eventually adopted as an 
intra-curial process.94 Once more, it is based on the negotiation/litigation combination. 
However, the purpose of early neutral evaluation differs significantly from that of the 
summary jury trial. As an intra-curial process, its purpose is to settle pending litigation 
during its early stages. Early neutral evaluation is therefore not directed at the trial stage 
but at producing a settlement during the formative stage of litigation when proper 
communication between the parties would be most beneficial in order to prevent a 
hardening of positions which normally takes place during this early stage of the process 
of litigation. 95 
Like the summary jury trial, early neutral evaluation is court-imposed process and both 
share the same processual structure. Under its inherent discretion to appoint a master, 
the court appoints a highly respected and experienced lawyer as a neutral person to 
93 
94 
95 
For Australian perspectives on the summary jury trial, see Astor and Chinkin 
Dispute Resolution 171-172; De Garis "Judicial alternative dispute resolution" 
51-66. 
See Levine "Northern district of California adopts ENE" 235-238. See also Levine 
"Early neutral evaluation" 236-240; Brazil et al "Early neutral evaluation" 279. 
Brazil et al "Early neutral evaluation" 279. 
259 
conduct the process. The process itself consists of a confidential two hour case 
evaluation which, beforehand, is preceded by written exchanges of information 
statements that state the parties' positions. The parties are represented by counsel and 
must themselves attend. Counsel for each party gives a presentation of the evidence on 
the facts and related legal arguments, without interruption. Thereafter, the evaluator 
gives a non-binding opinion that provides the basis for further negotiation. In so doing 
the evaluator may seek further information, explore the weaknesses of each party's case 
and assist the parties in reducing the issues in dispute. As a result, the parties obtain a 
clear idea of their settlement options. If a settlement is not reached, the evaluator gives a 
non-binding opinion regarding her assessment of the liability of the parties as well as the 
range of liability for damages, thus providing the groundwork for a negotiated settlement 
in the future.96 
Early neutral evaluation has a number of advantages as a pre-trial settlement process. 
Firstly, it forces the lawyers involved into a realistic analysis of the case during the early 
stages of litigation. 97 The process also opens communication between the parties and 
enables the one party to hear the other party's versions of the case.98 Through the 
intervention of the evaluator, the essential and non-essential elements of the dispute are 
determined with some precision.99 The process also provides a reality check for both 
parties that opens the way for a negotiated settlement.100 The chances for a settlement 
are enhanced by the fact that, because of their compulsory attendance, the parties are 
educated about the merits of their respective cases, the options at their disposal which 
considered cumulatively, especially in the case of an obstinate client, may dissuade 
them from taking a fixed and uncompromising position.101 
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Far too little is known about early neutral evaluation at this stage in order make any 
critical assessment. However, what is encouraging is that it emphasises the flexibility of 
the negotiation/litigation combination as a means of effecting extra-curial and intra-curial 
methods of settling litigation. 
8.3.3 The mediation/arbitration combination 
In theory, the combination of the processes of mediation and arbitration amounts to a 
contradiction in terms. Although they share the same basic principles of third-party 
intervention, each is diametrically different in its structure: mediation is a consensual 
process102 whereas arbitration is an adjudicative process.103 The distinction lies in the 
method of dispute resolution. Mediation relies on inter-party negotiations facilitated by a 
neutral third party to produce an outcome based on the mutual agreement of the 
disputants. Being an adjudicative process, arbitration applies a totally different method of 
dispute resolution. Essentially the process of arbitration uses interpretative methods to 
determine the issues in dispute that are resolved by means of a binding decision. 
Although both processes in theory occupy distinct positions on the dispute continuum, 
the demands of practice have resulted in the unlikely mix of mediation and arbitration to 
produce a process known by its abbreviated name as med/arb. 
In terms of its process, med/arb consists of two distinct stages. As its name suggests, 
med/arb commences with mediation and, if agreement is not reached, the mediation 
stage is converted into an arbitration stage.104 On the face of it, the distinction between 
these processual stages seems artificial for in any event, if the mediation fails, the next 
logical step on the dispute continuum would be to resort to arbitration. With this in mind, 
the only explanation of the processual integrity of med/arb is the expressed intention of 
the disputants that mediation and arbitration should follow as sequential and inseparable 
102 
103 
104 
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See Albertyn "Specialized arbitration and mediation" 120; Astor and Chinkin 
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stages as part of a single and independent process. This intention alone characterises 
med/arb as being a process distinct from standard mediation and arbitration. 
The combination of mediation and arbitration into a single process inevitably affects the 
quality of both processes. When the disputants enter into the mediation stage of the 
process of med/arb, they do so on the unconditional understanding that should the 
mediation fail, control of the dispute will be vested in the hands of a third party who is 
authorised to give a final and binding decision in favour of only one of the disputants. 
The disputants therefore commence the mediation stage of med/arb under threat that 
they will loose consensual control of the dispute if the mediation should reach deadlock. 
In this context, the disputants pressurise each other to reach mutual agreement as an 
alternative to an adjudicative decision that will definitely follow if their differences are not 
settled.105 Moreover, the possibility that the mediation stage might be followed by the 
arbitration stage, forces the disputants to thoroughly prepare for the mediation. In 
addition, the mediation stage leads both disputants to a better understanding of the 
strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases for the purposes of the arbitration 
that might follow.106 This in itself is an incentive to settle the dispute during the mediation 
phase. 
Med/arb also influences the quality of the process of arbitration. Usually the same 
person fulfils the dual function of mediator-arbitrator.107 Apart from the fact that this 
requires special skills, the disclosure of confidential information made during the 
mediation stage (especially during a private caucus) could influence the mediator-
arbitrator's decision when acting in an arbitral capacity.108 Although the arbitral award 
might be notionally fair, there is no guarantee that the confidential information acquired 
105 
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during the mediation stage has not influenced that decision.109 This is a particularly 
important criticism of the arbitration component of the med/arb process. 
An arbitrator is required to act in a judicial capacity. This entails a positive obligation to 
apply the natural rules of justice which could be compromised because of the arbitrator's 
direct participation during the mediation stage.110 In order to overcome this problem, it is 
possible to limit the mediational role or to exclude the arbitral function by appointing a 
different person as the arbitrator. This is not an entirely satisfactory arrangement 
because the limited mediational function could seriously affect the outcome of the 
mediation. Similarly, the arbitration stage could be influenced by the fact that a different 
arbitrator would have to be apprised anew of the relevant issues of the dispute by 
comparison to the mediator-arbitrator who would already be well informed in this 
respect. 111 Other methods of dealing with the judicial integrity of the arbitration stage are 
possible. One option is that an advisory opinion be given by the arbitrator if the 
mediation fails. 112 Another possibility is that of tripartite arbitration whereby a neutral 
arbitrator acts in conjunction with an arbitrator appointed by each of the disputants.113 
Once again, these options are not immune from criticism. An advisory opinion is a very 
weak substitute for an arbitral award114 and tripartite arbitration is a distortion of both the 
processes of mediation and arbitration.115 
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One other solution is to apply the process of arb/med which is only noted in the South 
African literature dealing with ADR.116 As its name implies, arb/med is the counterpart to 
med/arb. The ostensible difference between the two is that the processual stages are 
reversed. Arb/med commences with the arbitration stage which is directly followed by the 
mediation stage and only if the mediation fails, is the arbitral award given. A major 
disadvantage of arb/med is that the disputants must first enter into technical and often 
protracted arbitration proceedings before the mediation stage commences. Be that as it 
may, the advantage of arb/med is that it ensures the judicial integrity of the arbitration 
phase since the opportunity for the arbitrator-mediator being a party to the disclosure of 
confidential information is totally excluded. Although arb/med gives prominence to the 
rules of natural justice during the arbitration stage, the obversion of the processual 
stages changes the nature of the process. Arb/med therefore does not directly address 
the problem of the judicial integrity of the arbitration stage of med/arb because a totally 
new process is introduced to deal with the problem. 
The objections relating to the judicial integrity of the arbitration stage of the med/arb 
process, are somewhat strained. These objections reflect the stringent processual 
morality of Western systems of procedure that are preoccupied with standards for 
neutrality and impartiality which in other cultures would be regarded as being rather 
artificial.117 Certainly, traditional African processes move from mediational to arbitral 
processes, and vice versa, with alacrity. In any event, the disputants enter into the 
process of med/arb with knowledge of the risks and disadvantages involved.118 The 
possibility that the rules of natural justice might be compromised is one of the risks that 
ought to be calculated. By the same token, one of the factors in favour of med/arb that 
might outweigh the related risks is that the mediator-arbitrator could gain the confidence 
of both disputants and this could lead to a satisfactory outcome in either the mediation or 
even the arbitration stages.119 
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117 
118 
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There is the temptation to describe med/arb as a hybrid process consisting of a mix 
between mediational negotiation and interpretative adjudication. However, this 
description would not be accurate. In the final analysis, med/arb does not consist of an 
inextricable commingling of the primary elements of mediation and negotiation. 
Essentially, each process retains its own independent method of dispute resolution. Yet, 
this does not discount the fact that med/arb can still be classified as a hybrid process. 
What differentiates med/arb from the other hybrid processes described above is that it 
does not consist of a mixture of the elements of its constituent processes. Instead, 
med/arb consists of a unique blend of the functional roles of the mediator and arbitrator. 
The result alters the dynamic of both standard mediation and arbitration to form a totally 
new process with its own substantive norms and processual goals. Essentially, med/arb 
is a hybrid process based on the interplay between the functions of the neutral third 
parties involved in the primary processes of mediation and arbitration. 
8.4 The processual quality of the hybrid processes 
Conspicuous by its absence is any reference to neutral fact finding and expert appraisal. 
This omission contradicts other classifications that include these ADR mechanisms as 
hybrid processes.120 However, in this work, neutral fact finding and expert appraisal have 
been disregarded as hybrid processes on the grounds that neither of the two meet the 
required standards in this respect. 
Reduced to the most basic terms, neutral fact finding consists of the appointment of a 
neutral fact finder who is given the mandate to investigate and render an objective report 
in regard to a specific situation which relates in whole or in part to a particular dispute.121 
Expert appraisal is similar to neutral fact finding in all respects save one which is that the 
120 
121 
For instance, see the table contained in Goldberg, Sander and Rogers Dispute 
Resolution 5 attached to the end of this chapter and marked annexure A for the 
purposes of identification. 
See Bevan ADR 17; BNA Report 17; Goldberg, Sander and Rogers Dispute 
Resolution 283. 
265 
appointed expert renders an advisory opinion in regard to the subject matter of the 
investigation.122 
In the first place, it is difficult to detect which elements of the primary processes have 
been combined to construct these two ADR mechanisms. A likely mix is between t~e 
elements of arbitration and negotiation. The reasoning is that the fact finder's report or 
the expert appraiser's opinion act as a catalyst for a negotiated settlement. This 
construction is rejected. Although both neutral fact finding and expert appraisal seem 
closely related to the arbitration, neither of these two mechanisms reflect the binding and 
binary decisional qualities of the process of arbitration. It is therefore extremely artificial 
to presume the presence of the elements of arbitration. Moreover, the fact that the 
disputants inevitably attempt a negotiated settlement of the dispute once a fact finder's 
report or an appraiser's opinion has been received, does not establish that the related 
ADR mechanisms contain elements of the process of negotiation. Quite simply, neutral 
fact finding and expert appraisal are not hybrid process but rather independent ADR 
mechanisms, and no more than that. 
To take the matter further, neutral fact finding and expert appraisal even fall short of the 
standards required to be established as forms of process. In brief, these mechanisms 
have no independent processual structure that ultimately produces an outcome that 
definitively resolves a dispute. If any process is involved at all it is minimal and only of an 
elementary nature. The only processual requirements for both processes is that both 
disputants should voluntarily agree to either neutral fact finding or expert appraisal as 
methods of determining the factual issues in dispute and that the conduct of the neutrals 
so appointed should meet with the requirements of impartiality. Furthermore, the fact-
finder's report or the expert appraiser's opinion is inconclusive in the sense that it in no 
manner resolves a dispute but rather pre-empts it. A further step is necessary to effect 
the resolution of the dispute. Normally resort is made to the process of negotiation or if 
not, then to any other independent dispute resolution process. In this context, neutral 
122 See Astor and Chinkin Dispute Resolution 113-115; Singer Settling Disputes 
68-72. It is possible that the disputants might agree that the expert appraiser's 
opinion will be binding rather than non-binding. In such an instance, expert 
appraisal may regarded as a derivative of the process of arbitration. 
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fact finding and expert appraisal are adjuncts to other independent dispute resolution 
processes. Neutral fact finding and expert appraisal must therefore be classified as 
subsidiary ADR mechanisms that do not have any of the qualities of a hybrid process. 
This critical evaluation of neutral fact finding and expert appraisal is functional in that it 
indicates the standards that should be applied to determine the processual authenticity 
of a hybrid process. The processual requirements for a hybrid process may accordingly 
be enumerated as follows, namely, that a hybrid process -
(a) must consist of a combination either of the elements or functional roles of 
the neutral third parties of two or more independent informal or formal 
processes; 
(b) must have an identifiable and autonomous processual structure; and 
(c) should be capable of independently resolving a dispute. 
The absence of any one of these requirements disqualifies a purported process as being 
classified as a genuine hybrid process and relegates it to the status of an ADR 
mechanism. 
Although the hybrid processes cannot be equated with the primary processes in regard 
to their processual consistency, evaluated as a whole, they do share certain common 
characteristics. These characteristics simultaneously describe the intrinsic nature of the 
hybrid processes. In summary, the hybrid processes -
(a) privatise the settlement of a dispute, notwithstanding the fact that certain 
processes are mandatory under the rules of court; 
(b) convert adversarial dispute processing into co-operative terms that rely on 
the goodwill of the parties to effectively resolve the dispute; 
(c) transform the legal technical terms of a dispute into a problem-solving 
process that in certain instances may even be dealt with at the managerial 
level; 
( d) directly involve the disputants in the management and resolution of the 
dispute, thereby divesting legal representatives of absolute control; 
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(e) operate on the basis of third-party intervention, often even permitting the 
disputants control over the selection of the neutral third party 
(f) are expressly designed to produce a cost-effective and efficient resolution 
of dispute with the minimum delay.123 
What is evident is that these characteristics display a highly instrumentalist approach to 
disputing and dispute resolution. This in itself epitomises the rationale underlying the 
creation of hybrid processes. 
Apart from these common characteristics, the hybrid processes range from being extra-
curial to intra-curial processes, from being purely private to public processes and from 
producing non-binding to binding outcomes. Yet, in this diversity, the hybrid processes 
pose efficient and authentic alternatives to the conventional processes of the courts and 
in so doing seriously threaten their jurisdiction to be seized of all causes. As the existing 
hybrid process develop in their processual consistency and as other hybrid processes 
are designed in the interim, it is possible to speculate that these processes have the 
potential of becoming so firmly established in the future that, in conjunction with the 
primary processes, it is highly likely that a dual system of dispute resolution could be 
established. 
123 See also Green "Corporate ADR" 233. 
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PROCESSUAL PLURALISM 
9.1 The quest for processual humanism 
9.2 Propositions and principles 
9.3 ADR theory: prognosis 
9.1 The quest for processual humanism 
This thesis has been a learning experience. Many of my preconceived ideas about 
process and procedure have been set aside. Having taught Civil Procedure for the better 
part of my working life, it was quite normal for me blindly to accept the technicality and 
formality of procedure as being essential for upholding the fundamental procedural 
guarantees of litigants. Tactics, strategy and adversarial posturing were part of a "power 
game" to advance the partisan interests of a client. The object of the game was to win 
and that meant obtaining a favourable judgment. Of course, human beings were involved 
- judges, registrars, advocates, attorneys, articled clerks and even the litigants. They 
were all part of the system - part of the theory of procedure. 
The rules of court comprised the script and the actors, practitioners and litigants alike, 
had to conform to it - an austere drama, based on conflict and controversy, yet devoid of 
any sensitivity to the needs and emotions of the protagonists. Indeed, a dull drama, for 
the script always predicted the outcome of a procedural battle in which one of the 
litigants lost and both were normally bankrupted by the costs. There is always a 
catharsis but a traumatic one for the litigants. As they leave the stage, each knows that 
his or her personal needs and interests have not been conciliated. This began to prick 
my conscience a little for it became evident that "the play" is not "the thing". Process and 
procedure ought not to be regarded .as being ultimate at the expense of the needs, 
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wants and interests of litigants for to do so brands the system as being basically anti-
social. Of course this could be rationalised - civil procedure is a unitary system of 
procedure that has multiple functions within the institutionalised and authoritarian 
structure of the court system. Courts are therefore the first and only arbiters of disputes 
and civil procedure the only system for conducting a claim through its various stages. 
The anti-social nature of civil procedure began to disturb me. Surely the interests of 
litigants should supersede institutional objectives? I began to investigate this. One 
avenue was the history of Civil Procedure. There was some hope because the history of 
procedure shows a definite trend away from procedural rigidity and formality to greater 
procedural flexibility. However, history only explains but does not resolve contemporary 
problems. The next stage of enquiry began with a study of procedural reform. One 
enticing notion was that reform can be brought about by increasing judicial resources. 
Again, there was a stumbling block - the state of the ftscus does not permit such 
idealism. Procedural change can also be effected by the internal reform of the system. 
This is in accord with the historical imperative for greater procedural flexibility but this 
alone does not introduce a more humanistic ethos. There is also the possibility of 
reforming the system of procedure by manipulating jurisdictional limits or by the statutory 
exclusion of specified claims from the court system, as in the case of labour disputes that 
are regulated under the provisions of the Labour Relations Act of 1956 or the 
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act of 1993 that regulates 
compensation to workmen. Ironically, while examining the notion of diverting disputes 
from the court system, by chance I came across an obscure and rather insignificant work 
onADR. 
It took some time to digest the information. Slowly the realisation dawned on me that 
litigation is essentially a method of dispute resolution and that it is not the only method 
but one of many methods of dispute resolution. This insight was seminal. ADR cut 
across formal and institutional lines. It presented an obvious challenge to civil procedure 
and an unorthodox option for its reform. My first impulse was to reject ADR outright. 
Conventional legal training is suspicious of deformalised and decentralised methods of 
dispute resolution that deviate from the authoritarian norms and values of civil 
procedural law. Eventually, my curiosity as well as a nascent understanding that ADR 
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processes offer a humanistic alternative to public processes, prevailed. I decided to 
study ADR sceptically, with the single purpose of determining whether it is an authentic 
system of dispute resolution that is based on cogent principles with a structure of theory. 
The present thesis is the product of that decision. 
The conclusions reached in this thesis have cured my scepticism. ADR is an authentic 
system of dispute resolution that relies on a body of principles which are linked to a 
theoretical frame of reference. However, this should not be taken to mean that ADR is to 
be regarded as an independent or mature science and that it is a panacea for all the ills 
of civil procedure. As a system of dispute resolution, ADR can presently offer some 
solutions that could mitigate the rigours of adversarial litigation. What is important 
though is that ADR does have the potential for effecting systemic change to the system 
of civil procedure in the future provided that its theory and principles, which are presently 
rudimentary, are developed systematically into an independent science. 
However, if ADR is to develop into an independent science at all, an attitudinal change is 
necessary; ADR will only be understood as an independent system of dispute resolution 
if a drastic change of the legal mindset occurs. Essentially, the shift is one from a notion 
of a unitary system of procedure to a concept of a pluralistic system of process. 
Conventional assumptions concerning processual cohesiveness, unity of function and 
the certainty of a sanctioned outcome do not exist in regard to ADR. The theory and 
principles of ADR point to contrary premises. 
In its conclusions, this thesis rejects the premises of a unitary system of procedure as a 
basis for explaining the theory and principles of ADR. Instead, the notion is advanced 
that the system of ADR is founded on a theory of processual pluralism. The system of 
ADR comprises multiple informal processes. Traditional processes such as negotiation, 
mediation and· arbitration are the primary ADR processes that have generated the more 
exotic and modern processes of expedited arbitration, documentary arbitration, final-offer 
arbitration, mediation/arbitration, rent-a-judge, the mini-trial and many other processes 
that are either developing or in the making. Each process is distinct and separate, 
having its own unique form, function and method of transforming a dispute. Outwardly, 
this represents a diverse collection of disjunctive processes. Yet an introspective 
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analysis shows that there is an innate centrality that originates in core principles that 
bind individual processes to each other and to a unified body of theory. These 
foundational principles of ADR are replicated in each of its processes. The basic concept 
is therefore that of autonomous and individual systems of process that conform to a 
central body of theory and principle. 
9.2 Propositions and principles 
There is an unfortunate trend that is evident in much of the ADR literature. Many 
commentators tend to reduce the primary principles of ADR into instrumentalist 
considerations. In other words, ADR principles are used as rational guideposts for 
comparing the efficacy of various processes or for weighing up the advantages of using 
an ADR process instead of the process of litigation. The literature is replete with 
descriptions of the attributes of various ADR process. Some keywords or phrases are: 
consensual, mutual agreement, flexibility, privacy and confidentiality, disputant 
participation, control of the outcome, fairness of the outcome. Very rarely is the 
understanding shown that these purported attributes in reality constitute fundamental 
ADR principles. 
This situation arises because the same instrumentalist approach that is applied in regard 
to the process of litigation is transposed onto the system of ADR. At the root of the 
problem is the failure to recognise that the process of litigation and ADR processes are 
derived from two distinctly different systems of process. Although in practice ADR 
processes can and do compliment the process of litigation, in theory ADR is a true 
alternative to the public system of dispute resolution: ADR is a pluralistic processual 
system whereas the public system of dispute resolution is based on a unitary system of 
procedure. An inevitable dialectic is involved and until it is perceived, an instrumentalist 
approach to ADR will predominate. Throughout this thesis there are moves and shifts in 
meaning that accentuate this dialectic. Out of this dialectic certain propositions arise 
from which the primary ADR principles are extracted. 
273 
Proposition 1: ADR places emphasis on process, not on rules. 
Public process is authoritarian and institutionalised and is therefore rule directed. Rules 
external to the process itself prescribe in the minutest detail the manner in which 
procedures are to be conducted and furthermore sanction participation in the process. 
Public processes therefore have no independent existence apart from the rules that 
sustain them. 
No externally sanctioned rules are imposed on ADR processes. These processes are 
subject to their own rules - rules that are generated internally within the nature of a 
process itself.1 Because ADR processes are not bound by externally imposed rules, they 
are therefore consensual in their nature and flexible in their application. 
The consensual nature of ADR processes is expressed through the principles of 
disputant consensus, disputant autonomy and processual flexibility. ADR processes 
therefore operate on the basis of the mutual consent of the disputants, permit the 
disputants to participate in the management and control of both the conduct of a process 
and its outcome. Furthermore, the absence of externally imposed rules enables the 
disputants functionally to select or craft a process that suits their needs in relation to the 
nature of the dispute involved. Within this consensual context, ADR processes promote 
humanistic norms and values in contrast to public processes that serve a body of 
abstract rules. 
For example, the process of negotiation progresses through a number of 
definitive stages that create a processual framework within which the disputants 
bilaterally conduct the process on the basis of selected strategies. In the case of 
mediation, negotiations are conducted through the intermediary intervention of a 
mediator who, with the agreement of the disputants, sets and applies processual 
standards, while leaving the content and outcome of the dispute in the 
disputant's control. Rules are applied to the process of arbitration but these rules 
are not imposed externally for they can be traced to the consensual basis of the 
law of contact or to regulatory statutory provisions. 
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Proposition 2: ADR concentrates on a dispute and not on a claim. 
Intrinsic to its very nature, litigation eannot process a dispute. Every dispute must be 
formulated as a claim before it becomes eligible for public dispute processing. Moreover, 
the process of litigation is incapable of determining the validity of claim unless it has 
been reduced by means of a system of pleading into single issues in controversy which 
are then tested at a trial. 
Unfettered by formality and rules, ADR processes are able to absorb a dispute in its 
original form and process it according to the norms and values of the context within 
which it arose. ADR processes are capable of adapting themselves to the context of a 
dispute whereas public legal processes transform a dispute within the context of the 
legal system according to which the dispute must conform. 
ADR processes are therefore based on principles of dispute transformation and dispute 
processing that respect the integrity of a dispute as well as its context and culture. The 
context of the dispute and the culture of the disputants remain paramount and not the 
process itself. In the final analysis, ADR applies the principles of dispute transformation 
and dispute processing in such a manner that the dispute is not converted into a 
processual abstraction; instead, it deals with a dispute on the basis of humanistic 
values. 
Proposition 3: ADR relies on privatised decision making rather than on public 
adjudicative settlement. 
Courts do not solve problems. Should this happen, then problem solving is incidental to 
the judgment of a court that by precedent binds third parties. An ADR outcome has no 
such public effect. Instead, it is a private arrangement enforceable under the consensual 
principles of the law of contract. 
ADR privatises decision making in order to give effect to the mutual agreement of. the 
disputants even if, as in the case of arbitration, it is by their consent that they agree to be 
bound by a third party's decision. An outcome based on the mutual agreement of the 
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disputants is advanced as being more durable than a court's decision because, 
paradoxically, it lacks the element of coercion of a settlement dictated by a court. Mutual 
agreement is the foundation for reconciliation and the basis for a humane outcome that 
is devoid of direct sanction or the threat of executory procedures. The principle of 
privatised decision making, as idealistic as it might seem, personalises process since by 
means of joint problem solving, the disputants share responsibility for the substance of 
their dispute and the outcome of their mutual decisions. 
Proposition 4: ADR promotes functional processual goals and not institutional · 
objectives. 
Courts are primarily concerned with the enforcement of substantive legal rights that are 
interpreted in the light of public policy, boni mores, and for the good of society as a 
whole. The adjudicative and deliberative functions of the courts, as instruments of the 
judicial arm of government, therefore give . effect to institutionalised objectives in 
accordance with the governmental obligation to ensure the public ordering of society. In 
this setting, the process of litigation is the medium through which these institutional 
objectives are realised; its processes and procedures are therefore public in their nature 
and authoritarian in their premises. 
The domain of ADR is that of private dispute processing and therefore necessarily gives 
effect to personal, group or community norms and values. Consequently, the 
individualised nature of dispute processing is addressed at problem solving and not the 
maintenance of public values. Unhindered by institutional constraints, it is possible to 
differentiate functionally between the type of dispute involved, the needs of the 
disputants as well as the most appropriate process for the resolution of the dispute, even 
if this might entail the process of litigation. The concept is best represented by a 
continuum comprising multiple processes that each have a single processual function. 
ADR therefore adheres to principles that distinguish between the form and function of 
specific processes. Many of these principles apply within the internal dynamic Of specific 
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process2 while others apply generally to all ADR processes.3 As a result, because of the 
principles that relate the form of a specific process to its functional purpose, ADR 
consists of individual systems of process that operate within a· general processual 
system. 
9.3 ADR theory: prognosis 
The theory and principles of civil procedural law have been inextricably interwoven into 
the themes of this thesis. Yet, in its conclusions, the theory of ADR is distinct and 
separate from that of civil procedural law. Although borrowing does occur, the major 
conclusion reached is that private informal processes and public formal processes are 
derived from two systems of process that are antithetical to each other. Although civil 
procedural theory has been used paradigmatically as a means of understanding and 
extracting the principles of ADR, other than serving this specific purpose, it in no manner 
contributes to the theory of ADR. A definite conclusion is that a theory for ADR cannot be 
subsumed into civil procedural theory. In the final analysis, ADR is an independent 
system of dispute resolution based on its own structure of theory and principle. 
Processual pluralism is the only theory that explains the consensual principles of ADR 
as well as the cohesion between these principles and the diverse and individually 
distinct ADR processes. Without a theory structured on processual pluralism, ADR 
processes are seemingly no more than a loose collection of informal processes that are 
rationally selected on the basis of purely instrumentalist considerations of the functions 
and efficiency of each, as convenient techniques for resolving disputes privately outside 
the formal justice system. However, interpreted on the basis of the theory of processual 
pluralism, each ADR process is distinct in its form and according to its form, every 
process fulfils a specific function in regard to a particular type of dispute as it arises 
within its own context. Centralised under the unifying theory of processual pluralism, 
2 
3 
For instance, the principles of intermediary intervention apply only to the process 
of mediation; the bilateral adjustment of relationships is characteristic of 
negotiation and adjudicative problem solving is an attribute of arbitration. 
In this instance the consensual principles of ADR are brought into play eg 
disputant consensus, disputant autonomy, processual flexibility and the like. 
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ADR processes are not merely dispute resolution techniques or mechanisms applied in 
an ad hoc manner to various types of disputes but rather acquire a processual status 
based on the application of functional consensual principles. Each process is 
autonomous in its form and function yet capable of being explained and developed 
meaningfully within an independent system of theory and principle. 
Explained on the basis of the theory of processual pluralism, a distinct and definitive 
contrast is created between ADR and civil procedure as systems of dispute resolution. 
The authoritarian and unitary principles of civil procedural law support the theory that a 
one-dimensional system of procedure can fulfil multiple functions. A theory for ADR 
posits that singular functions are performed in a system of multiple processes. Despite 
the apparent dialectic, there is an intuitive understanding about the future development 
of both systems: that ADR and civil procedure share a common destiny and that the 
emergence of ADR is providential for the reform of civil procedure. 
The individualist principles and unitary procedural structure of civil procedure may be 
traced historically to their original agrarian foundations and their application in a 
homogeneous society, respectively. This accounts for many of the current problems with 
civil procedure. Irrespective of the increasing flexibility introduced by procedural reform, 
the essential unitary structure of civil procedure remains intact. Hence, reform that 
promotes access to justice in effect·still means access to a one-dimensional procedural 
structure. This conflicts with the contemporary tendency towards social pluralism. The 
emergence of ADR may therefore be interpreted as a confluence between processual 
pluralism and the phenomenon of social pluralism. 
It is believed that future civil procedural reform will inevitably have to accommodate the 
needs of a pluralistic society. The likely interaction between ADR and civil procedure 
therefore seems unavoidable. A foreseeable trend in the development of ADR is a move 
from an experimental phase during which its processes remain private and informal, to 
an institutional phase that absorbs ADR processes into the court system. The 
institutionalisation of ADR is tantamount to civil procedural reform but the mainstreaming 
of ADR into the public system of dispute resolution likewise alters the character of ADR. 
ADR processes are forced into the rigid mould of formal public processes and so too, the 
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introduction of the principles of processual pluralism drastically changes the unitary 
nature of civil procedure. 
The institutionalisation of ADR is already occurring to a greater or lesser degree in 
Anglo-American jurisdictions. The concern is for the quality of the reform that affects both 
systems of dispute resolution. Often, it is sensed that change is effected only on the 
basis of instrumentalist considerations with little understanding that two theoretically 
distinct systems of process are being interfaced. In order to understand fully the 
dimensions of the system of ADR and to enhance the quality of civil procedural reform, it 
is of extreme importance that ADR should be regarded as an independent system of 
dispute resolution, based on a theory of processual pluralism which is supported by its 
own functional processual principles. 
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